Supreme Court of Canada
Kerr v. Cummings, [1953] 1 S.C.R.
147
Date: 1953-01-27
Charles Kerr
(Plaintiff) Appellant;
and
Alexander
Cummings (Defendant) Respondent.
1952: October 29; 1953:
January 27.
Present: Kerwin, Estey,
Locke, Cartwright and Fauteux JJ.
ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF
APPEAL FOR BRITISH COLUMBIA
Automobile—Negligence—Injury
to gratuitous passenger—"Gross Negligence"—Proof of—Res ipsa loquitur—Motor
Vehicles Act, R.S.B.C. 1948, c. 227, s. 82.
By section 82 of the British Columbia Motor Vehicles Act, R.S.B.C. 1948, c. 227, no action lies by a
gratuitous passenger in a motor vehicle for injury sustained by him by reason
of the operation of such vehicle unless there was gross negligence on the part
of the driver that contributed to the injury.
Held: (1) it is not necessary that such gross negligence
be proven conclusively as if there were a prosecution for criminal negligence;
(2) very great negligence on the part of the driver must be shown (Studer
v. Cowper [1951] S.C.R. 450), and it was impossible to say in the
present case that the mere happening of the occurrence gave rise to a
presumption that it had been caused by very great negligence.
APPEAL from the judgment of
the Court of Appeal for British Columbia , affirming, O'Halloran J.A. dissenting, the
dismissal of an action for injuries suffered by the appellant as gratuitous
passenger in an automobile.
Alfred Bull Q.C. for the
appellant.
Douglas McK. Brown for the
respondent.
The judgment of the Court was
delivered by
KERWIN J.:—The appellant was a
gratuitous passenger in an automobile owned by the respondent and driven by one
Brentzen from Nanaimo northerly towards Port Alberni in the province of British
Columbia. About fifteen miles from Nanaimo the
car rammed a concrete abutment of a highway bridge on the west side of the
road. Brentzen and another passenger were killed while a third passenger was so
badly injured that he remembers nothing of the accident. The appellant had
fallen asleep when the car was about seven miles out of Nanaimo and
he does not know what happened. He was seriously injured and brought the
present action to recover damages for such injuries. By virtue of section 81 of
the British Columbia Motor Vehicles
[Page 148]
Act, R.S.B.C. 1948, chapter 227, the respondent is liable
for such damages if it can be shown that Brentzen was grossly negligent as
provided by section 82 of the Act :—
82. No action shall lie
against either the owner or the driver of a motor vehicle… by a person who is
carried as a passenger… for any injury, loss or damage sustained by such
person, or for the death of such person by reason of the operation of that
motor vehicle… while such person is a passenger… unless there has been gross
negligence on the part of the driver of the vehicle and unless such gross
negligence contributed to the injury, loss or damage in respect of which the
action is brought…
The trial judge and the majority
of the Court of Appeal decided
that the appellant had failed to show such gross negligence. I can find nothing
to suggest, as is intimated in the reasons of the dissenting judge in the Court
of Appeal, that the case proceeded on the basis that gross negligence is not
shown unless it is proven conclusively as if it were a prosecution for criminal
negligence in a criminal Court and, in any event, I do not proceed on any such
basis. This, of course, is a civil case but it is one where something more than
negligence must appear. As was held by this Court in Studer v. Cowper,
this means there must have been very great negligence. Without referring to any
of the decisions where the maxim res ipsa was applied in cases of claims
for damages caused by the operation of a motor car, it is impossible, in my
view, to say that the mere happening of the occurrence in the present case
gives rise to a presumption that it was caused by very great negligence on the
part of Brentzen.
It was argued that the proper
inferences from the evidence are that he had no sleep the night before, and
that starting out from Nanaimo about seven o'clock in the morning of a November
day he had fallen asleep at the wheel. I cannot read the evidence as indicating
either of these things, which in my view are mere suppositions. It is further
said that the marks on the left shoulder of the road indicate that the automobile
must have been driven from the right to the left side of the centrally paved
portion of the highway, because there are tire marks showing that for 66 feet
the car proceeded along the shoulder and into the concrete abutment. However,
these circumstances do not indicate what caused the auto to go from the right
to
[Page 149]
the left side of the road. There
was a governor on the car which precluded a speed exceeding forty miles per
hour. We know nothing of what the actual speed was but, even if it were much
lower than that permitted, it would not take long to cover the 66 feet.
The appeal should be dismissed
with costs.
Appeal dismissed with
costs.
Solicitors for the
appellant: Bull, Houser, Tupper, Ray, Guy & Merritt.
Solicitor for the respondent:
A. E. Branca.