Supreme Court of Canada
Rathie v. Montreal Trust Co., [1953]
2 S.C.R. 204
Date: 1953-10-06
W. G. Rathie
(Plaintiff) Appellant;
and
Montreal
Trust Company and British
Columbia Pulp and
Paper Co. Ltd. (Defendants) Respondents;
and
The Attorney
General of Canada, Chartered Trust Company, and W. H. Powell Intervenants.
1953: May 12, 13, 14; 1953: October
6.
Present: Kerwin, Taschereau,
Rand, Kellock, Locke, Cartwright and Fauteux JJ.
ON APPEAL FROM THE BRITISH COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEAL
Companies—Offer by company to
buy shares of another—Period offer to be open for acceptance under The
Companies Act (Can.)—Compliance with terms of s. 124 (1) prerequisite to
obtaining court order compelling acceptance—The Companies Act, 1934 (Can.) c. 33,
s. 124 (1).
S. 124 (1) of The Companies Act, 1934 (Can.) c. 33, provides
that where when any contract involving the transfer of shares in one company
has within four months after the making of the offer been approved by the
holders of not less than nine-tenths of the shares affected, the transferee
company may, at any time within two months after the expiration of the said
four months give notice in such manner as may be prescribed by the court, to
any dissenting shareholder that it desires to acquire his shares, and where
such notice is given the transferee shall, unless on an application made by the
dissenting shareholder within one month from the date on which the notice was
given the court thinks fit to order otherwise, be entitled and bound to acquire
those shares on the terms on which, under the contract, the shares of the
approving shareholders are to be transferred to the company.
The respondent Trust company, acting on behalf of an
undisclosed principal, on Dec. 1, 1950, made an offer to the shareholder of the
common stock of the respondent pulp and paper company to purchase their shares
at $200 per share, subject to the offer being accepted by Dec. 15, 1950 by the
holders of not less than 90 per cent of the shares. It further provided that it
should not be bound to accept or pay for any shares not deposited with it by
that date. The holders of more than the required percentage accepted and
complied with the terms of the offer, but the appellant did not, nor did the
intervenants. On April 15, 1951 upon application of the respondents, Coady J.
made an order under s. 124 (1) of the Act authorizing the Trust company to
notify the shareholders who had not accepted the offer that it desired to
acquire their shares under its terms and that, unless upon an application made
by any of them within one month from the date upon which notice was given them
the court should otherwise order, the Trust company would be entitled to
acquire their shares on such terms. The appellant then brought action naming
the respondents
[Page 205]
as defendants, claiming a declaration that the Trust company
was neither entitled nor bound to purchase his shares, nor the plaintiff bound
to sell or transfer them to it, and that s. 124 was ultra vires, and
alternatively that its provisions did not apply to the plaintiffs' shares. He
also moved for an order setting aside the ex parte order made by Coady J. The
latter dismissed the action and the motion. An appeal to the Court of Appeal
for British Columbia was also dismissed.
Held: That the language of s. 124 (1) of The Companies
Act contemplates that the offer shall be open for acceptance for a period of
four months after its making by those to whom it is made. Where the offer, as
in this case, does not comply with the terms of the subsection, the offeror is
not entitled to invoke the assistance of the court to compel the dissentients
to transfer their shares.
Judgment of the Court of Appeal for British Columbia (1952) 6
W.W.R. (N.S.) 652, reversed.
APPEAL from the judgment of
the Court of Appeal for British Columbia ,
affirming the judgment of the trial judge, Coady J. ,
who dismissed the appellant's (plaintiff's) action. By orders of various judges
in chamber, the Attorney General for Canada, Chartered Trust Co., and W. W.
Powell were permitted to intervene.
M. M. Grosman, Q.C. and C.
F. Scott for appellant.
A. S. Gregory for the
respondents.
F. P. Varcoe, Q.C. and K.
E. Eaton for the Attorney General of Canada, intervenant.
Terence Sheard, Q.C. for
the Chartered Trust Co., intervenant.
W. H. Powell, intervenant, in
person.
The judgment of Kerwin, Kellock,
Locke, Cartwright and Fauteux, JJ. was delivered by:
LOCKE J.:—This is an appeal from
a judgment of the Court of Appeal of British
Columbia, by which the appeal of the
present appellant from a judgment of Coady, J. in the action brought by the
appellant under the provisions of s. 124 of the Dominion Companies Act was
dismissed. As it was contended both in the action and upon the motion that the
section was ultra vires the Parliament of Canada, the Attorney-General of
Canada intervened in the proceedings in this Court. Mr. W. H. Powell, a holder
of common
[Page 206]
shares in the British Columbia
Pulp and Paper Company Limited, and the Chartered Trust Company as trustee of
the property of W. F. Bald, deceased, were by orders of this Court permitted to
intervene.
The British Columbia Pulp and
Paper Company Limited was incorporated by letters patent under the Companies
Act of Canada on December 24, 1925, and has since that time carried on
extensive operations in the production of pulp and and allied products in the
Province of British Columbia. Its head office is at the City of Vancouver.
On December 1, 1950, the
authorised capital of the company was 150,000 shares of common stock without
nominal par value and 10,000 shares of redeemable preference stock of the par
value of $100 each. Prior to December 1,
1950, 100,000 of the common shares had
been issued and were in the hands of 243 shareholders. On that date, Montreal
Trust Company addressed to each of these shareholders an offer to purchase
their shares which read as follows:—
MONTREAL TRUST COMPANY
Executors and Trustees
15 King Street West,
Toronto 1, Ont.
December 1, 1950.
TO THE HOLDERS OF COMMON
SHARES OF BRITISH COLUMBIA PULP & PAPER COMPANY, LIMITED:
Montreal Trust Company
(hereinafter called the "Trust Company") hereby offers to purchase at
$200 cash per share flat, Canadian funds, less transfer taxes, all the
outstanding common shares (hereinafter called the "shares") in the
capital stock of British Columbia Pulp & Paper Company, Limited, a company
incorporated under the laws of Canada (hereinafter called the
"company").
This offer is subject to the
following conditions:
1. That it shall have been
accepted on or before December 15, 1950 in the manner hereinafter provided by the holders of
not less than ninety per cent (90%) of the shares.
2. That acceptance of this
offer can be made by you only by depositing with any office of the Trust
Company in Canada your certificate or certificates for shares duly endorsed in
blank for transfer with signature guaranteed by a bank or trust company or a
member of a recognized stock exchange together with a letter of transmittal in
the form enclosed duly completed and singed. The conditions of this paragraph 2
may be waived in whole or in part by the Trust Company.
Upon acceptance of this
offer within the time aforesaid by the holders of not less than ninety per cent
(90%) of the shares, the Trust Company will forthwith make payment for such
shares. Failing acceptance of this
[Page 207]
offer within the time
aforesaid by the holders of not less than ninety per cent (90%) of the shares,
the shares certificates deposited will thereupon be returned by teh Trust
Company to the persons depositing the same. The Trust Company may, but shall
not be bound to accept deposit of or to pay for any shares not deposited on or
before December 15, 1950. All payments for the shares shall be made by cheque
negotiable without charge at all Canadian Branches of The Royal Bank of Canada.
Shareholders who wish to
forwared their certificates by mail are advised to use registered post for
their protection.
The Canadian Foreign
Exchanges Control Board has approved of the making of this offer. It is
understood, however, that shareholders who are resident in the United States
dollar area countries and who wish to accept this offer by depositing their
shares in accordance with its terms will be required to re-invest the purchase
price payable hereunder in appropriate Canadian domestic securities.
Yours very truly,
MONTREAL TRUST COMPANY.
It was found as a fact by the
learned trial Judge that on or before December 15, 1950, the holders of more than 90 per cent of these shares accepted the
offer.
S. 124 of The Companies Act,
1934, reads as follows:—
124. (1) Where any contract
involving the transfer of shares or any class of shares in a company (in this
section referred to as "the transferor company") to any other company
(in this section referred to as "the transferee company") has, within
four months after the making of the offer in that behalf by the transferee
company, been approved by the holders of not less than nine-tenths of the
shares affected, or not less than nine-tenths of each class of shares affected
if more than one class of shares is affected, the transferee company may, at
any time within two months after the expiration of the said four months, give
notice, in such manner as may be prescribed by the court in the province in
which the head office of the transferor company is situate, to any dissenting shareholder
that it desires to acquire his shares, and where such notice is given the
transferee company shall, unless on an application made by the dissenting
shareholder within one month from the date on which the notice was given the
court thinks fit to order otherwise, be entitled and bound to acquire those
shares on the terms on which, under the contract, the shares of the approving
shareholders are to be transferred to the transferee company.
Provided that, where any
contract has been so approved at any time before the coming into force of this
Act, the court may by order, on an application made to it by the transferee
company within two months after the coming into force of this Act, authorize
notice to be given under this section at any time within fourteen days after
the making of the order, and this section shall apply accordingly, except that
the terms on which the shares of the dissenting shareholder are to be acquired
shall be on such terms as the court may by order direct, instead of the terms provided
by the contract. The terms substituted by order of the court as aforesaid shall
not be such as to deprive the dissenting shareholder, without his consent, of
the right to receive any dividends declared and unpaid on his shares or any
unpaid cumulative preferential dividend on those shares whether declared or not
accrued or accruing up to the date of the
[Page 208]
acquisition of those shares
by the transferee company, but any provision made for the preservation of such
right shall be taken into account in determining such substituted terms.
(2) Where a notice has been
so given and the court has not ordered to the contrary, the transferee company
shall, on the expiration of one month from the date on which the notice was
given, or, if an application to the court by the dissenting shareholder is then
pending, after the application has been disposed of transmit a copy of the
notice to the transferor company and pay or transfer to the transferor company
the amount or other consideration representing the price payable by the
transferee company for the shares which by virtue of this section it is
entitled to acquire, and the transferor company shall thereupon register the
transferee company as the holder of those shares.
(3) Any sums so received by
the transferor company shall be paid into a separate bank account in a
chartered bank in Canada and such sums and any other consideration so received
shall be held by the transferor company in trust for the several persons
entitled to the shares in respect of which the said sums or other consideration
were respectively received.
(4) In this section the
expression "contract" includes an offer of exchange and any plan or
arrangement, whether contained in or evidenced by one or more documents,
whereby or pursuant to which the transferee company has become or may become
entitled or bound absolutely or conditionally to acquire all the shares in the
transferor company of any one or more classes of shareholders who accept or
have accepted the offer or who assent to or have assented to the plan or
arrangement; and the expression "dissenting shareholder" includes a
shareholder who has not accepted the offer or assented to the plan or
arrangement and any shareholder who has failed or refused to transfer his
shares to the transferee company in accordance with the contract.
The appellant had become the
registered owner of 25 of the common shares on November 30, 1950, and did not
accept the offer and it was not accepted by the intervenants Powell and the
Chartered Trust Company. On April 5, 1951,
upon the application of Montreal Trust Company and British Columbia Pulp and
Paper Company Limited, Coady, J., acting under the provisions of s-s. 1 of s.
124, made an order authorising the Trust Company to give notice to such of the
holders of the common shares who had not accepted the offer, advising them that
it desired to acquire the shares on the terms of the offer and settling the
form of the written notice to be given. It was a term of the order that unless,
upon an application made to the Court by any of these shareholders within one
month from the date upon which notice was given to him as directed, the Court
should otherwise order, the Montreal Trust Company should be entitled and bound
to acquire the said shares on the terms of the offer and should pay to the
[Page 209]
British Columbia Pulp and Paper
Company Limited, or the several persons entitled thereto, the money
representing the price payable for the shares in accordance with those terms.
On May 2, 1951, the appellant
issued a writ in which the Trust Company and the Paper Company were named as
defendants, the endorsement claiming, inter alia, a declaration that the
Trust Company was neither entitled nor bound to purchase the shares of the
appellant and that the plaintiff was not bound to sell or transfer them to the
Trust Company, for a declaration that s. 124 of the Companies Act was ultra
vires the Parliament of Canada, and alternatively, a declaration that the
provisions of the section did not apply to the shares owned by the plaintiff.
The appellant obtained special leave to serve with the writ a notice of a
motion to be made on June 5, 1951, for judgment in the terms of the endorsement.
Notice of this motion was given to the Attorneys-General of Canada and of
the Province of British Columbia. In addition, the appellant gave
notice of a further motion in the original proceedings for an order setting
aside the ex parte order made by Coady, J. on April 5 on the grounds, inter
alia, that s. 124 was ultra vires and that there had been no jurisdiction
to make the order and notice of this application was also given to the
Attorneys-General. These applications came on for hearing together. Neither of
the Attorneys-General were represented. Coady, J. dismissed the action and the
motion.
The first matter to be considered
is as to whether the proceedings taken by the Montreal Trust Company were in
accordance with the provisions of s. 124. In a matter involving what amounts to
a forced sale of the shares of the dissentients, there must clearly be strict
compliance with the terms of the section. S. 124 first appeared in the Dominion
Companies Act 1934. Other than that part of s-s. 4 which defines certain of the
meanings to be attributed to the word "contract" in s-s. 1, the
section was taken almost verbatim from s. 50 of the Companies Act 1928 (Imp.)
which amended in this respect the Companies (Consolidation) Act 1908. That
section was carried into the Companies Act of 1929 as s. 155 and, with certain
amendments and additions, is now s. 209 of the Companies Act, 1948.
[Page 210]
The offer of the Montreal Trust
Company, it is to be noted, was made subject to the condition that it should be
accepted in the manner specified on or before a date fourteen days after the
date of the offer by the holders of not less than 90 per cent of the shares. As
to those who did not accept within that time, the offer read:—
The Trust Company may, but
shall not be bound, to accept deposit of or to pay for any shares not deposited
on or before December 15, 1950.
The appellant contends that such
an offer is not within the terms of the section. For the respondents it is said
that, since it was shown that within two weeks it was accepted by the holders
of more than 90 per cent of the shares, they are entitled to invoke the
provisions of the first paragraph of s-s. 1 for the compulsory acquisition of
the shares of those who did not accept the offer. The point was carefully
considered by Mr. Justice Coady, who was of the opinion that an offer open only
for this limited period complied with the requirements of the section. With
great respect, I am unable to agree. The Trust Company's offer was open for
acceptance for a period of two weeks only: for the remainder of the four month
period after the making of the offer the company might, at its option, decline
to purchase the shares of any of those who had not accepted on or before December 15, 1950.
In my opinion, the language of s-s. 1:—
Where any contract involving
the transfer of shares or any class of shares in a company… to any other
company… has, within four months after the making of the offer in that behalf
by the transferee company, been approved by the holders of not less than nine-tenths
of the shares affected…
contemplates that the offer shall
be open for acceptance for the period of four months by those to whom it has
been made. The procedure authorised by the first paragraph of s-s. 1 enables
the transferee company, if the offer is not accepted, to apply to the Court for
an order that the dissenting shareholders transfer the shares on the terms of
the offer. The intention of Parliament in providing that such an application
could not be made until four months after the making of the offer was, in my
opinion, to enable the shareholders to make such investigation as they might
think advisable to enable them to determine whether the offer was fair and one
that they wished to accept. I cannot think
[Page 211]
that it was contemplated that the
offeror might limit the period within which the offeree might make these
inquiries in such manner as might suit his own convenience. If the time for
acceptance might be limited to two weeks, it might, of course, be limited to a
much shorter period and afford the shareholders a wholly inadequate opportunity
to make such inquiries as they saw fit to make before deciding upon the
acceptance or rejection of the offer.
As, in my opinion, the offer made
did not comply with the terms of the subsection, the respondents were not
entitled to invoke the assistance of the Court to compel the dissentients to
transfer their shares.
I express no opinion as to any of
the other questions which were so fully argued before us.
I would allow this appeal with
costs throughout and set aside the judgments of the Court of Appeal and of the
learned trial Judge and direct that judgment be entered in the action granting
the relief claimed in Paragraph (e) of the endorsement on the writ. No
order upon the substantive motion should be made.
I would make no order as to the
costs of the intervenants.
The judgment of Taschereau and
Rand, JJ. was delivered by:—
RAND J.:—In this appeal both the
interpretation and the constitutional validity of s. 124 of the Dominion
Companies Act have been raised: but the view at which I have arrived on the
former dispenses with a consideration of the latter.
The section reads:—
Where any contract involving
the transfer of shares or any class of shares in a company …to any other
company… has within four months after the making of the offer in that behalf…
been approved by the holders of not less than nine-tenths of the shares
affected… the transferee company may, at any time within two months after the
expiration of the four months, give notice… to any dissenting shareholder that
it desires to acquire his shares, and where such notice is given the transferee
company shall, unless on an application made by the dissenting shareholder
within one month from the date on which the notice was given the court thinks
fit to order otherwise, be entitled and bound to acquire those shares on the
terms on which, under the contract, the shares of the approving shareholders
are to be transferred to the transferee company.
[Page 212]
If no application is made by the
dissenting shareholder, the transferee company, on transmitting to the
transferor company a copy of the notice and paying or transferring the amount
of money or other consideration to be given for the shares, is entitled to have
them registered in its name. Provision is made for placing sums so received
into a separate bank account to be held in trust for the persons entitled. The
word "contract" is defined to include an
offer of exchange and any
plan or arrangement… pursuant to which the transferee company has become or may
become entitled or bound absolutely or conditionally to acquire all the shares
in the transferor company of any one or more classes of shareholders who accept
or have accepted the offer or who assent or have assented to the plan or
arrangement; and "dissenting shareholder" includes one who has not
accepted the offer or assented to the plan or arrangement as well as one who
has failed or refused to transfer his shares to the transferee company in
accordance with the contract.
The language of this section,
which appears within a fasciculus headed, "Arrangements and
Compromises", may have been clear to the draftsman, but I confess that it
presents to me many difficulties of construction. What, for instance, does the
word "contract", even including an "offer of exchange and any
plan or arrangement", mean? With whom is the contract made? Certainly not
with the shareholders; both the singular number and the fact that their
individual acceptances would be necessary exclude that; and I doubt that the
word "exchange", although in one sense including purchase, is an
exemplary use of language. Then the contract, within four months after the
"making of the offer", is to be "approved". If the offer is
to be made direct to the shareholders, it is quite impossible to say that in
the ordinary case it could be made on a particular day from which the four
months would be computed; and the word "approved" is quite out of
place if used in relation to such an offer. By s-s. (2), the transferor company
is to change the register upon receipt of a copy of a notice sent out to the
dissenting shareholder, which would be an extraordinary mode of dealing with
registered titles were that copy the only matter of record before the
transferor company.
In view of these difficulties, I
am bound to interpret the section as contemplating, in the practical working
out of a business scheme, an offer or plan or arrangement submitted by the
proposed transferee to the transferor company and
[Page 213]
by the latter to its shareholders
for approval. That was the course pursued in In re Evertite Locknuts Ld.
;
and In re Press Caps Ld. , the
proposal was accompanied by a letter from the directors to the shareholders
recommending acceptance. In that way the date of the "making of the
offer" is fixed by its delivery to the transferor company; meaning is
given to the word "approved"; and the notice to the dissenting
shareholder as received by the transferor takes its place in the records of
that company as arising out of the proposal already received.
The proposal must also remain
open for approval by any shareholder for the four months mentioned, otherwise
the postponement of the right to proceed by notice against the dissenting
shareholder until after the expiration of that period would scarcely make
sense. I should say, too, that every shareholder who approved the proposal
would be entitled to compel the transferee to purchase his shares, but there
seems to be no obligation to acquire shares of dissenting shareholders.
This comparatively new power by
which a majority may coerce a minority is one to be exercised in good faith and
with the controlling facts available to shareholders to enable them to come to
a decision one way or the other. In most, at least, of the cases which have
reached the courts in England, the circumstances showed a straightforward
transaction with its business considerations made evident to the shareholders.
The analogy which obviously suggests itself is that of the sale of a company's
undertaking. Such a power has long been accorded companies, and the equivalent
transfer by way of share acquisition presents no greater objection in principle
except in relation to individual shareholders. One can easily imagine resort to
s. 124 for a purely arbitrary acquisition of shares of a small interest by a
larger one, but I cannot think the provision was introduced for any such a
purpose; and it is significant that it is to a company and not an individual
that the power is given.
The proposal here was made
without reference either to s. 124 or to the Act or to the transferor company:
it was made direct by the transferee to the shareholders; there
[Page 214]
was therefore nothing to indicate
that those who disregarded the offer might be exposed to a compulsory divesting
of their property. Its offer to buy was one that could have been made at any
time regardless of the statute. Dated December 1, 1950, instead of being open
to the shareholders for approval for the period of four months, it was to be
accepted on or before December 15, 1950 by the holders of not less than 90 per
cent of the shares or it would lapse; and to put that beyond doubt, the
proposal added that in relation to any acceptances received after December 15
the company reserved the right to reject them. The date of the offer is assumed
to be December 1, but obviously that cannot be the time of its receipt by those
to whom it was addressed: the list of shareholders shows that three were
residents of the sterling area, nine of the United States, and the remainder of
Canada, and certainly the mailing date cannot be taken to be the date of an
offer to all. The applicant has, rather, proceeded on the view that all that
was necessary for the giving of notice was the ownership of the required
percentage of the shares.
There is also the point raised by
Mr. Sheard that the proposal was made by a trust company and we are asked, in
view of the nature of the company, to draw the inference that it was acting for
an undisclosed principal. It was pointed out that of the 100,000 shares issued,
79,161 were owned by five of a total of 244 shareholders. Nothing is indicated
of the interest of these persons in the trust or other purchasing company, and
it is difficult to say that that fact could not, in the situation here, be a
material consideration. That the shareholders are entitled to know the company
which in reality is proposing to buy or exchange appears to me to be undoubted.
In the present circumstances, however, I do not treat this feature as material
to the determination of the appeal and it is unnecessary to examine it further.
The question, then, is whether
the failure to conform with the procedure envisaged by the section,
notwithstanding that the trust company has acquired over 90 per cent of the
shares, is fatal to its claim to the benefit of the coercive effect of the
section. Is the mere fact of possessing the required percentage sufficient to
justify, in this case, such a departure from the procedural requirements?
[Page 215]
In my opinion, that procedure
cannot be disregarded or modified because of the special circumstances of a
proposal. The language contemplates various forms of schemes or arrangements,
and we have before us the simplest of them; but I can see no reason why a
departure in this case would not justify a like departure in any case. Here is
the exercise of a power by which an individual's property may be taken from
him, possibly by a fellow shareholder and a more complete negation of the terms
upon which originally, at least, individuals entered into the association of
company membership can hardly be imagined. Since the applicant specifically
intimated that the acquisition of all the shares was not vital to its proposal,
it cannot be taken that shares now outstanding can, in the slightest manner,
affect the exercise of the substantial control that was sought. If the property
of the minority shareholder is to be taken from him without his consent, then
on a principle as old as the common law, the steps prescribed must be strictly
followed. As that has not been done here, the applicant has not brought itself
within the conditions necessary to the exercise of the compulsory power of
acquisition.
I would, therefore, allow the
appeal and direct an order that the applicant is not entitled to acquire the
shares of the appellant. The latter will have his costs throughout.
There will be no costs to the
intervenants.
Appeal allowed with
costs to appellant throughout. No costs to or against the intervenants.
Solicitors for the
appellant: Grossman & Sharp.
Solicitor for the
respondents: A. S. Gregory.
Solicitor for the
intervenant, Chartered Trust Co: Johnston, Sheard & Johnston.
Solicitor for the
intervenant, W. H. Powell: W. H. Powell: in person.