Supreme Court of Canada
Lacaille v. Corporation de Lacaille, [1931] S.C.R. 619
Date: 1931-06-12
Sem Lacaille (Plaintiff) Appellant;
v.
La Corporation De Lacaille (Defendant) Respondent.
1931: February 25; 1931: June
12.
Present: Duff, Newcombe, Rinfret, Lam ont and
Cannon JJ.
ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF KING’S BENCH,
APPEAL SIDE, PROVINCE OF QUEBEC
Promissory note.—Overdue—Letter granting
delay for payment—Action after maturity—Delay not then expired—Whether action
is premature —Rights of debtor.
On September 3, 1929, the appellant sued the respondent corporation on
four promissory notes overdue and the defence set up was that the action was
premature because, on August 28, 1929, the
appellant had written a letter to the secretary of the corporation stating inter
alia that unless payment was made within fifteen days he would take
proceedings; but he brought his action before the expiry of that time.
Held, reversing
the judgment appealed from (Q.R. 49 K.B. 172) that the appellant was entitled to judgment. On the letter, the most
the respondent might have hoped for was that on payment before pleading the
court would relieve it of the costs up to payment.
APPEAL from the decision of the Court of
King’s Bench, appeal side, province of Quebec,
reversing the judgment of the Superior Court P. Cousineau J., and
dismissing the appellant’s action.
The material facts of the case and the
questions at issue are stated in the above head-note and in the judgment now
reported.
[Page 620]
Charles Laurendeau K.C. for the appellant.
Hervé Roch for the respondent.
The judgment of the court was delivered by
Lamont J.—The facts in this case are not in dispute. The appellant sued the
respondent corporation in the Superior Court on four promissory notes made by
the corporation in favour of the appellant and amounting in all to $6,073.47.
The defence set up was that the action was
premature. At the time the action was brought, September 3, 1929, the maturity
date of the notes sued on was passed, but the corporation relies on the fact that,
on August 28, 1929, the appellant wrote to the secretary of the corporation a
letter in the following terms:—
Je vous retourne vos billets pour la dernière
fois et je vous avertis que d’ici à 15 jours si je n’ai pas un règlement de tous les billets je prendrai des
procédures.
Je ne peux pas porter ces billets.
This letter, it was contended on behalf of the
corporation, had the effect of extending the time for payment of the notes
until the expiration of fifteen days from the date of the letter and, as action
was brought within fifteen days, it was prematurely brought.
The first question to be considered is: Did the
appellant, by this letter, intend to signify to the corporation that he was
extending the time within which the notes would become due for another fifteen
days, or simply to intimate that he would not exercise his right to sue on the
overdue notes for that length of time? In my opinion the latter is the true
construction. I cannot see in the letter anything that would justify the
conclusion that the appellant was assenting to any modification of the terms of
the obligations expressed in the promissory notes. Putting it at the very
highest, the letter neither declares nor conveys by implication anything more
than an assent to postpone the exercise of his undoubted right to sue. The
letter is not to be construed as depriving the appellant of his rights to any
greater extent than the language used calls for. Even conceding that it implies
a promise to refrain from suing for fifteen days, and assuming that, in the
circumstances, the respondent assented to this promise, such a
[Page 621]
promise would not afford a defence to the
action. That being so and the notes being overdue when the appellant sued, his
action cannot be said to have been prematurely, brought. On the letter the most
the respondent might have hoped for was that on payment before pleading the
court would relieve it of the costs up to payment.
The appeal should, therefore, be allowed, the
judgment below set aside and the judgment of the Superior Court restored. The
appellant is entitled to his costs throughout.
Appeal allowed with costs.
Solicitors for the appellant: Lalonde & Lalonde.
Solicitors for the respondent: Baril & Tousignant.
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