Supreme Court of Canada
Pratte v. Voisard, (1918) 57 S.C.R. 184
Date: 1918-10-08
Dame O. Pratte and vir (Plaintiffs) Appellants;
and
Narcisse Voisard (Defendant) Respondent.
1918: June 5, 6; 1918: October 8.
Present: Sir Charles Fitzpatrick C.J. and Davies, Idington, Anglin and Brodeur JJ.
ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF KING'S BENCH, APPEAL SIDE, PROVINCE OF QUEBEC.
Evidence—Forgery—Comparison of handwriting—Experts.
Per Fitzpatrick C.J. and Anglin and Brodeur JJ.—Under the law governing proof in the Province of Quebec, the testimony of experts in handwriting by comparison is admissible.
Per Brodeur J.—Evidence by experts cannot be set aside in a court of appeal, when it has been admitted without objection at the trial. Schwersenski v. Vineberg (19 Can. S.C.R. 243) followed.
Judgment of the Court of King's Bench, appeal side, reversed, Davies J. dissenting.
APPEAL from the judgment of the Court of King's Bench, appeal side, reversing the judgment of the Superior Court, Drouin J., District of Three Rivers, which maintained the plaintiffs' action with costs.
The material facts of the case are fully stated in the judgments now reported.
Alex. Taschereau K.C. and Fabre Surveyer K.C. for the appellants.
Belcourt K.C. and St. Laurent K.C. for the respondent.
The Chief Justice.—This is an action to set aside a will as fraudulent.
The testator, Edouard Voisard, was a farmer and a bachelor. He died on the 11th September, 1915, at the age of 76, shortly after meeting with a serious accident. He left an estate valued at about $40,000.
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At the time of his death, he had, living with him, his nephew, Narcisse Voisard, and two old women named Louise and Olivine Lescadre. These women, who were sisters, had kept house for him, and his father before him, for many years.
In answer to the inquiries of the relatives who attended the funeral, Louise Lescadre said that she knew of no will made by the deceased. But four days later she produced a holograph will dated 15th August, 1915, which she said she had found under the mattress of the deceased's bed. This will, which was proved on the 29th September, 1915, is the one now sought to be set aside.
At the trial documents admittedly in the handwriting of the testator and of Louise Lescadre respectively were put in for the purpose of comparison. Mr. Justice Drouin, by whom the case was tried, observes that the writings of the testator shew him to have been a man of education, capable of expressing himself correctly, whilst in the will we find:—
une ignare manière de dire, une orthographe pleine d'incorrections et une écriture bien inférieure à la sienne.
And, comparing the writing of Louise Lescadre with that of the will, he says:—
La similitude est tellement frappante et probante qu'elle saute aux yeux des moins experts;
and further:—
la physionomie générale de l'écriture est aussi parfaitement la même que différente de celle des écrits prouvés avoir été faits par Edouard Voisard.
The learned judge also says that as a witness Louise Lescadre shewed herself unworthy of credit, and he concludes that the will in its entirety was composed and written by her.
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The Court of King's Bench reversed the judgment, Cross and Carroll JJ. dissenting.
Mr. Justice Pelletier, who delivered the judgment of the majority of the court, admits, as every one necessarily must, that at first sight a comparison of the handwritings is most convincing in favour of the appellant's theory. But, he says:—
Si le procédé de la comparaison des écritures n'est pas infaillible, y a-t-il au dossier, dans l'ensemble, la preuve suffisante pour maintenir l'action.
It must, indeed, be admitted that proof by comparison of handwriting is not infallible. But, where it is so certain, as the trial judge has found, it must have great weight. For, in many cases, what other evidence of forgery could be made? Evidence in support of or against it can, however, of course, be offered.
Counsel for the respondent strenuously argued that "under the law governing proof in the Province of Quebec, the testimony of experts in handwriting by comparison is not recognised or admitted." And in support of this general proposition, reference was made to Paige v. Ponton; Deschénes v. Langlois; Banque Nationale v. Tremblay. The same objection must exist to all opinion evidence, whether it be medical testimony or that of a chemist, engineer or other scientist, and the disastrous results that would necessarily follow from the adoption of such a principle must be obvious to all who are concerned with the administration of justice. This objection, cannot, in my opinion, be maintained in view of the provisions of articles 1204, 1205 and 1224 of the Civil Code. The language of article 1205 seems wide enough to include evidence of handwriting experts. True, it is merely
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opinion evidence, but if given by honest and competent persons, it must be of assistance to the court. And, in a case of this sort, it is difficult to see how the alleged forgery could be exposed except by experts and competent opinion evidence. The rule contended for by the respondent would, I repeat, frequently be a serious obstacle in the administration of justice, and, as was recently said:—
it would, if adopted, create unlimited opportunities for designing persons to forge the name of deceased persons to important documents and then swear it through.
If the cases relied upon at the argument are carefully examined, it will be seen that they afford no support for the respondent's somewhat startling proposition. The judges who sat in these cases merely say that the evidence of an expert will be given weight according to the reasons given in support of it. In Paige v. Ponton, Sanborn J. says, at p. 158:—
There is, undoubtedly, great uncertainty in the proof of writing whether by general knowledge of handwriting or by experts; but, it is difficult to see why proof from comparison is less objectionable in principle than proof from having acquired a knowledge of a person's writing, by forming a standard in the mind from having frequently seen the person write.
This is not very illuminating. Then the learned judge concludes by saying:—
I find nothing in the expression of opinion by judges who have dissented from the rule of the old law indicating that a writing could be solely proved by comparison of a disputed writing with a genuine by experts. It has been urged merely that it might supplement weak proof of the writing by strictly legitimate means; I do not think that alone it is plenary.
The headnote of that case is:—
The signature to writing which is forged cannot be proved solely by comparison of the disputed signature with other signatures which are admitted or proved to be genuine,
and in Deschénes v. Langlois, Bossé J. said (p. 390):—
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Les raisons que les hommes de l'art donnent pour soutenir leurs opinions peuvent être d'un grand secours et aider puissamment l'avocat comme le juge à remplir son ministère; mais, il ne faudrait pas aller au-delà et adopter une théorie scientifique contrairement aux règles ordinaires de la raison.
I am of the opinion that the learned trial judge was guided by this principle in the appreciation of the evidence in this case.
It is quite true that expert evidence under modern practice is rapidly becoming of little value for any judicial purpose, because even men of the highest character and integrity are apt to be prejudiced in favour of the party by whom they are employed, and that the better procedure is that prescribed by the ordinance of 1667 and still followed in France. The court should, whenever necessary, appoint upon application of either party or of its own motion disinterested experts, to be procured and paid in such a way as to secure their freedom from bias as in the case provided for in articles 392 et seq. of the Code of Civil Procedure. But those articles do not apply to a case like this; no such application was made, and here the evidence was taken without objection. I would add that the difference between the admittedly genuine signature of the deceased and the signature to the will is so obvious that any one at all familiar with handwriting could readily discover it, and we can make the comparison for ourselves.
The handwriting of the will, the language in which the testator's intentions are expressed, together with the suspicious circumstances connected with the production of the will by Louise Lescadre, lead me to the same conclusion as Mr. Justice Drouin. And, as he had the inestimable advantage of hearing and seeing the witnesses, I have no hesitation in saying that we are practically bound to accept his finding.
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There seem to be two main reasons for the judgment now under appeal. First, the improbability of dishonesty in this old servant of the deceased; and second, the comparative smallness of the benefit which she takes under the will.
As to the first, it must be noted that it was not a question in any event of dishonesty towards her late master personally, whose wishes she might indeed have thought she was furthering if she did write the will. Towards his relatives other than his nephew and legatee, Narcisse Voisard, it is certain that she entertained no friendly feelings.
As regards the second reason, it must have been obvious to Louise Lescadre that to have appropriated the whole or great part of the property would have afforded grounds of suspicion against the will. The testator had years before brought his nephew, the respondent, from California to live with him, and the respondent was still residing with and helping him to work his farm at the time of his death. It may be well supposed that in view of their long service, the testator would have desired to make some provision for Louise Lescadre and her sister after his own death; but there was certainly no reason why he should do-more than make a reasonable provision, such indeed it might well be as is made by the will. It would have been highly improbable that he would have left to them the bulk of his estate to the exclusion of his nephew and other relatives, with all of whom he appears to have been on good if not intimate terms.
I think, moreover, one requires to consider the point of view of such a person as Louise Lescadre, placed in the position in which she was. Obviously the case would be entirely different from that of the common criminal and professional forger. She would never
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have thought of or desired fortune. She is one of those of whom it is said: "Their wants but few, their wishes all confined." Would she not have been most likely to put into the will what she had hoped her master would have done himself? She and her sister had lived thirty years in the house, and would wish to remain there with the succeeding member of the family to the end of their lives. She already had a little money of her own, and with the legacy of $1,200 probably she would have all she required. In giving the property to the member of the family best entitled to it, and in making such provision for herself and her sister as she doubtless considered herself entitled to, she might not unlikely persuade herself that she was merely giving effect to the testator's intentions. This, I think, is the most probable explanation of her action.
Judge Pelletier states that he has given the case much time and attention, as is indeed apparent from the elaborate judgment in which he has set forth the reasons for the conclusion at which he has arrived. Certainly I have not come to an opposite conclusion without devoting to the matter most careful consideration, realising as I do its importance, not merely on account of the value of the property at stake, but because of the serious reflections on the respondent which my judgment necessarily involves.
I would allow the appeal.
Davies J. (dissenting)—The question to be determined in this appeal is the validity or otherwise of the holographic will of the late Edouard Voisard, a farmer residing in the Province of Quebec, dated the 3rd day of August, 1915. The will was duly probated on the 29th September, 1915; and these facts which are important for our decision with regard to the deceased,
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namely, his relations towards Louise Lescadre, the alleged forger, his fortune, his relatives and his condition of life, etc., stated herein, are either admitted or not denied. His death took place on the 11th September, 1915. At the time of his death Voisard was 76 years old and a bachelor. Some short time before he had been gored by his bull, which, it is alleged, had seriously injured him and had probably hastened his death. He had been all his lifetime a farmer and lived on and cultivated the land devised in the will in question here. Louise Lescadre and Olivine Lescadre had been in his service and that of his father before him, one for thirty years and the other for forty years, receiving no salary beyond board, lodging and clothing. Narcisse Voisard, the respondent, universal legatee under the will in question, was testator's favourite nephew and had been brought back from California by the testator some six or seven years prior to his death to live with him and to look after the cultivation of the land, with the understanding that he was to be the testator's universal legatee. The testator had no relatives other than Narcisse Voisard except a number of nephews and nieces, all of whom lived in the United States or other distant places "and with whom the testator had little or no communication and in whom he took little or no interest. The trial judge declared that the will in question was false in its entirety and consequently null; but on appeal to the Court of King's Bench this judgment was reversed and the action dismissed with costs.
At the conclusion of the argument before us, I confess I entertained grave doubts. That the testator made a will and made it upon blue paper just as that now produced before us as his genuine will, I have no
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doubt whatever. The evidence of Pageau and François Beland satisfies me upon that point.
The former states that he went to testator's house some time before his death, in the evening, about eight o'clock, and found him at his table writing; and asking him what he was writing was told he was making his will.
The other witness, Beland, speaks of a conversation he had with the deceased on the 11th of August, which would be six days after the date of the will produced and three weeks before the testator's death, in which the deceased Voisard told him that he had made a will and shewed the witness a blue sheet of paper which he said contained his will. Upon being shewn the will in dispute he said that the paper which Voisard shewed him was a paper similar in colour to that on which the will now before us was written.
Then again there is the evidence that some time before his death he went to his notary and asked him whether he could make or write his will himself and was told he could.
The fact that he was carrying about his will with him in his pocket supports the contention that he did not put it with his other papers in his box, presumably because he did not want others to read it or know its contents, and for the same reason that in his last sickness he placed it under one of the mattresses of his bed, where he knew it would be found and where Louise Lescadre, the alleged forger, says she found it when making up his bed after the death or funeral.
These facts, coupled with the admission on all sides that in the circumstances under which the deceased lived, he possessed of a fortune of about $40,000, his will was not an unreasonable or unnatural one in any respect, assist partly in convincing me that the document
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produced as his will and found, as she says, by Louise Lescadre under the mattress after the funeral is the genuine will of the testator and not a forged document, as contended. The majority of the Court of King's Bench, consisting of the Chief Justice and of Lavergne and Pelletier JJ. have so found; and in my present state of mind I do not feel justified in finding Louise Lescadre guilty of the crimes of forgery, perjury and destroying a genuine will.
The only benefit she takes under the will is the sum of $1,200; and it was not contended that that sum was excessive, or more than she reasonably might have expected him to leave her for the care she had taken of him in his lifetime and of his father before him. The only possible motive which counsel could suggest for the forgery charged was this bequest of $1,200 to Louise Lescadre, the alleged forger. In view of the value of testator's estate and of the services she had rendered him for a period of over thirty years, this legacy cannot be held to be unreasonable. It is, on the contrary, such a legacy as an honourable man possessing the estate he had at his death would, under the circumstances, make.
I admit there are some strong arguments in favour of reaching the conclusion that the will was a forgery. The trial judge so found and Cross and Carroll JJ. dissented from the judgment of the majority of the Court of King's Bench and agreed with the conclusions of the trial judge.
I was strongly impressed during the argument with the contention that the signature of the witness to the will produced was the geniune signature of Louise Lescadre and her statement that it was not and that her signature had been written there by the deceased, who told her that he was making his will and that he
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would put her name as a witness, was untrue. The photograph of the will, which the appellant produced, rather confirmed that contention; but an examination of the will itself convinces me that the photograph copy was greatly misleading and shewed a different colour in the ink used in the witness' name and that used in the deceased's own name, which difference was not apparent at all in the will itself, and was greatly calculated to mislead and did for a time mislead me.
The two expert witnesses called by the appellant gave what seemed to me plausible reasons for their conclusion that the signature to the will in dispute was not the same as the genuine signature produced on the documents produced in the evidence. I confess that at one time I shared their opinion; but it must be remembered that such expert evidence as was given at the trial was not evidence which, as a rule, should have very great weight attached to it and none at all if at variance with controlling facts proved. The admissibility of this evidence was challenged by Mr. Belcourt; but I do not consider it necessary to give any opinion on his objection and treat the evidence as properly admitted. It must be remembered, however, in weighing the opinions of these experts and the reasons for them, that Voisard, who at the time of the making of the disputed will was about 76 years of age, had a few weeks before been gored by his bull and had suffered in consequence somewhat in health. It was not unfairly urged that this would account for some slight want of firmness in the writing of the signature to the disputed will. The signatures to the genuine documents appear certainly more firm and in the formation of a few of the letters a difference appears between the genuine signatures and the disputed one; but making every proper allowance for these slight differences,
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after examining for myself the several admitted genuine signatures most carefully and comparing them with the disputed signature to the will, I find myself unable to conclude that this signature to the disputed will is not a genuine one.
Weighing all the evidence most carefully, I am not satisfied that the findings of fact of the appeal court are wrong and am glad to find myself able to dismiss the appeal, and so amongst other things preserve to Narcisse Voisard, the absolutely innocent universal legatee, the just fruits of the property devised to him.
Idington J.—This appeal should be allowed with costs throughout and the judgment of the learned trial judge restored.
I agree with the reasons he assigned therefor as well as in the main with those respectively assigned by the learned judges dissenting in the court of appeal. What seems to me above all else should be held as an insuperable barrier in the respondent's way of maintaining the judgment in appeal is her repeated denials of the existence of such a will when interrogated on the subject of the existence of any will after the death of the alleged testator when the circumstances confronting her constituted an imperative demand to assert the truth. If what she now says was the truth she could have no just reason for withholding it from somebody. She is not, like some persons who may accidentally have found a testator's will in a most unexpected place and thus discovered it for the first time.
She professes to have seen it written and signed and to have known all about it.
The learned trial judge was not impressed with her veracity at the trial. He had, in seeing her and hearing her story in the witness-box, an advantage over any
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appellate court and his judgment should not, I most respectfully submit, have been disturbed to give effect to such a marvellous and I submit an incredible tale.
Anglin J.—After full consideration of all the evidence and the most critical examination of the handwriting of the alleged will and the most careful comparison of it with the many admittedly genuine samples of the writing of the deceased in the record of which I am capable, I am very clearly of the opinion that the alleged will propounded is not in the handwriting of the late Edouard Voisard. The question is purely one of fact. To detail the grounds on which my conclusion rests would serve no good purpose.
I may add, however, that I entertain no doubt as to the admissibility of the evidence of the witnesses called as experts in handwriting challenged by Mr. Belcourt.
I would allow the appeal in this court and in the Court of King's Bench and would restore the judgment of the learned trial judge.
Brodeur J.—Nous avons à décider dans cette cause si le testament d'Edouard Voisard est vrai ou faux. Afin de déterminer ce point, il est bon de rappeler la situation des parties et les circonstances dans lesquelles ce testament aurait été fait.
Edouard Voisard, le testateur, était un riche cultivateur de la paroisse de la Rivière du Loup. Il était très âgé, ayant atteint près de quatre-vingts ans. Vivaient avec lui depuis au-delà de trente ans deux ménagères, deux sœurs du nom de Lescadre. L'une appelée Louise avait été institutrice et avait par conséquent une certaine éducation. Elles étaient toutes les deux considérées comme membres de la famille, vu qu'elles ne recevaient aucun salaire.
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Edouard Voisard avait des neveux et des nièces; il ne paraît pas avoir de sœurs ni de frères vivants. Ces neveux et ces nièces étaienl assez indifférents à son endroit. Par contre, il y avait un neveu du nom de Narcisse Voisard, le défendeur dans la présente cause, qu'il paraissait affectionner puisqu'il l'a fait revenir de Californie pour rester avec lui et exploiter ses fermes. Narcisse Voisard est un homme assez âgé, dépassant la soixantaine, et paraît être un homme extrêmement paisible et jouissant d'un excellent caractère. La réputation de Narcisse Voisard et des ménagères était excellente à tous égards.
Dans le cours de l'été de 1915 Edouard Voisard eut un accident qui l'a empêché de travailler pendant quelque temps. Cependant il continuait de sortir et de vaquer à ses affaires. Mais après quelques heures seulement de maladie grave il mourait le 11 septembre 1915.
Les neveux et les nièces viennent à ses funérailles et le jour même ils envoient l'un d'eux pour demander s'il y avait un testament. Il me paraît évident que Narcisse Voisard ne savait pas qu'il y eût un testament, car on le voit lui-même aller s'enquérir chez le notaire pour savoir si son oncle avait écrit ses dernières volontés.
D'un autre côté, Louise Lescadre, l'une des ménagères, savait qu'il y avait un testament; cependant quand le représentant de la famille est allé lui demander s'il y en avait elle aurait répondu, d'après son témoignage, qu'il n'y avait pas de testament en sa faveur, à elle.
Elle a été un peu vexée de voir que ces neveux et ces nièces, qui n'avaient jamais pris intérêt à leur oncle, qui ne le visitaient qu'à de rares intervalles, s'empressent en foule quelques jours après pour s'emparer des
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documents, pièces, etc., qui se trouvaient dans la maison; et elle explique que c'est cette conduite de leur part qui l'a incitée à ne pas leur dire de suite toute la verité. A tout événement, elle prétend que le samedi suivant les funérailles d'Edouard Voisard elle a trouvé le testament produit en cette cause sous la paillasse du lit de la chambre du défunt.
Par ce testament, Edouard Voisard léguait ses biens à son neveu Narcisse Voisard et il donnait en même temps une somme de douze cents piastres ($1,200) à Louise Lescadre et exprimait le désir de la voir toujours rester avec son neveu. Il chargeait en même temps son neveu de donner une bonne pension à l'autre ménagère, Olivine, tant qu'elle vivrait, il faisait en outre un legs de deux cents piastres ($200) à une nièce, Emma Lambert, donnait une maison à Edouardina Voisard, une autre nièce, et déclarait en outre dans le testament qu'il devait une somme à Louise Lescadre qui était marquée dans son livre.
Les dispositions de ce testament sont extrêmement raisonnables et extrêmement justes. Il n'est pas étonnant que le testateur ait institué légataire universel de ses biens ce neveu qu'il affectionnait d'une manière tonte particulière et qu'il avait fait venir des Etats-Unis six ou sept ans auparavant pour vivre avec lui. Il n'est pas étonnant non plus qu'il ait donné quelque-chose, et cependant c'est bien peu de chose, à ses vieilles ménagères, qui avaient passé toute leur vie avec lui et qui l'avaient non-seulement servi lui-même, mais même son père. Il n'est pas étonnant, non plus, qu'il n'ait pas pourvu particulièrement à ses nombreux neveux et nièces, étant donné le fait que ces derniers avaient paru être assez indifférents à son sort.
En même temps, il faut dire aussi que la preuve me paraît bien certaine qu'il y a eu un testament de fait.
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Dans le mois d'août 1915, c'est-à-dire à l'époque où ce testament a été écrit, un de ses grands amis, un voisin, étant allé le voir un soir, le trouva à écrire quelque chose. Sa ménagère, Louise Lescadre, était alors à côté de lui et Edouard Voisard de déclarer qu'il était à faire son testament. Cette preuve me paraît irréfutable et a été donnée par une personne dont la respectabilité et l'honorabilité ne font pas de doute.
Mais il y a plus. Vers le même temps, Voisard va au village, chez une connaissance, et cette dernière de lui dire en badinant qu'elle espérait qu'il ne l'oublierait pas sur son testament: et alors l'autre aurait dit: "Mon testament est fait"; et il aurait sorti de sa poche un papier bleuâtre en lui disant: "Le voici." La couleur de ce papier correspond absolument à celle du papier sur lequel le testament en question est écrit. Il a dit la même chose aussi à Arthur Lacerte.
Il n'y a donc pas de doute, suivant moi, qu'il y a eu un testament de fait. Maintenant, est-ce celui que nous avons devant nous?
Plusieurs témoins ont été entendus dans cette cause: et quelques-uns, qui connaissaient bien la signature d'Edouard Voisard, disent que ce testament n'a pas été signé par lui.
En même temps, le demandeur a produit au dossier une lettre de Louise Lescadre et une lettre écrite par Edouard Voisard. Plusieurs reçus qui avaient été donnés par Edouard Voisard ont été produits également. Mais les documents les plus importants pour établir la comparaison des écritures sont certainement la lettre de Louise Lescadre et celle d'Edouard Voisard.
La prétention des demandeurs appelants, c'est que le testament est écrit entièrement de la main de Louise Lescadre; et je suis porté à croire, après avoir examiné
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avec soin ces pièces et avoir lu la preuve avec une attention toute particulière, que leur prétention est bien fondée.
Sur le testament le nom de Louise Lescadre apparaît comme témoin. Elle a prétendu que ce n'était pas sa signature cependant, mais que le testateur, Edouard Voisard, en finissant d'écrire son testament lui aurait demandé si elle avait objection à être témoin du testament et il aurait simplement mis son nom.
Pour moi, il n'y a pas de doute que la signature qu'il y a sur le testament et la signature qu'il y a sur la lettre de Louise Lescadre sont de la même personne. Par conséquent, ayant admis qu'elle avait signé cette lettre en question, elle n'aurait pas dit la vérité quand elle a dit que ce n'était pas sa signature qui apparaissait sur le testament.
Pourquoi avoir caché à Narcisse Voisard lui-même l'existence de ce testament? Elle admet que le testament a été écrit en sa présence environ un mois avant la mort d'Edouard Voisard. Il est des plus surprenant qu'elle n'ait pas dit à Narcisse Voisard, avec qui elle paraissait être en bonnes relations, qu'il y avait un testament qui avait été fait. Les héritiers la questionnent. Il est vrai qu'elle a pu être vexée de la manière dont ils se sont adressés à elle; mais enfin il n'y avait pas de mal pour elle de dire qu'il avait fait un testament et qu'elle en avait eu connaissance.
Le juge qui a présidé au procès, qui a vu les témoins, notamment Louise Lescadre, dans la boîte, déclare formellement dans son jugement qu'elle a eu devant la cour une attitude qui dénotait un indéniable manque de sincérité. Alors en présence d'une déclaration aussi formelle du juge, il me semble qu'il est bien difficile d'accepter le témoignage de cette personne, d'autant plus que si l'on compare le testament avec une lettre
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écrite par Edouard Voisard on voit de suite qu'il y une différence considérable dans l'écriture et que le testament ne paraît pas avoir été écrit par celui qui a écrit la lettre signée "Edouard Voisard;" et il est incontestable que cette lettre a bien été écrite et signée par lui.
La demande a produit des experts en écriture pour exprimer leur opinion sur ces documents. Aucune objection n'a été faite à cette preuve. Au contraire, je retrouve dans le dossier, à certains endroits, que les avocats de la défense se sont objectés à ce que certains témoins expriment une opinion sur les écritures parce qu'ils n'avaient pas d'abord déclaré s'ils étaient ou non des experts en écriture. Le témoignage de ces experts, Cartier et Bellinge, a été admis sans aucune objection de la part de la défense. Maintenant devant cette cour on prétend que ces témoignages-là devraient être rejetés parce que notre code de procédure civile n'autorise pas l'admissibilité de telle preuve.
L'ordonnance de 1667 avait une disposition formelle pour l'audition des experts en écriture. Cette disposition de l'ordonnance ne paraît pas avoir été suivie avant le code de procédure civile.
M. Belcourt prétend que le seul moyen de vérifier les écritures est suivant les dispositions de l'article 392 du code de procédure civile.
Par les dispositions de cet article le juge, s'il le trouve nécessaire, peut nommer des experts pour l'éclairer sur certains points de la cause. Il n'y a pas de doute que dans le cas actuel le juge aurait eu parfaitement le droit de nommer des experts en écriture. Mais était-il obligé de le faire? Et la preuve d'experts qui a été admise sans objection doit-elle être rejetée?
Il a été décidé par cette cour dans une cause de
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Schwersenski v. Vineberg, que dans le cas où une preuve a été admise pour contredire un écrit, sans objection, cette preuve ne peut pas être mise de côté subséquemment par les tribunaux d'appel.
Je suis d'opinion, suivant la jurisprudence énoncée dans la cause que je viens de mentionner, que dans le cas actuel si le défendeur voulait empêcher cette preuve il aurait dû s'y objecter formellement. Il ne l'a pas fait et je ne vois pas de raison pourquoi nous pourrions maintenant la mettre de côté.
Comme je le disais tout à l'heure, je suis convaincu qu'il y a eu un testament de fait. Maintenant qu'est-il devenu? Je ne le sais pas. A-t-il été détruit par Louise Lescadre et s'en est-elle servi pour écrire celui qui est maintenant devant nous? Je l'ignore également. Mais, à tout événement; je suis convaincu que celui que nous avons devant nous n'a pas été écrit par Voisard.
Sur le tout, j'en suis donc venu à la conclusion que le testament qui a été produit en cette cause n'a pas été écrit ni signé par Edouard Voisard et par conséquent l'action des demandeurs doit être maintenue. Leur appel devant cette cour doit donc être maintenu avec dépens de cette cour et de la cour d'appel et le jugement de la cour supérieure rétabli.
Appeal allowed with costs.
Solicitors for the appellant: Tessier, Lacoursière & Fortier.
Solicitors for the respondent: Bureau & Bigué.
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