Quebec Bridge Co. v. Roy, (1902) 32 SCR 572

Supreme Court of Canada

Quebec Bridge Co. v. Roy, (1902) 32 SCR 572

Date: 1902-11-06

THE QUEBEC BRIDGE COMPANY (DEFENDANTS)

Appellant;

And

MARIE ROY (PLAINTIFF)

Respondent.

1902: Oct 8; 1902: Nov 6

PRESENT:—Sir Henry Strong C.J. and Taschereau, Sedgewick, Girouard, Davies and Mills JJ.

ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF KING'S BENCH APPEAL SIDE PROVINCE OF QUEBEC.

Railways—Construction of statute—Tramway for transportation of materials —Expropriation551 V. c. 29, s. 114 (D)—2 Edw. VII. c. 29 (D.)

The place where materials are found referred to in the one hundred. and fourteenth section, of "The Railway Act" means the spot where the stone, gravel, earth, sand or water required for the construction or maintenance of railways are naturally situated and not any other place to which they may have been subsequently transported.

Per Taschreau and Girouard JJ The provisions of the one hundred and fourteenth section of "The Railway Act" confer upon railway companies a servitude consisting merely in the right of passage and do not confer any right to expropriate lands required for laying the tracks of a tramway for the transportation of materials to be used for the purposes of construction

APPEAL from the judgment of the Court of King's Bench appeal side reversing the judgment of the Superior Court, District of Quebec, by which the plaintiff’s action had been dismissed with costs

The appellants contactors for the construction of the Quebec bridge over the River St. Lawrence brought materials for its construction from a distance and deposited them on a wharf near the bridge-site, and then built a tramway across the respondent's land for the transportation of the materials from the wharf to the works. Upon the institution of a possessory action against him, the appellants, assuming to act

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either under their charter, the Acts, chap. 98 of the Statutes of Canada of 50 & 51 Vict, and chap. 69 of 60 & 61 Vict., (D.) or under sections 113 and 114 of "The Railway Act", 51 Vict. chap. 29 (D.), caused a notice of expropriation to be served on the respondent. Thereupon the respondent instituted the present action en complainte by which she also asked for a declaration that the appellants had no right to expropriate her said lands, and that the notice of expropriation should be declared null and void.

The learned judge (Routhier J.) at the trial, considering that the company had power under sections 113, 114 and 146 of " The Railway Act" to give the motes of expropriation and take possession of the strip of land occupied by the tramway, dismissed the plaintiff's action. This judgment was reversed by the judgment now under appeal which contains; as reasons formally expressed, the following considérants :

" Considérant que, soit en vertu de sa charte, (50-51 Vict Canada, chap. 98 et 60-61 Vict. Canada, chap 69), soit en vertu de l'acte des chemins de fer du Canada (51 Vict. chap. 29, sections 113 et 114) l'intimée est, dans l'espèce, non fondée à procéder à l'expropriation du terrain de i'appelante.

" Considérant que l'avis d'expropriation signifié à l'appelante est le commencement de procedures en expropriation, qui doivent avoir pour résultat de déposséder l'appelante de son terrain, nolens volens.

" Considérant que l'appelante a raison de se plaindre que cette procédure lui cause un trouble sérieux dans la possession de sa propriété et quelle est en consequence bien fondée à faire declarer que cette procéduee est illégale et à y mettre fin."

In delivering the reasons for the judgment the Court of King's Bench Mr. Justice Ouimet said :

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" Ces deux sections de l'acte des chemins de fer ne me paraissent pas avoir été faites en prevision du cas present. Il me semble qu'en adoptant les pretentions de l'intimée cette tour étendrait an delà des limites prévues par la loi et même du raisonnable, les pouvoirs extraordinaires d'expropriation déjà conférés aux compagnes de chemin de fer. D'après une pareil interprétation, il suffirait que la compagnie ou quelqu'un pour elle dépose des matériaux de construction sur un terrain quelconque, disons, sur un quai à Québcc pour l'autoriser à demander l'expropriation non seulement de ce terrain du quai mais aussi d'un droit de passage sur toutes les propriétés situées entre ce terrain et la ligne du chemin de fer. Nous sommes d'opinion que ce pouvoir d'expropriation aux terrains avoisinant le chemin de fer et dans lequel Ia nature a déposé des matériaux pouvant servir et requis pour la construction et le maintien du chemin."

The company by the present appeal asked for the restoration of the judgment of the trial court.

Alexandre Taschereau for the appellants.

L. P. Pelletier K.C. for the respondent.

In the absence of the Chief Justice Mr. Justice Taschereau pronounced the judgment of the court dismissing the appeal with costs for the reasons given by the court below.

The following remarks were added by:

TASCHRREAU J.—Je suis d'avis de renvoyer cet appel pour Ia raison qu'en supposant que la compagnie ait un droit quelconque d'expropriation sur le terrain en question, sans en rien decider, ce droit ne pent consister, d'après la section 114 de l'Acte des Chemins de Fer de 1888, qu'en un droit de passage, une servitude,

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et non un droit à la propriété tel que réclame par la compagnie.

Appeal dismissed with costs.

Solicitor for the appellants: L. A. Taschereau.

Solicitors for the respondent: Drouin & Pellctier.