Supreme Court of Canada
Blackwell
v. Minister of National Revenue, [1951] S.C.R. 419
Date:
1950-12-28
Fred James Blackwell (Appellant) Appellant;
and
The Minister Of National Revenue (Respondent) Respondent.
1950: November 29, 30; 1950: December 28.
Present: Rinfret C.J. and Taschereau, Rand, Estey and
Cartwright JJ.
ON APPEAL FROM THE EXCHEQUER COURT OF CANADA
Revenue—Excess Profits Tax—Whether commissions paid
commercial traveller by several firms exempt—Whether such traveller carrying on
a "profession" "mainly dependent upon personal
qualifications"—The Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940, S. of C. 1940, c. 32, as
amended, ss. 2(1), 3(1) and 7(b).
[Page 420]
The Excess Profits Tax Act 1940, S. of C. 1940, c. 32,
s. 7(b) provides that the following profits shall not be liable to taxation:
"The profits of a profession carried on by an individual * * * if the
profits of the profession are dependent wholly or mainly upon his * * *
personal qualifications and if in the opinion of the Minister little or no
capital is employed; provided that this exemption shall not extend to the
profits of a commission agent or person any part of whose business consists in
the making of contracts on behalf of others * * * unless the Minister is
satisfied that such agent is virtually employed in the position of an employee
of one employer in which case the exemption shall apply and in any case the
decision of the Minister shall be final and conclusive."
The appellant, a commercial traveller, solicited orders for
several firms and was paid by each a commission based on the amount of the
orders secured by his efforts and paid for. His authority was confined to
obtaining and transmitting orders. He was a free agent who maintained no office
and employed only sufficient capital to operate a motor car and pay his
travelling expenses. His claim for exemption from excess profits taxes under s.
7(b) was disallowed by the decision of the Minister of National Revenue
and the Exchequer Court of Canada affirmed that decision.
Held: that the profits of a profession not liable to
taxation under s. 7(b) of The Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940 apply
to a profession where the profits are dependent wholly or mainly upon personal
qualifications. The finding of the Court below that the profits of the
appellant did not either wholly or mainly depend upon his personal
qualifications were supported by the evidence in the case and could not be
disturbed and for that reason alone the appeal failed.
Held: also, that as it had not been contended that the
Minister's decision, that he was not satisfied that the taxpayer was virtually
employed in the position of an employee of one employer, was arbitrarily
reached upon a wrong principle; that decision must stand.
(Decision of the Exchequer Court of Canada [1949] Ex. C.R., 391 affirmed.)
APPEAL from a judgment of Thorson J., President of the
Exchequer Court of Canada , dismissing the appeal of the appellant
from the decision of the Minister of National Revenue affirming assessments
levied upon the appellant for the years 1942, 1943 and 1944 under the
provisions of The Excess Profits Tax Act.
J. C. Osborne for the appellant.
W. R. Jackett K.C. and E. S. McLatchey for
the respondent.
[Page 421]
The judgment of the Chief Justice, Taschereau, Rand and
Estey, JJ. was delivered by:
The Chief Justice:—It
is unnecessary to recite the facts in this appeal. They are fully stated in the
judgment of the learned President of the Exchequer Court and at Bar
counsel for the appellant declared that he accepted them as stated in that
judgment.
The appellant is a commercial traveller and during the
material years he represented several mills, or business houses. He did not
make sales or contracts for the concerns for whom he acted, his authority being
confined to obtaining orders for them and transmitting such orders to them. He
assumed all expenses for the carrying out of his calling and in no year could
it be said that his commissions came from only one concern. He was free to go
and solicit orders as he saw fit for any one of the business concerns for whom
he acted. He operated from his own house and selected his own customers, his
remuneration depending on his own efforts and their results. He was not subject
to the direction or control of any one of the business houses. He was
independent of them and absolutely his own master. The learned President found
that the merchandise for which the appellant solicited orders was the most
important factor in his success.
The question is whether, under these circumstances, the
appellant was properly assessed for Excess Profits Taxes and the learned
President held that he was, on appeal from the decision of the Minister of
National Revenue.
The decision of the Minister affirmed the assessment on the
ground that "the profits of the taxpayer have been correctly assessed for
Excess Profits Tax", adding that "the Minister is not satisfied that
the taxpayer is virtually in the position of an employee of one employer and he
is therefore not exempt from tax under the proviso to paragraph (b) of
Section 7 of The Excess Profits Tax Act."
By force of Section 3 (1) of that Act, in addition to any
other tax or duty payable under any other Act, "there shall be assessed,
levied and paid a tax in accordance with the rate set out in the Third Part of
the Second Schedule to this Act, during the taxation period." By section
2(1)
[Page 422]
(g) "profits"
in the case of a taxpayer other than a corporation or joint stock company, for any taxation
period, means the income of the said taxpayer derived from carrying on
one or more businesses, as defined by section three of the Income War Tax
Act, and before any deductions are made therefrom under any other
provisions of the said Income War Tax Act.
Now, although there is no definition of the word
"business" in either the Income War Tax Act, or The Excess
Profits Tax Act, it is easy to understand the meaning of the word
"business" in the latter Act by the context of the Income War Tax
Act. Of course, the appellant cannot be considered as exercising a
"profession" within the meaning of that word in the usual language,
but he relies on the use of the word "profession" in section 7 (b)
of the Act, and he claims to be entitled to the exemption therein provided.
As it can be said that it is important to consider every word of that section
for the purpose of deciding the present appeal, the section is quoted in full:
7. The following profits shall not be liable to taxation
under this Act:
(b) the profits of a profession carried on by an individual
or by individuals in partnership if the profits of the profession are dependent
wholly or mainly upon his or their personal qualifications and if in the
opinion of the Minister little or no capital is employed: Provided that this
exemption shall not extend to the profits of a commission agent or person any
part of whose business consists in the making of contracts on behalf of others
or the giving to other persons of advice of a commercial nature in connection
with the making of contracts unless the Minister is satisfied that such agent
is virtually in the position of an employee of one employer in which case this
exemption shall apply and in any case the decision of the Minister shall be
final and conclusive.
It will be noted from the wording of that section that the
exemption applies first to a "profession" and by no means can the
appellant, in the ordinary sense, be held to exercise a "profession".
But, moreover, it is not "all professions" that can claim the
exemption. It must be a "profession" where the profits are dependent
wholly or mainly upon his personal qualifications; and the finding of the
learned President that the profits of the appellant in the present case do not
either wholly or mainly depend upon his personal qualifications but that, on
the contrary, his merchandise is the most important factor in his success,
[Page 423]
cannot be disturbed upon the evidence in the case. For that
reason alone, therefore, the appellant would fail to bring himself under the
exemption of section 7(b). Of course, in order to claim the
exemption, the appellant had first to show that his profits depended entirely,
or at least mainly, upon his personal qualifications, but the proviso in the
section must also be considered. He is not a commission agent, nor, as we have
seen, does his business consist in the making of contracts on behalf of others,
nor in the giving to other persons advice of a commercial nature in connection
with the making of contracts. In these several respects the proviso does not
apply to him.
Finally, he was not able to satisfy the Minister that he was
virtually in the position of an employee of one employer —the evidence is
decisive on the point that he is not such an employee. The decision of the
Minister states that he was "not satisfied that the taxpayer is virtually
in the position of an employee of one employer and he is therefore not exempt
from tax under the proviso to paragraph (b) of section 7 of The Excess
Profits Tax Act." On that point the section enacts:
In any case the decision of the Minister shall be final and
conclusive.
In this case, the decision of the Minister is to that
effect. Therefore, as it has not been contended that the decision of the
Minister was arbitrary and reached upon a wrong principle, it follows from all
points of view that section 7(b) does not relieve the appellant.
The appeal should be dismissed with costs.
Cartwright J.:—This
is an appeal from a judgment of the President of the Exchequer Court pronounced
on the 26th of October, 1949, affirming the decision of the Minister holding
the appellant liable to taxation under The Excess Profits Tax Act in
respect of his earnings as a commercial traveller during the years 1942, 1943
and 1944.
The following findings of fact made by the learned President
are accepted by both parties:
The appellant is a commercial traveller and resides in
London, Ontario. During the years in question he represented several mills or
business houses, nine altogether in 1942 and 1943 and eight in 1944. His
activities consisted in travelling throughout his territory with samples of the
merchandise of the business concerns he represented, calling or customers,
[Page 424]
displaying the samples and soliciting and obtaining orders
for the merchandise. When he obtained such orders he sent them to the credit
manager of the mill or business house concerned. If the order was accepted the
merchandise was shipped to the customer and thirty days after the date of such
shipment the appellant was paid a commission based on its amount. He received
no salary, wages or remuneration from any of the mills or business houses
except these commissions and if a customer did not pay for the goods the
commission that had been paid to him thereon was charged back to him. He did
not make sales or contracts for the concerns for whom he acted, his authority
being confined to obtaining orders for them and transmitting such orders to
them. He had no office or office staff and no telephone, typewriter or
stationery of his own. The samples he carried belonged to the concerns he
represented. In the course of his activities he incurred expenses for such
items as hotels and meals, baggage and sample rooms, telephone, telegrams and
tips, rail fares and excess baggage, car, gasoline, oil, etc. He did not send
in any expense accounts in respect of these items to any of his mills or business
houses or apportion them amongst them but assumed them all himself. The
particulars of his commissions with the amount received from each mill or
business house for each of the years in question appear in his income tax
returns. In no year could it be said that they came virtually from one concern.
It was admitted at the trial by counsel for the respondent
that the appellant employed capital only to the extent sufficient to maintain a
car and to pay his expenses on the road. One further finding of fact made by
the learned President is as follows:
The appellant has not shown that his profits, even if it
were conceded that they are those of a profession, depended wholly or mainly
upon his personal qualifications. When he was asked what his success as a
commercial traveller depended upon he mentioned his personality, his ability to
show his merchandise to the best advantage, his health and his experience but
on cross-examination he stated that his merchandise was the most important
factor in his success.
In my view this finding is supported by the evidence.
The main grounds relied upon in support of the appeal were,
first, that the appellant's earnings were not "profits" within the
meaning of the charging provisions of The Excess Profits Tax Act and
secondly, that even if such earnings fell prima facie within the terms
of such charging provisions they were exempt under the terms of section 7(b)
of the Act.
It was submitted by counsel for the respondent that on the
pleadings the first point was not open but I think it desirable to deal with
the appeal on the assumption, but without deciding, that the point is properly
before us.
[Page 425]
By section 3 of The Excess Profits Tax Act the tax
claimed is levied upon the profits of every person residing or ordinarily
resident in Canada or who is carrying on business in Canada. The relevant
definition of "profits" is contained in section 2(g):
(g) "Profits" in the case of a
taxpayer other than a corporation or joint stock company, for any taxation
period, means the income of the said taxpayer derived from carrying on one or
more businesses, as defined by section three of the Income War Tax Act, and
before any deductions are made therefrom under any other provisions of the said
Income War Tax Act;
The relevant words of section 3 of the Income War Tax Act
are as follows:
3. (1) For the purposes of this Act, "income"
means the annual net profit or gain or gratuity, whether ascertained and
capable of computation as being wages, salary, or other fixed amount, or
unascertained as being fees or emoluments, or as being profits from a trade or
commercial or financial or other business or calling, directly or indirectly
received by a person from any office or employment, or from any profession or
calling, or from any trade, manufacture or business, as the case may be whether
derived from sources within Canada or elsewhere; and shall include the
interest, dividends or profits directly or indirectly received from money at
interest upon any security or without security, or from stocks, or from any
other investment, and, whether such gains or profits are divided or distributed
or not, and also the annual profit or gain from any other source including * *
*
It is suggested that section 3 of the Income War Tax Act divides
all earned income into three classes according to whether it is received from
(i) any office or employment or (ii) any profession or calling or (iii) any
trade, manufacture or business, and that the words in section 2(g) of The
Excess Profits Tax Act "Income derived from carrying on one or more
businesses" refer to income received from source (iii) to the exclusion of
that received from sources (i) and (ii); and that the income earned by a
commercial traveller is more aptly described as being derived from a "calling"
than from a "business". It is suggested that the words in section 3
of the Income War Tax Act "profits from a trade, or commercial or
financial or other business or calling" also show that the word
"business" is used in contradistinction from the word "calling".
It seems to me from reading the last mentioned section as a whole that the
purpose of Parliament was not to subdivide earned income into classes according
to its source but rather to use words which would embrace earned income from
every
[Page 426]
source. I do not think that the words
"business" or "calling" are used in the section as terms of
art intended to define mutually exclusive categories of sources of income but
in the popular and ordinary sense and, so used, I think that the words
"profits derived from a commercial or financial or other business"
are wide enough to include the earnings of a commercial traveller.
It was further argued in support of the first ground of
appeal that when The Excess Profits Tax Act is read as a whole it
appears that the intention of Parliament was to tax only such persons as employ
capital in their businesses and that the whole scheme of the Act contemplates
the taxation of abnormal return on capital received during the life of the Act.
It appears to me that the words of the charging section are too wide to permit
so restricted an application. If the matter were doubtful, a consideration of
the words of section 7(b) would seem to indicate that the fact that little or
no capital is employed by a person is not alone sufficient to create an
exemption from taxation under the Act.
In my view the earnings of the appellant fall within the
terms of the charging provisions and are liable to tax unless specially
exempted.
It now becomes necessary to examine the second main ground
of appeal, that the appellant is entitled to exemption under the terms of
section 7(b) reading as follows:
7. The following profits shall not be liable to taxation
under this Act:
(b) the profits of a profession carried on by
an individual or by individuals in partnership if the profits of the profession
are dependent wholly or mainly upon his or their personal qualifications and if
in the opinion of the Minister little or no capital is employed: Provided that
this exemption shall not extend to the profits of a commission agent or person
any part of whose business consists in the making of contracts on behalf of
others or the giving to other persons of advice of a commercial nature in
connection with the making of contracts unless the Minister is satisfied that
such agent is virtually in the position of an employee of one employer in which
case this exemption shall apply and in any case the decision of the Minister
shall be final and conclusive * * *
Assuming, without deciding, that the appellant's occupation
falls within the meaning of the word "profession" as used in this
clause, and without passing upon the submission of counsel for the respondent
that the opinion of
[Page 427]
the Minister that little or no capital is employed has not
been obtained, I think that this argument cannot prevail. It is a condition of
the operation of the exemption that the profits of the person claiming it be
dependent wholly or mainly upon his personal qualifications. On this question
of fact the learned President has found against the appellant and, as stated
above, I think this finding is supported by the evidence. I therefore do not
find it necessary to consider the proviso to the clause.
I would dismiss the appeal with costs.
Appeal dismissed with costs.
Solicitors for the appellant: Raymond, Spencer,
Law & Maclnnes.
Solicitor for the respondent: R. S.
W. Fordham.