Commissioner of Provincial Police v. The King, [1941] SCR 317

Supreme Court of Canada

Commissioner of Provincial Police v. The King, [1941] S.C.R. 317

Date: 1941-04-22

Commissioner of Provincial Police (Defendant) Appellant;

and

His Majesty The King On the Prosecution of Pascal Dumont (Plaintiff) Respondent.

1941: February 6; 1941: April 22.

Present: Duff C.J. and Crocket, Davis, Kerwin and Hudson JJ.

ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL FOR BRITISH COLUMBIA

Automobile—Mandamus—Judgment for costs only against person holding automobile licenses—Power of Commissioner of Provincial Police to suspend licenses on failure to satisfy judgment—Whether such judgment within meaning of section 84 (1) of Motor Vehicle Act—Capacity in which Commissioner acts under said section—Motor Vehicle Act, R.S.B.C, 1936, c. 195, s. 84.

The respondent Dumont brought action against one Bollons for damages resulting from an automobile accident, and Bollons counterclaimed for damages in the sum of $59.35. Both claim and counter-claim

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were dismissed with costs. No damages therefore were recovered by either party. After taxation, the respondent Dumont's costs of the counterclaim being set off against Bollon's costs of the action, the result was that the respondent Dumont became liable under the judgment to pay to Bollons the balance of the costs, i.e., $466.25. This sum not having been paid within 30 days and no appeal having been taken, the Commissioner of Provincial Police suspended the respondent Dumont's driver's and owner's licenses under section 84 of the Motor-Vehicle Act. The respondent Dumont then launched mandamus proceedings directed against the Commissioner to compel him to return the said licenses. The trial judge dismissed the application; but, on appeal to the Court of Appeal, that judgment was reversed and mandamus was granted. After the judgment of the appellate court, the Commissioner of Police complied with the order and delivered up the licenses and number plates to the respondent Dumont.

Held, affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeal (55 B.C.R. 298), that the facts of this case do not bring the appellant's action, suspending the respondent's licenses, within the authority of the Commissioners under the statute. The judgment against the respondent Dumont for costs in an action brought by himself in which no amount was recovered for damages, either in respect of personal injury or in respect of damage to property and in which no claim was made against Dumont for damages in excess of $100, does not bring the power of the Commissioner under section 84 into operation.

Held, also, that, the appeal on the question of the construction of the statute being entirely without merit and owing to the acquiescence of the Commissioner in the judgment of the appellate court, this appeal had no practical object; but it may be stated that there is no doubt that the Commissioner's authority is vested in him as the agent of the statute and that mandamus would lie to compel him to perform his statutory duty; but it is unnecessary for the court to decide whether in the circumstances of this case mandamus was the proper procedure.

APPEAL from the judgment of the Court of Appeal for British Columbia[1], reversing the judgment of the trial judge, Morrison C.J.S.C., which judgment had discharged an order nisi for a mandamus to compel the Commissioner of Police to return a driver's and owner's licenses which were alleged to have been wrongly suspended in purported pursuance of section 84 of the Motor-Vehicle Act.

The material facts of the case and the questions at issue are stated in the above head-note and in the judgment now reported.

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H. Castillou for the appellant.

P. S. Marsden for the respondent.

The judgment of the Court was delivered by

THE CHIEF JUSTICE—A brief sketch of the facts leading up to this litigation is necessary. The respondent Dumont is a retail dealer in Vancouver, using in connection with his business a delivery truck, for which he had a British Columbia license. He also held a driver's license. In November, 1937, a motor vehicle driven by Dumont was in collision with a motor vehicle driven by one Bollons. Dumont instituted, subsequently, as plaintiff, an action in the Supreme Court of British Columbia against Bollons as defendant, claiming damages for personal injuries and for injury to his motor vehicle. Bollons defended the action and entered a counterclaim against Dumont for the sum of $59.35 for damages to his automobile. At the trial Dumont's claim was dismissed with costs, which were subsequently taxed at $675.45, and Bollons' counterclaim was dismissed with costs, subsequently taxed at $209.40, Dumont's costs of the counterclaim being set off against Bollons' costs of the action, in the result Dumont became liable under the judgment to pay to Bollons the balance of costs. No damages were recovered by either party.

On the first of April, 1940, the judgment for costs not being paid, the Commissioner of Provincial Police, purporting to act under section 84 (1) of the Motor-Vehicle Act, suspended the truck license mentioned above and Dumont's driver's license, and on the 2nd of April, 1940, the licenses were delivered by Dumont to the Commissioner in response to his demand. On or about the 6th day of April, 1940, Dumont consulted his solicitor, who wrote a letter to the Commissioner setting out the facts and requesting the Commissioner to rescind the purported suspension of Dumont's licenses. By letter dated April 9th, 1940, and addressed to Mr. P. S. Marsden, Dumont's solicitor, the Commissioner refused this request. Thereupon, on the 16th day of April, 1940, Dumont, through his solicitor, commenced proceedings by notice of motion for a writ of mandamus, directed to the Commissioner of Provincial Police requiring him to return to Dumont the licenses and number plates.

The learned Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of British Columbia dismissed the application for mandamus

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and on appeal this judgment was reversed and mandamus was granted. The learned judges of the Court of Appeal unanimously held that the Commissioner had no authority under subsection (1) of section 84 of the Motor-Vehicles Act, R.S.B.C., 1936, chap. 135, under which he had purported to act, to suspend the respondent's licenses. I agree with this view. The suspension of a driver's license and the owner's licenses in respect of motor vehicles may be a very serious matter and, while the legislation under consideration was enacted no doubt for cogent reasons as affecting the public interest, it must be assumed that the language which the legislature employed to express its meaning does express it; and a public official, named in such a statute as the official to exercise the authority thereby conferred, is, in exercising that authority, within the " iron framework" of the enactment to which he is professing to give effect.

As I have said, I have no doubt that the facts of the present case do not bring the Commissioner's action within the authority of the Commissioner under the statute. It is quite plain that the judgment against Dumont for costs in an action brought by himself in which no amount was recovered for damages, either in respect of personal injury or in respect of damage to property and in which no claim was made against Dumont for damages in excess of one hundred dollars, does not bring the power of the Commissioner under section 84 (1) into operation. This is so clear that, in my opinion, there is no room for argument upon it.

After the judgment of the Court of Appeal allowing the appeal, the Commissioner of Police very properly complied with the order and delivered up the licenses and number plates. The argument on behalf of the appellant in support of the Commissioner's authority being, as I have said, quite without substance, I think a reasonable interpretation of what occurred is that the Commissioner acquiesced in the judgment of the Court that the suspension was invalid and that he was not entitled to retain the licenses and number plates. From that point of view the appeal had no practical object. Even if the appellant's technical objection to the proceeding by way of mandamus had been well founded, the licenses and number plates would still remain in the hands of the respondent; the purported suspension would still remain a void act and the

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only question for discussion on the appeal would be the academic technical question with regard to the propriety of proceeding by mandamus and the question of costs.

If an application had been made to quash the appeal at the outset we should have been compelled to say that, the appeal on the question as to the effect of this statute being entirely without merit and the judgment on that point having been acquiesced in, the sub-stratum of the litigation had disappeared and the appellant could not be allowed to prosecute the appeal for the purpose of raising a technical question which had become entirely academic and the question of costs.

I do not mean to throw any doubt upon the decision of the Court of Appeal touching the technical point of procedure and I have no doubt that the Commissioner's authority is vested in him as the agent of the statute and that mandamus will lie to compel him to perform his duty. It is unnecessary to decide whether in the circumstances of this case mandamus was the proper procedure, but it must be understood that on that point we are not dissenting from the view of the Court of Appeal.

The appeal should be dismissed with costs.

Appeal dismissed with costs.

Solicitor for the appellant: H. Castillou.

Solicitor for the respondent: P. S. Marsden.