Supreme Court of Canada
Laurentian Ins. Co. v. Davidson, [1932] S.C.R. 491
Date: 1932-03-24
The Laurentian
Insurance Company (Defendant) Appellant;
and
J. Donald Davidson (Plaintiff)
Respondent.
1932: February 25; 1932: March 24.
ON APPEAL FROM THE APPELLATE DIVISION OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF ONTARIO.
Fire insurance—Insurance Act, R.S.O., 1927,
c. 222—Property becoming vacant—Destroyed by fire within 30 days from
commencement of vacancy—Liability on policy—Statutory condition 5 (d)—“Change
material to the risk” (statutory condition 7)—Representation as to occupancy in
application for insurance.
During the term of a fire insurance policy on
farm buildings, the insured, with his family, moved from the farm and took up
residence in a new home, intending to reside there permanently and to rent or
sell the farm, which remained vacant. He gave no notice to the insurer of the
vacancy. Within 30 days from the time the insured property became vacant, it
was destroyed by fire.
Held: The
insurer was liable on the policy. (Judgment of the Appellate Division, Ont.,
[1931] 4 D.L.R. 720, affirmed.)
In view of statutory condition 5 (d)
(Ontario Insurance Act, R.S.O., 1927, c. 222) in the policy, vacancy
for a period of 30 days was a risk contemplated by the policy and assumed by
the insurer, and it was not open to the insurer to shew that the mere fact of
vacancy or non‑occupancy for less than 30 days was a “change material to
the risk” within statutory condition 7.
The insured’s answer “yes” to the question in
his application for insurance, “Is the house occupied all the year round,” was
not a misrep-
[Page 492]
resentation, or a representation on which the
insurer could deny liability; it was a representation as to an existing fact
and was then true.
APPEAL by the defendant from the judgment of
the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of Ontario which, on an equally divided court,
dismissed the defendant’s appeal from the judgment of Wright J., holding that the plaintiff was entitled to
recover from the defendant the loss which he had sustained by fire on property
covered by a certain fire insurance policy issued by the defendant.
The material facts of the case and the questions
in issue are sufficiently stated in the judgments now reported. The appeal was
dismissed with costs.
Nathan Phillips K.C. and H. Weinfield
K.C. for the appellant.
N.L. Matthews and J.P. Ebbs for the
respondent.
DUFF J.—I agree with my brother Cannon.
I think the construction proposed by the
insurance company would, if acted upon, operate as a fraud upon the insured.
The provision of Condition 5 (d) is a very specific one. It
relates to buildings, to property contained in buildings and to manufacturing
establishments, and goes into effect on vacancy or lack of occupation or
discontinuance of operation for the period named in the Condition. Where a
particular matter such as vacancy or lack of occupation or cessation of
industrial operation is dealt with in a contract and in a specific way in a
particular clause, then the parties naturally look to that clause as containing
the controlling provision in relation to the subject dealt with. I think
Condition 5 (d) is a declaration indicating that the parties
contemplate vacancy and lack of operation during the periods mentioned as
normal conditions of the risk insured against, and any change which consists
merely in such vacancy or lack of occupation or cessation of operation is not a
change material to the risk within the contemplation of the contract and is,
therefore, not within Condition 7.
[Page 493]
I think that is all I have to say upon the
appeal. To my mind the point is very clear and the appeal should be dismissed
with costs.
The judgment of Rinfret, Lamont, Smith and
Cannon JJ. was delivered by
CANNON J.—This appeal is asserted from a
judgment of the Second Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of Ontario, which, by an equal division of opinion,
dismissed an appeal of the defendant and confirmed the judgment of the Supreme
Court of Ontario (Wright J.),
rendered on the 15th April, 1931, in favour of respondent for a fire loss
covered by insurance and ordering a reference to the Master to determine the
amount payable.
The policy of insurance issued by the appellant
to the respondent insured, to the extent of $5,000, the respondent’s farm
dwelling, barns and contents, for three years from the 24th August, 1928.
On the 20th February, 1930, the respondent, with
his family, moved away from the farm and took up residence in a new home that
he had built in Newmarket, with the intention of permanently residing there and
of renting or selling the farm, which remained vacant after his departure.
The property insured was destroyed by fire on
the 21st day of March, 1930, being within thirty days from the time the
property became vacant. No notice was given by the respondent to the defendant
company that the property had become vacant.
The appellant disclaims liability, first upon
the ground that there was misrepresentation of fact in the application signed
by the respondent where he answered “Yes” to the question, “Is the house
occupied all the year round?”
The answer referred to in the application was a
representation as to an existing fact and was then true, and therefore the
first ground fails.
The second question involved in this appeal is
whether, in view of statutory clause 5 (d) of the Ontario Insurance
Act (R.S.O., 1927, c. 222), introduced in 1924, it was still open to the
defendant to show that a vacancy or non-
[Page 494]
occupancy for less than thirty days is a change
material to the risk within the meaning of statutory condition no. 7.
There was, prior to 1924, no specific statutory
condition in Ontario, in relation to the non‑liability of the insurer, in
the case of a vacancy or non-occupation. This was covered by the general
statutory condition no. 2, which, with some unimportant changes, is now
statutory condition no. 7, and which reads as follows:
Any change material to the risk and within
the control and knowledge of the insured shall avoid the policy as to the part
affected thereby, unless the change is promptly notified in writing to the
insurer or its local agent; and the insurer when so notified may return the
unearned portion, if any, of the premium paid and cancel the policy, or may
notify the insured in writing that, if he desires the policy to continue in
force, he must within fifteen days of the receipt of the notice pay to the
insurer an additional premium, and in default of such payment the policy shall
no longer be in force and the insurer shall return the unearned portion, if
any, of the premium paid.
In 1924, the Ontario Legislature by the Act, 14
Geo. V, chap. 50, adopted statutory condition 5 (d), which reads as
follows:
Unless permission is given by the policy or
endorsed thereon, the insurer shall not be liable for loss or damage occurring:—
* * *
(d) When the building insured
or containing the property insured is, to the knowledge of the insured, vacant
or unoccupied for more than thirty consecutive days, or being a manufacturing
establishment, ceases to be operated and continues out of operation for more
than thirty consecutive days.
Evidence was offered at the trial to show that
the vacancy of the property was a change material to the risk, but there was no
evidence of any change material to the risk in addition to the bare fact of vacancy.
We are of opinion that, by virtue of clause (d)
of condition 5 in the policy, vacancy for a period of thirty days was one
of the risks contemplated by the policy, and assumed by the appellant, and
that, the vacancy in question having been for less than thirty consecutive
days, statutory condition no. 7 does not apply, and the appellants are liable.
The appeal is therefore to be dismissed with
costs.
Appeal dismissed with costs.
Solicitors for the appellant: Nathan
Phillips & Company.
Solicitor for the respondent: Norman L.
Matthews.