Supreme Court of Canada
Canadian Northern Quebec Railway Co. v. Gignac, (1915) 51 S.C.R. 136
Date: 1915-02-10
The Canadian Northern Quebec Railway Company (Defendants) Appellants;
and
Gilbert Gignac (Plaintiff) Respondent.
1915: February 5, 10.
Present: Davies, Idington, Duff, Anglin and Brodeur JJ.
ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT, SITTING IN REVIEW, PROVINCE OF QUEBEC.
Appeal—Jurisdiction—Judgment of Court of Review—Modification of trial judgment—Affirmance—“Supreme Court Act,” R.S.C., 1906, c. 139, s. 40.
An action to restrain the flooding of the plaintiff’s land from the defendants’ railway ditch, was maintained by the Superior Court and an order made directing the railway company to construct the necessary works to cause the trouble to cease within a time mentioned, failing which the plaintiff was authorised to do the works at the company’s expense. On an appeal from this judgment, the Court of Review, of its own motion, added more specific directions as to the works to be done and, instead of authorizing the plaintiff to construct the works, in case of default, reserved his recourse for future damages and dismissed the appeal.
Held, that the judgment of the Court of Review had confirmed that of the court of first instance and, therefore, an appeal therefrom would lie to the Supreme Court of Canada under the provisions of section 40 of the “Supreme Court Act,” R.S.C. 1906, ch. 139. Hull Electric Co. v. Clement (41 Can. S.C.R. 419), followed.
MOTIONS to set aside the judgment of the registrar, acting as a judge in chambers, affirming the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Canada to entertain an appeal from the Superior Court, sitting in review, at Quebec, and also to quash the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
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The respondent moved to set aside the judgment of the registrar and also to quash the appeal for want of jurisdiction on the grounds that, as the judgment of the Court of Review had modified the judgment of the Superior Court, an appeal lay to the Court of King’s Bench, appeal side, and, consequently, that an appeal would not lie from that judgment to the Supreme Court of Canada. The circumstances of the case are stated in the judgment of the registrar, as follows:—
Cannon K.C. for motion.
Belleau K.C. contra.
The Registrar:—This is a motion to affirm jurisdiction of the court.
It would appear from the pleadings that the lands of the plaintiff, having been by the works of the defendants compelled to receive more water than they were by nature called upon to carry, the plaintiff brought an action in 1911 for redress. The parties came to an agreement on October 28th, 1911, set out in the statement of claim, which provided for the construction by the defendants of certain drainage works which would relieve the plaintiff from the injuries complained of and the action was thereupon dropped, the defendants paying the costs and damages.
Subsequently the defendants altered the drainage system with the result that the plaintiff’s land was again subjected to an overflow of water and the present action was taken in which the plaintiff by the 10th paragraph of his pleadings, declared himself to
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be the proprietor of the lands in question and, by the 11th, declared that he was not subjected to any servitude with respect to the water now being brought Upon his property by the defendants. He also asked that it be declared that the defendants should make the works necessary to relieve him from the injuries complained of and in default of so doing that he, the plaintiff, be authorized to make these works at the cost and charges of the defendants and that the defendants be ordered to pay damages to the amount of $250.
The defendants denied generally the allegations of the plaintiff and also alleged that the works subsequently made by them and which the plaintiff now complains of were so made at his express request and that the result of the works was to carry the water in its natural channel as it existed before the construction of the railway.
The case was tried before the Hon. Mr. Justice Letellier, who gave judgment as follows:—
Nous maintenons l’action et déclarons que la défenderesse n’a aucun droit d’exercer sur la propriété du demandeur la servitude d’écoulement des eaux qui résulte des travaux de la construction de son chemin de fer; et nous lui ordonnons de cesser l’exercice de cette servitude et de cesser de faire couler dans le fossé de ligne et la décharge du demandeur, les eaux qu’elle lui envoie venant dans le fossé de ligne et conduite par le talus et le fossé du chemin de fer; et nous lui ordonnons de faire les travaux nécessaires à cette fin, et qu’à son défaut de la faire avant le mois d’octobre, 1914, le demandeur soit autorisé à faire ces travaux aux frais de la défenderesse et à ses dépens, en par lui donnant avis du temps où il fera ces travaux; et nous condamnons de plus la défenderesse à payer au demandeur la somme de $250 de dommages avec intérêt et dépens, de l’action.
The defendants thereupon inscribed in review where the judgment was confirmed in the following language:—
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Confirme le dit jugement avec dépens, sujet à la modification suivante du dispositif qui se lira comme suit:—
Nous maintenons l’action et déclarons que la défenderesse n’a aucun droit d’exercer sur la propriété du demandeur la servitude d’écoulement des eaux, lequel résulte des travaux de construction du chemin de fer:—Nous ordonnons de plus à la défenderesse de discontinuer l’exercice de telle servitude et de cesser de faire se déverser dans le fossé de ligne et les décharges du demandeur les eaux qui s’y écoulent par suite du talus et du fossé du chemin de fer; et nous ordonnons à la défenderesse de faire les travaux nécessaires pour mettre fin au dit trouble conformément à la transaction intervenue entre les parties le vingt-huit octobre 1911, et à défaut par elle de ce faire d’hui au premier mai prochain, la Cour réserve au demandeur tout recours pour dommages ultérieurs, et nous condamnons de plus la défenderesse à payer au demandeur la somme de deux cent cinquante piastres de dommages avec intérêt et les dépens de l’action.
The defendants now desire to appeal from the judgment of the Court of Review, claiming that no appeal lies to the Court of King’s Bench and that an appeal lies to the Supreme Court of Canada under section 40 of the “Supreme Court Act,” which, reads as follows:—
In the Province of Quebec an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment of the Superior Court in Review where that court confirms the judgment of first instance, and its judgment is not appealable to the Court of King’s Bench, but is appealable to His Majesty in Council. 54-55 V. c. 25, s. 2.
It will be perceived that, substantially, the only modifications made by the Court of Review of the judgment of the Superior Court are two:—
1. That while the earlier judgment simply orders that the necessary works be done to put an end to the cause of complaint, the subsequent judgment provides that the manner of doing these works shall be that provided for in the agreement between the parties above referred to and,—
2. That in case of default instead of authorizing the plaintiff to make the works himself, it reserves to him the right of further recourse by action in the
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event of future damages. The question between the parties in the present motion, therefore, resolves itself shortly into this.: Has the judgment in the Court of Review confirmed, although modifying, the judgment below, or has it rectified an error in that judgment? It is to be noted that the Court of Review expressly uses the words “confirme le dit jugement” and that the modification in question which the plaintiff now claims to be so material to his interests, was not asked for by him by way of a cross-appeal, but was of its own motion granted to him by the court as a result of the defendants’ appeal.
Two cases are cited by the defendants in favour of their motion. The first is Beauchêne v. Labaie, a decision of the Court of Queen’s Bench of Quebec, which is very much in point. The judgment turned upon the interpretation which should be placed upon what now appears as article 43(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure of Quebec, which provides that an appeal shall lie to the Court of King’s Bench sitting in appeal, except:—
At the suit of the party who has inscribed in review a cause in which the sum demanded or the value of the thing claimed amounts to or exceeds five hundred dollars, and who has proceeded to judgment on such inscription, when the judgment confirms that rendered in the first instance.
In that case upon an appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Superior Court the Court of Review said
Considérant que le dit jugement est correct quant au droit du demandeur Labbé au pétitoire, c’est à dire, à la propriété de l’immeuble qu’il réclame, maintient cette partie du jugement, mais quant à la condemnation pour deux années de fruits et revenus, considérant que le demandeur n’a acquis l’immeuble que le 4 février, 1874, et qu’il n’a pas eu cession de fruits et revenus précédant cette
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date, la cour ici présente revise et renverse cette partie du dit jugement avec dépens de la cause en Cour Supérieure à Arthabaska contre le défendeur.
Notwithstanding this modification of the judgment of the Superior Court, it was held by the Court of Queen’s Bench that the judgment of the court below was confirmed by the judgment of the Court of Review and that no further appeal lay.
The defendant also relies on the case of Hall Electric Railway Co. v. Clément, where a judgment for the plaintiff in the Superior Court for $6,000 was, upon appeal by the defendant to the Court of Review, reduced to $3,500. The defendant, dissatisfied with this, appealed to the Court of King’s Bench, where it was held that no appeal lay, because the judgment in review had confirmed the judgment below. The judgment of the Court of King’s Bench was affirmed by the Supreme Court, this court holding that the defendant, when dissatisfied with the judgment of the Court of Review, should have appealed directly to the Supreme Court, it being a case in which no appeal lay to the Court of King’s Bench because the Court of Review had confirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.
The plaintiff relies on the case of Fraser v. Burnette, but in that case the Court of Review expressly and in terms reversed the judgment of the Superior Court. He also relies upon Simpson v. Palliser, but in that case also the Court of Review in terms declared that there was error in the judgment of the Superior Court, and this is the ground upon which the Supreme Court said that no appeal lay from the
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judgment of the Court of Review to this court, but only to the Court of King’s Bench.
It appears to me that a review of these decisions justifies it being held that where the judgment in review confirms the judgment below in favour of the plaintiff, although some additional or other relief is also given to the plaintiff, not as a result of a cross-appeal by him, but by the court of its own motion for the purpose of more effectively carrying out the judgment of the trial judge, no appeal lies to the Court of King’s Bench by the defendant, and, therefore, an appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court of Canada, if the judgment would have been the subject of a further appeal to the Privy Council, had the case been a proper subject for an appeal to the Court of King’s Bench. In the present case it is admitted that had the judgment in review simply confirmed the judgment below, the case would have been appealable to the King in His Privy Council. This is an action négatoire raising an issue with regard to a servitude which under the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court is a matter concerning “titles to land” and is, therefore, appealable to the Privy Council under article 68, sub-section 2, of the Code of Civil Procedure, and is also appealable to the Supreme Court, where substantially the same language is used in section 46, sub-section (b), of the “Supreme Court Act.”
I am, therefore, of the opinion that the jurisdiction of the court should be affirmed.
A motion is now pending returnable on the 1st day of the February session to quash this appeal for want of jurisdiction. I would have refused to entertain the present motion until the court had dealt with the
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motion to quash were it not that both parties were desirous of having the present motion disposed of because, if I were against the jurisdiction of the court, the defendant would be within the delays provided by the Code of Civil Procedure for launching an appeal from the judgment of the Court of Review to the Court of King’s Bench, but the time for taking such proceedings will expire before the 2nd of February. My order as to costs, therefore, will be that the costs of this motion be costs to the defendant in any event of the cause unless the motion to quash is granted, in which event my order affirming jurisdiction will, of course, fall.
E. Belleau K.C. for the respondent, supported the motions.
L. A. Cannon K.C. for the appellants, contra.
Davies J.—I concurred with the judgment of this court in the case of Hull Electric Co. v. Clément only because, as I stated, the settled jurisprudence of the Province of Quebec upon the meaning of sub-section 4 of article 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure of Quebec was that a judgment of the Court of Review confirming one of the Superior Court and affirming the right of the plaintiff to recover in the action, but reducing the amount of damages awarded to plaintiff was a confirmation of the judgment of the Court of Review within the meaning of the article of the Code referred to and was not appealable to the Court of King’s Bench.
I think the registrar was right in affirming our jurisdiction to hear this appeal direct from the judgment
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of the Court of Review which confirmed, but modified, that of the Superior Court; and that the appeal from his judgment should be dismissed with costs and the motion to quash the appeal should be refused with costs.
No absolute rule can, in my opinion, be laid down. The question in each case must be not simply whether there was a formal confirmation of the Superior Court, but whether the modification was a substantial modification of the judgment of the lower court. Here the substantial question in controversy was decided by both courts in respondent’s favour; the modification related merely to the manner in which effect should be given to that judgment.
I think, therefore, that no appeal would, under the jurisprudence of that court, lie to the Court of King’s Bench; but, as it is conceded one would lie to the Privy Council, the appeal will lie here.
Idington J.—This appeal seems to me within the principle affirmed by the judgment of this court in Hull Electric Co. v. Clément, and, hence, the motion to quash must be refused and the counter motion of appellant against the ruling of the registrar dismissed, each with costs of motion.
Duff J.—I concur in the result.
Anglin J.—In my opinion the jurisdiction of this court to entertain this appeal is settled by Hull Electric Co. v. Clément. The Court of Review pro tanto affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court against the defendant, and from the judgment so
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affirmed it has a right of appeal to this court. Unless the plaintiff should launch and maintain a cross-appeal the variation of the judgment made by the Court of Review will not be a subject for consideration in this court.
The appellant is entitled to the costs of the motions before us to quash and by way of appeal from the order of the registrar affirming jurisdiction.
Brodeur J.—Il s’agit de savoir si nous avons juridiction pour entendre cette cause.
Le demandeur intimé, Gignac, avait, en 1911, institué une action négatoire contre l’appelante en alléguant que cette dernière laissait écouler sur son terrain des eaux qu’il n’était pas tenu de recevoir. Une transaction était intervenue le 28 octobre, 1911, et la compagnie appelante avait reconnu comme bien fondées les plaintes du demandeur, Gignac, et s’était engagée de faire certains travaux.
Les travaux convenus auraient été exécutés mais ils furent subséquemment démolis par la compagnie et alors la présente action négatoire a été instituée. Cette action a été maintenue par la Cour Supérieure dans les termes suivants:—
Nous maintenons l’action et déclarons que la défenderesse n’a aucun droit d’exercer sur la propriété du demandeur la servitude d’écoulement des eaux qui résulte des travaux de la construction de son chemin de fer; et nous lui ordonnons de cesser l’exercice de cette servitude et de cesser de faire couler dans le fossé de ligne et la décharge du demandeur, les eaux qu’êlle lui envoie venant dans le fossé de ligne et conduite par le talus et le fossé du chemin de fer; et nous lui ordonnons de faire les travaux nécessaires à cette fin, et qu’à son défaut de les faire avant le mois d’octobre 1914, le demandeur soit autorisé à faire ces travaux aux frais de la défenderesse et à ses dépens, en par lui donnant avis du temps où il fera ces travaux; et nous condamnons de plus la défenderesse
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à payer au demandeur la somme de $250. de dommages avec intérêt et dépens de l’action.
La défenderesse a porté la cause devant la Cour de Revision, où le jugement fut confirmé dans les termes suivants:—
La Cour * * *
Confirme le dit jugement avec dépens, sujet à là modification suivante du dispositif qui se lira comme suit:—
Nous maintenons l’action et déclarons que la défenderesse n’a aucun droit d’exercer sur la propriété du demandeur la servitude d’écoulement des eaux, lequel résulte des travaux de construction du chemin de fer.: Nous ordonnons de plus à la défenderesse de discontinuer l’exercice de telle servitude et de cesser de faire se déverser dans le fossé de ligne et les décharges du demandeur les eaux qui s’y écoulent par suite du talus et du fossé du chemin de fer; et nous ordonnons à la défenderesse de faire les travaux nécessaires pour mettre fin au dit trouble conformément à la transaction intervenue entre les parties le vingt-huit octobre, 1911, et a défaut par elle de ce faire d’hui au premier mai prochain, la Cour réserve au demandeur tout recours pour dommages ultérieurs, et nous condamnons de plus la défenderesse a payer au demandeur la somme de deux cent cinquante piastres de dommages avec intérêt et les dépens de l’action.
L’appelante appelle à cette cour du jugement de la Cour de Revision.
En vertu de la section 40 de l’acte de la Cour Suprême, il y a appel devant cette cour dе tout jugement de la Cour de Revision confirmant celui de la Cour supérieure.
Je dois dire que par contre, en vertu de l’article 43 du Code de Procédure Civile, les jugements de la Cour Supérieure confirmés par la Cour de Revision ne sont pas susceptibles d’appels à la Cour du Banc du Roi.
Nous avons donc à décider si dans la présente cause le jugement a quo a confirmé celui de la Cour Supérieure.
Comme on le voit, l’action négatoire a été maintenue
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en Cour Supérieure et en Cour de Revision. Suivant la demande qui en avait été faite par l’action, la défenderesse fut condamnée, en outre, à faire certains travaux.
En Cour Supérieure on avait ordonné de faire les travaux nécessaires.
En Cour de Revision on a spécifié que les travaux devraient être faits suivant la convention des parties. Mais dans son principe le jugement de la Cour Supérieure est le même; on a simplement spécifié plus clairement la nature des travaux à faire.
Il n’y a pas de doute que la partie du jugement qui maintenait l’action négatoire puisse être portée devant cette cour. En effet, la Cour de Revision sur ce point a confirmé simplement le jugement de la Cour Supérieure et la compagnie appelante n’aurait pas le droit d’aller devant la Cour du Banc du Roi pour faire renverser cette partie du jugement.
C’est du moins la pratique suivie par la Cour du Banc du Roi depuis la décision rendue en 1876 dans la cause de Beauchêne v. LaBaie. Et la Cour Suprême a décidé dans le même sens dans la cause de Bull Electric Co. v. Clément.
L’autre partie du jugement qui détermine comment les travaux devront être exécutés n’est que la conséquence de l’action négatoire elle-même. Elle ne touche pas à la substance du litige, mais elle rend plus explicite l’ordonnance de la Cour Supérieure.
Elle enlève, il est vrai, au demandeur la faculté d’exécuter lui-même les travaux. Mais il ne se plaint pas de cela. Le jugement a quo d’ailleurs déclare formellement que l’on confirme celui de la Cour Supérieure.
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Dans le cas où un jugement de la Cour Supérieure est partiellement confirmé ou infirmé par la Cour de Revision, la Cour Suprême devra exercer sa discrétion pour décider si l’appel doit être porté directement devant elle, ou bien s’il doit au préalable être soumis à la Cour de Banc du Roi.
Garsonnet, Procédure Civile, vol. 5, p. 328.
Le législateur a voulu évidemment éviter les appels trop nombreux et alors il a décrété que les jugements confirmés par la Cour de Revision seraient immédiatement portés au Conseil Privé ou à la Cour Suprême. Dans les jugements partiellement confirmés, la Cour Suprême rencontrera certainement mieux les vues du législateur en permettant de suite l’appel qu’en ordonnant aux parties de passer par la Cour de Banc du Roi.
Les motions doivent être renvoyées avec dépens.
Motions refused with costs.
Solicitors for the appellants: Taschereau, Roy, Cannon, Parent & Fitzpatrick.
Solicitors for the respondent: Bellean, Baillargeon & Belleau.
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