Brassard et al. v. Langevin, (1878) 2 SCR 319

Supreme Court of Canada

Brassard v. Langevin, (1878) 2 SCR 319

Date: 1878-04-15

CONTROVERTED ELECTION OF THE COUNTY OF CHARLEVOIX

OSÉE BRASSARD AND OTHERS

Appellant;

And

HONORABLE L. H. LANGEVIN

Respondent.

1878: Jan 25; 1878: April 15

PRESENT: Sir William Buell Richards C. J., and Strong, Taschereau, Fournier and Henry, J.J.

ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOWER CANADA, FOR THE DISTRICT OF SAGUENAY.

Appeal,—Election petition—Jurisdiction—Preliminary objections, judgment on, not appealable—sec. 48, chap. 11, 38 Vic.

On the 21st April, 1877, an election petition was fyled in the Prothronotary's office [at Murray Bay, District of Saguenay, against the Respondent. The latter pleaded by preliminary objections that this election petition, notice of its presentation and copy of the receipt of the deposit had never been served upon him. Judgment was given maintaining the preliminary objections and dismissing the petition with costs. The petitioners, thereupon, appealed to the Supreme Court under 38 Vic., cap. 11, sec. 48.

Held,—That the said judgment was not appealable and that under that section an appeal will lie only from the decision of a Judge who has tried the merits of an election petition [Taschereau and Fournier, J. J. dissenting.]

Per Strong, J., (Richards, C. J., concurring,) That the hearing of the preliminary objections and the trial of the merits of the election petition are distinct acts of procedure (1).

(1) By The Supreme Court Amendment Act of 1879, sec. 10 it is provided that An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court “from the judgment, rule, order or decision of any Court or Judge on any preliminary objection to an Election Petition, the allowed have been final and been final and conclusive, and which shall have put an end to the petition, or which would, if allowance of which shall have conclusive, and have put an end

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THE question to be decided in this appeal was whether a judgment maintaining preliminary objections and dismissing an election petition was appealable under the 48th section of the Supreme and Exchequer Court Act.

The facts appear sufficiently in the head note and the judgments.

Mr. A. F. McIntyre, for Appellant: —

The petition has been virtually tried, for the judgment of the Court amounts to a final judgment against the petitioners. We must read section 25 of the Supreme and Exchequer Court Act in connection with section 48. If this Court has not jurisdiction in such a case as this, then it is in the power of any Judge to oust the appellate jurisdiction of this Court in every controverted election case. The policy of the law has not been to diminish the right of appeal but to extend it. The judgment in this case is final and therefore appealable. See Freeman on judgments ([1]); Powell on the law of appellate proceedings ([2]).

Mr. H. C. Pelletier for Respondent :—

The judgment is final and without appeal.

The 8th section of the Statute 38 Vic, chap. 11, (the Supreme and Exchequer Court Act) says positively: Any party to an election petition under the said Act, who may be dissatisfied with the decision of the Judge who has tried such petition, &c., may appeal from said judgment. In the present case, we have not to consider

to the petition: Provided always, that an appeal in the last- mentioned case shall not operate as a stay of proceedings or to delay the trial of the petition, unless the Court or a Judge of the Court appealed from, shall so order: and provided also that no appeals shall be allowed under this section in cases in litigation and now pending. Except cases when the appeal has been allowed and duly filed.

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a decision given at the time of the trial of an election petition, but a judgment given on preliminary objections

If an appeal is allowed from every decision of a judge, it would be impossible to proceed with a petition. “Trial” means the examination of witnesses &c. See Hardcastle, Laws and Practice of Election Petitions ([3]) and Wolferstan Law of Election Petitions ([4]).

STRONG, J.:—

This was an appeal from a judgment rendered by His Honor Mr. Justice Routhier, of the Superior Court of the Province of Quebec for the District of Saguenay, in the matter of a petition filed by the Appellants, under the Controverted Elections Act 18*74: against the return of the Respondent as member of the House of Commons for the Electoral District of Charlevoix, The return of the writ of election to the Clerk of the Crown in Chancery in which the Respondent was declared to be duly elected a member of the House of Commons was published in the Canada Gazette on the 7th April; 1877. The Appellants .filed their petition against the return on the 21st April, 1877. A copy of the petition is alleged to have been served on the Respondent on the 27th April. On the 28th April, 1877, an application was made on behalf of the Respondent to Mr. Justice Routhier to extend the time for filing preliminary objections to the petition until the 22nd May following, which application was allowed. On the 22nd May the Respondent filed his preliminary objections against the further maintenance of the Appellant's petition. The objections material to be noticed here (being those which the learned judge sustained) are the first and fourth.

The first objection is “That no certified copy of the

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"said petition has been served on the Respondent;” and the fourth, “That no notice of the presentation of the” petition and of the security was served on the Respondent."

The Appellants inscribed these objections for proof and hearing for the 12th July last when counsel for both parties appeared before Mr. Justice Routhier and no evidence being entered into by either side, the objections were argued and taken en delibére.

On the 24th of July the learned Judge gave judgment, holding the first and fourth objections to be well founded, and dismissing the Appellant's petition with costs. The appeal to this Court is from that judgment. The grounds of the appeal are, that the judgment is wrong and cannot be maintained. First, Because there was no proof of any kind establishing the objections. Secondly, Because the burthen of proving the objections was upon the Respondent.

The first objection in answer to this appeal, set up by the Respondent in his factum and in argument at the Bar, was, that the decision of the Court below was final, as having been pronounced by a Court of last resort, and that this Court has no jurisdiction.

The procedure for the trial of Controverted Elections under the Act of 1874 (37 Vic, Cap. 16) may, so far as it is material here, be succinctly stated as follows :—

The petition must, subject to some exceptions not applicable here, be presented not later than thirty days after the day of publication in the Gazette of the receipt of the return to the Writ of Election by the Clerk of the Crown in Chancery.

The presentation is to be made by delivery to the Clerk of the Court. At the time of the presentation a deposit of $1,000 is to be made for which the Clerk is to give a receipt, which shall be evidence of the deposit. Within five days after presenting the petition and

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making the deposit, or within such other time as the Court or a Judge may allow, a notice of the presentation of the petition and of the security, together with a copy of the petition, is to be served on the Respondent. Within a like delay, after service of the petition, the Respondent is to present any preliminary objections which he may have against the petition, or the petitioner, or against any further proceedings. The Court or any Judge thereof is to hear these objections, and is to decide them in a summary manner. After the expiration of five days from the decision of the preliminary objections, or from the expiration of the time for presenting them, if none be presented, the petition is to be deemed to be at issue and the Court is to fix a time and place of trial. So far, all the proceedings are to take place in or before the Court in which the petition has been presented, or before one of the Judges of that Court. By section 13 the petition is to be tried by one of the Judges of the Court without a jury. The trial is to take place unless otherwise ordered by the Court in the electoral district the election or return for which is in question At the conclusion of the trial the Judge must determine whether the member whose election or return is complained of, or any and what other person, was duly returned or elected or whether the election was void, and other matters arising out of the petition, and requiring his determination; and shall, except only in the case of an appeal, immediately after the expiration of eight days from the day on which he shall have given his decision, certify in writing such determination to the Speaker, appending thereto a copy of the notes of the evidence; and the determination so certified Is to be final to all intents and purposes. If any charge is made in the petition of any corrupt practice having been committed at the election, the Judge is, in addition to such certificate and at the same time to report

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in writing to the Speaker: (a) Whether any corrupt d practice has or has not been found to have been committed by or with the knowledge and consent of any candidate at the election, stating the name of the candidate and the nature of the corrupt practice. (b) The names of any persons who have been proved at the trial to have been guilty of any corrupt practice. (c) Whether corrupt practices have, or whether there is reason to believe they have, extensively prevailed at the election. The Judge may, at the same time, make a special report to the Speaker as to any matters arising in the course of the trial, an account of which, in his judgment, ought to be submitted to the House of Commons.

Section 54 of the Act contains a provision recognizing a distinction very pertinent to the question raised here; it relates to the withdrawal of a petition and enacts ”That a petition shall not be withdrawn without the leave of the Court or Judge according as the petition is then before the Court or before the Judge for trial, upon special application,” to be made as prescribed by general rules.

This clause recognizes and carries out very clearly a distinction which runs through the whole Act as to the separation of the powers and jurisdiction of the Court and those of the Judge at the trial.

After the petition is set down for trial the functions of the Court are at an end for no provision similar to that embodied in section 23 of the Controverted Elections Act of 1873, authorizing the Judge who tries a petition to reserve a case for the opinion of the Court is contained in the Act of 1874. There is therefore a well defined line of demarcation between the two jurisdictions, that of the Court and that of the Judge who tries the petition. It appears, then, that a Judge who is called upon to decide a “preliminary objection” presented

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under section 10, exercises the jurisdiction of the Court in which the petition is filed.

This jurisdiction is not restricted as to locality, but the objections may be heard and determined at any place within the jurisdiction of the Court, whilst the trial of the petition in the absence of an order of the Court, founded on some special circumstances, must be had within the Electoral District. Again, whatever may be the proper construction of the words “preliminary objections,” whether they are to be taken as applying to every irregularity or failure to comply with the procedure laid down by the Act of Parliament and the rules of Court, as well as to objections which might be taken to the qualification of the petitioner, or to the latter class of objections only, it is plain, that their determination does not comprise any such decision as the Judge at the trial is bound to come to. In deciding preliminary objections, the Judge cannot determine whether the member whose election or return is complained of, or any other person, was duly returned or elected, or whether the election was void. He can have no evidence before him to enable him to enter into the merits of the petition, and, consequently, he cannot make the report to the Speaker required by the 30th section of the Act of 1874.

In determining preliminary objections, although the Judge may have to hear evidence he is in no sense” trying the petition.”The 10th section, and the whole context of the Act, indicates that the two proceedings of hearing preliminary objections and the trial of the petition are separate and distinct, to be taken before different tribunals, at different times, and possibly at different places. The determination of the preliminary objections has for its object adjudication upon such exceptions as the Respondent to a petition may take to the status of the Petitioner and to his compliance

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with the statutory prerequisites to being permitted to proceed to trial.

If the decision of the Judge on the objections is against the Respondent, his functions are terminated; he cannot proceed to enquire into or try the merits of the petition. On the other hand, the decision which section 29 of the Act of 1874, makes it incumbent on the Judge at the trial to pronounce is one, on the grounds of law and fact, upon which the validity of the election is impugned, and upon those grounds also on which by way of recrimination the Respondent may seek to in validate any claim to the seat made by the Petitioner on his own behalf, or on that of some other person. Manifestly, this is a very different process from that to be gone through with by the Court or a Judge dealing with preliminary objections only. In short, the word ”preliminary” imports that these objections are to be precedent to some proceeding in which the merits of the election and of the petition are to be enquired into, and the Statute authorizes no other proceeding for that purpose than the trial of the petition. The words “preliminary objections” are, therefore, to be construed as an elliptical expression for objections preliminary to the trial.

The convenience of such a division of the enquiry under the petition is very obvious. It is calculated to save large expenditure in summoning and paying witnesses, generally very numerous, to testify for and against the merits of the petition which would be useless and wasteful, if the preliminary objections were reserved until the trial and should then appear to be well founded. It relieves the Judge from the inconvenience and loss of time which might be occasioned in going to the Electoral District to hear mere technical points of law argued, and it tends to disembarrass the trial on the merits, when it comes on, from collateral

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issues, and to save time which, might otherwise be consumed in long arguments as to the qualification of the Petitioner or the regularity of his proceedings, whilst the witnesses on the merits were uselessly kept in attendance.

This practice of disjoining the hearing of preliminary objections from the trial, which does not correspond with any similar proceeding provided for by the English Act, was probably suggested by the course of proceeding formerly adopted by the Election Committees, who, though bound by no prescribed rules, but being free to regulate their procedure in each case according to convenience were accustomed to hear and determine in limine, objections taken to the qualification of the Petitioner, and others of the same class, before proceeding to investigate the merits of the petition. These considerations appear sufficient to demonstrate that the Controverted Elections Act of 1874 deals with the hearing on preliminary objections and the trial of the petition as two distinct acts of procedure, having for their objects different results, and which it was the policy of the Act to keep separate. Parliament has, indeed, in so many words recognized the separation between the jurisdiction of the Court before trial and that of the Judge after the petition is set down for trial, when, in the 54th section it requires the withdrawal of the petition to be with the leave of the Court or Judge,

According as the petition is then before the Court or before the Judge for trial

Then, the Respondent's proposition is, that the appeal to this Court is limited to one from the decision of the Judge who tries the petition, and does not include an appeal from the determination of the Court or Judge on the hearing of preliminary objections.

Section 48 of the Supreme and Exchequer Court Act is the enactment which confers the jurisdiction on this

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Court, and it repeals sections 33, 34 and 35 of the Act of 1874, which had provided for appeals in the Province of Quebec to the Superior Court sitting in Review, and in the other Provinces to the Court in which the petition was presented sitting in banc. These repealed clauses in themselves shew that they were meant to confer the right of appeal from the Judge at the trial only. Section 33, which has reference to appeals in Quebec cases, requires the Court of Review to determine and certify its determination and decision to the Speaker upon the several points and matters, as well of fact as of law, upon which the Judge might otherwise have determined or certified his decision, in the same manner as the Judge would otherwise have done at the trial and declares that the determination of the Court thus certified shall be final to all intent and purposes

Section 35 which relates to appeals from the Provinces other than Quebec, is to the same effect, and contains even stronger indications that the appeal was intended to apply only to the substance and merits of the petition.

These sections, however, are repealed by section 48 of the Supreme Court Act, which contains express words not found in the repealed clauses of 37 Victoria, Cap.10, limiting the appeal to one from the Judge at the trial. After enacting a repeal of the sections just mentioned, to take effect so soon as the Supreme Court should be organized, and in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, it proceeds as follows :—

And thereafter any party to an election petition under the said Act, who may be dissatisfied with the decision of the Judge who has tried such petition on any question of law or fact, and desires to appeal against the same,

may do so by adopting the mode of procedure which had been provided for by the repealed section 35 of the

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Act of 1874, and it requires the Registrar to certify the decision of this Court to the Speaker in the same manner as the Judge at the trial is required to do by the pro visions of the former Act already referred to, and it lastly declares that the judgment and decision of the Supreme Court shall be final to all intents and purposes.

Applying this section to the case in hand, it cannot possibly be said, having regard to what appears to be the proper construction of the Act of 1874, as already stated that Mr. Justice Routhier, when he heard these preliminary objections, ”tried the petition,” nor would it be possible for the Court if it came to the conclusion that the preliminary objections ought to have been over ruled instead of allowed, to pronounce a decision which would have been final on the merits of the petition, nor could this Court in any aspect pronounce a judgment upon this appeal which would warrant such a certificate as in every case of appeal this Court is imperatively bound to send to the Speaker of the House of Commons. Therefore the inevitable result of the construction I have placed upon the Controverted Elections Act of 1874, in treating the hearing of the preliminary objections and the trial as distinct acts of procedure, requires me to hold that the decision complained of is not a proper subject of appeal.

The language of the 48th section of the Supreme Court Act, already quoted, seems so explicit that it scarcely requires the aid of any extrinsic argument to support the construction I uphold, but it may well be thought that an enactment which would have made every decision upon preliminary objections or upon interlocuoory or incidental motions or applications in litigated election proceedings appealable, would have been most undesirable, since it might have been used vexatiously and oppressively, both as regards delay

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and expense. If from every incidental decision in the, proceedings in a controverted election, the parties were to be at liberty to resort to this Court by way of appeal to be remitted back upon the determination of the appeal against the objection to the primary Court, there to resume the contestation of the merits, the litigation would be prolonged to the prejudice not merely of the parties to the petition but to the detriment also of the constituency whose representation was in dispute. It cannot be presumed, that the Legislature intended to authorize such appeals, for it may be truly said that there is no class of litigation in which judicial dispatch is more desirable than that arising out of controverted elections. The interests of all concerned, those of the parties, the Courts and the public alike, require reasonable promptitude of decision in such cases. There may, no doubt, be exceptional cases in which the rights of parties to petitions may be seriously affected by erroneous decisions on preliminary points and motions, but the balance of convenience greatly preponderates in favor of confining appeals to the merits. Were this Court to concede the right to take an appeal in the present case, an equal process of reasoning in construing the Act would require it to admit an appeal from the most insignificant motion which could be made. There is, therefore, every argument to be drawn from convenience in favor of restricting the appeal, as the Legislature has done to one upon the merits of the petition, the decision of which must be conclusive.

But supposing I am wrong in this opinion as to the policy of the law, and even though in particular instances the interpretation of the Statute restricting appeals to the merits of the petition might seem to leave parties without relief against erroneous decisions, such consequences would afford no ground for wresting the plain words of the 48th section of the Supreme Court

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Act from their obvious primary meaning and extending them so as to include such cases as the present. Where the language of a Statute is doubtful, arguments drawn from unjust and inconvenient results may be of force but where there is no ambiguity of language they cannot affect judicial construction, whatever weight they may have as reasons for Legislative amendment.

A majority of the Court agreeing on the question of jurisdiction, there is no necessity for discussing the second point argued on this appeal; that involving the correctness of the judgment which is called in question.

In my opinion, this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, which should, therefore, pursuant to section 37 of the Supreme and Exchequer Court Act, be quashed, with costs to be paid to the Respondent.

The Chief Justice concurred with Strong, J.

TASCHEREAU, J :—

Je dois donner un court aperçu des faits de la cause en ce qui concerne le présent appel.

1o. Le 21 avril 1877. Les appelants, contestant l'élection de l'Intimé, produisent leur petition et en déposent une copie au bureau du protonotaire de la Cour Supé rieure du district de Saguenay, qui sous sa signature en date du mŒme jour reconnaît en avoir reçu copie, et de plus les appelants déposent la somme de mille piastres en un billet de la Puissance du Canada. Cette petition ne porte aucun certificat de sa signification ni d'avis du jour de sa presentation a l'Intimé, et on ne trouve pas an dossier un certificat d'avis du. dépôt des mille piastres et de leur destination, on d'aucun cautionnement quel. conque.

2o. Le 9 mai 1877. Les pétitionnaires, présents appe lants, produisent an greffe du bureau du protonotaire du district de Saguenay in avis informant l'Intimé que le

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douze de ce méme mois de mai 18777 ils demanderont i an Juge du district de fixer un jour pour 1 instruction de la petition.

3o. Le 12 mai 1877. L'Intimé présente une requéte pour extension de délai pour produire ses objections préliminaires, et ce délai lui est accordé jusqu'au 22 mai, et le 21 mai 1'Intime produit ses objections préliminaires, et le 12 juillet la cause est inscrite au r6le pour preuve et audition sur les objections préliminaires. La cause est mise en délibéré devant M. le juge Routhier qui, le 21 juillet, renvoie la petition sur le principe qu'aucune copie certifiée de la petition, non plus qu'aucun avis de la presentation de cette petition et du cautionnement n'ont été signifies au défendeur.

Maintenant la premiere question qui est soulevée en cette cause par 1'Intimé, l'honorable M. Langevin, est celle de savoir si la decision du Juge sous les circons tances que je viens d'exposer, est on n'est pas susceptible d'appel, en un mot, si une decision sur les objec tions préliminaires est susceptible d'appel. L'Intimé le pretend, et il a en sa faveur 1'opinion de mes deux honorables confreres qui viennent d'exposer leur vues à ce sujet. L'Intimé se fonee sur la section 48 de la 88e Vic., ch. 11, (Acte constitutif de la Cour Supreme) pour y trouver une distinction entre le droit d'appel d'une decision sur les objections préliminaires et le droit d'appel de la decision du mérite de la petition mŒme. Je ne trouve rien dans cette section pour justifier cette distinction. La section est en ces termes :

Sec. 48. When the Supreme Court is organized, and in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, the thirty-third, thirty-fourth and thirty-fifth sections of the Act passed in the thirty-seventh year of Her Majesty's reign, and intituled An Act to make better provision for the trial of controverted elections of members of the House of Commons, and respecting matters connected therewith,” shall be repealed, except as hereinafter provided with respect to proceedings then pending, and thereafter any party to an election petition under

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the said .Act, who may be dissatisfied with the decision of the Judge who has tried such petition, on any question of law or fact, and desires to appeal against the same, may within eight days from the day on which the Judge has given his decision, deposit with the clerk, or other proper officer of the Court (of which the Judge is a member) for receiving moneys paid into such Court at the place where the petition was tried, if in the Province of Quebec, and at the chief office of the Court in any other Province the sum of one hundred dollars as security for costs and a further sum of ten dollars as a fee for making up and transmitting the record: and thereupon the clerk or other proper officer of the Court shall make up and transmit the record in the case to the Registrar of the Supreme Court, who shall set down the matter of the said petition for hearing by the said Court, &c., &c., &c.

Je ne trouve rien en cette section pour justifier la prétention de 1'Intimé. Au contraire j'y vois qu'il y a appel de toute question de droit où de fait. Or, en la présente cause le Juge qui en a été charge, a adjugé sur les questions de droit et de fait, lo. de droit, en déci dant que les appelants devaient commencer l'enquête et faire Ia preuve, 2o. de fait, en décidant qu'ils avaient failli de prouver leurs objections préliminaires.

Une contestation d'1élection est soumise au même Juge qui peut ab initio la conduire jusqu'à jugement final; il est oblige de decider également les objectionspréliminarres aussi bien que le mérite même, et il y a dans l'un et l'autre de ces cas une importance et une responsabilité égales, et de la decision de ces objections préliminaires, comme de celle du mérite de la petition, depend le sort de cette petition; les intéréts d'une division électorale peuvent en être également et fatalement affectés.

Je ne vois aucun motif legal ni rationel pour justifier une telle distinction du droit d'appel sur des quesions également import antes quant au résultat. Au contraire, je trouve un argument sérieux dans le danger de laisser à un seul homme le pouvoir d'adiuger en dernier ressort sur des objections préliminaires.

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Je ne puis me reconcilier à l'idée que la legislature au moyen de cette section 48, et de l'emmploi des mots: J Judge who tried the petition,”ait voulu dire que le Juge chargé d'adjuger sur une contestation d'élection et qui la renvoie in foto sur des objectionspréliminarres n'y a pas complétement mis fin et n'a pas jugé la petition d'une maniére substantielle,”did not try the election”il l'a tellement jugée cette contestation d'élection qu'il l'a renvoyée a toutes fins que de droit, et sans laisser aux pétitionnaires l'espoir de renouveler cette contestation.

Sous un autre aspect, on peut dire que la prise en considération d'une contestation d'6lection par un juge commence avec la lecture et l'étude de la petition des moyens de défense, et se termine avec la preuve si on n'y met fin auparavant par le renvoi sur objections préiminaires. Tout cela forme le trial savoir: la preuve et l'adjudication sur tous les points en litige, et c'est la Ia seule interpretation plausible à donner à cette section 48.

Quant a cette premiere question relative au droit d'appel, je considére que les prétentions de l'Intimé sont non fondées.

Mais il y a dans les autres objections que l'lntimé énonce en son factum, quelque chose que je considére comme trés sérieux.

Les appelants prétendent que l'lntimé comme excipant, devait commencer sa preuve sur les objections préliminaires, et l'Intimé soutient le contraire et je considere que l'Intimé a raison sur ce point. Il est le defendeur, il se tient donc sur la defensive ; li dit a ses adversaires, vous m'accusez, montrez a la Cour que vous m'avez assigné conformément aux requisitions du statut, et que vous m'avez signifié un certificat legal du cautionnement et un avis du jour de la presentation de la petition. Les appelants où n'ont pu où n'ont pas voulu

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faire cette preuve et Son Honneur le juge Routhier, devant qui elle devait se faire, a renvoyé la petition, faute par les Appelants d'avoir établi ce qui était la base la fondation de la petition, savoir, que les pétitionnarres avaient signifié à I'lntimé une copie certifiée de la petition, un avis de sa presentation, et du cautionnement fourni tel que Ia loi l'exifire.

Mais comme je l'ai dit, les Appelants prétendent que c'était a l'lntimé a prouver ces negatives, væ qu'il était l'excipant. Je concois qu'il peut y avoir des cas où l’excipant puisse étre tenu de prouver un plaidoyer affirmatif qui attaquerait une présomption légale. Dans le cas present la loi ne presume pas que les Appelants se soient conformés aux requisitions du statut en ce qui concerne la signification des documents exigés comme assignation de l'lntimé. O'était donc aux Appelants a commencer cette preuve et non a Tintime qui n'avait qu'à attendee les bras croisés la preuve de ces significations, II lui faudrait prouver une négative, ce qui dans la plupart des cas est impossible, cette preuve incombait aux Appelants comme ayant on devant avoir en mains les documents nécessaires pour l'établir, d'aprés la section 40 du statut des elections de l'année 1874 qui énonce que le service de la petition et des avis de sa presentation, et d'une copie du recu du dépôt on du cautionnement doivent être effectués autant que possible en la mŒme maniére qu'un bref de sommation en matiére civile on en toute autre maniére qu'il pourrait étre prescrit. Or, a défaut de toute autre injonction a cet égard, le Code de Procedure Civile de la province de Quebec doit régler, et de fait régle ce mode de signification par les articles 56, 57, 77, 78, 80. Ces articles exigent que les significations de sommations soient efiectués par un huissier on par une personne quelconque qui en donnera un certificat sous forme d'affidavit.

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Les Appelants prétendent que l'Intimé a admis avoir recu une. copie de la petition, mais iln'admet pas qu'il ait recu avis de sa presentation, ni d'une copie du cautionnement on du recu du dépot pour en tenir lieu. Si cet aveu de l'Intimé quant a la reception d'une copie de la petition pent étre interpreté contre lui (ce que je ne crois pas), toujours estil vraique son objection quant à l'absence d'un certificat de signification de l'avis de sa presentation et de la copie du cautionnement subsiste en son entier et doit être fatale aux Appelants. Le dossier en cette cause ne démontre nullement l'ac complissement d'aucune de ces formalités essentielles exigées par le statut et sans lesquelles la petition ne peut exister. Je le demande, comment étaitil possible au Juge qui a prononcé le jugement de passer pardessus de telles irrégularités. Je crois de plus que M. le Juge Routhier ne pouvait exercer aucune discretion a cet égard, et de son propre mouvement, sans y être requis par les Appelants, accorder un d1ai ultérieur aux Appelants pour rectifier leurs erreurs on omissions Les Appelants ne paraissent pas avoir aucunement essayé ce moyen d'y remédier, et s 'en sont tenus a leurs prétentions que j'ai signalées. Ilis ont eu grand tort; pour ces raisons, je suis d'opinion,

1o. Qu'il y avait en faveur des Appelants un droit d'appel du jugement renvoyant les objections préliminaires.

2o. Qu'au mérite de l'appel, le jugement doit étre confirmé avec dépens contre les Appelants.

FOURNIER, J.: —

Le present appel est de la decision rendue en cette cause, le 24 juillet dernier, maintenant des objections pr61iminarres produites par l'Intimé, et renvoyant la péti tion produtte par 1'Appelant contre son election.

L'Intimé a soulevé devant cette cour une question au

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sujet de la compétenee de celleci a entendre le present appel. C'est de cette question qu'il faut d'abord s'oc- J cuper, car de sa decision dans la negative depend le _L sort de la cause.

L'Acte des Elections Contestées de 1878 sec. 14 admettait dans les mémes termes que celui de 1874, sec. 10, les objectionspréliminarres à la petition. Ces objec tions sont définies d'une maniére générale dans l'un et l'autre acte, comme étant toutes les objections où raisons d'insuffisance que le défendeur pourra faire valoir contre le pétitionnaire, où la petition, où contre toute procedure ultérieuee sur la petition, et la Cour où le Juge doit en décider sommairement. Mais la constitution de la Cour n'est pas la mŒme dans les deux actes.

Le statut de 1873 établissatt une Cour d'é1ection com posée de trois juges, dont chacun, individuellement, ainsi que tous les autres juges qui pouvaient y siéger, exer^aient au sujet des petitions d'elections des pouvoirs différents de ceux de la Cour.

Ainsi, un seul juge pouvait decider de la validité des objections faites au cautionnement et de tout ce qui s'y rapportait, et exercer les pouvoirs de la Cour d'élection, excepé lorsqu'il était declare que la Cour seule pouvait decider, on quant aux points de droit soulevés par la petition, on dans un cas special (special case) où dans les questions réservées par le Juge pour la decision de la Cour. Le Juge avait le pouvoir de réserver sans distinction tous les points de droit soulevés dans les pro cédures faites en vertu de l'acte.

Quant aux objectionspréliminarres qui devaient étre décidées sommairement, ii y avait juridiction concurrente entre le Juge et la Cour.

L'Acte de 1874 a fait disparaître ces differences de pouvoir entre un seul Juge et la Cour telle que composée auparavant. Aujourd'hui, la Cour ne consiste plus que d'un seul juge qui decide sur toutes les procedures

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qui peuvent avoir lieu au sujet d'une petition d'élec tion, ainsi que sur toutes les questions defaits et de droit qui peuvent v être soulevées Il doit decider finalement, sans pouvorr les référer a la Cour; car la Cour c'est luiseu,l Ia distinction entre les pouvoirs de la Cour et du juge n'existant pIus.

Au lieu du pouvoir qu'avait le Juge en vertu de l'acte de 1873, simplement de réserver la decision des ques tions de droit pour la Cour, composée de trois juges, la loi de 1874 avait substitué l'appel, pour la province de Québec, à la Cour de Révision. Toute partie a la petition pouvait dans les huit jours de la decision faire transmettre le dossier à cette Cour. Les procedures devaient être conduites comme dans une cause en revision et la Cour devait prononcer sa decision sur les matiêres de fait et de droit sur lesquelles le juge aurait pu liii mŒme prononcer, et de la mŒme maniêre qu'il aurait Pu le faire

Les pouvoirs exercés a cette époque par la Cour de Revision ont éte, en vertu de la 38me Vict., ch. 11, sec. 48, transférés a, cette Cour qui dolt prononcer, tant sur les questions de droit que sur les questions defaits, le jugement qui aurait dû étre rendu par le juge de ladécision duquel appel est interjeté.

La principale objection que l'on fait au droit d'appel en cette cause provient de ce que dans cette sec. 48 l'on emploie, pour designer le jugement dont il y aura appel, les expressions suivantes:”the decision of the Judge who has tried such petition;”et aussi de ce que plus bas dans la mŒme section, le régistraire est requis”to set down the matter of the said petiiion for hearing.”On pre tend que ces expressions ne peuvent s'entendre que du mérite de la petition, et non pas d'une decision sur des objections preliminaires; que partant cette Cour n'a pas droit de prendee connaissance du present appel, bien que le iuffement dont on se plaint mette fin a la petition.

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C'est en donnant au mot trial une signification restreinte qu'il ne me semble pas avoir dans cet acte, qu'on arrive a cette consequence. Ce terme (trial) ne doit pas s'appliquer seulement a l'examen des faits concernant le mérite de la petition, puisque d'aprés la loi ii peut y avoir plusieurs trials dans la mŒme contestation, savoir: trial sur les objectionspréliminarres, et trial stir le mérite de la petition L'examen de la matiére de fait en issue étant un trial d'aprés la definition technique ce terme devait donc s'appliquer a liinstrnction de la contestation soueovée par les objections préliminaires aussi bien qu'à l'examen du mérite de la petition; laloi en se servant de cette expression indique l'un aussi bien ane l'autre, puisque, dans les deux cas, il y a lieu a I'examen (trial) des questions de faits.

Mais on dira, peutêtre, que dans le cas actuel les objections prêliminaires, n'êtant fondêes que sur des moyens de forme attaquant la régularitC de la signification de la petition et des avis requis par la loi, elles ne font pas régulièrment la matière d'une telle procedure. Cependant d'apres la section 10, toute raison suffisante pour empêcher touts procéduee ultérieure sur la petition est indiquée comme pouvant faire le sujet d'objections préliminaires sur lesquelles il peut être prononcé un jugement qui met fin a la contestation. Or, il n'existe pas, je crois, d'autre maniére de prendre avantage de ces irrégularités que par objections preliminaires.

De tout temps cette maniere de procéder a été admise, et de tout temps aussi, on a considéré que les expressions try the merits of the petition, try the matter of the petition s'appiiquaient au jugement rendu sur ces objections comme au jugement décidant le mérite de la petition.

C'est par des objections préliminaires que dans la cause de Honiton, ([5]) le membre slégeant prenait avantage, lo.: du fait que la petition produite n'était pas de

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bonne foi une petition renouvelée, ainsi que la loi l'exi-d geait a cette époque, Iorsque la procédure n'avait pas été terminée dans la session mais un duplicata de celle qui avait été présentee dans une session précédente; 2o: que les pétitionnarres s'étaient rendus coupables de corruption.

Le Conseil du membre siégeant argumentait ainsi;

Both these points are preliminary conclusive objections to the trial of the cause; contending, that if established by evidenee, the Court ought not in justice to proceed upon it. That though the duty of the members, enjoined by oath, required a trial of the matter of the petition referred to them, yet this rule was necessarily subject to the fundamental rules of practice, by which the Court proceeded: because all trials were necessarily guided by such rules. For, if it could be supposed that the names to a petition were forged, or that the parties had no interest or right to petition, it would be proper to receive the evidence of the facts and if found true, to reject such petition. For in such cases there are no merits to try and the ends of justice would be obtained in this manner, although the terms of the oath would not be literally obeyed.

Le comité adopta cette maniére de voir et déclara que le membre siégeant pouvait faire la preuve de la nullité de la petition, et prouver aussi l'irrégularité dans la signature et la présentation de la seconde petition Le résultat final fut le renvoi de la petition pour les motifs invoqués dans les objections preliminaries. La cause de Bedford en 1728 était même genre.

Ces decisions ont été rendues en vertu de l'acte 10 Geo 3 ch. 16 communément appelé le GrTSfiville act lequel contient au sujet de la reference d'une petition d'election a un comité, les mémes expressions que celeas employees dans la 38 Vict. ch. 11. sec. 48. La section 72 de cet acte décrétait que le comite general auquel était référée la formation des comites spéciaux pour la decision des petitions d'élection ferait rapport a la Chambre des noms des membres”of such select committee appointed to try the merits"

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Par la section 73 ii était exigé des membres ainsi nommés quills prétassent le serment de

well and truly to try the matter of the petitions referred to them, and a true judgment to give according to the evidence, and shall be taken to be as a select committee lesallv appointed to try and deter”mine the merits of this return of election so referred to them by the House.

Section 78. Such select committee shall meet at the time and place appointed for that purpose, and shall proceed to try the merits of the election petition so referred to them.

Cependant, en dépit des expressions si souvent répé tées”to try the merits to try the matter of the petition, to determine the merits of the return of election,”on a de tout temps divisé la contestation d'une élection et admis des moyens de forme plaidés par objectionspréliminarres, dont la decision avait l'effet de terminer la contestation. J'oserais dire sans craindre de commettre une grave erreur, qu'il a été jugé autant de petitions d'élections sur des objections préliminaires, que sur le mérite mŒme de ces petitions. Cependant lee references, faites aux comités charges de les decider, étaient”to try the merits”malgré cela on n'a jamais eu l'idée que c'était forfaire au serment”to try the merits”que de decider finalement du sort d'une pétition sur des moyens de forme. Telle a toujours été la jurisprudence tant en Anglelerre qu'ici depuis que la decision des elections contestées a été transferee de la Chambre des Communes a des comités spéciaux assermentés pour cet objet, c'est a dire pendant un siécle,

On ne doit done pas hésiter a conclure que ces expres sions”try the merits”signiaiaient dane l'acte imperial des elections contestées de 1770, et dans notre statut provincial de 1851, le procés (trial) sur les objections préliminaires aussi bien que le procés (trial) sur le mérite de la petition.

En répétant les memes expressions dane l'acte des elections contestées de 1873 et 1874 ainsi que dans la

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38e Vic, ch. 11, sect. 48, lalégislature est censée d'aprés les régles ordinaires d'interprétation des statuts, avoir adopté et conserve l'interprétation donnée antérieurement a ces expressions. Dans la section 48 conformément à la jurisprudence àtablie, les expressions”try the petition”où”try the matter of the petition”doivent avoir la mŒme signification qu'auparavant,

Conséquemment l'appel donné dans ces termes doit' aussi comprendre l'appel d'un jugement qui, quoique rendu sur des objections préliminaires decide en mŒme temps le mérite de la petition et anéantit la contestation

D'ailleurs les termes de la section 48 donnant le droit d'appel me semble ne laisser aucun douee sur ce sujet;”any party to an election petition under the said Act who may be dissatisfied with the decision of the judge who has tried such petition, on any question of law or of fact and desires to appeal against the same etc.”C'est de la decision que l'appel a lieu, non pas du procés (trial) et cette decision peut étre rendue”on the trial of a question of law or of fact.”Dans le cas actuel il y avait l'un et l'autre; et c'est de la decision sur les questions de fait et de droit que l'appel est donné, sans distinction d'appel sur le mérite où sur les objectionspréliminarres. La loi ne fait a cet égard ni restriction ni distinctions, et la où elle n'en fait pas, ii n'est pas permis au juge d'en faire.

Pour ces raisons, je suss d'avis que l'appel devrait être recu.

Quant aux questions soulevées sur le mérite il serait inutile d'entrer dans leur considération, puisque la majorité de la Cour est d'opinion qu'il n'y a pas d'appel du jugement dont on se plaint en cette cause.

HENRY, J.:—

The points in this case I have found notto be so easily resolved as at the hearing, I was inclined to think

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They were raised by two issues, numbers one and four, in the shape of preliminary objections, by the Respondent as follows ;—

The Respondent asked to have the petition dismissed because, as he alleges,

1st. No certified copy of the petition was served upon him, and

2nd. No notice of the presentation of the petition and o the bail (cautionement) was served upon him.

The learned Judge before whom the matter came decided in favor of the Respondent on both points; and dismissed the petition with costs. From that judgment the Petitioners appealed to this Court; and, in addition to the claim of the correctness of that decision the Respondent takes the ground that, inasmuch as the merits of the petition were not heard and adjudicated upon by the learned Judge, no appeal will lie.

I will deal with the latter objection first, as it touches the jurisdiction of this Court to try the merits of the judgment given on the other points at issue.

The appeal directly to this Court in controverted election cases is given bv section 48 of the Dominion Act of 1875 entitled '.”An Act to establish a Supreme Court and a Court of Exchequer for the Dominion of Canada"

It provides for the repeal of sections 33, 34 and 35 of the Controverted Elections Act of 1874 and enacts that:

Any party to an election petition under the said Act, who may be dissatisfied with the decision of the Judge who has tried such petition on any question of law or of fact, and desires to appeal against the same may appeal to this Court. And the appeal shall thereupon be heard and determined by the Supreme Court, which shall pronounce such judgment upon questions of law or of fact, or both, as in the opinion of the said Court ought to have been given by the Judge whose decision is appealed from.

It also empowers this Court to make orders as to the money deposited; as to the costs of the appeal; and also

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for the taking of further evidence when improperly rejected, and it further provides :

That the Registrar shall certify to the Speaker of the House of Commons the judgment and. decision of the Court upon the several questions, as well of fact as of law, upon which the Judge appealed from might otherwise have determined and certified his decision in pursuance of the said Act, in the same manner as the said Judge should otherwise have done, and with the same effect, &c.

The thirty-third section of the Act of 1874, so repealed, provided for appeal from the Judge to the Court of Review in Quebec or Montreal, as the case might be, as follows ;

Provided also that in the Province of Quebec any party to the petition may, after depositing the necessary sum of money as security,. &c., file in the same office an inscription for review, notice of which must be given to each of the opposite parties, &c., * * * and all other proceedings, shall be had as in a case of review. And the Court shall determine and certify its determination and decision to the Speaker upon the several points and matters, as well of fact as of law, &c.

as in section 48 of the other Act hereinbefore first quoted.

Section 34 provides for the appeals to be made to the Court of Review at Quebec or Montreal, as the case might be.

Section 35

Provided, also, that in any other of the Provinces any party to the petition who may be dissatisfied with the decision of the Judge on any question of law or of fact, and desiresto appeal against the same_r may, within eight days from the day on which the Judge has given his decision, deposit in the Court of which the said Judge is a member, with the proper officer of the Court, &c., the sum of one hundred dollars, &c., by way of security for costs, &c.

The matter of the petition is then to be set down”for hearing before the full Court.”And the said appeal shall thereupon be heard and determined by the said full Court, and the judgment shall be pronounced both upon questions of law and of fact, as should, in the

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opinion of the said Court, have been delivered, by the said Judge, with, the same conclusion as to the power to dispose of the deposit and the costs of the appeal, the certificate to the Speaker, and the finality of the judgment in substance as in the section which gives the appeal to this Court.

Under the circumstances in this case then could a party, dissatisfied with the decision of a Judge of the Superior Court of Quebec as to the preliminary objections, appeal to the whole Court ? By the Act the preliminary questions may be tried by the Court or a Judge, and sections 3 and 7 declare what ”the Court” and ”the Judge,” when used in the Act, shall mean. Section 3 provides :—

In this Act and. for the purposes thereof, the expression, ”the Court,” as respects elections ii the several Provinces hereinafter mentioned respectively, shall mean the Courts hereinafter mentioned, or any Judges thereof, &c.

And section 7 provides:—

The expression, “the Judge,” shall mean the Judge trying the election petition, or performing any duty to which the enactment in which the expression occurs has reference, &c.

Section 10 provides for the filing of preliminary

Objections or grounds of insufficiency which he may have to urge against the petition or the Petitioner, or against any further proceedings thereon; and the Court, or any Judge thereof, shall hear the parties upon such objections or grounds, and shall decide the same in a summary manner.

I have no doubt that the objections taken were legiti mate ones in this case, which, if proved, would be sufficient to cause the dismissal of the petition but the consideration of which I consider unnecessary.

By the Act of 1874 no part of the proceedings in regard to preliminary objections need necessarily come before ”the Court"; for section 3 makes a Judge ”the Court,” with plenary powers. The Judge who tries the preliminary objections is, for the time being, ”the

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Court,”and, if so, no appeal to the whole Court would lie, unless expressly provided by the statute. I think, therefore, no appeal would lie to the whole Court. Section 7 says that ”the Judge” shall mean not only the Judge trying the petition, but a Judge performing any duty to which the enactment in which the expression occurs has reference.

Section 33 provides for an appeal to the whole Court within ”eight days from the day on which the Judge has given his decision,” and for the hearing of the appeal, and enacts, that all other proceedings shall be had as in a case of Review.

It has been contended that an appeal will only lie from the decision of the Judge who tried the merits of the petition, and not from the Judge who tried the preliminary objections. Section 33, however, gives an appeal from the decision of ”the Judge,” without any distinction, as between the Judge trying the preliminary objections and the Judge trying the merits of the petition. The words ”performing any duty,” would, no doubt, in some respects, and for some purposes, apply to and include the Judge trying the preliminary objections. The section in question says, in substance, that ”the Judge” shall mean and include a Judge other than the Judge trying the petition, but it may not still be applicable to “the Judge” trying the preliminary objections and still have abundant application otherwise.

If it be considered wise or necessary that the party against whom a decision is given on a trial of the merits should be entitled to an appeal, why should there not be an appeal when an erroneous judgment on the preliminary objections deprives the petitioner of a trial on the merits, and leaves the Respondent illegally in his seat. I cannot conclude the Legislature intended to leave parties interested and the status of the Legislature itself dependent to such an extent on the decision

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of any one Judge with out appeal. The question here is however not so much, what the intention was, but whether an appeal in such a case is, by legislation, provided. That it is not by express provision is clear and must confess I find no little difficulty in arriving at the conclusion that it is necessarily to be implied. The words of the clause giving the appeal to this Court provide for such appeal only from “the decision of the Judge who has tried such petition;” and the five latter words, being clearly words of limitation, we cannot extend the provision beyond them, unless by other parts of the Act it is patent they were not intended to be so construed. I have sought in vain for anything in any of the enactments to justify the conclusion that the restrictive words in question were not intended to have their full effect. If the Legislature intended an appeal should be had from the judgment on the preliminary objections, the restrictive words were unfortunately used; but 1 feel myself bound to interpret the several Statutes as I find the wording of them requires irrespective of results.

What is meant by the words ”tried the petition"? They are, to my mind, intended to distinguish between the Judge who has tried the merits of the petition from a Judge who may have tried the preliminary objections'

Section 13 of the Act of 1874, provides that every election petition shall be tried by one of the Judges, &c without a jury; and settles where the trial shall take place.

"The Judge who has tried the petition,” is here pretty plainly indicated, and certainly does not, in my opinion, include the Judge who tries the preliminary objections. It is not necessarily the same Judge who tries both; and although it may be asserted that the Judge who tries the preliminary objections does indirectly as in this case determine the election and in

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that way try the petition is such a trial what the Statute refers to ? I have had no small difficulty on that point; but I cannot see my way clear, after a studious consideration of all the legislation 'upon the subject, to the conclusion that such should be the proper legal interpretation of the words by which an appeal is provided. The clause giving the appeal to this Court, as also those giving the appeal to the other courts under the Act of 1874, clearly point to a final judgment and report to the speaker; and if it was intended that the judgment on preliminary objections should be the subject of an appeal, no final judgment could in many cases be given, and the matter would, in case of reversal, have to go back to a Judge to try the merits of the petition. For such there is no statutory provision; and when considering the words of limitation I have mentioned in connection with that fact and the provision for the peculiar and final judgment to be given on appeal, and report of the same to the Speaker, I feel myself bound to conclude, either that no appeal in such cases was intended, or, that if it was, the legislation for it is defective. Section 29 of the Act of 1814 provides that the Judge shall, after eight days from the time of his decision, unless in case of an appeal, certify his determination to the Speaker and it shall be final l and the same provision for eight days' time for an appeal is given in section 32, where provision is made for a decision upon a ”special case” agreed upon. Section 10 which provides for the trial of preliminary objections, has no such time given, but says that

The parties shall be heard upon the objections and grounds, and that the Court or a Judge shall decide the same in a summary manner.

The distinction that thus appears as to the judgment in the latter case from those under sections 29 and 32 would lead to the conclusion that on the trial under section 10, no appeal was contemplated. There are,

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however, several reasons in opposition to those I have mentioned, but I cannot help feeling that they are not sufficient to control those I have given for the conclusions I have arrived at. Taking this view it is un necessary for me to refer to the remaining points.

Appal quashed with costs.

Solicitors for Appellants: Laugelier & Langelier.

Solicitor for Respondent: H. Cyrias Pelletier.