Supreme Court of Canada
Galarneau v. Guilbault, (1889) 16 SCR 579
Date: 1889-03-28
MAGLOIRE C. GALARNEAU et al
Appellant;
And
LOUIS GUILBAULT
Respondent.
1889: Jan 19; 1889: Jan 21; 1889: Mar 28
PRESENT:—Sir-W.J. Ritchie C. J., and Strong, Fournier, Taschereau and Patterson JJ
ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH FOR . LOWER CANADA (APPEAL SIDE).
Toll Bridge—Ferry—Appeal R. S. C. ch. 135, sec. 29 (b), 38 Vic ch. 97— Interference—Damages.
By 38 Vic, oh. 97, the plaintiffs, were authorized to build and maintain a toll bridge on the River L'Assomption at a place called " Port-age " and " if the said bridge should by accident or otherwise he destroyed, become unsafe or impassable, the said plaintiffs were bound to rebuild the said bridge within fifteen months next following the giving way of said bridge, under penalty of forfeiture of the advantages to them by this Act granted; and during any time that the said bridge should be unsafe or impassable they were bound to maintain a ferry across the said river, for which they might recover the tolls."
The bridge was accidentally carried away by ice, but rebuilt and opened for traffic within fifteen months. During the reconstruction, although plaintiffs maintained a ferry across the river, the defendant built a temporary bridge within the limits of the plaintiffs' franchise and allowed it to be used by parties crossing the river.
In an action brought by the plaintiffs, claiming $1,000 damages, and praying that defendant be condemned to demolish the temporary bridge on an appeal to the Supreme Court it was
Held,—1st, that as rights in future might be bound, the case was , appealable under R. S. C, ch. 135, sec. 29 (b).
2nd—Reversing the judgment of the court below Ritchie C. J. and Patterson J. dissenting.—That the exclusive statutory privilege extended to the ferry and while maintained by the plaintiffs the defendant had no right to build the temporary bridge, but as the bridge had since been demolished the court would merely award nominal damages and costs.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench for Lower Canada (Appeal Side), affirming the
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judgment of the Superior Court, by which the appellants' action was dismissed with costs.
The appellants sued the respondent in the Superior Court, alleging in substance, by their declaration certain powers, privileges, immunities unto them granted under and by virtue of 38 Vic, ch. 97, and that under said statute they built a bridge over the river L'Assomption and kept it in good order; that in the course of the month of April 1885 the said bridge was partly carried away by the ice; that they repaired it within the delay fixed by the Act and had it again opened for circulation on the first of November of the same year, they having during the interval accommodated the public with a sufficient ferry across the said river; that respondent, in the course of May, 1885, erected another toll bridge which was opened for public circulation on the 1st of June 1885 within the limits prohibited by the said Act as being within the appellants privilege, thereby encroaching and infringing upon their said privileges; the appellants praying, by their conclusions, amongst others, that the respondent be ordered to demolish his said bridge that he be prohibited from further troubling appellants in the exercise of their privilege, and that on his default of so doing, the appellants be allowed to demolish respondent's said bridge, and the respondent be condemned to pay to appellants the sum of one thousand dollars damages and costs.
The respondent answered the said suit, first, by a defense au fonds en fait, and further, by another plea, stating that his bridge was built Only for his own use, and for such time only as appellants' bridge would remain impassable; that he allowed no stranger to pass thereon, and if any one did pass, it was without his consent and without remuneration and that he
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thereby did in no way infringe upon any of the appellants' privileges.
The appellants specially replied that the respondent by constructing his bridge, had illegally acted and, moreover, violated the privileges of the appellants: that the respondent had built his bridge not only for his personal utility, but even for that of a great number of persons who continued to use it, to his knowledge and with his consent and that he was personally profiting by it.
At the trial it was proved that the bridge had been accidentally carried away by ice, but rebuilt and open for traffic within fifteen months, during which time appellants maintained a ferry across the river, and that the respondents' bridge was a temporary bridge within the limits of the appellant's franchise upon which he allowed the public to cross the river, and the bridge was subsequently taken away.
The material sections of the statute 35 -Vic. ch. 97 are the following:-
" Sec. 5.—At all times, so long as the said bridge is kept in good repair and open for the use of the public, no person whatever shall erect any bridge or bridges, or shall use, for purposes of ferriage, boats of any description whatever, for the passage of any person, cattle or vehicle whatsoever for hire across the said river, within the distance of half a mile from the said river in the direction of the flow of the river and within the distance of two miles in the other direction, such distance being measured along the banks of the said river and following its windings, and any person who shall build any toll-bridge or toll-bridges over the said river within the limits aforesaid, or shall ferry for hire within the limits aforesaid shall, without prejudice to any proceedings which may he instituted against him by the said François Xavier Galarneau and Magloire Cléophas
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Galarneau before any court, to cause the said bridge to, be destroyed, and to cause their privileges to be otherwise respected, pay to the said François Xavier Galarneau and Magloire Cléophas Galarneau treble the tolls hereby imposed for all persons cattle horses and carriages passing over such bridge or crossing by means of such ferry or ferries.
Sec. 6.—The said Francois Xavier Galarneau and Magloire Cléophas Galarneau to entitle themselves to the benefits and advantages to them by this act granted, shall be bound to put the said bridge into a safe and convenient condition for the passage of travellers, cattle or vehicles and if the said bridge should by accident or otherwise, be destroyed, become unsafe or impassable, the said François Xavier Gralarneau and Magloire Cléophas Galarneau shall be bound to rebuild the said bridge within the fifteen months next following the giving away of the said bridge, under penalty of forfeiture of the advantages to them by this act granted; and during any time that the said bridge shall be un-safe or impassable they shall maintain a ferry across the said river for which they may recover the tolls aforesaid.''
McConville for respondent, on the motion to quash the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
The amount claimed, one thousand ($1,000) does not make the case appealable.
The case does not involve the validity of any of the acts mentioned in paragraph (a) of section 29 of the Supreme and Exchequer Courts Act.
It does not relate to any fee of office duty rent revenue or any sum of money payable to Her Majesty, nor to any title to lands
Does it relate to any title to a tenement?
I believe, not, because the franchise granted to the appellants, being for the limited period of 25 years
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(section 9 ch. 97 38 Vic.) is rather a chattel than a tenement which must be permanent. Blackstone, Kerr's edition (1); Abbott's Dictionary (1); Brown's New Law Dictionary (1); Tomlin's Law Dictionary (1); Bouvier's Law Dictionary (1); Maxwell Interpretation of Statutes (2).
Is there any annual rent or such like matter or thing where the rights in future might be bound? I respectfully submit that there is no such thing.
If the view I have above expressed as to the true construction of the statute 38 Vic., ch 97 is correct, it remains clear that appellants never had in the past, have not actually, and will never have the right by them claimed Until they obtain another act from Parliament they will have no right that might hereafter be bound by the decisions of the courts below.
Laflamme Q.C. for appellants contra contended that the case came within the sub-section (c) of section 29 of R. S.C.
The decision of the court on the question of "jurisdiction being* reserved the case was then argued on the merits.
Laflamme Q.C. and Charpentier for appellants con tended that the charter or privilege granted by the general statute 38 Vic, chap 97, is a contract between the public and the grantee, which warrants to the latter, the exclusive right to build a bridge over the River L'Assomption within the limits indicated, and that according to the 5th section of the statute there is an absolute prohibition to construct any other bridge t the limits of the privilege, in favor of the grantees, at all times provided the grantee executes
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the obligations mentioned in his grant. See Lessee v.Douglass (1); Girard v. Belanger (1).
As to the damages, they contended that although it would be difficult to strictly determine the amount it appeared however by the evidence that a great number of travellers had eluded the toll which the appellants had the right to claim, by using the ferry constructed by respondent, which was open to the free circulation of the public. In such a case, the court must consider the determined violation of the law and grant to the injured party exemplary damages, or at least sufficient to cover the "probable loss that the party may have suffered, and the sum of two hundred dollars would be an extremely moderate amount.
McConville for respondent contended that the only reasonable construction to be "put upon sections 5 and 6 of the statute was that in case of accident the benefits and privileges granted to appellants are suspended during the fifteen months allowed for repairs. During that time they can claim none of such benefits and privileges; and the public, of which respondent is one, may protect themselves in any manner that suits them, if they are not satisfied with the appellants' ferry.
Grrants of this kind are always strictly construed, are always taken in a most favorable sense for the King and the public, and against the grantee. They are valid only as to what is therein precisely mentioned are not to be extended beyond the terms expressly used. Blackstone, Kerr Edition (1).
SIR W. J. RITCHIE C.J. I am of opinion the appeal should be dismissed with costs.
STRONG and ' TASCHEREAU J J. concurred with FOURNIER J.
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FOURNIER, J. En vertu du statut 38 Vict. ch. 97 les appelants ont obtenu du parlement du Canada le prillège de construire un pont do péage sur la rivière G L'Assomption, dans la paroisse de L'Assomption, à 1 endroit appelé "portage," où cetee rivière est navigable.
Le statut en leur accordant le droit de construire un pont solide et suffisant à la charge de le maintenir et réparer à leurs frais, les autorise à recevoir et exiger les taux de péages spécifiés dams le dit acte en se conformant aux conditions y mentionnées.
Le privilège accordé est énoncé dans les termes suivants:
En tout temps, tant que "le dit pont sera tenu en bon état de réparation, et ouvert pour l'usage du public, des lors aucune personne quelconque ne pourra ériger aucun pont on ponts, ni ne pourra faire usage, comme moyens de traverse, de bateaux d'aucune espèce pour le passage d'aucune personne, bestiaux ou voitures quelconques, moyennant retribution sur la distance d'un demimille du pont dans la direction du cours de la rivière et sur la distance de deux milles dans l'autre direction,. et toute personne qui construira un pont de péage ou des ponts de péage sur la dite rivière dans les dites limites, ou qui traversera des passagers moyennant retribution dans les limites susdites, paiera, en outre des procédés que pourront adopter contre lui les dits François-Xavier Galarneau et Magloire Cléophas Galarneau devant les tribunaux pour faire détruire les dits ponts et faireautrement respecter leur privilége, aux dits François-Xavier Galarneau et Magloire Cléophas Galarneau, trois fois la valeur des taux, etc., etc. Et s'il arrivait que le dit pont s'écroulât par accident ou autrement, qu'il fut détruit, que sa traversée devint dangereuse, on qu'il devint impraticable, les dits François-Xavier Galarneau et Magloire Cléophas Galarneau, seront tenus de rétablir le dit pont dans les quinze mois à dater du jour de l'écroulement du pont à peine d'être déchus des avantages a eux accordes par le present acte, et pendant le temps que le dit pont sera impraticable et que sa traversée sera dangereuse, ils devront entretenir un passage sur la dite rivière, à raison duquel ils pourront exiger les péages susdits.
En 1883, los appelants ont, conformément aux dispositions do ce statut, construit sur la dite rivière L'Assomption, à l'endroit appelé " portage," un pont, qui fut emporté par les glaces.
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Ce pont ayant été reconstruit la même année et entretenu conformément à la loi fut de nouveau endommagé par la glace dans le printemps de 1885, de manière à le rendre impraticable. Dans le but de con-' server leur privilège de reconstruire le dit pont dans le délai que leur accorde le statut, les appelants s'empress Crent de se conformer à la condition d'entretenir un passage sur la rivière, dans le cas où le pont est devenu impraticable, et l'ont entretenu jusqu'à ce que le dit pont eût été complètement réparé et mis en état d'être ouvett au public, ce qui eut lieu longtemps avant l'expiration du délai de quinze mois accordé par le statut pour la reconstruciion.
Daus le mois de juin 1885, pendant que les appelants entretenaient, conformément au dit statut, une traverse suffisante pour les besoins du public, en attendant la reconstruction du pont endommagé, l'intimé a illégalement érigé un pont sur la dite rivière dans les limites du privilège des appelants et a ouvert ce pont au public, en exigeant des péages pour le passage des personnes voitures et bestiaux, au detriment des appelants et en violation de leur privilège exclusif de percevoir des péages dans les limites susmentionnées.
Pour obtenir reparation du tort que leur causait l'intimé, et faire reconnaître leur privilège exclusif, les appelants intentèrent leur action en cette cause pour faire ordonner la démolition du pont construit par l'intimé et lui faire défense de troubler les appelants dans l'exercice de leur privilège et aussi pour faire condamner l'iintimé à leur payer $100.00 de dommages.
A cette action l'intimé a plaidé qu'étant resident au village de L'Assomption et propriétaire d'une terre sur la dite rivilre il est obligé de la traverser souvent et d'y faire traverser ses animaux; qu'après Ia destruction du pont des appelants il a construit vis-à-vis sa terre,
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à ses propres frais, un pont temporaire, pour son utilité personnelle, dont ii s'est servi jusqu'au mois de novembre suivant.
Après enquête et audition la cour Supérieure a donné gain de cause à l'intimé, et son jugement a été confirmé par la majorité de la cour du Banc de la Reine.
Les raisons de ce jugement ne se trouvent que dans les considéranss du jugement de la cour Supérieure, qui sont à l'effet que l'intimé avait droit de construire un pont temporaire, et sont une negation directe et formelle de l'existence du privilège des appelants pendant la reconstruction de leur pont.
La preuve a établi d'une manière certaine qu'aussitôt après l'accident les appelants se sont conformés à la condition qui leur est imposée d'entretenir une traverse suffisante pendant la reconstruction, qu'à part des accidenss causés par force majeure leur pont a toujours été tenu en bon état de reparation et ouvert pour l'usage du public. Ils ont aussi prouvé que l'intimé a reçu des profits pécuniaires, sous forme de péage, de l'exploitation de son pont. Lanegation de ces faits a été positivement contredite. La seule question qui s'éléve en cetee cause est de savoir * si pendant les 15 mois de délai accodéé par le statut pour la reconstruction du pont dans le cas d'accidents, les appelants out encore le privilège d'empêcher la construction d'aucun pont, dans les limites qui leur sont assignées par le statut, en se conformant toutefois à la condition de maintenir une traverse tel que le veut le statut en attendant que le pont soit rendu à la circulation
Le jugement dont est appel a nié formellement cette proposition—ainsi que la défense—ce qui a eu l'effet de mettre en question le litre des appelants et partant de rendre la cause appelable comme soulevant une question de titre à un immeuble. Cette cause tombe évidemment sous la section déclarant:
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In any matter which relates to any title to lands or tenements \where the rights in future might be bound.
etest, partant, appelable à cette Cour.
La question de droit à décider repose entièrement sur l'interprétation du statut conférant le privilége dont il est question.
D'après la cinquième section, ce privilège doit exister tant que le pont sera en bon état de réparation et ouvert au public, et pendant tout ce temps personne ne pourra ériger aucun pont ni ne pourra faire usage, comme moyen de traverse, de bateaux d'aucune espèce pour le passage des personnes, voitures et bestiaux, moyennant rétribution, sur la distance d'un demi mille du pout dans la direction du cours de la. rivilre et sur la distance de deux milles dans l'autre direction. Ce privilège est transmissible aux héritiers et ayans-cause, et doit durer pendant vingt-cinq ans. Ce privilège, qui n'est accordé que dans l'intérêt du public, est protége par l'interdiction de construire aucun pout dans les limites accordées et par l'imposition de pénalités de trois fois la valeur du taux de péage contre ceux qui traverseraient des passagers moyennant rétributions La statut leur donne en outre le droit de poursuivre devant les tribunaux pour faire détruire les "ponts qui seraient construits en violation de leur privillge et de faire autrement respecter le dit privilège.
La sixième section pourvoit au cas où la communication serait interrompue par accident an pont et declare que dans ce cas les appelants—
Shall be bound to rebuild the said bridge within fifteen months next following the giving away of the said bridge, under penalty of forfeiture of the advantages to them by this article granted, and during the time that the said bridge shall be unsafe or impassable, they shall maintain a ferry across the said river for which they may* recover the tolls aforesaid.
Cette clause loin d'autoriser l'interprétation de 1 cour Supérieure qui justifie la construction temporaire
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d'un pont par l'intime, pourvoit, au contrarre, à la continuation du privilège pendant la construction du pont, en obligeant les appelans à le reconstruire dans les quinze mois qui suivront l'accident qui l'aura rendu.F impassable, sous peine de perdre tous les privilèges et avantages qui lui sont accordés par le statut. Elle l'obige aussi, pour remédier à l'interruption des communications, à maintenir une traverse • pour laquelle elle l'autorise à exiger les mêmes taux que pour le passage sur le pont. Les appelanss s'étant conformés à cetee condition, leur privilége d'empêcher la construction d'un pout dans leurs limites n'a pas cessé un seul instant. Il doit, d'après le statut, durer vingt-cinq ans, pourvu que les appelants remplissent les obligations qui leur sont imposées. Ils ont fait une preuve complète de l'accomplissement de ces conditions. Si l'iintimé avait memo temporairement le droit de construire un pont, ce serait une négation du droit absolu et exclusif des appelants pendant toute la durée qui leur a été accordée.
En supposant que l'intimé n'aurait pas exigé de péages sur son pont, il n'en aurait pas moins porte atteinte au privilège des appelants, qui auraient tout de memo le droit dŁen demander la demolition pour faire respecter leur privilège.
Ce principe a été approuéé par la cour du Banc de la Reine en appel, en 1874, par un jugement unanime, infirmant celui de la cour Supérieure dans la cause de Girard v. Bélangrr et al.
Il ne paraît pas y avoir de rapport régulier de cette cause, mais on trouve la substance du jugement de la cour d'Appel dans l'ouvrage de feu l'honorable juge Ramsay (Ramsay Appeal Cases) (), où l'honorable juge faitles observations suivantes '.
Where a statutory privilege is accorded to construct a toll bridge,
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and where by the statute according such power it was enacted " that after said bridge should be open for the public no person should erect or cause to be erected any bridge or bridges or maintain or cause to be maintained any means of communication for the carriage of any person, cattle or carriage whatsoever for hire, across the said branch of the river Yamaska, at the place above mentioned, anywhere within one mile above and one mile and a half below the said bridge, under the penalty of a fine of forty shillings currency for each person, animal or carriage conveyed across the said river on any bridge or means of communication constructed and maintained for hire provided nothing in said act should be constructed to deprive the public of the right of crossing the said river within the limits aforesaid, by fording or in canoes or otherwise without payment." A large number of people built a subscription bridge within the limits of the said statutory privilege avowedly with the object of avoiding the use of the toll bridge and depriving the owner of the privilege of his custom. Held that this was an indirect mode of defeating the privilege aforesaid, and that the defendants should be condemned to demolish the bridge by them constructed. Girard v. Bélanger et al. Judgment reversing, September, 1874.—Monk, Taschereau, Ramsay, Sanborn, Belanger, JJ.
La doctrine énoncée dans cette decisionest certainement légale et son application à la cause actuelle est évidente.
Les appelants sont entrés dans une savante dissertation et ont cite un grand nombre d'autorités pour établir qu'ils avaient droit pour la protection de leur privilège, d'empêcher tout empiètement sur la propriété publique dans les limites qui leur sont assignées, et qu'ils avaient droit de les faire disparaître au moyen de l'action populaire ou en obtenant un bref de prohibition. Il n'était guère utile de reférer à toutes ces autorités, car le statut leur donne toute la protection nécessaire contre quiconque enfreindrait leurs droits en décrétant ce qui suit:
And any person who shall build toll bridge or toll bridges over the said river within the limits aforesaid or shall ferry for hire within the limits aforesaid, shall, without prejudice to any proceeding which may be instituted against him by the said (the appellants) before any court, to cause the said bridge to be destroyed, and to cause their privilege to be otherwise respected.
Cette clause leur ouvre tous les moyens de droit pour la protection de leur propriété.
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Bien que Ia preuve alt établi qu'un grand nombre de personnes ait passé sur le pont du défendeur, an prejudice des appelants, et qu'en conséquence ceux-ci ont dû souffrir des dommages; cependant le montant n'en a pas été détermin C, l'action ayant pour but principal de faire reconaître le privilège exclusif des appelants ii ne saurait, dans ces circonstances, être accodéé que des dommages nominaux.
En conséquence, le jugement de cette cour devrait accorder aux appelants les conclusions de leur déclaration moins la demolition du pout que le défendeur a fait enlever dans l'automne de 1885 et le dit défendeur en outre condamné à la somme de $50 de dommages avec intérêt et les dépens dans les deux causes distraits en faveur du procureur des appelants.
PATTERSON J. I am unable to understand the statute 38 Vic, chap. 97, in the same way as some of my learned brethren, nor can I see that it ought to mean what they interpret it to mean.
The exclusive privilege of maintaining a toll bridge across the River l'Assomption is given to Galarneau, who is protected by the prohibition of all other persons from transporting persons vehicles, &c, across the river for hire, either by bridge or ferry, within the specified limits, so long as the bridge is kept in good repair and open for the use of the public. If the bridge is destroyed or becomes unsafe or impassable Galarneau is bound to restore it within fifteen months on pain of the forfeiture of his privileges, and in the meantime to maintain a ferry
Now his exclusive privileges are in terms extended only to such times as the bridge is in good repair and open for use to the public. He is bound, it is true, to maintain a ferry while the bridge is not available, but I find no exclusive privilege attached to that nor do I perceive on what public principle there should be such an exclusive privilege.
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The object of the monopoly is the bridge. The consideration for it is the providing a bridge, not a ferry. The privilege connected with the bridge being preserved to the grantee during the time, not exceeding fifteen months, when there is no bridge there, it is reasonable that he should during the time furnish the public with a ferry which, though not so useful as a bridge, is the best temporary substitute. That is the price of the maintenance of the monopoly given in respect of the bridge, which monopoly, by the terms of the statute as I read them, is suspended while the bridge is not available, but becomes again operative when the bridge is restored.
That seems to me the plain reading of the statute, and I do not see why it should be otherwise, or why as soon as the bridge is gone, any one should not be at liberty to build another and use it until the toll bridge is restored. The public was to have a bridge. That was the object and excuse of the monopoly, and I should be surprised to find the statute forbidding the temporary use of another bridge, which temporary use might become permanent if the fifteen months elapsed without the other being restored.
I think this appeal should be dismissed.
Appeal allowed with costs.
Solicitor for appellants : M. E. Charpentier.
Solicitors for respondent : McConville & Renaud.
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