King v. McHendry, (1900) 30 SCR 450

Supreme Court of Canada

King v. McHendry, (1900) 30 SCR 450

Date: 1900-06-12

PATRICK KING et al. (DEFENDANTS)

Appellant;

And

ELLEN MCHENDRY et  vir. (PLAINTIFFS)

Respondents.

1900: Mar 6; 1900: Mar 7; 1900: June 12

PRESENT:—Sir Henry Strong C.J. and Gwynne, Sedgewick, King and Girouard JJ.

ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH FOR LOWER CANADA APPEAL SIDE

Marriage laws—Community—Continuation of community—Inventory— Procès-verbal de carence—Tripartite community.

At the time of the dissolution of community by the death of one of the consorts in 1845 the common assets consisted of bare necessaries of small value and exempt from seizure. There was no inventory or process-verlal de carence made and subsequently the survivor contracted a second marriage. In an action by a child of the first marriage claiming a share in continuation of community,

Held, that there was no necessity for an inventory of property of such insignificant value and that failure to make an inventory or procès-verbal de carence did not, under the circumstances, effect a continuation of community.

[Page 451]

APPEAL from the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench for Lower Canada, appeal side ([1]), reversing the judgment of the Court of Review, at Montreal, and restoring the judgment of the Superior Court, District of Montreal ([2]) which maintained the action with costs.

The female plaintiff's parents were married at Montreal in 1845 and resided there under the regime de Ia communauté until her father's death in 1846. The entire assess at the time of dissolution of this community consisted of bare necessaries of insignificant value within the class of chattels exempted from seizure under execution. ' The widow made no inventory or procès-verbal de carence, and subsequently, in 1848, married the defendant, Patrick King and they together continued the business of hucksters on the Montreal Market which had been previously carried on by the widow and her first husband. The second marriage was also subject to the regime de la communauté and was dissolved by the death of the wife in 1895, the property of the consorts being then of considerable value After receipt of a share of her mother's estate devised to her, the female plaintiff brought the present action, against her step-father and the children of the second marriage, asking for an account and demanding a share of the common property in virtue of a continuation of the community under the first marriage and consequent tripartite community between her, her deceased mother and the second husband The defences raised were (1) that there had been no continuation of community ; (2) that as continuation had not been demanded during the lifetime of the deceased consort there could be no tripartite community ; and (3) that the assets in possession of the consorts

[Page 452]

at the death of the first husband were insufficient to constitute an estate of which the law required an inventory to be made.

The action was maintained by the Superior Court, Doherty J., but on inscription in review this judgment was annulled Sir Melbourne Tait A. C. J. and Taschereau J., (Curran J. dissenting), on the ground that the demand for continuation of community ought to have been made during the lifetime of the consort who survived the first marriage and that the demand by the action came to late. On further appeal the Court of Queen's Bench reversed the judgment of the Court of Review and rendered the judgment from which the present appeal is asserted.

Mignault Q.C. and Beaudin Q.C. for the appellants. The plaintiff did not allege that her parents possessed assets which could have been comprised in legal community and the presumptions are that that community never possessed anything, that there was no community to be continued or of which it was possible for the surviving consort to make an inventory. It is impossible to infer from the want of such inventory, that the community continued. Lebrun Communauté ([3]) ; Pothier, Communauté, nn. 778, 786, 787 ; Pearson v. Spooner ([4]) ; Dalloz Rep. vo. "Scellé et Inventaire," n. 1; art. 240 C. de P.; art. 1343 C. C. The surviving consort was not required by law to establish the absence of property by means of an official return procès-verbal de carence. The law imposing a penalty on the consort who neglects to make an inventory of the common property must be strictly construed. .As the first community possessed nothing the essential condition was wanting, and to require this to be shown by procès-verbal de carence would be to add to the law and impose a new obligation.

[Page 453]

The admission that there was no property-does away with the necessity of a procès-verbal de carence. Exacting a procès-verbal de carence where no property exists would be contrary to elementary principles of equity. See the Lurdonnois Case decided bv the Parlement de Paris, in 1731, Lebrun (2 ed.) 1754, p. 559, and recent decisions under art. 1442 C. N in the Cour d'Appel in France; S. V. '94, 2, 199; S. V. '95, 2, 30 ; Patrix v. Quesnel Jour, de P. '95 2 230. Compare also exceptions in cases of minors, (art. 311 C. C. and art. 472 C. N.) Dalloz, Rep. vo. " Minorité," no. 649 ; " Cessante ratione, legis, cessai ipsa lex."

The continuation should have been demanded from the survivor and it is too late now after her death to make that demand upon her heirs. Continuation does not exist de plein droit, the demand to the survivor is essential consequently, during her life time. Arts. 240, 291 C. de P. ; art. 1323 C. C. (old text ; Pothier, Com. no. 800 ; Merlin, Rep. vo. " Con. de Com." p. 177. The continuation is dissolved by death of the survivor ; art. 1335 C. C.; Morte socii solvitur societas. See also Bourassa v. Lacerte ([5]), per Sir L. N. Casault, C.J. at page 121 ; Beckett v. The Merchants Bank ([6]). Monk Q.C. and Pelletier for the respondents. The duty imposed upon the survivor existed from the time of the death of the deceased consort and corresponds to the right of the child to the continuation of community. Lamoignon, Arréts, lit, 33, art. 2 ; 2 Prévost de la JannŁs, no. 374. To prevent the continuation of con munity, the survivor must make a formal inventory. 2 Argon Int. Liv. 3, chap. 5, pages 46, 47; Lebrun, Comm. Lib. 3, chap. 3, s. 1, n. 9, par. 1 .Pothier, Comm. nn. 772, 876 : art. 241 C. de P.; arts. 1323-11325 C. C. The law presumes the existence of common property in cases of community

[Page 454]

and it is consequently unnecessary to make proof of its existence, quantity or value. The omission to make the inventory leaves the survivor in reputed usurpation of the presumed property of the first community, small though it may be. She prevented dissolution taking effect, and voluntarily and deliberately submitted herself to the obligation as well as to the penalty of continuation of community. This presumption can be destroyed only by authentic proof in writing. Apart from that, property existed in a sufficiently appreciable proportion to give rise to the continuation. There was at the Lime of the marriage, a bed, bedding and some other small effects. The second husband admits having continued the business of the first husband, and no doubt made use of the instruments and tools of the first husband in his occupation as a gardener and dealer in garden produce. See Pothier, "Comm." nn. 565, 771, 772, 784, 785, 800, 805, 876 ; Armour v Ramsay ([7]). The defence does not deny the existence of common property and the law can now only regard the confusion resulting from the omission of the inventory and apply the provisions of the Code. The cases cited by the appellants all involve special circumstances which distinguisi! them completely from the condition of facts in this action. See also Renusson, " Communauté," 3rd part., ch. 2, no. 42. The law regards the inventory as a quasi-judicial proceeding of the greatest importance and it cannot be omitted without incurring the penalty Art. 1323 et seq. C. C. (old text) ; arts. 1387 et seq. C. P. Q. The deceased consort and the defendant were defaulters and can claim no equitable rights in. face of their disregard of the law.

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This court should not disturb the findings of the courts below as to the fact of the existence of common property.

There has not been any decision in the Province of Quebec that a demand was necessary during the lifetime of the survivor the remarks of Sir L. N. Cassault in Bourassa v. Lacerte([8]) are merely obiter dicta. A valid demand can be made upon the survivor's representatives.

The Chief Justice.—I entirely agree with Mr. Justice Girouard m the ground on which he places his judgment for the allowance of this appeal, namely, that it sufficiently appears that there was nothing to include in an inventory and, such being the case, the omission to make an inventory is not to be followed by the penal consequences imposed by the Code, viz., a continuation of community, but I think it right to say that I also agree with the reasons given by the majority of the Court of Review for their judgment. Those learned judges following the jurisprudence and especially the decision of Chief Justice Casault and the late Chief Justice Meredith in Bourassa v. Lacerte (1) held that the continuation of community must be demanded in the lifetime of the surviving spouse and that a demand of the heirs after the death of that survivor and at a time when a continued community would by the express provision of article 1335 C. C, if one had existed have been dissolved, is too late.

The appeal must he allowed with costs and the action dismissed with costs to the appellant in all the courts below.

Gwynne Sedgewick and King JJ. concurred in the judgment allowing the appeal and dismissing the action.

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GIROUARD J. —De droit commun, la continuation de

communauté n'existe pas. Elle fut introduite en France en 1510 par l'article 118 de l'ancienne coutume de Paris et puis continuée en 1580 par les articles 240 et 241 de la nouvelle coutume, qui devinrent le droit commun de la province de Quebec, reproduite au Code Civil art. 1323 et 1324. Il faut done l'entendre conformément aux termes de ces lois, sans en étendre les dispositions à ce qui n'a pas été prévu. Or le Code, comme la coutume, décrète que, si le survivant  des epoux

manque de faire procéder à l'inventaire des biens communs, la communauté se continue, etc.

Il faut done qu'il ait des biens communs et c'est aux parties qui invoquent la continuation . de communauté à alléguer et prouver ce fait. C'est ce que les intimés n'ont pas fait. Ils out cependant examine l'appelant qui a repondu que lors de son marriage ii n'avait rien,

ni elle non plus, seulement un lit, une couchette et quelques petites affaires.

Les intimés savaient si bien que telle était la situation de fait de la premiere communauté qu’ils n'ont pas même tenté de faire la preuve par commune renommée.

Bien peu de commentateurs ont examine la question de savoir s'il fallait un procès-verbal de carence, lorsque la communauté n'avait rien on presque rien à inventorier. Le Brun fut le premier à l'exiger dans son Traité de la Communauté, qui fut publié la premiŁre fois un an après sa mort en 1709. La seconde edition parut en 1734 avec des additions, une, entr'autres, où est rapporté un arrêt du Parlement de Paris du 4 septembre, 1731, qui, sur un appel du Chatelet de Paris décida tout le contraire de la doctrine de LeBrun. L'annotateur observe

[Page 457]

Le Parlement de Paris a jugé le contraire de la décision de M. LeBrun par arrêt renduen la quatrième chambre des Enquêtes, le 4 septembre 1731. Quand on supposerait que les deux conjoints auraient eu quelque peu de meubles, c'est-à-dire, leurs hardes, cela ne pouvait valoir la peine, ni les frais d'un inventaire, ni payer le coût d'un procès-verbal de carence, qui d'ailleurs n'est prescrit par aucune Ordonnance, ni par un arrêt de réglement.

Renusson, un contemporain de LeBrun, adopee son sentiment dans son Traité de la Communauté se contentant d'observer que c'est l'opinion de LeBrun. Les dernières editions de ses œuvres constatent cependant qu'elle fut rejetée par le Parlement de Paris par l'arrêt de 1731, et que c'est le dernier mot de la jurisprudence. Egalement, Meslé, un autre autorité sur Ia matiŁre, rapporte cette decision avec approbation sur le fondement de la notoriété évidente de la pauvrete de la communauté

car, dit-il, là où il n'y a point de bien, il ne peut y avoir ni communauté ni continuation de communauté (p. 645.)

Mais, disent les intimés, ii résulte du témoignage memo do l'appelant qu'il y avait des biens communs peu de choses, il est vrai, mais enfin quelque chose. Oui, quelques choses non appréciables à prix d'arget un lit, des hardes de corps, et probablement quelques petits meubles de nécessité première et exempts de saisie. L'inventaire de tels biens échappe à l'attention de la loi. De minimis non curat lex. Aussi Denizart vo. "Carence," définit-il le procès-verbal de carence

un acte qui se fait pour constater qu'un défunt n'a rien laissé dans sa succession, ou n'a laissé que très peu de choses.

Los intimés ont invoqué l'autorité de Pothier, " Communauté " n. 565 mais cet eminent jurisconsulte n'y entend pas parlor de la continuation de communauté mais simplement de la renonciation à la com-muanuté de Ia part de la femme qui n'a pas fait inventaire. Pothier ajoute qu'un acte de notoriété du 23 février 1708, atteste que dans ce cas ii ne suffit pas à

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la veuve, pour se dispenser de rapporter un inventaire, de dire que son mani n'a laissé, à sa mort, aucuns effets, mais quelle dolt le justifier par un procès-Verbal de carence. L'on trouve cet acte de notoriété rapporte an long par Denizart, " Actes de Notoriété " p. 331 ; mais nulle part, Pothier enseigne que cette régle doit également être suivie s'il s'agit de la continuation de communauté. A ce sujet, ii garde le silence il ne cite ni LeBrun, ni l'arrêt en 1731. Pas un arrétiste, pas un commentateur n'enseigne que cet arrêt ne fit pas autonite ;  bien au contraire, ii est cite comme étant la dernière expression de l'ancienne jurisprudence française.

Enfin la règle qu'il consacre a été appliquée par les tribunaux et les jurisconsultes modernes dans des cas analogues ([9]). Elle parait solidement appuyée sur le texte de la coutume de Paris et je ne crois pas que celui du Code Civil de Québec puisse raisonnablement admettre une autre interprétation.

Pour cette raison et sans examiner les autres points soulevés par cet appel, nous sommes d'avis d'accorder l'appel et de renvoyer l'action des intimés avec dépens.

Appeal allowed with costs.

Solicitors for the appellants. Beaudin, Cardinal, Loranger & St. Germain.

Solicitors for the respondents: Pelletier & Letourneau.