Canada & Gulf Terminal Ry. Co. v. Fleet and the King, (1918) 57 SCR 140

Supreme Court of Canada

Canada & Gulf Terminal Ry. Co. v. Fleet and the King, (1918) 57 S.C.R. 140

Date: 1918-06-25

Canada & Gulf Terminal Railway Company Appellant;

and

Charles J. Fleet Respondents.

and

His Majesty The King Respondents.

1918: June 10; 1918: June 25.

Present: Sir Charles Fitzpatrick C.J. and Davies, Idington, Anglin and Brodeur J.J.

ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF KING'S BENCH, APPEAL SIDE, PROVINCE OF QUEBEC.

Appeal—Jurisdiction—"Matter in controversy"—"Court"—"Public Utilities Commission" R.S.Q., 1909, arts, 718 & seq.—"Supreme Court Act," R.S.C., 1906, c. 139, ss. 36, 37(a).

An appeal lies to the Supreme Court of Canada under section 37 of the "Supreme Court Act" from the judgment of the Court of King's Bench in the Province of Quebec in an appeal from a ruling of the Quebec Public Utilities Commission which had affirmed its own jurisdiction to accord running rights to the Intercolonial Railway over the Canada & Gulf Terminal Railway (Fitzpatrick C.J. and Idington J. dissenting).

Per Fitzpatrick C.J. and Idington J. (dissenting).

The Public Utilities Commission, constituted by R.S.Q. 1909, art. 718, is not a "court" in the sense of that word in the "Supreme Court Act."

APPEAL from a decision of the Court of King's Bench, appeal side, Province of Quebec, maintaining the jurisdiction of the Public Utilities Commission in this case.

The Public Utilities Commission granted a petition of C. J. Fleet and ordered the appellant to permit the Intercolonial Railway to run its engines and cars over the railway line of the appellant.

The appellant made an application for the cancellation of this order on the ground that the Commission had no jurisdiction in the case but the application was refused. On appeal to the Court of King's

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Bench the jurisdiction of the Public Utilities Commission was affirmed.

The appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada and applied to the registrar to affirm the jurisdiction of the court and to have the security approved, which application was granted for the following reasons.

The Registrar.—This is an application to affirm the jurisdiction of the court coupled with a motion to allow a bond offered as security for the appeal. Mr. Walker appears for the motion, Mr. Darveau appears for the King. No exception is taken to the nature of the security offered if the court has jurisdiction.

The facts appear to be as follows:—

R.S.Q., art. 718, establishes the Quebec Public Utilities Commission and art. 742, as amended by 1 Geo. V., ch. 14, sec. 4, provides that the Commission should have general supervision over all public utilities subject to the legislative authority of the province, and may make such orders regarding equipment, appliances, safety devices, extension of works or systems of reporting and other matters as are necessary for the safety or convenience of the public or for the purpose of carrying out any contract, charter, or franchise involved in the use of public property or rights.

C. J. Fleet, Esq., K.C., residing in Montreal, on the 11th June, 1917, presented a petition to the Commission asking that an order should be made requiring the Canada & Gulf Terminal Railway Company to permit the Intercolonial Railway to run a train over the line of the former company from Mont Joly Junction to Little Metis; and thereupon the Commission made an ex parte interim order granting the petition and

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ordered the Canada & Gulf Terminal Railway Company to permit the Intercolonial Railway to run its engines and cars over the railway line of the Canada & Gulf Terminal from Mont Joly Junction to Little Metis. It also provided that the Intercolonial should furnish the necessary motive power and the crew for operating its trains and directed the Canada & Gulf Terminal and Intercolonial Railways to appear before it on the 26th June, 1917, for the purpose of determining the compensation to be paid by the latter company to the former. Both companies appeared before the Commission and the Canada & Gulf Terminal Company confined its objection to the question of jurisdiction of the Commission and asked for the cancellation of this order on the ground that the Intercolonial Railway was not subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, and because the Commission had no power to accord running rights to one railway company over another. This objection was overruled on the 10th July following.

Art. 763 gives an appeal to the Court of King's Bench (appeal side) from any final decision of the Commission upon any question as to its jurisdiction or upon any question of law, but such an appeal can be taken only by permission of a judge of the said court given upon a petition presented to him within 15 days from the rendering of the decision.

The appeal was apparently regularly taken to the Court of King's Bench, which pronounced judgment on the 3rd April, 1918, affirming the jurisdiction of the court below (two judges, Carroll and Pelletier JJ. dissenting). The present application is based on the right of appeal conferred by sec. 37, s.s. a, of the "Supreme Court Act," which provides as follows:—

37. Except as hereinafter otherwise provided, an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any final judgment of the highest court of

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final resort now or hereafter established in any province of Canada, whether such court is a court of appeal or of original jurisdiction, where the action, suit, cause, matter or other judicial proceeding has not originated in a superior court, in the following cases;

(a) In the Province of Quebec if the matter in controversy involves the question of or relates to any fee of office, duty rent, revenue, sum of money payable to His Majesty, or to any title to lands or tenements, annual rents and other matters or things where rights in future might be bound; or amounts to or exceeds the sum or value of two thousand dollars;

The applicants contend, first, that the matter involved exceeds the sum or value of $2,000 and in any event his case falls within the words "matter in controversy involves the question of or relates to any title to lands or tenements, annual rents and other matters or things where rights in future might be bound."

With respect to the amount involved, an affidavit is filed by the vice-president of the applicant company in which he says that the amount involved exceeds the sum of $2,000, while the traffic manager of the Canadian Government Railways files an affidavit in which he says that the compensation which should be allowed to the applicant for the use of the railway for the season of 1917 should be materially under $2,000. The only other evidence bearing on the amount involved is the petition of Fleet presented to the Commission, in which it is said that the Intercolonial Railway had offered $2,000 for the running rights during the year and that the applicant company had demanded $5,000. The Commission never determined the compensation owing to the objection taken to its jurisdiction. If I had to determine the application solely on the question of the amount involved for the privilege of using the applicant's railway, I should have little hesitation in holding that it must exceed $2,000 as the order which has been made is not limited to one year. I am, however, of the

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opinion that there is jurisdiction because titles to lands or tenements, annual rents and other matters or things where rights in future might be bound are involved. This provision of section 37 is substantially the same as section 46 (b) which has been the subject of consideration by the court in a number of cases. The right conferred upon the Intercolonial to use the roadbed and rails of the applicant company is quite as much an interest in lands under this section as are the servitudes which have been declared to confer jurisdiction in the cases of Macdonald v. Ferdais[1], and the other cases to be found collected in Cameron's Supreme Court Practice, at pp. 225-228.

I am therefore of the opinion that the court has jurisdiction and grant the motion. Costs in the cause.

(Sgd.) E. R. Cameron.

The respondent then made a motion, by way of appeal to the Supreme Court, to reverse the decision of the registrar.

C. V. Darveau K.C for the motion.

H. N. Chauvin K.C. contra.

The Chief Justice (dissenting)—In my opinion this appeal should be allowed. The case does not come within sec. 36 of the "Supreme Court Act" and I cannot quite understand how section 37 can be applied. The Public Utilities Commission is not a court (vide section. 740 R.S.Q.) and the statute which creates the Commission provides for an appeal to the Court of King's Bench subject to limitations which shew that it was the intention of the legislature to limit appeals to certain specified questions and to the Court of

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King's Bench in an advisory rather than a judicial capacity (vide sections 763 et seq. of the R.S.Q.). More-over, in the present instance the Commission exercised the jurisdiction formerly vested in the Railway Committee of the Provincial Executive Council.

The appeal should be allowed.

Davies J.—I am to dismiss the appeal from the registrar with costs and to affirm our jurisdiction to hear this appeal.

Idington J. (dissenting)—The constitution of a Public Utilities Commission in Quebec does not create a court in the sense of that word in the "Supreme Court Act" and hence there does not seem to be any place in that Act for appeals from the Court of King's Bench (appeal side) rendering a judgment pursuant to the provisions of art. 763 of the revised statutes of Quebec. It is manifest that such a proceeding as in question herein did not originate in any superior court and hence the jurisdiction given by section 36 of the "Supreme Court Act" cannot be invoked to support an appeal here.

No more can section 37 of same Act which in the first part thereof giving jurisdiction in cases originating in other courts reads as follows:—

Except as hereinafter otherwise provided, an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any final judgment of the highest court of final resort now or hereafter established in any province of Canada, whether such court is a court of appeal or of original jurisdiction, where the action, suit, cause, matter or other judicial proceeding has not originated in a superior court, in the following cases:

It is to be observed that this section relates only to judicial proceedings which the exercise of power given the Utilities Commission is not. The nature of the powers given are purely administrative and not judicial.

The power conferred upon the King's Bench to

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determine whether or not the Commission has acted within its jurisdiction, and according to law is of course a judicial jurisdiction, but that did not originate in any other court as contemplated by the section I have just quoted.

The proposed appeal should be quashed with costs of the motion.

Anglin J.—Although at first of the opinion that the appeal from the registrar's order affirming jurisdiction should succeed, further consideration has led me to the contrary conclusion. Admittedly not within section 36 of the "Supreme Court Act" because the proceeding did not originate in a superior court, the appellant maintains that this appeal is within our jurisdiction under section 37 (a) on the grounds: (a) that the matter in controversy involves a question of or relating to title to lands or tenements and (b) amounts to or exceeds the sum or value of $2,000.

As the registrar points out, it has been established by affidavit that the value of the running rights granted by the order of the Public Utilities Commission exceeds $2,000. Their annual value is said to be over $1,000 and the order is for an indefinite term. While the matter in controversy on the proposed appeal is merely the jurisdiction of the Public Utilities Commission to make the order which it did, the matter in controversy in the proceeding is the running rights; and it has been determined in a number of cases that the words "the matter in controversy" in section 37 (a) mean not the matter in controversy on the appeal but the matter in controversy in the proceeding. While I cannot think that it was ever intended that an appeal should lie from these provincial boards to this court, section 37 (a) in terms covers this case.

I would dismiss the appeal with costs.

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Brodeur J.—Il s'agit d'un appel, de la part de l'intimé, d'une décision du Régistraire de cette cour qui a déclaré que nous avions juridiction pour entendre la présente cause.

La compagnie appelante est une compagnie de chemin de fer incorporée par la Législature de la province de Québec. Sa ligne se raccorde à Mont Joli avec le chemin de fer Intercolonial. Une demande a été faite devant la Commission des Services d'Utilité publique de Québec sous l'autorité des dispositions des articles 740 et suivants des statuts refondus de la province de Québec pour que la compagnie appelante soit tenue de donner un droit de passage sur sa voie à certains trains de l'Intercolonial. La compagnie appelante s'est objectée à cette demande en alléguant que la Commission des Services d'Utilité publique n'avait pas le pouvoir et la juridiction nécessaire pour accorder cette demande.

La Commission a le 10 juillet 1917 maintenu la demande. Suivant les dispositions de l'article 763 des Statuts refondus de la province de Québec, un appel a été institué devant la Cour du Banc du Roi par la compagnie appelante de cette décision de la Commission des Service d'Ulilité publique. Le jugement de la Commission a été confirmé et la Compagnie Canada & Gulf Terminal institue le présent appel.

Par l'article 36 de l'acte de la Cour Suprême, il est déclaré qu'il y a appel à cette cour de tout jugement final de la plus haute cour de dernier ressort établie dans toute province du Canada, que cette cour soit une cour d'appel ou une cour de première instance, dans le cas où la cour de première instance est une cour supérieure.

Par la section 37 de l'acte de la Cour Suprême, il est déclaré cependant qu'il peut y avoir appel de tout

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jugement définitif de la Cour du Banc du Roi de Québec même quand la poursuite n'a pas pris naissance devant une cour supérieure, si l'affaire en litige

a trait au titre à des biens-fonds, à des rentes annuelles et à d'autres affaires où choses ou peuvent se rencontrer des droits futurs; ou bien si le montant de l'affaire atteint ou dépasse la somme ou la valeur de deux mille dollars.

Cette cour a été appelée à plusieurs reprises à interpréter une disposition semblable qui se trouve à la section 46 de l'acte de la Cour Suprême et il a été déclaré que les poursuites concernant les droits de passage affectaient le titre d'une propriété et, par conséquent, pouvaient donner lieu à un appel devant cette cour.

Voir Macdonald v. Ferdais[2], et les autres causes qui sont mentionnées dans Cameron's Supreme Court Practice, pp. 225 et 228.

Mais on dit: La Cour d'Appel, en vertu de l'acte, ne peut intervenir dans les causes qui ont originé devant la Commission des Services d'Utilité publique que dans les questions de droit ou de juridiction; et alors la matière qui est en litige devant nous n'est pas la question du droit de passage que l'on demande sur la propriété de l'appelante, mais simplement la question de savoir si la Commission des Services d'Utilité publique a jurisdiction ou non.

Je crois qu'en adoptant ce point de vue-là on arriverait à des conséquences assez étranges. Les montants en litige qui sont généralement demandés par la poursuite entrainent presque toujours la décision de questions de droit et faudrait-il dire alors que nons n'avons pas juridiction parce que le fonds du litige repose sur une question de droit seulement? Evidemment non. Il faut aller aux sources; il faut examiner la nature de la demande faite devant les

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tribunaux inférieurs; et si cette demande a pour objet une somme d'argent excédant $2,000 ou un droit de servitude et si cette demande ne peut être accordée que dans le cas où la cour superieure aurait juridiction il n'en reste pas moins vrai que la matière en litige sera de savoir si telle somme est due ou si telle servitude doit être accordée ou refusée.

Le jugement que nous aurons à rendre dans cette cause-ci est, suivant les dispositions de Particle 51 de l'acte de la Cour Suprême, celui qui aurait dû être prononcé par la Commission des Services d'Utilité Publique, c'est-à-dire refuser ou accorder la demande qui lui a été faite pour un droit de passage sur la propriété de la compagnie appelante.

J'en suis donc venu à la conclusion que nous avons juridiction pour entendre cet appel et que le jugement rendue par le régistraire doit être confirmé avec dépens.

Motion dismissed with costs.