Supreme Court of Canada
Quebec Street Railway Company v. Corporation of the City of Quebec, (1888) 15 SCR 164
Date: 1888-03-15
THE QUEBEC STREET RAILWAY COMPANY (DEFENDANT)
Appellant;
And
THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF QUEBEC (PLAINTIFF)
Respondent.
1887: Nov 2; 1888: Mar 15
PRESENT Sir W.J. Ritchie C.J., and Strong, Fournier, Henry, Taschereau and Gwynne JJ.
ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH FOR LOWER CANADA, (APPEAL SIDE.)
Street Railway-By-Law-Agreement—Construction of—Notice— Arbitrators——Appointment of by Court.
The Quebec Street Railway Company were authorised under a bylaw passed by the Corporation of the City of Quebec and an agreement executed in pursuance thereof to construct and operate in certain streets of the city a street railway for a period of forty years, but it was also provided that at the expiration of twenty years (from the 9th February 1865) the corporation might, after a notice of six months to the said company, to be given within the twelve months immediately preceding the expiration of the said twenty years, assume the ownership of said railway upon payment, &., of its value, to be determined by arbitration, together with ten per cent additional.
Held, reversing the judgments of the courts below, Fournier J. dissenting, that the company were entitled to a full six months notice prior to the 9th February, 1885, to be given within the twelve months preceding the 9th February, 1885, and therefore a notice given in November, 1884, to the company that the corporation would take possession of the railway in six months thereafter was bad.
Per Strong and Henry J J.-That the court had no power to appoint an ai bitrator or valuator to make the valuation provided for by the agreement alter the refusal by the company to appoint their arbitrator. Fournier J. contra.
APPEAL from the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench for Lower Canada (Appeal side) confirming the judgment of the Superior Court.
On the 18th November, 1864, the Corporation of the City of Quebec passed a by-law, under the authority
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of 27 Vic. c. 61, intituled " A by-law allowing the Quebec Street Railway Company to construct a Railway in certain streets in the City of Quebec," by which powers were, subject to certain restrictions and conditions, conferred upon the company appellant, to build and operate a railway in the streets mentioned therein; and by the 25th section of the bylaw, it was enacted :
The privilege hereby granted to the said Company shall extend over a period of forty years, from the date hereof, but at the expiration of twenty years, the said corporation may, after a notice of six months to the said Company, to be given within the twelve months immediately preceding the expiration of the said twenty years, assume the ownership of the said Railway, and of all real and personal property in connection with the working thereof, and on the payment of their value, to be determined by arbitration, together with ten per cent, over and above the value thereof.
And the 30th section provided:
This present by-law shall not come into force and effect until an agreement based upon the conditions and provisions herein mentioned, shall have been executed by a notarial deed entered into by and on the part of the said Company and the said corporation, on whose behalf the Mayor is hereby authorized to sign the said agreement.
On the 9th February, 1865, the Corporation of Quebec and the Quebec Street Railway Company executed a notarial agreement in accordance with the 30th section of the by-law, embodying such by-law and containing the above cited 25th section in these words :
That the privilege granted to the said Company by the said by law and by the present deed, shall extend over a period of forty years from the date hereof, but at the expiration of twenty years, the said corporation may, after a notice of six months to the said Company, to be given within the twelve months immediately pre ceding the expiration of the said twenty years, assume the owner ship of the said Railway, and of all real and personal property in connection with the w006Frking thereof, and on payment of their value to be determined by arbitration together with ten per cent, over and above the value thereof.
The rights and privileges of the company thus extended for forty years, from the 9th February, 1865,
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unless terminated in the manner provided by the law and agreement.
On the 9th January, 1884, the Corporation of the city of Quebec gave notice to the company that it intended to avail itself of the right stipulated in its favor by the by law, to assume possession of the railway; but subsequently they gave a second notice on the 21st November, 1884, whereby it informed the company that the previous resolution and notice was annulled and that after the 9th February, 1885, at the time and in the manner provided by the by-law, it would assume the possession and ownership of that part of the railway in question situate within the city limits, and of the real and personal property in connection with the working thereof, and would be prepared to pay the value thereof, together with ten per cent over and above, as established by arbitrators; and by the same notice the corporation notified the company of its nomination of F. X. Berlinguet as its arbitrator, and called upon it to name an arbitrator to value the property conjointly with Berlinguet: to this notification no attention was paid by the company, and on the 9th May, following, Berlinguet proceeded alone to value that part of the company's property situated within the limits of the City of Quebec, which he estimated at a sum of $23,806.30 and his award was deposited with a notary and signified to the appellants on the 18th may, 1885. Three days afterwards legal tender of this sum with ten per cent, added was made to the appellants and on its being refused an action was instituted, by which after reciting the several statutes, by-laws, contracts, tenders, &., the corporation concluded that the tenders be declared good and valid; that it be adjudged that it had aright to take possession of the road, horses, harnesses, cars, &c., and that such judgment serve as a title hereto, in favor of the corporation.
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This action was dismissed by the Superior Court on the ground of insufficient notice.
The Court of Queen's Bench for Lower Canada (appeal side) confirmed this judgment on other grounds, but the majority of the court expressed the opinion that the notice was sufficient, the same having been given within the year but not within the first six months of the year in which the term of twenty years had expired; and the recourse of the city corporation was by the last mentioned judgment reserved.
The respondents then brought a second action, claiming that the appellant should be held bound to proceed with the arbitration; that in default of their naming an arbitrator, one should be named by the court on their behalf; and on an award being rendered, upon payment of the amount of the award and ten per cent. in addition, the respondents should be authorized to take possession of said railway and property of the appellant company situate within the limits of the City of Quebec, and that such judgment should operate a title in favor of said respondents.
To this second action, the appellants pleaded substantially as in the former action :
1. Want of sufficient notice.
2. That in connection with the railway they, the said company, owned a large amount of real and personal property, and that a large amount of their said property was without the city limits.
That if the City Corporation had a right to take the railway which was desired, they must take the whole railway and all the property in connection therewith.
3. That there was no power to force the Street Rail way Company to name an arbitrator or to proceed with the arbitration.
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Upon these issues, Casautt J. presiding in the Superior Court, whilst stating that his opinion as to the insufficiency of the notice remained the same as when he delivered. the judgment in the first action, considered himself bound by the opinion of the Court of Queen's Bench and gave judgment in favor of the respondents. This judgment being confirmed by the Court of Queen's Bench for Lower Canada (Appeal side) the Quebec Street Railway Company appealed to the Supreme Court.
Irvine Q.C. and Stuart for the appellants contended :
1. That the notice could only be given in the first six months of the twentieth year, that is between the 9th February, 1834, and the 9th August, 1884, and must have been to the effect, that on the 9th February, 1885, the Corporation would assume the ownership. Conditional obligations, dependent upon the will of the person in whose favor the obligation is contacted, must always be performed in forma specified et indivisibiliter. Larombière, Obligations ().
2. The court had no power to force the company to appoint an arbitrator.—The condition of the contract between the parties, gives, upon fulfilment of its pro visions, to the corporation the right to purchase the property of the appellants, at a premium of ten per cent, over the price fixed by arbitrators. No contract of sale is valid unless the price be fixed, or be susceptible of being established, by the joint consent of buyer and seller.
Troplong (); Duranton (); Delvincourt. (); Lau rent (); Duvergier (); Marcad'e, on C. N. Art. 1562 (); Aubry & Rau ().
The remedy of the corporation, if there has been
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a breach of contract on the part of the appellants, is in damages.
3. That the corporation was obliged to tender for all the real and personal property in connection with the working thereof, not for a part only.
Nothing was offered for a considerable part of the plant and the necessary buildings because situate out side of the city limits.
P. Pelletier Q.C. for respondents contended:
1. That the corporation could give the said notice at any time within the twelve months preceding the 9th February, 1885, but the possession of the railway could not be obtained by the corporation before the 9th February, 1885, and if the notice was given at a date not leaving six months up to the 9th February, 1885, then the full space of six months was to be allowed between the notice and the taking possession of the railway.
2. Trie appellants having agreed to settle their rights by way of arbitration, it was not competent for them to escape their obligation by refusing to appoint their own arbitrator. The jurisdiction of the Superior Court in the Province of Quebec is unlimited to enforce the contracts between the parties. Such jurisdiction is paramount to the obligations of the contracting parties. It is a remedial power even for cases not provided for.
3. As to tendering for property outside of the city limits the respondents could have no control and the portion to be taken possession of, contemplated by the by-law and contract, was the portion of the railway within the city limits.
Sir W. J. RITCHIE C.J.-To my mind it is clear that "after a notice of six months to the said company, to be given within the twelve months immediately
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preceding the expiration of the said twenty years, " means that the company are entitled to a full six months notice before the expiration of the twenty years, and that such six months must be within the twelve months immediately preceding the expiration of the twenty years. In this case no such notice of six months was given within the ' twelve months, the notice given having" been on the 21st November, 1884, which clearly was not a six months notice within the twelve months, the expiration of the twelve months being on the 9th February, 1885.
I think the judgment of the Superior Court in the first action, which held the notice insufficient, was clearly right and should be restored.
I think it very clear that the right to assume the road was to be at the expiration of twenty years and at no other time. It is a mistake to say the corporation have the whole year to give the notice : they are bound to give such a notice as will entitle them to assume the road at the expiration of twenty years; the express provision and privilege is, that at the expiration of twenty years the corporation may assume the ownership, but they cannot do this unless 'a notice of six months has been given within the twelve months immediately preceding the expiration of the said twenty years; if they fail to give such a notice the right to assume the ownership of the road at the expiration of twenty years ceases; so long as they give the six months notice within the twelve months they are all right, the six months having reference to the expiration of the twenty years; there was no other time contemplated or fixed for the termination of defendants', or the assumption of plaintiffs', rights in the road but the expiration of the twenty years.
The notice given was on the 21st November, 1884,
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that they would on the 9th February, 1885, assume the possession and ownership, &c. How can this be a good notice in any view of the by-law? It is neither notice of six months within the twelve months, nor any notice of six months at all. The notice of the 21st of November, 1884, that on the 9th of February, 1885, they would assume, &c, is only a notice of two months and nineteen days.
The only right the plaintiffs had was to put an end to the defendants' rights on the expiration of twenty years and from that date to assume the ownership, and if they failed to give the notice necessary to accomplish this they failed to avail themselves of the privilege accorded them by the agreement and by-law.
STRONG J.—-Under the authority of an act of the Legislature of the late Province of Canada (27 Vic ch. 61) by which the present appellants (defendants in first instance) were incorporated, the City of Quebec passed a by-law, authorizing the company to lay down rails in the streets of Quebec and amongst other things providing as follows:—
The privilege hereby granted to the said company shall extend over a period of 40 years from the date hereof, but at the expiration of 20 years the said corporation may after a notice of six months to the said company to be given within the 12 months immediately pre ceding the expiration of the said 20 years assume the ownership of: the said railway and of all real and personal property in connection with the working thereof and on the payment of their value to be determined by arbitration. together with ten per cent, over and above the value thereof.
This by-law further provided that the railway was not to go into operation until
An agreement based upon the conditions and provisions therein mentioned should have been executed by a notarial deed entered into by and on the part of the company and the said corporation on whose behalf the mayor was thereby authorized to sign the said agreement.
A notarial deed embodying. an agreement of the
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same tenor and effect was accordingly duly passed on the 9th February, 1865, The 20 years therefore 'expired on the 9th February, 1885. On the 21st November, 1884, the respondents gave notice that they would take possession of the railway and its property under the expropriation clause mentioned on the 9th February, 1885, that is, within three months from the date of the notice and by the same notice the corporation appointed Mr. F. X. Berlinguet as its arbitrator to value the property according to the provision of the by-law and called Upon the company to name an arbitrator to make the valuation conjointly with Mr. Berlinguet. The company did not appoint any arbitrator and on the 9th May, 1885, Berlinguet proceeded alone to value that part of' the company's property situated within the limits of the City of Quebec which he estimated at a sum of $23,806.30, and his valuation or award to that effect was deposited with a notary and signified to the appellants on the 18th May, 1885. Three days after wards the respondents caused this amount of the valuation with 10 per cent. additional to he tendered to the appellants through the ministry of & notary. They then instituted an action offering to consign the amount of Berlinguet's valuation and the 10 per cent, addition al and concluding for .a declaration of their title, and of the right to the possession of the property. To this action the appellants pleaded a defence in law (demurrer) and a perpetual exception and on the 8th February, 1886 the Superior Court, presided over by Mr. Justice Casault, rendered a judgment dismissing the action on the ground that no notice of six months within the twelve months immediately preceding the expiration of 20 years from the date at which the by-law came in force had been given according to the requirements of the by-law and the notarial deed executed pursuant to
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its terms.
The corporation appealed to the Court of Queen's Bench which latter court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court but upon other grounds from those which had formed the “considérants “of the judgment pronounced by Mr. Justice Casault.
The respondents then instituted the present action in which they repeated the allegations of their former action and in addition the facts that the first action had been instituted and that the judgment already mentioned had been rendered therein and they concluded that the company be ordered to name an arbitrator to value jointly with the one named by the corporation the property of the company, situated within the city limits, and in default of its so doing that the court should itself name an arbitrator to act for the company and that upon the payment of the amount to be awarded and 10 per cent, in addition the corporation should be authorized to take possession of such property situate within the limits of the city of Quebec and that such judgment should be declared to operate as a title in favor of the corporation. To this action the appellants pleaded, (1) That the company had failed to give the six months notice required by the by-law and agreement; (2) that by the notice stated in the action the company only proposed to assume and pay for so much of the company's property as was comprised within the limits of the city of Quebec whilst the company had in accordance with its powers in that behalf extended its line beyond the city limits and had other property beyond the limits which the city if entitled at all were bound to include in any expropriation under the by-law and agreement. (3) The appellants pleaded a defence en droit, or demurrer, by which they denied the legal sufficiency of the notice set forth in the action, excepted to the power
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and jurisdiction of the court to appoint an arbitrator for them, and insisted that the acquisition of the rail way and its works and property would be ultra vires of the corporation. Upon issues taken on these pleas and defences the parties went to trial before Mr. Justice Casault who, whilst stating that his opinion as to the insufficiency of the notice remained the same as when he rendered judgment in the first action, considered himself bound by the opinion of the Court of Queen's Bench and therefore rendered a judgment by which the company were ordered to appoint an arbitrator within 15 days. This judgment having been affirmed by the Court of Appeal, two judges (Mr. Jus tice Baby and Mr. Justice Church) dissenting, has now been appealed from to this court.
I am of opinion that the notice of the 21st November, 1885, was too late. The clause of the by-law and of the agreement executed in pursuance of it, ˛already set forth, clearly contemplate that the assumption of ownership by the corporation shall be at the expiration of 20 years from the date at which the by-law took effect and not later. It is not disputed that the by-law came into force on 9th February, 1865, and that the 20 years consequently expired on the 9th February, 1885. The corporation being in law bound to the utmost exactitude as to time in executing this unilateral clause, were therefore bound to show that they were in a position by a strict and literal observance of all pre requisite conditions to claim the right to assume the ownership on this 9th February, 1885. Then what were the pre-requisites? 1st. They were bound to show that that they had given a notice within twelve months immediately preceding the expiration of the 20 years. The only notice given within that period was the notice of the 21st November, 1884. 2ndly, they had to prove that at the time they claimed the
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right to assume the ownership of the railway, at the end of the 20 years, they did so after having given to the company a notice of six months. Then, do they show that on the 9th February, 1885, they had given a six month's notice? The only available notice they show that is the only notice given within the immediately preceding twelve months, is that of the 21st November, 1884. But this notice had not been given six months before the 9th February 1885, and as no other notice is suggested to have been given within the twelve months the corporation wholly fail to establish that they have complied with these preliminary requirements and conditions upon which alone they could claim to exercise the unilateral right of pre-emption or expropriation conferred by the by-law and agreement.
That an option of purchase of the kind given to the corporation in the present case, being a condition potestative, must be executed literally and strictly as to all its terms and conditions, including time, appears well established both by French and English authorities; Pothier on Obligations (); Demolombe on Con tracts (); Larombiere (); Fry on Specific Performance (); Austin v. Tawney (); Brooks v. Garrod (). Upon this ground alone the appellants are therefore entitled to succeed.
Further, it appears very clear that the great weight of French as well as English authority is against the respondents as regards the right of the court to appoint an arbitrator or valuator to make the valuation pro vided for by the agreement. It is universal and elementary law that the price is the very essence of the contract of sale and that no such contract can be
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considered as completed unless either directly or indirectly the parties are agreed as to the amount and terms of the price. A valuation by an arbitrator appointed by the corporation and one appointed of office by the court for the company after their refusal to appoint one for themselves would not involve any such agreement as to the price as the law absolutely re quires. It is not therefore surprising to find the best commentators almost universally of accord against such a jurisdiction. The jurisprudence of the French courts is also the same way. I refer to the following authorities on this point : Troplong, vente (); Durant on (); Delvincourt (); Laurent (); Zachariae par Masse & Verffé (); Marcadé on art. 1592 (); Aubry & Rau (); Taulier (); Alauzet, Code de Commerce (); and the jurisprudence is to the same effect in Dalloz Jur. Gren. Vente 380—D. P. 62 1-242 note; Limoges 4 April, 1826, Jur. Gen. Vo. Vente, 381-40; Toulouse, Y March, 1827, Jur. Gen. Vente, 381-20; Paris 6 July, 1812, Jur. Gen. Vol. Vente, 382 (motifs); Montpellier, 13 February, 1828 ib., 195; Jury. Gen. Vente, 380, Trans-Hy., 94, 95, D.P. 62,1, 242 notes; Jur. Gen. Vente, 378; Pau 30 November, 1859, D.P., 60, 2, 36. The English authorities are decisively to the same effect : Milnes v. Gery (); Derby v. Whittaker (); Tillett v. Charing Cross Bridge Co. ().
The provisions in the English Common Law Procedure Act as to the appointment of arbitrators by the court in default of an appointment under a contract do not apply to mere valuers Collins v. C. (); Fry on Specific Performance (). The circumstance that art. 15920. N. has
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not been textually re-reproduced in the C. C. of Quebec can make no difference. There is nothing in the code indicating that there was any intention to alter the law in such an important and radical particular as that which regards the price as an essential of the contract of sale, the rule which is the foundation of this objection. Therefore I think the appellants are entitled to have the judgment appealed against reversed upon this ground also.
The objections that the corporation do not propose to assume all the company's property, and that insisting that the by-law and agreement as regards the clause reserving an option of purchase was ultra vires of the corporation, need not be considered and I express no opinion on those points.
The appeal should be allowed with costs and the action dismissed with costs to appellants in both the courts below.
FOURNIER J.—Le 18 novembre 1864, la corporation de la cité de Québec a adopté un (by-law) règlement au sujet de la construction d'un tramway dans ses limites Ce règlement est textuellement inséré au long dans le contrat notarié intervenu entre la cite d'une part et la compagnie appelante de l'autre, par laquelle cette dernière s'obligeatt à construire le tramway dont il était fait mention dans le règlement et le contrat aux conditions et stipulations énoncées dans ces deux docments. Ces stipulations ont non-seulement la force d'un règlement municipal, mais elles ont de plus le caractère obligatoire d'un contrat passé en forme au thentique.
La clause de ce règlement donnant lieu, pour la deuxième fois, à un litige entre les parties, sur les mêmes questions, est identiquement la même que celle contenue dans le contrat, et elle est conçue dans les
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termes suivants:—
Le privilege accordè par les présentes à la dite compagnie, (savoir : , la dite compagnie du. chemin de fer des rues de Québec) durera pendant quarante ans, mais au bout de vingt ans, la dite corporation aura le droit, après un avis de six mois donnè à la dite compagnie dans les douze mois qui prècèderont immédiatement l'expiration des dites annèes, de prendre et s'approprier le dit chemin do fer, ainsi que les biens, meubles et immeubles qui serviront à'son exploitation, en en payant la valeur qui sera estimée par arbitrage, et, de plus, dix pour-cent de la valeur ainsi estimée.
La corporation de la citè de Quèbec, après l'avis de six mois requis par le contrat et le règlement, intenta une première action fondée sur une sentence arbitrale rendue par l'arbitre nommè par la dite corporation, après le refus de l'appelante de nommer son arbitre pour procèder à l'arbitrage pourvu par le dit règlement. L'honorable juge Cross a, dans ses notes sur cette cause, donnè l'historique de la première action, faisant voir pour quels motifs elle a été renvoyée par la Cour Supérieure, dont le jugement a été confirmé par celle du Banc de la Reine, à l'exception de la partie du dit lustrèrent déclarant que l'avis donné n'était pas suffisant, la cour du Banc de la Reine déclarant, au contraire cet avis suffisant et réservant a la dite corporation son recours pour une autre action.
Par sa deuxième action la dite corporation désirant faire exécuter la convention au sujet de l'arbitrage demande qu'il soit ordonné à la dite appelante de nommer in arbitre, et qu' a son défaut de ce faire ii en soit nommé un par la cour, etc.; que sur paiement du montant qui serait accordé par la sentence arbitrale, avec dix par cent en outre de cémentant, la corpora tion serait autorisée à prendre possession du tramway et des autres propriétés en faisant partie, situés dans les limites de la cite et appartenant à la dite appelante et que, le jugement vaudrait titre à la dite corporation.
La compagnie appelante a de nouveau plaidé, lo l'insuffisance de l'avis donné; 2o que la corporation de la
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cité de Québec n'avait le droit de posséder ni d'exploiter un tramway comme propriétaire; 3o qu'elle avait pour lexploitation du tramway des propriétés mobilières et ' immobilières dont une grande partie était située en dehors des limites de la cité que Si la dite cite voulait prendre possession du tramway elle devrait aussi prendre possession de toutes les autres propriétés qui en faisaient partie; 4o que la dite compagie ne pouvait légalement être contrainte à nommer un arbitre ni à procéder a l'larbitrage.
La principale question est sans doute celle de la suffisance de l'avis requis pour mettre fin au bail fait par le règlement. La disposition du règlement à cet égard a donné lieu à une différence entre les deux cours appelées à juger cette cause. L'hon. juge Casault de la Cour Supérieure a maintenu que l'avis pour être legal devait ttre donné au moins six mois avant l'expiration des derniers douze mois de la 20me année. La majorité de la cour du Banc de la Reine a déclaré au contraire que l'avis tel que donné était suffisant. La clause du règlement dit: Mais au bout de vingt ans, la dite corporation aura le droit, après un avis de six mois donné à la dite compagnie dans les douze mois qui précéderont immédiate ment l'expiration des dites années, de prendre, etc. Les premières 20 années du bail devant se terminer le 9 février 1885, l'avis fut donné le 21 novembre 1884, par conséquent avant l'expiration des derniers douze mois. Il n'y a qu'une condition di imposée à la formalité de l'avis, c'est qu'il sera donné dans les derniers douze mois; la partie obligée à le donner a donc jusqu'à la dernière minute des douze mois pour donner son avis, et pourvu qu'il soit signifié en dedans des douze mois ii est legal. Le délai pour le donner n'est pas de douze mois, moins six mois, comme ce serait le cas Si l'avis en question devait, comme on l'a pretendu,
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être signifié six mois entiers avant l'expiration des douze mois. La clause ne contient aucune expression qui puisse justifier une interpretation qui réduit aux premiers six mois de la dernière année le délai pour donner avis. Il est clairement de douze mois. Ii est vrai que dans le cas actuel l'avis étant donné le 21 novembre, les six mois de délai qu'il comporte n'expireront qu'âpres la 20e année écoulée. Mais ce sont les termes de la convention qui le veulent ainsi. Les parties ayant jugé à propos de la conclure de cette manière sans doute parce qu’elles ont prévu qu'il ne pouvait en résulter aucun inconvénient. La convention, fait remarquer l'honorable juge Cross, n'oblige pas à donner l'avis dans les premiers six mois :
On the contrary, it in effect says that it may be given at any time within the whole year, and, therefore, up to the last day of the year.
Les arguments faits par l'honorable juge Cross pour soutenir l'opinion du Banc de la Reine sur la suffisance de l'avis me paraissent tellement concluants que je crois devoir en citer la plus grande partie :—
It is not like the case of a lease, where the law provides for its continuance by regular stated annual terms, and in the absence of a specific agreement, requires as a condition precedent to the tenant's right to continue, a pure notice of a period whose limit is fixed by law, and in default whereof, the law prescribes as a penalty against the lessor and in favor of the lessee, that the lease shall continue for another year.
The parties in this instance had in view the termination of their relations at the end of twenty years : that was the main object of the stipulation but it did not necessarily follow that these relations should absolutely cease on the very day of the termination of the twenty years; on the contrary, much necessarily remained to be done after the expiry of the twenty years, in the valuation of the property, the payment of the price with its augmentation, and other like matters, before the relations established between the parties could effectually cease; and this especially required time on the part of the Street Railway company. Hence when the City Corporation had expressly the whole year in which to give the notice, the Street Railway Company could always claim the six months delay after the notice, although it may have carried them nearly six months into the following year. So that although the Street Railway
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Company might have insisted on terminating their relations to the City Corporation on the exact expiry of the twenty years, yet they were not obliged to do so, but could insist on the full expiry of a | six months notice given to them within the year before being obliged to take measures to relinquish their position: that is, the six months previous notice was stipulated for in their interest, in case they, should require the whole of that time.
Ces motifs me paraissent suffisants pour soutenir la décision de la cour du Banc de la Reine à laquelle je crois devoir donner mon concours.
Quant à la question du pouvoir do la corporation de posséder et d’exploiter le tramway en question, il est tout-à-fait inutile de s'en occuper sur cette contestation, bien que l'acte 27 Vict., ch. 61, ne laisse guère de doute à ce sujet. Le droit de s'en faire mettre en possession est soul mis en contestation aujourd'hui. Lorsque la corporation voudra exploiter le dit tramway, ii sera temps alors de s'occuper de l'étendue des pouvoirs que la loi lui a conférée à cet égard.
Quant à l'étendue des propriétés mobilières et immobilières qui devaient être comprises dans l'évaluation qui devait en être faite par l'arbitrage, elle est déterminée par l'acte notarié passé le 9 février 1865, Elle doit se limiter à cette partie du tramway qui est situé dans les limites de la cite. Ni le règlement ni le contrat no ne donne à ce sujet aucun pouvoir à la corporation. quant aux propriétés mobilières qui devaient être évaluées comme dépendances du tramway, cela dolt être laissé à la décision des arbitres,
Sur la validité de la clause par laquelle les parties se sont engages à reforger à arbitres la question d'évaluation du tramway et des propriétés mobilières de la compagnie, la majorité do la cour du Bane de la Reine s'est formellement prononcée tout en admettant comme l'a fait l'hon. juge Cross, qu'il y a divergence d'opinion parmi les auteurs. Mais comme le fait observer ce savant juge, la raison semble être tout-à-fait du côté de
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ceux qui maintiennent que cette clause Peut être mise en force. Les autorités citées par l'appelante dans son 'factum pour prouver li impossibilité de la mettre à exécution n'ont pas d'application au cas actuel. Elles B ne concernent que le cas d'une vente dans laquelle un vendeur et un acheteur ayant promis de laisser la fixation du prix de vente à la décision d'un tiers, la question s'élève au sujet de la légalité du consentement indispensable à la validité de la vente. Il ne s'agit pas ici d'une vente, car la propriété (les rues de la cité) qui fait le sujet de la clause compromissoire est inaliénable. Il n'y a pas eu et il n'a Pu y avoir vente par l'intimée des rues de la cite dont elle a permis l'usage à l’appelante pour un certain nombre d'années. Cette propriété est inaliénable de sa nature. La transaction dont il s'agit ne peut être tout au plus qu'un bail dont la considération reçue par la cite serait la facilité des communications offertes aux citoyens pour les transporter en ville. Il est pourvu qu'à son expiration la corporation reprendra possession du tramway et de ses dépendances en remboursant la compagnie appelante avec en outre dix pour cent. Ce n'est pas une vente, la rue n'a pas été vendue, c'est une simple résolution de la convention qui permet à l'in timée de rentrer dans sa propriété en indemnisant la partie dépossédée de ses frais de construction. La somme à payer n'est pas un prix de vente, puisque l'appelante pretend que l’intimée ne peut posséder le chemin en question. Ce n'est tout au plus qu'une indemnité pour les travaux de lappelante. La prospiété devant retourner à l'intimée, au bout de 20 ans, rien n'était plus rationnel et plus conforme aux usages judiciaires du pays que de convenir, comme on l'a fait dans le cas actuel que cc serait en en payant la valeur qui sera estimée par arbitrage, et, de plu, dix pour cent clé la valeur ainsi estimée. Comme on le
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voit il ne s'agit nullement de vente et les autorités citées par l'appelante portent à faux. Ii s'agit idi seulement de la validité de la clause par laquelle les parties sont convenues que leur contestation au sujet de l'évaluation à. faire serait jugée par des arbitres. cette clause est-elle valable? Ii y a divergence d'opinion à ce sujet entre les auteurs, comme l'a fait observer l'honorable juge Cross. Aussi, je ne me propose pas d'entrer dans la discussion des raisons données de part et d'autre—ce travail est déjà fait—je me con tenterai de n'en citer que les parties qui font voir, comme l'a si bien dit l'honorable juge Cross, que la raison est du côté de ceux qui soutiennent la validité de cette clause. Voir Dalloz, Rep. de Jurisprudence ().
Mais en supposant que la transaction puisse être con sidérée comme une vente dont le prix doit être laissé à l'arbitrage d'experts qui seront nommes ultérieurement la clause est valable, comme le prouve Dalloz ().
Je suis d'avis de confirmer le jugement, mais je suis seul de cet avis.
HENRY J.—By agreement and in virtue of a by-law the appellant company obtained the right to exercise the powers and privileges of a street railway company in the city of Quebec for a period of forty years, and upon one condition only could this right be put an end to, viz : " the privilege hereby granted to the said company shall extend over a period of forty years from the date hereof, but at the expiration of twenty years the said corporation may, after a notice of six months to the said company to be given within the twelve months immediately preceding the expiration of the said twenty years, assume the ownership of the said railway and of all real and personal property in connection with the working thereof and on the
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payment of their value to be determined by arbitration together with, ten per cent, over and above the (4) value thereof."
The notice in this case was given on the 21st. Nov. 1884, and the twenty years expired on the 9th Feb. 1885. I entirely concur in the opinion expressed by the majority of my learned colleagues that the notice is too short. The condition is a condition precedent to the right of the corporation to assume the ownership of the railway after twenty years.
I also concur with Mr. Justice Strong in holding that the court has no power under the agreement to appoint an arbitrator for the company. If it were the case of expropriation of public land for public use the court, no doubt, would have had power td appoint the arbitrator. But the agreement here distinctly provides that the company's arbitrator should be appointed by themselves and there is no provision that in the case of the refusal of the company to appoint their arbitrator a judge or court can then appoint one.
I have serious doubts on the other point raised, but it is sufficient for me to say that upon these two grounds I am of, opinion that the present appeal should be allowed with costs and the judgment of the Superior Court in the first action restored.
TASCHEREU J.—I am of opinion that the notice is defective and therefore the present appeal should be allowed with costs.
GWYNNE J. —The notice was quite insufficient; there is therefore no necessity to refer to the other points argued.
Appeal allowed with costs.
Solicitors for appellants: Caron, Pefitland Sc Stuart.
Solicitors for respondents : Baillargé & Fellctier.
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