St. Denis v. Quevillon, (1915) 51 SCR 603

Supreme Court of Canada

St. Denis v. Quevillon, (1915) 51 S.C.R. 603

Date: 1915-05-18

Paul Saint-Denis (Plaintiff) Appellant;

and

François-Xavier Quevillon and Henri Payette (Defendants) Respondents,

1915: February 15; 1915: May 18.

Present: Sir Charles Fitzpatrick C.J. and Idington, Duff, Anglin and Brodeur JJ.

ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF KING’S BENCH (APPEAL SIDE), PROVINCE OF QUEBEC.

Lease of land—Special condition—Promise of sale—Option—Pacte de preference—Unilateral contract—Real rights—Registry laws— Arts. 2082, 2085 C.C.—Specific performance—Damages—Right of action.

In a lease of lands for the term of five years, which was registered, the lessor agreed to sell the property to the lessee for a certain price at any time during the term of the lease. It was also stipulated that in the event of a proposed sale to any other person, for any price whatsoever, the lessor should notify the lessee thereof and give him the right, by preference, to exercise his option to purchase. After the expiration of about two years of the term, the lessor served written notice on the lessee requiring him to exercise his option forthwith and stating that, in default, he would sell to another person, without, however, mentioning the terms and conditions of the proposed sale and, on request by the lessee, these particulars were refused. The lessee took no action on this notice and the lessor executed a deed of sale of the property to P. by conveyance in which the latter undertook that the registered lease would be maintained in force. Two years later, the lessee brought suit against the lessor and P. for specific performance of the agreement to sell and, alternatively, for damages against the lessor for breach of contract.

Per curiam.—The notice as given, without mentioning the terms and conditions of the proposed sale to P., was ineffectual to place the lessee in default in regard to exercising his option; the

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rights of the lessee under the deed of lease continued to subsist during the whole term of the lease.

Per Idington and Brodeur JJ. (Duff and Anglin JJ. contra).—The promise of sale and pacte de préférence were accessory to the contract of lease and created a real right in favour of the lessee which was capable of being registered against the leased lands. The registration of the deed of lease and actual knowledge by the purchaser of the rights of the lessee thereunder placed P. in the position of a purchaser in bad faith and, consequently, he became bound by the obligations resting upon the lessor and specific performance should be decreed against him as well as against the lessor.

Per Duff and Anglin JJ.—The promise of sale and pacte de préférence, being stipulations separate and distinct from the contract of lease, did not create real rights in the property leased which might be protected by registration under the registry laws of the Province of Quebec. Under the laws of that province (there being no evidence of bad faith on the part of the purchaser), the purchase of the leased property with knowledge of the owner’s obligations, in personam, could not render such purchaser liable to a decree for specific performance thereof.

Per Fitzpatrick C.J. and Anglin J.—The plaintiff had the right to bring his action notwithstanding the expiration of the period of two years after the date of the sale; the wrongful act of the lessor, in violation of his obligations under the deed of lease, did not impose upon the lessee the duty of asserting his rights at a period earlier than that required in his option.

Judgment appealed from (Q.R. 23 K.B. 436) reversed.

APPEAL from the judgment of the Court of King’s Bench[1], reversing the judgment of Lafontaine J. in the Superior Court, District of Montreal, and dismissing the plaintiff’s action with costs.

The material circumstances of the case are stated in the head-note and the questions in issue on the present appeal are discussed in the judgments now reported.

Lafleur K.C. and Perron K.C. for the appellant.

Migneault K.C. and Robillard K.C. for the respondents

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The Chief Justice.—This is an action “en passation de titre" and in the alternative damages are claimed on the ground that the defendants, now respondents, conspired together to prevent the plaintiff, now appellant, from getting his deed. The trial judge maintained the action, but his judgment was reversed on appeal to the Court of King’s Bench on these two grounds:—

(1) That respondent Payette was a “bonâ fide” purchaser for value, and that his knowledge of the option given by his co-respondent Quevillon to the appellant St. Denis in the lease of the latter did not constitute him fraudulent purchaser or chargeable with illegal collusion;

(2) That Quevillon complied with the stipulation in said deed of lease in favour of said St. Denis respecting said option and that the said St. Denis did not exercise his rights of purchasing the property in question in this cause, although duly notified and put in default to do so by the said Quevillon.

It appears by the record that in July, 1908, Quevillon leased to St. Denis for a period of five years a store and dwelling; the lease was duly registered in the month of September following, and in the interval St. Denis entered into possession of the premises which were subsequently purchased (8th June, 1910) by the respondent Payette.

The lease contains this clause:—

Le locataire aura droit de prendre possession des dits magasin et logement au vingt de juillet courant, 1908. Et le dit locataire aura en outre le droit d’acheter l’immeuble ci-dessus loué, comprenant les dits magasin, logement, étal de boucher et dépendances, en aucun temps pendant la durée du présent bail, moyennant le prix de sept mille cinq cent piastres, dont trois mille piastres seront payables comptant et la balance par versements annuels de mille piastres, avec intérêt au taux de six pour cent, par an; et dans le cas où le dit bailleur désirerait vendre a quelque autre pour un prix quelconque, il devra en signifier l’avis par écrit au dit locataire et donner la préférence à ce dernier.

The questions to be decided in this appeals are:— (1) What are the rights of the landlord and tenant

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respectively under this clause during the term of the lease; (2) what is the legal recourse of St. Denis in view of the sale to Payette?

The trial judge came to the conclusion that the intention of the parties was (1) to give the tenant St. Denis the right, at any time during the whole period of the lease, to purchase the property at $7,500; (2) to reserve to the landlord Quevillon the right to dispose of the property during the same period to any one and at any price, provided, however, notice in writing of the landlord’s intention to avail himself of that right was given to the tenant, who was in that case entitled to take the property at the new price offered by any serious intending purchaser. The trial judge held also that the sale to Payette, having been deliberately entered into by both the parties to it, for the purpose of defeating the plaintiff’s rights, should be set aside.

I agree entirely with the learned trial judge in his appreciation of the evidence and his statement of the law.

Having carefully read the notes of Mr. Justice Cross in the court of appeal, I come to the conclusion that the main ground upon which the judgment of the Superior Court is reversed is that St. Denis, when notified of Quevillon’s intention to sell, did not object more definitely and explicitly. The learned judge says, speaking of the time when Quevillon served notice of his intention to sell to Payette:—

I think that the plaintiff St. Denis should have objected more definitely and should have pressed his request for particulars then and there more explicitly. Instead of doing so, he remained inactive for over two years.

With all respect, it is impossible for me to agree that the appellant was under any obligation to take

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action upon the notice served upon him by Quevillon, or that his rights under the promise of sale were in any wise affected by that notice. By virtue of the promise of sale the appellant was entitled to buy the property at any time during the currency of the lease for the stipulated price of $7,500. (S.V., 60.1.849.) On the other hand, the respondent Quevillon reserved to himself the right to sell the same property at any time and for any price obtainable, but that right so reserved could only be exercised subject to notice to the appellant, who then was entitled to the preference, that is to say, to the right to purchase the property by preference on the same terms as the intending purchaser offered. To exercise this right it was, of course, necessary for the appellant to be informed not only of the price offered, but also of the name of the purchaser, that he might be in a position to judge of the bona fides of the offer (see Beaudant, page 224), otherwise the tenant could not intelligently exercise his right to purchase subject to which the landlord retained the right to sell notwithstanding the option contained in the first part of the clause. I gather from the notes of judgment that Mr. Justice Cross is also of opinion that a notice such as was required was not given. He says:—

If Quevillon desired to sell to somebody else pending the option the covenant was that “il devra en signifier un avis par écrit au dit locataire et donner la préférence à ce dernier.”

The notice served called upon the plaintiff to sign a draft deed and intimated that if he did not comply, Quevillon would hold himself free to sell to another person, but it did not give the plaintiff a notice of the purport or terms of the sale desired to be made to another, as I think should have been done.

The plaintiff’s testimony is to the effect that he asked who the intending offerer was.

The defendant Quevillon admits that his intention was not to

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disclose the term or terms of the contemplated sale to the plaintiff, and he did not do so.

If, as found by Mr. Justice Cross, the required notice was not given, I am with all respect, unable to understand how it can be said that Quevillon complied with the express condition subject to which he retained his right to sell and what steps St. Denis was obliged to take in order to protect his option, which had still about three years to run.

Coming now to the sale to Payette. Assuming in favour of the respondents that the clause in the lease is analogous to a “pacte de préférence.” In ordinary circumstances the recourse of the appellant Payette would be limited to damages (Beaudant, Vente et Louage, p. 224). But the trial judge finds that Payette bound himself

de maintenir les baux existants, en percevant les loyers, à compter du premier juin aussi courant.

When examined as a witness, he says that he was careful to take legal advice as to the meaning of the clause above quoted. Payette also knew, before he bought, of the difficulty which had arisen between Quevillon and St. Denis about the sale and that the latter was insisting upon his right to have the terms and conditions under which the sale was to be made before exercising his right under his deed. And finally Payette served a protest on the appellant from which I quote the three following clauses:—

(a) Qu’en vertu d’un bail par le dit F. X. Quevillon à Paul Saint-Denis, devant Mtre J. H. A. Bohémier, N.P. le 3 juillet, 1908; ce dernier Paul Saint-Denis est locataire et occupant de partie des lieux sus-mentionnés, magasin No. 1580 et logement 1582 de la dite rue Saint-Hubert, et ce, pour le loyer et aux charges, clauses et considération spécifiées au dit bail;

(b) En conséquence les requérants, notifient et signifient au dit Paul Saint-Denis de se conformer au dit bail et à tout ce qui y est

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mentionné, tel que loyer, etc., en faveur des dits H. et D. Payette, en leur payant tous les loyers échus et à échoir pour la durée d’icelui.

Qu’à défaut par le dit Paul Saint-Denis d’exécuter ce que mentionné aux dits actes en leur faveur, les requérants prendront contre lui tous procédés légaux et de droit pour l’y contraindre et le tiennent responsable immédiatement de to us frais, perte, dépens, dommages et intérêts soufferts et à souffrir et du coût des présentes, copie et signification. Pour que le dit Paul Saint-Denis ne puisse plaider ignorance, je, dit notaire, lui ai signifié une copie de l’acte de vente suscité et des présentes en parlant comme susdit.

What could be the object or the meaning of this protest if not to notify the tenant that he was thereafter to deal with his new landlord on the same footing as with the old and to warn him that the “charges, clauses et considérations spécifiées” in his lease were to be considered as still binding upon both parties?

I was much impressed by the argument that the provision in the deed by Quevillon to Payette above referred to was merely to give effect to article 1663, C.C., but after much consideration I cannot escape from the conviction that in the protest served by Payette on St. Denis the former construed his deed of sale to mean that he, Payette, acquired all the rights and assumed all the obligations of his vendor Quevillon towards St. Denis, not only as landlord, but also as owner of the property.

The authorities referred to by the learned trial judge are conclusive in support of his judgment granting rescission on the ground of collusion. Alambert v.Reynal[2]; Dal. 1903, 2, 41 (vide note); Dal. 1903, 1, 38.

The appeal should be allowed with costs.

Idington J.—The appellant was lessee of certain property owned by the respondent Quevillon. By

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the terms of the lease appellant was given an option of purchase at a price named, during the entire term of the lease and a further option, as some put it, but as others contend in modification of said option, that in case the lessor should desire to sell to someone else for any price whatever that he must notify in writing the appellant lessee, and give the preference to the latter.

We have heard many diverse attempts in argument to put a construction upon the terms of this clause. Some of these attempts seemed to me to begin with adopting that which might best fit the legal consequences sought to be reached by him arguing.

I think we should, rather than beginning thus, begin by attempting to realize what the parties, in a business-like common-sense way, probably desired to accomplish and let the legal consequences be ascertained after so determining the realization of the actual purpose in hand when framing a somewhat ambiguously worded contract. If there were surrounding circumstances which might have helped they have not been brought much in evidence by those concerned.

I think in default thereof we are safe in assuming that the parties were rational business people who were fair-minded enough at that stage, whatever they may have become since, to try to arrange to give such advantages to the lessee as would be likely to induce him to give the best renting terms he could, in light of such advantages, afford to the advantage of the lessor. And on the other hand the lessor would desire whilst giving the option hot to be tied down thereto for five years if during that term he should find a purchaser. It was agreed accordingly in such case

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that the lessee should be notified of any such proposal and given his alternative option. That no doubt was fair and a very common way, and common sense way, of dealing with such a problem and I think the document should be construed accordingly.

If the respondent had acted thereupon in the way I have no doubt intended originally, he would have informed the appellant of the offer he had got and its terms and possibly as evidence of, or means of shewing, good faith the name of the purchaser also.

The latter, however, need not have to be pressed for, unless the terms are such as to arouse some suspicion, and it was not.

A full knowledge of the terms, however, was pressed for and refused. That part of the contract having been so broken could not affect the first option and hence that stood. Had it been honestly observed and the terms of the alleged, purchase disclosed and the chance given appellant to accept them or reject them then the lessee would have been driven to act. If he accepted in such case the matter of purchase was closed. If he in such event had rejected such terms then I think the respondent, Quevillon, would have been quite within his rights in making the sale and the first option might have ended.

I have no hesitation in accepting the version of appellant as to what transpired when he sought to learn the terms. The sort of contradiction given thereto is quite as emphatic as a straightforward assent thereto. So far I have little trouble in dealing with this case.

Before coming to what arises out of mere local practice and mode of thought, in regard to which I

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speak with diffidence, there are to be considered one or two interesting questions.

Is this contract a subject of registration? It has, as embodied in the lease which was duly registered, but by some error so as to omit an unimportant part of the land, been in fact registered.

Could it if embodied in a separate instrument have been registered?

It seems to me that article 2085 of the Civil Code was only designed to force any one having a registrable deed to register it under pain of losing his priority even over another who has notice of the right conferred thereby unless he is claiming through an insolvent.

As fit was in fact registered the operation of this article seems automatically eliminated from any possible bearing upon the question of what effect notice or knowledge on the part of Payette might otherwise have had on his good faith.

Hence it seems to me Payette whether acting in face of a contract affecting real property, or in face of a mere personal right such as his counsel contends this alleged unilateral contract to have been, must be held to have acted in bad faith.

In the latter point of view I agree with the learned trial judge that Payette has as a result of his bad faith become bound to observe the obligation thus resting upon Quevillon.

It is to be observed that the article 2085, C.C., does not in terms protect such a purchaser except as against

an unregistered right belonging to a third party and subject to registration.

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If as contended (of which I say nothing) this option was not the subject of registration then no protection exists for him acting in face of positive knowledge and he must abide by the general consequences attaching by law to such a course of conduct.

If on the other hand the unilateral contract is to be treated according to the authorities referred to in Mr. Justice Cross’ judgment, at lower part of page 438 of the official report of this case in volume 23, Cour du Banc du Roi, then there can be no doubt of the matter.

And I most respectfully submit that in view of what I have above set forth relative to the question of registration the learned judge’s view of the effect of the registry system upon said opinions, which he cites, is not well founded.

There is another view occurs to me, not in conflict with what the same learned judge has later on presented, and that is that an option such as this in question in a lease and forming part of the bargain between the parties might well be considered accessory thereto and part of the leasing contract and consideration for the terms in way of rental and, hence, cannot be dissociated from the lease in the way sought to be done by counsel for respondent. It is quite clear to my mind that many a man would for the sake of obtaining such an option in his lease be willing to increase the rent beyond what he would otherwise give and may have done so in this very case. The case where a tenant, as often happens, desires to make improvements (which the lessor cannot afford) in the property, and does so relying upon his option in the lease, is one where pushing too far the doctrine of the

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option being merely unilateral and hence merely a personal obligation dissociated from the lease proper might in the consequences work much injustice. As this suggestion only occurs to myself and was not dealt with in argument by the able counsel representing the parties herein, I put it forward with much hesitation.

Yet I must say that when I come to consider the question of what meaning is to be attached to the language of the deed from Quevillon to Payette and the obligation therein to maintain the lease and of the protest following it relative thereto, I think such considerations are entitled to some weight.

When people speak of a lease they usually mean all that exists therein and hardly ever think of severing all that is therein from that which in a narrow sense alone constitutes the lease.

Looking to the matter in that way makes me the more inclined to adopt the view pressed by Mr. Lafleur that the vendee of Quevillon assumed as part of his obligation to maintain the lease, to observe the option therein as well as all else and thereby preserve his vendor from damages for breach of anything arising from the failure of said vendor to maintain his tenant in possession. It may be answered the law in such case does so in case of registration. Granted so; what then is the use of any covenant unless to cover any risk beyond the mere tenant’s possession?

However all this may be I think the construction I put upon the much discussed clause giving appellant the option renders it unnecessary to rely upon this part of appellant’s contentions.

It is the different construction which the court of appeal has put upon the said clause that gives rise to

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any trouble. The other way of construing it which I adopt leads on the reasoning of Mr. Justice Cross to the same conclusion as the learned trial judge.

If anything in the objections of form of pleading and difficulty arising therefrom and practice I think they can be all overcome if necessary by amendment this court has the power and must observe the duty to make to render them conformable with the facts in order that justice be done.

I should, therefore, allow the appeal and restore the judgment of the learned trial judge with costs here and below.

Duff J.—First as to the construction of the pacte de préférence. I think the lessor’s right to sell was conditional upon his giving notice in writing to the lessee of the price at which he proposed to sell; and giving the lessee an opportunity to buy. Whether the lessee would be entitled to buy at the price mentioned in his option or at the price named by the lessor, or at the more favourable of the two is a question which I need not discuss. The answer to it is by no means obvious and I express no opinion on it. No notice was given and the sale was therefore a violation of the lessor’s obligation; and admittedly on this construction the lessee is entitled to damages; but in the view taken by the majority of the court it is unnecessary to consider how much.

Is the appellant entitled to enforce his option against Payette, the purchaser? He is not entitled to do so in my opinion. The lessee’s right under the promise of sale is not a jus in re. It is a jus in personam ad jus in rem acquirendum. The lessor’s obligation,

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therefore, does not (in the absence of special circumstances giving a right against the purchaser) bind the purchaser from him or the land in the hands of the purchaser.

Then, is there just reason for enforcing the obligation against the respondent on the ground of bad faith? Of bad faith there is really no evidence, in the sense that the transaction was colourable. Bad faith in the sense of the English equity there was, the transfer, that is to say, was taken with full notice of the appellant’s rights; but I have not found any authority for the proposition that, in the law of Quebec, to purchase property with the knowledge of the owner’s obligation in personam to sell it to another— there being no jus in re vested in the person in whom the obligation inheres—subjects the purchaser to a like obligation.

A more important question is as to the effect of the registration of the lease. Has the registration the effect of making the obligation binding on the lands in the hands of a purchaser? Does it transform a jus in personam into a jus in re? The point to be determined is a question of strict law and that is whether or not the promisee’s right is a droit réel within the meaning of article 2082, C.C. It is not a droit réel within the strict meaning of that term, that is to say, it is not a right in the thing or a right assertable generally against the world. I have examined the context fully (see articles 2089, 2098, 1601, 1663, 2128, 2102, 2106, 2016, 2168, C.C.) and I can see nothing justifying an interpretation inconsistent with this.

Anglin J.—There is no evidence in the record to sustain the defendant’s contention that the plaintiff

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parted with his interest in the lease in question and, therefore, has no status to maintain this action.

In the view I take it is not necessary to determine whether the option of purchase, which the lease gave to the lessee, was entirely independent of and unaffected by the pacte de préférence which follows it. There is a great deal to be said in support of the position taken by Mr. Justice Lafontaine that it was and that no action by the lessor under the latter clause could effect his obligations or the lessee’s rights under the earlier provision; and I am far from being convinced that his view is not correct. On the other hand, with great respect, I can find nothing to warrant the construction which its formal judgment shews was placed by the court of appeal on the pacte de préférence itself, namely, that by it the lessor, on receipt of any offer of purchase which he Was willing to accept, was empowered to call upon his lessee to exercise at once his option to buy under the former clause, with the consequence that, if he should decline or neglect to do so and the lessor should accept the offer and carry out the sate, all the lessee’s rights under the option would be extinguished. As I read the clause creating the pacte de préférence whatever may have been its effect (if any) upon the rights of the lessee under his option, it entitled him to a preferential right during the term of the lease to purchase the property at whatever price and upon whatever terms the lessor might desire to sell it to any other person.

It is obvious that it was essential to the lessee’s enjoyment of this right of preference that he should have been told the price and the terms which the

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lessor was prepared to accept from the other proposing purchaser. This information was refused him and he was notified that, although his lease had still more than three years to run, he must at once agree to buy the property under his option (which by its terms was to hold good until the termination of the lease), or forego all rights under it. Assuming, therefore, in favour of the lessor, that if proper notice had been given to enable the lessee to exercise his rights under the pacte de préférence his refusal to purchase under it would have extinguished his option to buy at $7,500, such notice was not given, the lessee never had an opportunity to buy at the price and on the terms which the lessor accepted from the Payettes, and it follows that not only was the pacte de préférence itself broken, but the lessee’s rights under his option remained intact.

I am, however, unable to agree with the learned trial judge that, notwithstanding the sale by the lessor to the Payettes and the, subsequent transfer from Didyme Payette to the defendant Henri Payette, the plaintiff is entitled to specific performance of his lessor’s promise to sell and transfer the property in question to him. Until he signified acceptance of his lessors’ offer to sell under the option, as Mr. Justice Lafontaine states, it gave him no interest in the land but merely a personal right against the lessor. I have not found in the Quebec registry law any provision for the registration of an unaccepted unilateral promise of sale or anything which would render a subsequent purchaser from the promisor liable to implement such a promise merely because it was included in a registered document, such as a lease, which contained other provisions susceptible of registration. With deference,

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I am unable to accept the view expressed by Mr. Justice Cross on this point.

The learned trial judge did not rest his judgment against the defendant Payette on this ground, but on his knowledge of the plaintiff’s option and fraudulent conspiracy on his part with his co-defendant to defeat it.

By the sale to the Payettes the lessor put it out of his power to fulfil his personal obligation to the plaintiff, and, although the Payettes took subject to the lease, I cannot find that they assumed Quevillon’s obligation to sell to the plaintiff, which was not an ordinary covenant incident or accessory to a lease, but a substantive and independent contract. Fuzier-Hermann, Rep., vo., “Bail en général,” Nos.2354 and 2355; Guillouard, “Louage,” No. 361. On the contrary, the clear purpose of Quevillon and the Payettes was that the latter should obtain a title free from any claim of the plaintiffs. Quevillon guaranteed the Payettes against disturbance by St. Denis. Nor does it appear, as was alleged, that the Payettes were parties to a fraudulent conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff of a right which they knew he had to obtain the property. They appear to have acted in the belief, and on the assurance of Quevillon based on opinions of counsel, that he was entitled to determine all the rights of St. Denis, except his interest as lessee, by calling on him, as he did, forthwith to exercise his option to purchase. Notice of the clause in the lease under which St. Denis claims did not, I think, under these circumstances (if, indeed, it ever would) suffice to establish bad faith on the part of the Payettes such as the learned trial judge thinks would render them

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liable at the suit of St. Denis to carry out Quevillon’s obligation to sell to him. Moreover, the deed to the Payettes was duly registered and the plaintiff has not asked to have it declared void or set aside.

Then it is urged that by delaying for over two years after the sale to the Payettes before bringing action and paying them meantime the rental for the property under his lease, the plaintiff acquiesced in the sale to them and abandoned all rights under his option to purchase. He had, no doubt, an immediate right of action against Quevillon for his breach of the pacte de préférence by the sale to the Payettes. It may be that he could have treated that sale as a repudiation by Quevillon of the option as well and sued him thereupon for breach of his promise to sell. Rut the lease gave the plaintiff the right to exercise his option at any time during the term, and I do not think he can be charged with default or laches in asserting that right during its currency. Notwithstanding what he had done the lessor might re-acquire the property or otherwise put himself in a position to meet the exigency of the plaintiff’s option. I cannot think that the lessee was bound to treat the sale as a repudiation and breach of the option and elect promptly to bring action or to abandon his rights. He was entitled to wait until it suited him (of course, within the term of the lease) to make his demand upon the lessor to implement his promise to sell and on failure to meet that demand to bring action for the breach then committed. I cannot understand on what basis the position can be maintained that the lessor’s own wrongful act in selling, without giving his lessee the benefit of his pacte de préférence and in violation of the option, imposed upon the lessee an obligation to assert

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his rights under that option at a period earlier than the option itself required. The plaintiff certainly did nothing which amounted to a positive or direct renunciation of his rights, and, under the circumstances, there was, in my opinion, no delay on his part which implied an abandonment, or barred his assertion of them.

I am, for these reasons, of the opinion that the appellant is entitled to succeed as against the defendant Quevillon for breach of his personal obligation, but that the recovery must be limited to damages. There is no material in the record, however, to enable us to determine the quantum of the damages which should be awarded. Unless the parties can agree upon the amount for which judgment should be entered for the plaintiff, the action must be remitted to the Superior Court for the assessment of his damages.

The appellant should have his costs throughout as against the defendant Quevillon. Under all the circumstances, while the appeal against the Payettes must be dismissed, I think it should be without costs.

Brodeur J.—Il s’agit d’une action en passation de titre qui a été maintenue par la cour supérieure et renvoyée par la cour d’appel.

Le demandeur appelle de ce dernier jugement.

Les circonstances qui ont donné lieu à cette poursuite sont les suivantes.

Le 3 juillet, 1908, l’intimé, Quevillon, a loué à l’appelant St. Denis une certaine propriété pour cinq ans. Le bail contenait la clause suivante, qui a donné lieu au présent litige:—

Et le dit locataire aura en outre le droit d’acheter l’immeuble ci-dessus loué * * * en aucun temps pendant la durée du présent

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bail moyennant le prix de $7,500, dont $3,000 seront payables comptant et la balance par versements annuels de mille piastres, avec intérêt au taux de six pour cent par an; et dans le cas où le dit bailleur désirerait vendre à quelque autre pour un prix quelconque, il devra en signifier un avis par écrit au dit locataire, et donner la préférence à ce dernier.

Ce bail fut enregistré sur la propriété.

Le 28 mai, 1910, le locateur, Quevillon, fit signifier un protêt à l’appelant et le mit en demeure d’acheter la propriété suivant la promesse de vente contenue au bail pour le prix de sept mille cinq piastres, et, qu’à défaut par lui de ce faire, il déclarait qu’il vendrait alors aux conditions qu’il jugerait à propos.

Il ne dénonça pas dans ce protêt les conditions auxquelles il disposerait de sa propriété.

Le 8 juin, 1910, Quevillon, l’intimé, vendit la propriété à Payette pour la somme de $7,925, dont $500 comptant et la balance qui était stipulée payable au vendeur devait être acquittée par versements de $400 par année. Il était déclaré en outre dans l’acte de vente entre Quevillon et Payette que ce dernier maintiendrait les baux existants.

Le demandeur a, le 22 novembre, 1912, institué son action en passation de titre qu’il a dirigée et contre Quevillon et contre Payette, en alléguant qu’ils s’étaient concertés ensemble pour le priver de ses droits.

Il prétend que la promesse de vente a toujours continué de subsister malgré la vente faite à Payette, que ce dernier, en s’engageant de maintenir le bail, a assumé la promesse de vente qui y était stipulée.

Les défendeurs prétendent, au contraire, que le défaut par St. Denis d’exercer sa promesse de vente a mis fin à son droit, que le demandeur était libre de vendre la propriété à Payette et qu’il n’était pas tenu

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de lui dénoncer les clauses auxquelles il vendait la propriété à Payette.

La cour supérieure a maintenu l’action, mais ce jugement a été renversé par la cour d’appel.

Cette clause du contrat stipulant promesse de vente et préférence est loin d’être claire et peut donner lieu à différentes interprétations.

Après avoir mûrement considéré le contrat et les circonstances établies par la preuve, j’en suis venu à la conclusion que le contrat pourvoit à une promesse de vente unilatérale et à un pacte de préférence qui doivent cependant s’interpréter l’un par l’autre. Nous avons d’abord le locateur qui promet à son locataire de lui vendre pendant la durée du bail la propriété louée moyennant le prix de $7,500. Mais en même temps cette obligation de sa part se trouverait à disparaître au cas où il trouverait un acheteur pour sa propriété et alors il ne pourrait en disposer qu’en donnant la préférence à son locataire.

Voilà pour l’interprétation du contrat. Maintenant Quevillon a-t-il rempli ses obligations?

Je considère que la mise en demeure qu’il a faite à St. Denis était insuffisante. Il aurait dû lui dénoncer les conditions auxquelles il vendait à Payette, le prix, les termes de paiement, enfin toutes les conditions de la vente. Mais Quevillon ne s’est pas soumis à cette obligation. Comme je le disais tout à l’heure, il a simplement demandé par son protêt à St. Denis d’acheter la propriété aux conditions contenues dans le bail.

Quevillon a donc engagé sa responsabilité. Il nous reste à savoir si le demandeur avait droit à une action en passation de titre et de se faire mettre en

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possession de la propriété, on bien s’il n’avait droit qu’à des dommages.

Les intimés prétendent que la propriété étant passée entre les mains d’un tiers, le demandeur n’aurait pas le droit de revendiquer.

Je considère que le concert frauduleux du promettant vendeur et du tiers acquéreur et l’obligation du tiers acquéreur de maintenir le bail m’amènent à considérer comme bien fondée l’action en revendication.

Sur l’effet de l’enregistrement d’une promesse de vente, l’honorable Juge Lafontaine, en cour supérieure, déclare formellement dans son jugement qu’une promesse unilatérale de vente, sans promesse réciproque d’acheter, de même que la promesse de pacte de préférence, ne confèrent aucun droit réel et que, lorsque le promettant vendeur a cessé d’être propriétaire, le recours que le promettant acheteur peut avoir est un recours en dommages-intérêts.

La cour d’appel, sur ce point, a décidé, au contraire, que:—

1. Un acte enregistré qui affecte un immeuble, tel qu’une promesse de vente ou option d’acheter, peut être opposé à un tiers acheteur qui a un titre subséquent à cet enregistrement, nos lois d’enregistrement n’étant pas limitées dans leurs effets au contrat translatif de propriété ou aux droits susceptibles d’hypothèques.

Je serais porté à croire avec la cour d’appel que tout droit dans une propriété résultant soit d’une promesse de vente, soit d’un autre contrat, est un droit réel et susceptible d’être enregistré et je citerais à l’appui de cette opinion Dalloz, “Biens,” No. 151.

La loi ne dit pas qu’il n’y a que les contrats synallagmatiques, ou bilatéraux, qui soient susceptibles d’être enregistrés; mais tout acte qui est de nature à affecter une propriété et à conférer un droit réel sur

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l’immeuble peut donner lieu à l’enregistrement. (Aubry & Rau, vol. 2, § 209, note 1; Mourlon, Revue Pratique, vol. 2, p. 193, note 39.)

Il nie semble que la promesse de vente et la faculté de réméré devraient être traitées de la même façon. Dans la faculté de réméré comme dans la promesse de vente le créancier de l’obligation n’est pas tenu d’en demander l’execution. Il n’y a aucune obligation de sa part d’acheter. Cependant si la faculté de réméré a été enregistrée, l’acheteur ne pourra pas disposer de la propriété; (art. 2102, C.C.).

Mais il n’est pas nécessaire pour moi de disposer de cette question d’enregistrement, vu la conclusion à laquelle j’en suis venu sur les deux autres points de la cause.

Je considère en effet que le concert frauduleux qui s’est fait entre Quevillon et Payette et l’obligation assumée par Payette de maintenir le bail engagent la responsabilité de ce dernier et le forcent à donner suite à la promesse de vente contenue dans le bail.

Dans une cause analogue à celle-ci, la cour de cassation, en France, a décidé (Dalloz, 1903-1-38) que l’on peut annuler la vente faite au mépris d’un pacte de préférence et condamner le tiers acquéreur à la restitution de la chose s’il est constaté en fait que le tiers acquéreur subrogé par son titre aux droits et obligations résultant d’un bail a connu l’existence de ce droit de préférence et l’intention du bénéficiaire d’en profiter.

Dans la présente cause nous avons une promesse de vente stipulée en faveur de l’appelant par l’intimé Quevillon dans le bail qu’il lui a fait de la propriété

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en question. Cette promesse de vente, enregistrée sur la propriété, était connue au défendeur Payette.

La preuve démontre, ainsi que le décide le juge instructeur, que Payette et Quevillon s’étaient concertés pour la faire échouer. Dans ce cas il n’est pas douteux que le tiers acquéreur devient obligé vis-à-vis du titulaire.

De plus, Payette, en s’obligeant de maintenir les baux existants sur la propriété, est devenu substitué aux droits et obligations de Quevillon lui-même. Il s’est contractuellement substitué à l’obligation qui pesait sur son vendeur et il est tenu comme l’était celui-ci.

Le titulaire de la promesse est donc en droit d’intenter contre le tiers acquéreur l’action réelle en délivrance de la chose dérivant du contrat qui les lie désormais et de provoquer en conséquence l’annulation de la vente qui lui fait grief. Dalloz, 1885-2-259.

Et même au cas où le tiers acquéreur n’aurait pas pris vis-à-vis de son vendeur l’engagement de subir la réalisation de la promesse de préférence, s’il s’est concerté avec le vendeur pour déposséder le titulaire du pacte de préférence, ce dernier pourrait tout de même provoquer la nullité de la vente comme faite en fraude de ses droits. Dalloz 1849-2-46.

Mais on dit que dans le cas actuel Payette en s’obligeant de maintenir le bail n’a pas entendu par là assumer des obligations étrangères aux rapports entre locateur et locataire. Pothier, “Louage,” No. 299, dit:—

Lorsque celui à qui j’ai succédé à titre singulier à un héritage m’a charge de l’entretien du bail * * * il est censé * * * m’en avoir aussi cédé tous les droits et actions.

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Et il a été jugé par la cour de Dijon que l’acquéreur d’un immeuble est obligé de respecter non-seulement le bail proprement dit mais les conventions qui y sont jointes et forment avec lui un tout indivisible. Sirey 1875-2-33.

Dans cette cause, jugée par la cour de Dijon, le locateur s’était obligé de fournir une matière première pour l’exploitation d’une usine que le locataire devait installer sur la propriété louée. Il vendit plus tard la propriété à une autre personne avec obligation de maintenir le bail et la cour sa décidé que ce nouveau propriétaire était obligé non-seulement de respecter le bail proprement dit mais les conventions qui y ont été jointes.

Il est vrai que cette décision a été critiqué par Guillouard et Fuzier-Herman. Il me semble cependant que le fait pour un tiers acquéreur d’assumer les obligations d’un bail doit couvrir tout ce qui y est mentionné, car autrement les stipulations en faveur du locataire et pour lesquelles il est censé avoir donné considération se trouveraient annulées.

Dans la cause décidée par la cour de cassation et qui est rapportée dans Dalloz, 1903-1-38, les tribunaux ont décidé que le tiers acquéreur était supposé assumer toutes les obligations contractées par son vendeur dans le bail.

Cette décision de la cour de cassation confirme par conséquent la position prise par la cour de Dijon en 1875.

Je considère que dans ces circonstances le demandeur avait le droit d’instituer son action en passation

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de titre, que le jugement qui a renvoyé cette action doit être renversé et que le dispositif du jugement de la cour supérieure devrait être rétabli.

Appeal allowed with costs.

Solicitors for the appellant: Perron, Taschereau, Rinfret, Genest, Billette & Plimsol.

Solicitors for the respondents: Robillard, Julien, Tétreau & Marin.