Beach v. Township of Stanstead, (1899) 29 SCR 736

Supreme Court of Canada

Beach v Township of Stanstead (1899) 29 SCR 736

Date: 1899-10-13

NATHAN ALLAN BEACH (PLAINTIFF)

Appellant;

And

THE TOWNSHIP OF STANSTEAD (DEFENDANT)

Respondent.

1899: Oct 12; 1899: Oct 13

PRESENT:—Sir Henry Strong C.J. and Taschereau, Sedgewick, King and Girouard JJ.

ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH FOR LOWER CANADA, APPEAL SIDE.

Liquor laws—Municipal corporation—Action—Discretion of members of council—Refusal to confirm certificate—Liability of corporation.

In an action against a municipal corporation for damages claimed on account of the council of the municipality having, as alleged, illegally refused to confirm a certificate to enable the plaintiff to obtain a license for the sale of liquors in his hotel ;

Held, affirming the judgment appealed from (Q. R. 8 Q. B. 276), that the municipal council had a discretion under the provisions of the “Quebec License Law," R. S. Q. Art. 839, to be exercised in the matter of the confirmation of such certificates, for the exercise of which no action could lie, and, further, that even if the members of the council had acted maliciously in refusing to confirm the certificate there could not on that account be any right of action for damages against the corporation.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench for Lower Canada ([1]), reversing with costs the judgment of the Superior Court, District of Saint Francis, maintaining the plaintiff's action.

The plaintiff was proprietor of a hotel at Greorgeville, in the Township of Stanstead, where no by-law prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors existed, and being desirous of obtaining a license to sell liquors at his bar, made the necessary deposits of money and filed a certificate, as required under the “Quebec

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License Law," with the secretary-treasurer of the municipality. It did not appear that there existed any cause such as set forth in the statute for the refusal of the confirmation of the certificate but the municipal council, (having received a guarantee from the Quebec Provincial Branch of the Dominion Alliance against damages, etc., which might result from their action in the matter), passed a resolution refusing to confirm the certificate without assigning any cause except that the majority of the members of the council were opposed to the sale of intoxicating liqueurs under any circumstances whatever. The plaintiff thereupon took an action for mandamus to compel the corporation to confirm the certificate, and by a judgment of the Superior Court, sitting in review, at Montreal ([2]), it was ordered that a peremptory writ of mandamus should issue enjoining the council to confirm the certificate which was accordingly done. The plaintiff afterwards brought the present action for damages against the municipal corporation for the loss of business profits, expenses, etc., caused by the wrongful act as alleged of the council as above set forth. The Superior Court of Sherbrooke decided in favour of the plaintiff, but on appeal this judgment was reversed by the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench from which the present appeal is taken.

H. B. Brown Q.C. for the appellant. Trenholme Q.C. and S. P. Leet Q.C. for the respondent.

The judgment of the court was delivered by:

THE CHIEF JUSTICE, (Oral.)—As we are all of opinion that this appeal must be dismissed, we do not call upon the learned counsel for the respondent.

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I am very clear that in deciding this appeal we are not bound by the judgment of the Superior Court in the matter of the mandamus; but, even if we were, there are other grounds, in which we all concur, in holding the action not maintainable.

In order to uphold the judgment of the Superior Court in the present action we should have to deter-mine three points in the appellant's favour : First that the municipal council could exercise no discreation in the matter of confirming the certificate ; secondly, that the council in refusing to confirm acted not in good faith but with the malicious intention of injuring the appellant ; and thirdly that such an action as this is maintainable against the municipal corporation for the alleged acts and conduct of the members of the council. We think the appellant must fail in all these essential points

The council clearly had a discretion for the exercise of which no action will lie; further there is no evidence of malice (even if that would have sufficed), and such an action as this would not lie against the municipality, even if the two former essential grounds were established in the appellant's favour.

The appeal is dismissed with costs

Appeal dismissed with costs.

Solicitor for the appellant: Brown & Macdonald

Solicitor for the respondent: A. P. Leet.