Turgeon v. St. Charles, (1913) 48 SCR 473

Supreme Court of Canada

Turgeon v. St. Charles, (1913) 48 S.C.R. 473

Date: 1913-10-14

Paul L. Turgeon, Ês-Qualité (Contestant) Appellant;

and

François-Xavier St. Charles (Petitioner) Respondent.

1913:March 28, 31; 1913: October 14.

Present: Sir Charles Fitzpatrick C.J. and Davies, Idington, Duff, Anglin and Brodeur JJ.

ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF KING’S BENCH, APPEAL SIDE, PROVINCE OF QUEBEC.

Appeal—Jurisdiction—“Supreme Court Act,” ss. 36, 37, 46—Judge in Chambers—Originating petition—Arts. 71, 72, 875, 876 C.P.Q.—Liquor laws—“Quebec Licence Law” R.S.Q., 1909, arts. 924 et seq. — Property in licence—Agreement—Ownership in persons other than holder—Invalidity of contract—Public policy.

A cause, matter or judicial proceeding originating on petition to a judge in chambers, in virtue of articles 875 and 876 of the Quebec Code of Civil Procedure, is appealable to the Supreme Court of Canada where the subject of the controversy amounts to the sum or value of two thousand dollars.

It is inconsistent with the policy of the “Quebec Licence Law” (R.S.Q., 1909), that the ownership of a licence to sell intoxicating liquors should be vested in one person while the licence is held in the name of another. An agreement having that effect is void inasmuch as it establishes conditions contrary to the policy of the statute. Judgment appealed from (Q.R. 22 K.B. 58) reversed, Brodeur J. dissenting.

APPEAL from the judgment of the Court of King’s Bench, appeal side[1], affirming the judgment of Mr. Justice Greenshields, in Superior Court chambers, in the District of Montreal, by which the respondent’s petition was granted with costs.

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The proceedings were commenced by petition to a judge in chambers by the respondent whereby, on his own behalf as well as in his capacity of testamentary executor of the late Ferdinand Paquette, deceased, he claimed the property, goodwill and accessories of a restaurant, including the licence to sell spirituous liquors in connection therewith, whereof the respondent, as curator of the insolvent estate of Joseph Goderre, had taken possession by virtue of a judicial abandonment. These proceedings were instituted under the provisions of articles 875 and 876 of the Quebec Code of Civil Procedure. The prayer of the petition was granted by Greenshields J. and his decision in favour of the petitioner was affirmed by the judgment now appealed from.

On the argument the court raised the question of its jurisdiction to hear and determine the appeal, which depended on whether or not the originating petition was or was not a proceeding in a superior court within the provisions of sections 36, 37 and 46 of the “Supreme Court Act,” R.S.C., 1906, ch. 139.

The material circumstances of the case are stated in the judgments now reported.

Lafleur E.C. and St. Germain E.C. for the appellant.

Aimé Geoffrion E.C. and A. Perrault for the respondent.

The Chief Justice (oral).—This appeal must be allowed with costs, reserving to the respondent his right to rank on the estate as a privileged creditor with respect to the amount paid by him in order to

[Page [Page 475]]

obtain the transfer and renewal of the licence in question.

Davies J.—I concur in the opinion stated by my brother Anglin.

Idington J.—The appellant is curator of the estate of one Goderre who had been a hotelkeeper in Montreal for some years and up to the time of his judicial abandonment, on the 21st of March, 1910, of his property as an insolvent.

As such he held at that date a licence to sell intoxicating liquors. This licence had been issued to him under the provisions of the “Quebec Licence Act,” on the first of May, 1909, for one year.

The appellant applied for and got the consent of the Licence Commissioners pursuant to the provisions of the said Act to the transfer to him, as curator, of said licence, and later procured from them, on the first of May following, a renewal of said licence for the next ensuing year from said date.

The appellant, as such curator, having taken possession of the business premises and stock-in-trade of the insolvent, was duly proceeding to sell same with said licence by public auction to be held on the 31st May, 1910, when the respondent, on the 26th May, 1910, applied by petition addressed

to one of the judges of the Superior Court sitting in and for the District of Montreal,

to have the said curator ordered to turn over to him the said licence and certain stock-in-trade relating to said business.

The prayer of the petition was granted by Mr. Justice Greenshields and his order has been upheld by

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the court of appeal. The appellant seeks a reversal of said judgment.

The petition is founded upon articles 875 and 876 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

During the argument a question was raised as to whether an appeal would lie to this court from such a judgment.

Section 46 of the “Supreme Court Act,” defining the grounds of appeal from the court of final resort in the Province of Quebec, seems comprehensive enough to include the subject-matter in controversy herein which is admitted to be above two thousand dollars in value.

It is urged that the proceeding in question was not one taken in the Superior Court, but was a mere chamber motion and, hence, non-appealable.

The distinction between a judge in chambers and his sitting as a court is, for many purposes, quite valid.

The Code of Civil Procedure (in like manner as procedural legislation does in other provinces on the like subject) declares, by article 24, that the court has the same powers as a judge over matters assigned to the latter by article 71; that the judge can adjourn an application brought before him into the court or vice versâ, and, by article 72, that a decision of a judge in chambers shall have the same effect as judgments of the court and be subject to appeal and other remedies as against judgments.

Article 876 is as follows:—

Any property not belonging to the debtor, which is in the curator’s possession by virtue of the abandonment, may be recovered by the person thereto entitled, upon a petition to the judge.

It would seem as if this remedy had been provided as a specific mode of trial and adjudication relative

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to the title to property which had passed into the curator’s hands and to which a third party might have made a claim. Its peculiar terms may have a bearing (which I pass for the present) upon the merits of this appeal.

The question of our jurisdiction, it is to be observed, does not, having regard to the terms of the “Supreme Court Act,” necessarily turn upon the form but upon the substance of the question of whether or not the proceeding has been had in a superior court.

I think our jurisdiction to hear this appeal is quite as well founded as it was in the case of The North British Canadian Investment Co. v. The Trustees of St. John School District[2], where the question was the right of appeal when an officer under the “Land Titles Act” of the North-West Territories had been directed by a judge to make an entry affecting a title; or the case of The City of Halifax v. Reeves[3], when the proceeding was begun and founded upon a petition to a judge in chambers.

As to the merits of the appeal there is nothing, so far as I can see, to be gained by going into many of the questions argued before us. It must be determined by the question of whether or not, having regard to the provisions of the “Quebec Licence Act” (which alone creates thereby such rights of property or otherwise as any one can have in, to or over such licences) the respondent has any such right of property in the licence as to entitle him to the order made directing the curator to transfer it to him.

Not even the court can have any power or authority directing its curator or any one else to meddle

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with such a transfer unless given by said Act the power to do so.

In 1906, the hotel business in question with the then stock-in-trade, the goodwill, the lease and licence had been transferred by one Thibault to the respondent and a partner named Paquette, since dead but whom he represents, and by them re-transferred to the said Goderre under an instrument which contained what was expressed to be a suspensive condition and is claimed now to have been so effectively such that the respondent and Paquette could, and he now, personally and as representative, can claim that, by reason of default in the terms of the payment of the price of that sale to Goderre, the said licence has reverted to him by reason of the terms of the condition or became his because the said Goderre had so covenanted.

It may be observed just here that by reason of the licence only having a yearly existence it is rather difficult to define in legal terms just what the claim is. I, therefore, try to put it thus alternatively, and express something that we are expected to grasp, however elusive it becomes once it is touched or some one tries to touch it.

Having regard to the purview of the “Liquor Licence Act” and the provisions thereof specially applicable to the curator of an insolvent estate, I do not think such a contention as is thus set up is maintainable.

Article 923 of the said Act is as follows:—

923. Subject to the provisions of this section as to removals and transfers of licences, and as to voluntary or judicial abandonments made by bonâ fide insolvents, every licence for the sale of liquor shall be held to be a licence to the person therein named only and for the premises therein described, and shall remain valid only so long as

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such person continues to be the occupant of the said premises and the owner of the business there carried on.

It would puzzle one to frame language more destructive than this of such a claim as respondent sets up. If words mean anything these must mean that the licence was personal and remained valid only so long as the person named continued to be the occupant of the premises and the owner of the business there carried on. The moment he ceased to carry on the business that moment the licence lapsed save in so far as

the provisions of this section as to removals and the transfer of licences and as to voluntary or judicial abandonments made by bonâ fide insolvents

preserved the licence, and then only in and for the interests of those named in regard to any preservation of it.

There is not a sentence or semblance of a provision in the Act making any preservation of such licence subserve the purposes of any such bargain as the respondent relies upon. Indeed, there are provisions distinctly anticipating the lapsing of licences not specifically preserved by the terms of the Act and dealing with the accrual of benefit the public interests or policy may be expected to derive therefrom.

This, I most respectfully submit, ends or ought to have ended any pretension on the part of the respondent to invoke the powers of the court or any judge thereof acting under article 876 which primâ facie enables only a dealing with property seizable by the sheriff and claimable by some party having a title thereto or right therein of some kind. No court or judge can re-create that which has perished, still less make a valid order which in effect contravenes the

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plain duty the law in question provides for the doing of, by an officer whose peculiar duty it is to serve the interest of the general creditors.

But that is not all; for article 953, sub-section (b), which is specifically directed to cover the cases of transfers referred to in above article 923, provides for a special transfer fee of $75,

when it is granted in consequence of a voluntary or judicial abandonment in a case of bonâ fide insolvency,

and, by sub-sections 3 and 4, in the case of the death of a licensee or of a voluntary or judicial abandonment of property on his part, as follows:—

3. Save in the case of an abandonment of property or of the death of the licensee, no transfer of a licence shall be made until after the expiration of forty days from the date upon which the licence was delivered by the collector of provincial revenue.

4. In the case of the death of a licensee or of a voluntary or judicial abandonment of property on his part, a delay of thirty days is granted to his heirs or representatives, or to the provisional guardian or the curator of his estate, during which delay the licence continues in force, in order to give them an opportunity to apply for a transfer.

And by sub-section 5 of article 953 the transferee of a licence approved of and duly certified as provided therein is to enjoy the rights which accrued to the original licensee.

But in the case of the death of a licensee, or of a judicial abandonment on his part, the municipal council shall give the preference to the purchaser of the stock-in-trade of the licensee’s estate and shall transfer the licence to him or to the person recommended by him — provided such purchaser or such person so recommended be of good character and repute — for the same premises or for other premises should the landlord of the deceased or transferror refuse to accept such transferee as his tenant.

How can respondent claim to have fallen within the first part of this sub-section or to defeat the second part just quoted?

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Then article 922 expressly declares such

licences shall be granted for one year, or for part of a year only, and shall expire on the first day of May subsequent to their issue.

There are other provisions indicating, as in article 924, the qualifications and formalities to be observed to get or hold a licence; and, as in article 940, respecting preference for a particular place; and, as in article 954, giving three months from date of abandonment “failing which the licence is of no avail”; and, in article 1082, when not a bonâ fide case of insolvency the general policy of the Act and the purpose of protecting creditors of an insolvent licensee. But nothing is to be found to preserve the rights of persons whose whole scheme was part of a system of trafficking in licences for the direct and incidental profits of such traffic and but a palpable evasion of the said policy of the legislature and its purpose in this enactment to protect creditors of an insolvent.

How, for example, when the lease of the premises was got by Goderre for a new term of five years and this lease has thus got beyond respondent’s control, can he claim a transfer without the premises it applies to? True, the landlord may be got to consent, may be pacified or he may have assented to all this, though it does not appear in evidence. But the possibilities are such as to be quite unworkable unless we adopt the theory that a licence once granted is a thing to be bargained about and handed round from hand to hand, just as a horse or other chattel, all of which is not what the Act contemplates.

There are also provisions to meet the case of companies getting and dealing with licences through their employee or nominee.

These provisions of business convenience, in such

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cases safeguarded against abuse, shew it never was intended such a bargain or consent as respondent relies upon should be held valid.

If it had been the law before that such rights could exist or be created, then there was no need for such a special enactment relative to companies. It was because substitutes or nominees of the capitalist or liquor dealer behind the scene would not be tolerated that this special enactment was made to provide for. Such rights as any one can have in regard to a licence must rest upon the Act and respondent is not one of any such class as the Act gives a right to.

The attempt elaborated in respondent’s factum to make out of the several exceptions the Act provides for a rule of law that, hence, the licence is a piece of property, just as any other, is a curiosity in the way of legal argument deserving of notice, but, I respectfully submit, no more need be said than state it.

The licence is annual and only good for the year. Some sort of consideration is given relative to parties who may have been for several years holders of a licence for the same place, but that does not help respondent. Moreover, his whole arrangement was such a conflict with the policy of the Act as, in my opinion, to render the whole security illegal. The stock-in-trade claimed was of so little value as to render this branch of the dealing of small consequence herein. No separate claim was urged here on that head.

We have pressed upon us the jurisprudence of Quebec on the subject, but the Act, in its main features, is so like what prevails elsewhere we cannot assent thereto and apply other principles of construction elsewhere even if we could find such jurisprudence had been older than shewn herein.

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The appeal should be allowed with costs throughout and the petition be dismissed with costs. Of course, respondent is entitled to be recouped his advances to keep the licence alive since the insolvency.

Duff J.—I concur in the result.

Anglin J.—I am unable to accede to the suggestion that there should be read into section 37(a) of the “Supreme Court Act” words which would restrict its application to cases originating in the Circuit Court or in some other court. That provision dispenses, in cases of the classes therein specified, with the usual requirement that, in order to be appealable to this court the proceeding must originate in a Superior Court. The word “court” is not mentioned in clause (a); it does occur in clauses(b) and (d). We have before us the judgment of the highest court of final resort in the Province of Quebec rendered in a judicial proceeding in which the matter in controversy exceeds the value of $2,000. This case, therefore, in my opinion, fulfils the conditions upon which a right of appeal is conferred by section 37.

Thibault, the original owner of the business and licence in question, on the 14th of December, 1906, executed a contract of sale to Messrs. St. Charles and Paquette of his business, stock-in-trade, licence, etc. A special term of the contract was that Thibault would transfer the licence to his vendee’s nominee. Pursuant to that undertaking he transferred the licence to one Goderre, who subsequently became insolvent and made an abandonment under which the appellant, Turgeon, became curator of his estate. The Licence Commissioners approved of the transfer from Thibault

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to Goderre and the latter thus became the holder of the licence of which several renewals were subsequently issued to him. Concurrently with the transaction between Thibault and St. Charles and Paquette and the transfer of the licence to Groderre an agreement was made with Goderre by St. Charles and Paquette whereby they sold to him the business, stock-in-trade, licence, etc., subject to a suspensive condition in the following terms:—

Faute par monsieur Goderre d’observer toutes les conditions qu’il a ci-dessus (assumées, ou faute par lui de payer, trente jours après échéance, un seul des versements qu’il s’est ci-dessus engagé de payer, messieurs St. Charles et F. Paquette auront le droit de reprendre possession immédiate du dit fonds de commerce de restaurant licencié, avec accessoires, tel que ci-haut défini, comprenant la licence pour La vente des liqueurs spiritueuses attachée au dit fonds de commerce et les renouvellements de cette licence, avec le droit d’avoir telle licence transportée au nom de toute personne désignée par eux, et ce, sans être tenus de donner aucun avis à cette fin à monsieur, Goderre, ni d’user d’aucun procédé judiciaire, ni de donner aucune indemnité à Monsieur Goderre, les sommes d’argent jusqu’alors payées par ce dernier devant demeurer la propriété de messieurs Paquette et St. Charles et de Monsieur Thibault, à titre de dommages-intérêts liquidés, étant spécialement convenu que le présent contrait est fait sujet a la condition suspensive que tout ce que cédé et transporté ici demeure et demeurera la propriété de messieurs St. Charles et Paquette jusqu’à ce qu’ils aient été intégralement payés du prix qui forme la considération du présent contrat, ce contrat n’étant qu’une promesse de vente et les parties étant d’accord pour convenir que l’article 1478 du code civil de la Province de Québec n’aura pas lieu de s’appliquer ici.

In my view under these documents St. Charles and Paquette never became owners of the licence in question. They certainly were not at any time the holders of it. Assuming that a licence under the “Quebec Licence Law” is property (I rather think it is not), I am of the opinion that the licence in question and all right of property in it passed directly from Thibault to Groderre. If so, no property in the

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licence passed from St. Charles and Paquette to Goderre under the contract between them; and, since the suspensive clause in that contract in terms purports to affect only what passed or was transferred by it, the licence would not be subject to that clause. Neither could it “remain” (demeure) the property of St. Charles and Paquette.

But if this be too narrow a view to take of the purpose and effect of the two documents of the 14th of December, 1906, and if under the Thibault sale St. Charles and Paquette acquired some right of property in the licence as well as in the other subjects of sale, then, if the agreement between Goderre and St. Charles and Paquette should be construed solely according to what appears to be the expressed intent of the parties and without regard to the nature of any of its subject-matters or any incidents attached to them by law, it would, if valid, probably have the effect of confining the right of Goderre to a mere contingent or precarious right of possession of the several subjects with which it purports to deal — including the licence — the entire right of property in them remaining in St. Charles and Paquette pending fulfilment of the suspensive condition as to payment.

A study of the provisions of the “Quebec Licence Law,” however — particularly article 923 — has satisfied me that any property which may exist in a licence in that province is and must remain vested in the holder of the licence, upon whom it confers a personal right or privilege so long as he holds it and is the occupant of the premises and owner of the business in respect of which it issues. Having regard to this essential characteristic of a licence it is inconsistent with the letter and the spirit of the “Quebec Licence Law”

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that there should be vested in one person the property in a licence held by another under a right intended to be more than merely temporary. The statute (art. 953(4)) specially provides for a short delay in the case of the death of, or voluntary or judicial abandonment of his property by the licensee. Unless, perhaps, pending the carrying out of an assignment intended to become effective practically at once, the law contemplates that the holder of a licence shall be its real owner. If, therefore, upon the only possible construction of the agreement in question, it involves Goderre holding for a term of years a licence of which during the entire period the ownership should be in St. Charles and Paquette, it would, in my opinion, be void as providing for a condition of things entirely contrary to the policy of the licence law. But, ut res magis valeat, I would be inclined to treat the agreement, at all events so far as the licence is concerned, as intended to provide not that the property in it while it was held by Goderre should be vested in St. Charles and Paquette, but that the latter should have a right at any time, on default in payment by Goderre according to the terms of his contract, to retake (reprendre) the licence by employing such means for that purpose as the law provides. I see no difficulty in a construction which involves personal obligation on the part of Goderre, on his making default in payment, to execute, on the demand of St. Charles and Paquette, a formal assignment of the licence, or any other documents requisite and proper to enable the latter to secure a transfer of it to themselves or to their nominee. But I cannot, consistently with the provisions of the licence law, as I appreciate them, admit its validity if the agreement be susceptible only

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of a construction which involves St. Charles and Paquette having a right of property — or a jus in re — in the licence itself while it was held by Goderre.

I do not wish to be understood as questioning the assignability of a licence or the right of a transferee who can obtain the approval of the commissioners to become its holder. That question is not before us. The agreement under consideration is not a transaction of that kind. On the contrary, if it necessarily means what the respondent contends, it provides that a licence which was and was to remain the property of Messrs. St. Charles and Paquette, Should, nevertheless, be held during its original term and renewals by Goderre. Such a contract is, in my opinion, not possible under the “Quebec Licence Law.”

Whether St. Charles and Paquette never had any right of property in the licence by virtue of their agreement with Thibault, or whether under their transaction with Goderre he became the owner of it subject to a contractual obligation, on his making default in payment, to re-transfer it to them or to their nominee, the licence was not at the time of Goderre’s insolvency the property of St. Charles and Paquette and it is not now their property

in the curator’s possession by virtue of the abandonment —

which a judge might, upon petition, order the curator to transfer or deliver to them under article 876 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

That is, as I understand his petition, the remedy which the petitioner sought and the jurisdiction to which he appealed. But if he be entitled to take advantage of what is, perhaps, the broader provision of article 875 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which his counsel invoked at bar, I am still of opinion that he

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cannot succeed in this proceeding. I am unable to distinguish, on principle, between the property of an insolvent debtor subject to an executory contract, which creates a merely personal obligation to transfer it but does not confer on the obligee a jus in re, and other property of the debtor which passes under his abandonment to his curator for the benefit of his creditors. As against them (art. 1981 C.C.) I know of no ground upon which the obligee under such a personal contract can enforce “specific performance” (l’exécution) (art. 1065 C.C.) of the obligation by the curator. In this case there appear to be other difficulties in the way of adjudging an execution of the obligation which it is not necessary to discuss.

I am, for these reasons, of opinion that, as to the liquor licence in question, which was the only matter seriously discussed at bar, this appeal should be allowed with costs in this court and in the Court of King’s Bench, and the petition should be dismissed.

Brodeur J. (dissident). — L’Intimé St. Charles était, en 1906, propriétaire avec un nommé Paquette d’une licence pour la vente de liqueurs spiritueuses dans la cité de Montréal. Le 14 décembre de cette même année (1906) ils ont fait un contrat avec un nommé Goderre par lequel ils lui promettaient de lui transporter un fonds de commerce auquel était attaché cette licence, dès qu’il leur aurait payé un certain montant comme prix de vente, lequel prix de vente était stipulé payable par versements.

La clause spéciale suivante était incorporée dans l’acte:—

Faute par Monsieur Goderre d’observer toutes les conditions ci-dessus assumées, ou faute par lui de payer, trente jours après

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échéance, un seul des versements qu’il s’est ci-dessus engagé de payer, Messieurs St. Charles et F. Paquette auront le droit de reprendre possession immédiate du dit fonds de commerce de restaurant licencié, avec accessoires, tel que ci-haut défini, comprenant la licence pour la vente des liqueurs spiritueuses attachée au dit fonds de commerce et les renouvellements de cette licence transportée au nom de toute personne désignée par eux, et ce sans être tenus de donner aucun avis à cette fin à Monsieur Goderre, ni d’user d’aucun procédé judiciaire, ni de donner aucune indemnité à Monsieur Goderre, les sommes d’argent jusque là payées par ce dernier devant demeurer la propriété de Messieurs Paquette et Saint-Charles, et de Monsieur Thibault, à titre de dommages-intérêts liquidés, étant spécialement convenu que le présent contrat est fait sujet à la condition suspensive que tout ce que cédé et transporté ici demeure et demeurera la propriété de messieurs St. Charles et Paquette jusqu’à ce qu’ils aient été intégralement payés du prix qui forme la considération du présent contrat, ce contrat n’étant qu’une promesse de vente et les parties étant d’accord pour convenir que l’article 1478 du code civil de la Province de Québec n’aura pas lieu de s’appliquer ici.

En vertu de cet acte Goderre a pris possession du fonds de commerce, l’a exploité et a obtenu sa licence des autorités provinciales. Cette licence a été renouvelée pendant un certain nombre d’années.

Le 21ème jour de mars, 1910, Goderre a fait cession de ses biens et l’appelant a été nommé curateur. En cette qualité il a pris possession du restaurant y compris la licence qu’il s’est fait transporter. La licence a été renouvelée pour l’année fiscale 1910-11 et le paiement pour ce renouvellement a été fait par l’intimé. Au mois de mai, 1910, le curateur a annoncé en vente la licence en question.

Alors l’intimé (tant personnellement qu’en sa qualité d’exécuteur testamentaire de Paquette) a présenté une requête au juge, conformément aux dispositions de l’article 876 C.P.C. et a demandé à ce qu’il soit enjoint au curateur de ne pas procéder à la vente de la licence et à ce qu’il soit tenu de signer tous les documents nécessaires aux fins de la remettre en la possession de l’intimé.

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Cette requête a été contestée par le curateur dans l’intérêt des créanciers de Goderre, prétendant que cette licence n’appartient pas à l’intimé mais doit être vendue pour les bénéfice et avantage des créanciers en général.

La question est donc de savoir si l’intimé en vertu de son contrat avec Goderre peut réclamer la propriété de cette licence.

L’appelant prétend que St. Charles peut avoir une créance contre la faillite et peut avoir droit à des dommages mais que cette réclamation et ces dommages doivent être payés “au mare la livre.” St. Charles répond qu’il est propriétaire de la licence attachée an fonds de commerce, sauf nécessairement à faire approuver son transfert par les autorités chargées d’administrer la loi, mais qu’il n’en a pas moins un droit de propriété qui comporte avec lui tous les avantages qui en découlent, et notamment celui de pouvoir revendiquer la jouissance exclusive de ce droit à l’encontre des créanciers.

Cette cause est de la plus grande importance vu qu’il y a un très grand nombre de personnes qui possèdent dans dès licences et des fonds de commerce de restaurants des intérêts analogues à ceux en question dans cette cause-ci.

La question de savoir si ces contrats étaient valides est venu déjà à différentes reprises devant les tribunaux de la province et notamment dans une cause de Canadian Breweries Co. v. Gariépy[4]. Cette décision de la cour d’appel a été suivie par l’honorable juge Tellier dans une cause non rapportée, 1908, cour supérieure, Montréal, de Gariépy v. Ghartrand et

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dans une cause de Labelle et Turgeon jugée le 4 octobre, 1910, par l’honorable juge Fortin.

Nous pouvons dire par conséquent que la jurisprudence de la province a reconnu la validité de ces transactions et si le législateur n’a pas jugé à propos d’intervenir pour modifier la loi depuis, c’est qu’il est satisfait que cette interprétation est correcte et que le système ne doit pas être changé.

La question s’est présentée en France de savoir si les brevêts d’imprimerie, qui étaient alors absolument personnels et ne pouvaient être exploités que par ceux qui en avaient reçu l’autorisation du gouvernement, étaient susceptibles de faire l’objet d’un contrat et d’engendrer des obligations; et il a été décidé dans une cause rapportée dans Dalloz, 1833-2-50, qu’un brevêt d’imprimerie, qui est incessible et personnel, ayant été vendu à une personne avec tout le matériel, cette personne-là ne serait pas venue à demander la rescision du contrat parce que le gouvernement aurait refusé de confirmer le transfert.

Il est de principe élémentaire que les biens se divisent en biens incorporels et corporels. (Art. 374 C.C.) Le droit du porteur d’une licence est un bien incorporel et il est susceptible d’être transféré, vendu ou aliéné, et entre les parties la vente est parfaite (art. 1472 C.C.).

Dans le contrat que nous avons à examiner Goderre, insolvable, pouvait bien être le porteur de la licence aux yeux de l’autorité publique. Aux yeux des commissaires, il l’était virtuellement; mais dans ses relations avec St. Charles, l’intimé, il est régi par son contrat de 1906. Or, en vertu de ce contrat, St. Charles était le véritable propriétaire de la licence.

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On a prétendu que la licence future ne pouvait pas être susceptible d’être la propriété de l’intimé. L’art. 1061 C.C. déclare cependant que les choses futures peuvent être l’objet d’une obligation; et à l’art. 1488 C.C. au titre de “La Vente” il est déclaré que la vente est valide si le vendeur devient ensuite propriétaire de la chose. La licence future peut donc faire l’objet d’une obligation et elle pouvait faire également l’objet d’un contrat de vente.

Dans ces circonstances je considère que le contrat fait par Goderre, d’une part, et par St. Charles et Paquette, d’autre part, est un contrat parfaitement valide; que ce contrat fait la loi des parties; et, par conséquent, l’intimé était avant la faillite propriétaire de la licence en question. Il peut donc en revendiquer la propriété à l’encontre des créanciers de Goderre; et le jugement de la cour d’appel, qui a reconnu sa prétention, doit être confirmé.

La question s’est présentée de savoir ci cette cour avait juridiction pour entendre le présent appel. Pour les raisons données sur ce point par mon confrère Anglin je suis d’opinion que nous avons juridiction. Cette cause a d’ailleurs origine devant la cour supérieure et je crois que les articles 36 et 37 de “l’Acte de la Cour Suprême,” interprétés l’un par l’autre, nous mènent à la conclusion que la présente cause a origine en cour supérieure et est, par conséquent, susceptible d’être portée ici, vu que le montant en litige excède $2,000.

Il y eut un temps dans Québec où on faisait une grande différence entre la juridiction du juge en chambre et de la cour elle-même. Mais par des amendements faits au Code, il a été déclaré que les décisions rendues par le juge en chambre ont la même force et

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le même effet que si elles étaient rendues par la cour elle-même (art. 72 C.P.C.). A tout événement, en admettant que le tribunal de première instance dans le cas actuel ne serait pas la cour supérieure, alors il ne peut pas y avoir de doute que sous la section 37 de l’acte de la cour suprême nous aurions juridiction.

Appeal allowed with costs.

Solicitors for the appellant: St. Germain, Guérin & Raymond.

Solicitors for the respondent: Gouin, Lemieux, Murphy, Berard & Perrault.