Price v. Mercier, (1890) 18 SCR 303

Supreme Court of Canada

Price v. Mercier, (1890) 18 SCR 303

Date: 1891-01-19

EVAN JOHN PRICE (TIERS OPPOSANT IN THE SUPERIOR COURT )

Appellant;

And

HON. H. MERCIER, ès qual et al., PLAINTIFF AND INTERVENING PARTY IN THE SUPERIOR COURT)

Respondent.

1890: Mar 5; 1891: Jan 19

PRESENT:—Sir W. J. Ritchie C.J., and Fournier, Taschereau, Gwynne and Patterson JJ.

ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH FOR LOWER CANADA (APPEAL SIDE.)

Tierce-opposition to judgment—Interest of Opposant—Intervention----OCLLG of litigious rights—Arts. 485, 989, 990, 1583 G. C.---Arts. 154, 510 G. P. C.—Judgment—When action was prescribed—Arts. 2216, 2243, 2265, 2187 C. C.

P. having filed a tierce-opposition to a judgment obtained by the Attorney-General of the Province of Quebec in 1884, in a suit commenced by information in 1790 against the succession of one M. P. in order to have the judgment set aside on the ground that it declared escheated to the Crown a part of the Seigniory of Grondines of which he (P. ) had been in possession for a great number of years and which judgment it was alleged had been obtained illegally and by fraud and collusion, one M. au advocate, who had purchased all the rights of the Crown in the said succession, intervened and asked for the dismissal of the tierce-opposition. The Attorney-General and the curator to the succession of M. P., the only parties to the judgment sought to be set aside, in answer to P.'s tierce-opposition merely appeared and declared that "ils s'en rapportent justice." Upon the issues being joined on the tierce-opposition and on the intervention and evidence taken the Superior Court dismissed M 's intervention and maintained P.'s tierce-opposition. On appeal to the Court of Queen's Bench by the crown and M. jointly, this judgment was reversed, and P.'s tierce-opposition was dismissed.

On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada :

Held, reversing the judgment of the court below, 1st that M. had no locuestandi to intervene the sale to him of the crown s rights being void (a) because it was a sale of litigious rights to an

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advocate prohibited by arts. 1485 and 1583 C. 0. and therefore null under arts. 14 and 990 0. C. C; (b) because it was tainted with champerty, arts. 14, 989, 990 0.0.; (c) because M. admitted he had no interest in the, case, art. 154 C. P. C.

2nd. That P. being in posession of the property declared escheated to the crown in a proceeding to which he was not a party had a sufficient interest under the circumstances in the case to file a tierce-opposition, and that the judgment of 1884 should be set aside because inter alia, (a) it was obtained by fraud and collusion; (b) the action' being prescribed in 1884 ('Arts. 2216, 2242 2265 0. C) P. under art. 2187 had the right to avail him~ self of this prescription.

Founder J. dissented on. the ground that P. not having alleged or shown a right 'superior to that of the crown his tierce-opposition should be dismissed.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench for Lower Canada, (appeal side) reversing a judgment of the Superior Court, whereby a tierce op-position filed by the appellant to a judgment rendered in the Superior Court of the 14th June, 1884, was maintained.

Upon an information filed by the Attorney-General for. the King in 1790, claiming as escheated to the crown certain real estate, viz: a portion of the Seigniory of Grondines forming part of the succession of one Marie Fiery widow of Jean Baptiste Hamelin Fran chevilee, and alleging that she died intestate and without heirs, and that the deceased was a bastard the curator to the succession appeared and pleaded to the information, and no further steps or proceedings were taken until 11th March, 1884, when Hon. L. O. Taillon, Attorney-General for Province of Quebec obtained a reprise d'instance\, and after certain proceedings were taken to appoint another curator, &c, and the filing of an amended information, and the hearing of the case on the merits, the Superior Court on the 14th June 1884, rendered a judgment in favor of the crown.

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On the 24th. July, 1884, the Queen, represented by the Commissioner of Crown Lands sold to Gr. P. La-fontaine, as agent for T„ T. Moreau, among other property, all that heretofore described as forming part of the estate and succession of the late Marie Piery, belonging to Her Majesty par droit de desherence, and on the 24th March, 1885, T. T. Moreau, as assignee of the crown, brought an action against the present appellant, claiming the property in question.

Upon the service of this action the present appellant filed an opposition tierce opposition) to the judgment of June, 1884, which declared the property of which he had been in possession for over 30 years, as escheated to the crown, and the respondent for and on behalf of Moreau intervened.

The pleadings and documentary and oral evidence produced on the tierce opposition and on the intervention are fully stated in the judgment of Mr. Justice Taschereau hereinafter given.

The Superior Court rendered the judgment now appealed from, on the 1st February, 1887, maintaining the opposition of the appellant and dismissing 1. 1. Moreau's intervention.

On an appeal to the Court of Queen's Bench for Lower Canada (appeal side), that court allowed the appeal on the ground that the present appellant, in order to succeed on his tierce opposition, should have alleged an interest on a right superior to that of the party who had obtained the judgment sought to be set aside, but reserved to the appellant his right to have it declared by the court upon regular proceedings, that the judgment complained of does not affect the immovables in appellants s possession.

Irvine Q.O., and Stuart Q.C., for appellant, and Beique Q.C., for respondents.

The arguments and authorities relied on by counsel

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are reviewed at length in the judgments hereinafter given.

Sir W. J. RITCHIE C-J.I feel very great embarrassment in arriving at a conclusion in this case in consequence of the great diversity 01 opinion of my brother judges from the Province of Quebec for both of whose opinions it is needless to say I entertain the highest respect and from the able manner in which both have dealt with the question at issue and to which judgments, having been accorded the privilege of reading them, I have given the most serious consideration

The question, independent of the merits, seems to resolve itself very much into a matter of procedure namely, as to the right of Price, an intervening party, to make a fierce opposition to the judgment in this case, the learned judge of the Superior Court holding that there was a manifest interest in the opposant by tierce opposition to call in question the legality of the judgment in the present case, declaring the Seignory Grondines, or. any part thereof, belonging to or in the possession of the opposant, to the property of Her Majesty as against the opposant who was not a party to the present action. On appeal the majority of the Court of Queen's Bench, on the contrary, holding that to authorize a person, not a party to a judgment, to form a tierce opposition to this judgment, it was not sufficient that he may have an interest contrary to him who has obtained this judgment but it is necessary that this interest should be founded on a right superior to that of the party who has obtained this judgment in his favor.

I cannot bring my mind to the conclusion that Price the tiers opposant had no interest which was affected by the judgment in this case. He is in

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possession of the land in question, and has been so for a very long time, some fifty years, adverse to the crown, and L cannot think his right to this possession would not be seriously affected by the said judgment; in addition to which this judgment would be registered and could continue in force for thirty years, during all of which time it would seriously affect the ability of the tiers opposant to sell or deal with the property and the title under which it is fair to assume he claims to hold this possession; and in any proceeding instituted to dispossess the opposant this judgment, it appears to me, would necessarily be the basis of the plaintiff's claim. If so, I cannot avoid thinking that he has a substantial and direct interest in having it removed if he can show as he alleges, that the judgment was fraudulently, improperly and illegally obtained, and therefore I cannot help thinking he had a right to file an opposition to such judgment by virtue of Art. 110 CO P. which declares that any person whose interests are affected by a judgment rendered in a case in which neither he nor the persons representing him were made parties can file an opposition to such judgment.

My brother Taschereu, whose views I feel constrained to adopt has in a very full and elaborate judgment, traced the history and merits of this, I may say, very extraordinary case, from its inception, more than one hundred years ago, and has discussed at length the law as applicable to it, and has, so far as I am capable of forming an opinion, shown that this appeal should be allowed. Consequently I am relieved from doing more than concurring in that judgment which he will deliver, which, however, I must say, I do with the greatest diffidence.

I therefore think the appeal should be allowed the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench reversed and the judgment of the Superior Court restored.

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FOURNIER J.—La prèsente contestation a été soulevée sur la tierce-opposition produite par l'appelant Price, au jugement de la cour Supérieuce, en date du 14 juin 1884 accordant à la Couronne, par droit de deshérence, la possession et la propriété de la succession de dame Marie Piery, veuve de Jean-Baptiste Hamelin Fran-chieville.

Cette procedure avait été commencée par Alexandre Gray, procureur-général, au nom de Sa Majesté, par une information en date du 9 juillet 1790, dirigée contre J.-Bte. Gueyrault, nommé curateur à la succession vacante de la dite dame Piery.

Le 7 juillet 1791, Nicolas Piery, Marie Madeleine Piery et Marie Scholastique Piery intervinrent pour reclamer la dite succession contre le curateur. Le même jour 11 fut permis à Jenkins Williams, Ecr., soliciteur-général, vu le décès d'Alexandre Gray, procureur-général, de reprendre l'instance an nom de Sa Majesté.

Le 11 mars 1881 l'honorable Louis Olivier Taillon procureur-général de la province de Quebec, obtint de la cour Supérieure la permission de reprendre l'instance en cette cause en remplacement de Jenkins Williams. Le 8 mars de la méme année Adalbert Fontaine, de Québec, avocat, ayant été nommé curateur en remplacement de Gueyrault, reprit, le 14 du même mois l'instance comme défendeur.

L'intervention de Nicolas Fiery et autres fut renvoyée le 4 juin par jugement de l'honorable juge Casault. Et la cour le 14 juin, considérant que Sa Majesté avait prouvé les allégués de son information, déclara par son jugement que les biens de la dite succession appartenaient à Sa Majesté par droit de deshé-rence et ordonna an curateur Fontaine, Ła-qualité, de rendre compte à Sa Majesté de sa gestion et administration des biens de la dite succession et de payer et délivrer à Sa Majesté les argents, droits, credits, effets,

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titres et sûretés appartenant à la dite succession, avec la possession des terrains et parties de seigneurie, etc., pour 1 usage de Sa Majeste.

L'appelant Price qui so trouve en possession d'immeubles appartenant à cette succession s'est porte tiers-opposant au jugement qui a ordonné au curateur d'en remettre la possession à Sa Majesté qui en est déclarée propriétaire par droit de deshérence.

Ilse son opposition principalement sur les moyens suivants :—que dans une certaine cause pendante, savoir, le no 1796, ii a été poursuivi par Tancrède Toussaint Moreau, comme acquéreur des droits appartenant à la couronne en vertu du jugement qui l'a déclaré propriétaire par droit do déshérenoe des biens de la succession Piery, le 14 juin 1884, dans la présente cause, et qu'en qualité de cessionnaire de ces droits ii réclame du tiers-opposant, une partie do la seigneurie des Girondines appelée le fief do Francheville, dont celui-ci est en possession paisible comme propriétaire depuis un grand nombre d'années, avec aussi thus les arrérages et revenus perçus par le dit opposant, et à défaut du paiement d'une somme de $100,000. Quo le dit Tancrède T. Moreau, cherche comme acquéreur des droits de la Couronne à priver le dit opposant do sa possession et jouissance do la dite propriété et qu'en conséquenee celui-ci a intérêt à so porter opposant au jugement qui a été rendu en cette cause le 14 "juin 1884.

Cette action do Tancrède T. Moreau est encore pendante

Price allègue encore dans son opposition que ce jugement est illegal, irrégulier, erroné et non fondé en faits et en loi et devrait étre annulé révoqué et mis do côté pour les raisons suivantes :

10 Parcequ'il n'y a aucune preuve établissant quo Marie Piéry était une enfant illégitime. 2° Parce qu'il n'y a pas do preuve que la dite Marie Piery fut pro-

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priétaire d'aucune partie de la dite seigneurie des Grondinss, parce que si la dite Marie Piery. eût été illégitime, sa succession vacante n'aurait pas appartenu à la Couronne de France; que tous les procédés faits dans la dite cause depuis 1884 sont entachés de fraude irréguliers et illégaux.

Que le jugement renvoyant l'intervention de Nicolas Piery et al a été obtenu par surprise, etc., etc. Et l'opposant conclut à ce que tous les procédés faits depuis 1884 soient déclarés frauduleux et collusoires et le jugement du 14 juin 1884 déclaré nul.

Sur cette opposition Tancrède T. Moreau a étè reçu partie intervenante et a produit une défense en droit à cette partie de la dite opposition qui se lit comme suit :

That the intervention in this cause filed on the seventh day of September, one thousand seven hundred and ninety-one, by Nicolas Piery, Marie Madeleine Piery, and Marie Scholastique Piery, should not have been dismissed and the judgment in this cause rendered on the fourth day of June, one thousand eight hundred and eighty-four, dismissing such intervention, was obtained from the court by surprise, and is illegal null and void in as much as there was at the date of such indgment legal presumption of the death of such intervening parties and of their attorneys, and that no judgment could legally be rendered upon such intervention until the heirs and legal representatives of the said intervening parties had been legally summoned to continue the said intervention.

That the .proceedings taken in the name of the Crown for the pur~ pose of forcing the said intervening parties to appoint attorneys in lieu of their said attorneys being since deceased and the judgment rendered upon such proceedings are, for the same.reason, illegal, null and void and of no effect.

Parceque cette partie de la dite opposition de l'opposant dolt être retranchée et rejetée en admettant que les allégués en seraient vrais.

Parce que l'opposant excipe du droit d'autrui.

Le dit intervenant plaida aussi au mérite de la dite opposition les moyens suivants :—

Que l'opposant n'a aucun intérêt dans l'opposition et dans l'action

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intentée par Sa Majesté pour recouvrer les biens de la succession de feu Dame Marie Piery et qu'il n'est pas lésé par le jugement rendu en icelle.

Que l'oppposant n'a aucun droit dans les dits biens, qu'il n'en est pas,. n'était pas et n'a jamais été lui ou ses auteurs, propriétaire et en pos- l session des dits biens revendiqués par la dite action et qu'il n'allègue F aucun titre.

Que les prétenduss illégalités et informalités alléguées par l'opposant n'ont pu lui causer aucun tort et lui préjudicier, et queen supposant pour un moment qu'elles seraient fondées ce que l'intervenant nie ce ne seraient que des nullités sans grief et dont l'opposant ne peut se plaindre.

Que tous et chacun des faits allégués dans la dite opposition, sont faux et mal fondés, et que l'intervenant les nie tous spécialement, spécifiquement, et comme s'il les niait seriatim.

Que toute la procédure a été faite régulièrement et légalement, pour et au nom de Sa Majesté et qu'il n'y a eu aucune fraude ou collusion ou artifice, parce que les dits intervenants Piery, seuls, pourraient invoquer les dits moyens et se plaindre des dites procedures, et que l'opposant est sans intérêt pour le faire

Sur la contestation, ainsi liéd, après preuve faite de part et d'autre, la cour Supérieuee rendit jugement le ler février 1887, maintenant l'opposition de l'appelant.

That the action and intervention of the heirs Piery were pending at the time the Court of Common Pleas ceased to exist 1793 and that no evidence had ever been adduced in proof of the allegations of the principal demand or of the intervention; that no proceedings were taken to revive the said suit before any existing Court of the Province, by and on behalf of his Majesty George III.

That the action against the defendant, Gueyrault. was a personal action to account, which, had the King established a right of property in the succession or shewn provisional possession thereof under judicial authority a judgment to account would have condemned the defend ant, Gueyrault, in the amount proved, but upon default of the Crown to prove property or possession of the estate, the action could not be maintained : '

That all the parties being dead, Attorney-General Taillon could not validly move to continue the suit in lieu of Jenkin Wiliiams, Solicitor General to King George III :

That if the case could be revived after a century it could only be done by some one representing King George III against the heirs or legal representatives of J. B. Gueyrault, by means of an action em reprise d'instance commencing with a writ of summons.

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That King George III was not shewn to be vested with any pro-perty in the succession, nor to have been put in provisional possession thereof :

That Mr. Fontaine was not the heir or legal representative of Gueyrault and he is not shewn to have been in the possession of the estate in question:

That there is no pleading or demand in the Record, by Her Majesty claiming the succession as her property, and the judgment, in consequence, was ultra perty and inoperative.

Ce jugement ayant été porte en appel à la cour du Bane de la Reine, a été infirmé sur le principe que l'appelant n'avait pas démontré qu'il avait un droit supérieur a celui de la partie qui avait obtenu .ce jugement en sa faveur.

En effet, les moyens invoqués consistent principalement dans l'invocation des droits des héritiers Piery, s'il en existe, et de moyens d'irrrégularités .dans la procédure

La cour a déclaré que pour être autorisé à former une tierce-opposition un jugment, iI ne suffit pas d'avoir un intérèt contraire à celui qui a obtenu le jugement, mais ii faut que cet intérêt soit fondé sur un droit supérieur a celui de la partie qui a obtenu ce jugement en sa faveur. Que l'objet de la tierce-opposition n'est pas seulement de faire annuler le jugement dont se plaint le tiers-opposant, mais de faire prononcer le tribunal contradictoirement sur le mérite des droits réclamés par le tiers-opposant et par celui qui a obtenu le jugement attaqué par la tierce-opposition.

Dans cette cause, le tiers-opposant, ni par les allégués de son opposition, ni par ses conclusions, n'a mis en question le droit de la couronne aux biens qui out été délaissés par feu Marie Piery lors de son décès. II a simplement demandé que le jugement fut annulé pour des vices de forme dans la procedure et pour absence de preuves, et en invoquant le droit d'autrui. Ces allegations sont tout à fait insuffisantes.

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Le recours extraordinaire à la tierce-opposition nest pas accordé pour faire declarer nul un jugement pour des irrègularités, ii faut, comme le dit le jugement de la cour du Bane de la Reine, que l'opposant allègue et démontre un droit supérieur au droit de celui qui a obtenu le jugement. Ceci est confirmé par toutes les autorités.

Il v a plusieurs conditions nécessaires pour avoir droit de former opposition à un jugement. La première de toutes est d'établir que le jugement dont se plaint l'opposant lui cause un prejudice. Comment peut-il démontrer ce prejudice s'il n'alègue pas son droit, s'il ne fait pas voir qu'il a aux propriétés réclamées, un titre qui, mis en comparaison avec celui de son adversaire, doit l'emporter et lui faire adjuger légalement la propriété. C'est une condition essentielle de la tierce-opposition de mettre la cour en état de juger sur la validité des titres respectifs des parties.

Le droit, (dit Bioche), doit être Certain et légitime; en cas d'incertitude on ne saurait admettre une attaque dirigée contre une décision de justice et autoriser peut-être une procedure frustratoire (1).

Dalloz dit (2) :—

Aussi la premiere condition pour agir par la voie de la tierce-opposition est d'éprouver un prejudice à nos droits fart. 474). Cette disposition repose sur ce principe de droit et d'équité : pas d'intérêt, pas d'action.

Carré et Chauveau (1):

Ce n'est pas un intérêt, mais un droit quelconque compromis directement, qui est indispensable pour légitimer la voie de la tierce-opposition.

Et plus loin il ajoute :

Il faut, ainsi que l'enseignent MM. Favard de Langlade (1), et Poncet (1), que l'intérêt qui sert de mobile au tiers-opposant soit reel, légitime, en d'autres termes que l'atteinte portée à l'existence d'un de ses droits actifs autorise l'emploi du recours extraordinaire qui lui est ouvert contre cette sentence pour en obtenir la rétractation (1).

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Appréciée d'après les principes énoncés dans ces autorités, ii est évident que la procedure de l'opposant est tout à fait vicieuse. D'abord, parce qu'il n'a fait aucune allegation qui puisse mettre la cour en état de '. decider le mérite des prétentions respectives des parties —n'ayant allégué aucun titre à la propriétè en litige la cour ne pent decider que l'opposant a un meilleur titre que le contestant (l'intimé); qu'il ne fait voir aucun prejudice, puisqu'il ne montre aucun titre—et le titre qu'il doit produire doit être certain et légitime. Loin de prendre cette position, qui est la seule que puisse prendre le tiers-opposant, il no conclut pas même à ce que la propriété qu'il réclame lui soit adjugée; ii conclut simplement à la nullité du jugement en faveur de l'intimé. C'est-à-dire Qu'il fait une demande qui ne decide rien ni sur le droit de la Couronne à cette propriété ni sur le sien. C'est-à-dire qu'il fait comme dit Bioche :

Une attaque contre une décision de justice par une procédure frustiatoire.

Les droits de la couronne dans cette cause sont ceux des héritiers de Marie Fiery veuve de J.-Bte Hamelin Francheville, morte en 1785, sans laisser de représentants. Ces droits appartenaient du moment de son décès, an domaine public par droit de déshérence, on succession irrégulière Laurent dit (1) :

Quoique les successeurs irréguliers n'aient pas la saisine, ils out la propriété des biens héréditaires, de plein droit, des l'instant de l'ouverture de l'hérédité

Le droit de la couronne remontant à 1785 l'appelant aurait dû alléguer dans son opposition un titre autérieur on supérieur à celui de la couronne, au bien alléguer et prouver qu'avant cette époque cette propriété avait été acquise par la prescription. Mais comme on l'a déjà vu ii n'a allégué aucun titre quelconque. Dans son

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opposition ii n'alègue la possession de cette propriété que d'une manière indirecte en disant que l'ntimé :—

Demands from appellant who is and has been for many years past in open public and peaceable posession of the Seigniory of Grondines as proprietor thereof, etc. etc.

Il n'allègue pas non plus que cette possession est antérieure au jugement qu'il attaque.

L'appelant se trouvant comme opposant dans la position d'un demandeur, c'était à lui à faire preuve des erreurs qui auraient été de nature à faire rétracter le jugement. Il aurait dû établir que s'il eut été partie en cause ses titres auraiet empèhé ce jugement d'être renduton prouver l'existence d'héritiers de madame Piery, et que partant ii n'avait Pu exister de déshérence en faveur de la Couronne; que le fief Francheville ne faisait pas partie des biens délaissés par madame Piery. Mais il était sans intérêt à faire cette preuve à moins de pouvoir aussi prouver qu'il dérivait son titre de madame Fiery, ce qu'il ne pouvait aucunement faire, car ii n'a et ne produit aucun titre à la propriété qu'il réclame. Conséquemment les deux moyens de la demande du procureur-général, que le fief Francheville appartenait à madame Piery et que sa succession est tombée en déshérence, n'ont été nullement attaqués. Le droit de la Couronne reste donc clairement éstabliest

Il facile de comprendre pourquoi l'opposant n'a pas allégué de titre au fief Francheville. C'est parce que lors de la vente par le shérif en octobre 1807 à Moses Hart de la seigneurie des Grondines, il a été fait dans le titre accordé à ce dernier, par le shérif, dans l'acte de vente passé par Têtu et Bélanger, notaires, l'exception suivante :—

Every part and parcel of the seigniory of St. Charles and Grondines containing save and except the following' parts and parcels of the said seigniory of St. Charles.

That is to say: "First, one undivided fourth and one undivided

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eighth of that part of the seigniory of St. Charles, commonly called the fief Francheville, which fief begins on the South West, at the line which separates the seigniory of St. Charles from that of Dorviliers, contains in front twenty-six arpents, six perches and twelve feet by the whole depth of the seigniory, and on the North East side at the line which separates the seigniory of St.- Charles from the seigniory of Latesserie, commonly called Lachevrotière, contains twenty-two arpents in front by three leagues in depth, exclusive in both parts of any right in each island and battures in front of said seigniory and is claimed by the attorney general for and on behalf of His Majesty.

Cette vente fut faite en vertu d'un ordre de la cour du Banc de la Reine dans lequel cette exception est exprimée dans les mêmes termes.

Le 26 février 1810, Hart revendit la propriété à P. Charay avec la méme exception, et le 8 juillet 1831, Charay vendit à Burnet qui revendit ensuite à l'hon. D. E. Price qui par son testament a légué la propriété en question à l'appelant.

Dans le titre Burnet à l'hon. D. E. Price en date du 21 décembre 1871 la propriété est décrite de la même manière et contient la même reserve, avec cette seule difference que référence est faite an titre de Charay, du 8 juillet 1831, passé devant Campbell, notaire public, dans les termes suivants :—

Save and except such parts or portions of the said seigniory lands and tenements as were and as are in the said deed of sale excepted and reserved.

Plus loin il est dit que Price prend la propriété :—

Without any other or greater estate, right, title, or interest than the said Peter Burnet hath therein to have and to hold the premises so sold, assigned, transferred and made over to the said I). E. Price, his heirs and assigns forever, subject to the reservations and provisions herein before mentioned and referred to and more especially in the deed of sale under which the same were acquired by the said ]ate Peter Burnet from the said Pierre Charay.

Un témoin du nom de Lacourcière eutendu de la part

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de l'appelant dit que la dans l'acte de vente de Burnet à Price et celle contenue dans l'acte de Charay à Burnet se rapporte au fief de Francheville mentionné dans les divers actes et procedures comme le fief de Francheville reclamé par le procureur general pour Sa Majesté.

Tel est le litre en vertu duquel D. E. Price s'est mis en possession de ce fief en 1871. Ce titre ne contient aucune transmission da droit de propriété à Price et ne pent même servir de base la prescription. Tout au contraire ii contient une reserve expresse du fief Fran-cheville qui est déclarée appartenir à la couronne. L'appelant est l'héritier de D. E. Price et n'a partant pas plus de droit que lui à la propriété dont ii s'agit. Il lui eut donc été impossible, s'il cut été partie an jugement du 14 juin 1884 de se faire declarer propriétaire du fief Francheville auquel ii n'a aucun titre. Et la cour n'eut pu faire autrement que de declarer comme elle l'a fait que le fief Francheville était échu en 1787 à la Couronne par droit de déshérence. Dans tous les cas, l'appelant ne peut se faire adjuger la propriété en question, parce qu'il ne la réclame pas par son opposition et qu'il n'a pas mis la cour en position de decider la question de titre; il ne demande que la nullité du jugement, qui, Si elle était prononcée, n'aurait pas plus d'effet que le jugement n'en a maintenant, puisque n'y ayant pas été partie, ce jugement n'affecte nullement ses intérêts ni ses droits. C'est res inter alios judicata. Cette procedure est tout-à-fait inutile et frustratoire. Ce n'est qu'en faisant triompher ses moyens de defense à l'action prise contre lui par Fontaine qu'il pourrait arriver à son but. C'est cette action qu'il aurait dû mener à judgment en cour an lieu de recourir à la tierce-opposition que la loi ne lui accorde pas dans le cas actuel.

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Par tous ces motifs, je suis d'opinion de renvoyer l'appel avec dépens.

TASCHEREAU J.—Over one hundred and five years ago, on the 25th March, 1785\, one Marie Fiery, widow of Jean Baptiste Hamelin Francheville died, at Quebec. intestate, and without leaving any then known heirs,

On the same day, one Gueyrault was named curator to her vacant succession. The said curator appears to have proceeded to the inventory required by law, but an extract only of such inventory dated the 30th January 1787 is to be found in the record In this extract a portion of the seigniory of Grondines, consisting of a frontage of 26 arpents, six perches et twelve pieds by three leagues in depth is entered as forming part of the said succession.

On the 9th of July, 1790, the Attorney-General filed an information in the Court of Common Fleas at Quebec, against this curator, claiming for his Majesty King George III the succession of the said Marie Fiery and more particularly the aforesaid portion of the seigniory of Grondines à titre de bastardise et deshérenee On the 16th of July 1790 the curator filed an answer to this information whereby he alleges, 1st. That the succession of Marie Fiery was not vacant, as she had left legitimate heirs in France who, as he alleges, were entitled to her succession 2nd That even if these heirs did not accept the succession the crown could not, in any case, maintain its claim as to the seigniory of Grondines, because such seigniory, in law, for reasons given in the said answer, became, by Marie Piery's death the property of one Hamelin and one Boisvert, who then were in actual possession of it 3rd. That consequently the said Hamelin and Boisvert should have been made parties to the information, or that the

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King to have his claim on the said seigniory established, should proceed against them by a direct action.

The Attorney-General, on the 25th September, 1790, replied to the curator's plea praying that the succession Ta aforesaid, in the curator's hands, should be accounted for and delivered over to His Maiesty's Receive-General It would appear that towards the end of 1790 or in the beginning of 1791, an intervention claiming the said succession was filed by the brother and sisters of Marie Fiery, in answer to which, on the 7th of July, 1791 the Solicitor-General for the King, substituted that same day to the Attorney-General, filed an opposition or plea. However neither this intervention nor the crown's said opposition or plea are now to be found in the record.

On the 13th July, 1791, the intervening parties filed an answer to the crown's opposition or plea and on the 15th the Solicitor-General filed a replication to that answer both of which are in the record This ends the proceeding's in the Court of Common Fleas, with the exception of the filing, on the 9th February, 1808, by the intervening parties of a copy of Gueyrault's appointment as curator; and for the next seventy-six years, no proceedings whatever were taken in the case either by the crown, or by the curator, or by the heirs Piery.

By deed executed on the 12th of January, 1884, the Quebec Government promised to sell for the sum of $300 to one Tancrède Toussaint Moreau, barrister, of Montreal, all the rights of the crown in the said succession, and authorised him to continue the proceedings, in the name of the crown, upon the aforesaid information of 1790. One Eugène Pierre Lafontaine, also a barrister and partner as such of the then Prime Minister, Mr. Mousseau, accepted this promise of sale

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as agent of Moreau and in his name. It is clearly established however by the evidence of Mioreau himself and of one Martin to which I shall refer later on, that it was himself, Lafontaine, who was the real purchaser of the crown's rights and that Moreau had no interest whatsoever in the matter.

A short time after that deed, on the 8th March, 1884, one Albert Fontaine was appointed curator to replace Gueyrault who had been appointed in 1795, on a petition purporting to be in the Attorney General's name. On the 11th the Honorable Louis Olivier Taillon as Attorney General, took up the instance for Her Majesty on the information of 1790 with conclusions against Fontaine the said new curator. (In these and all subsequent proceedings, I must here observe, the Attorney General had nothing whatever to do with the case and all the proceedings, though in his name, were taken and carried on by and in the interest of the purchaser of the crown's rights, who, by the aforesaid promise of sale, was even bound to give to Her Majesty, before taking any proceeding, security for the costs to be incurred and those already incurred).

On the 13th March the new curator promptly declared that he was willing to take up the instance. On the previous day he had gone before a notary and had passed a deed of amended inventory, giving a new description of the part of the Seigniory of Grondines that, in his opinion, the crown was entitled to, a fact of which he had not the least personal knowledge; and upon this amended inventory an amended information was subsequently, on the 20th of March, by consent, fyled in the name of the crown.

On the 22nd of March a notice was served on the intervening parties at the Prothonotary's office, on the part of the Attorney-General, calling upon them to appoint a new attorney in lieu and place of Barthelot

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Dartigny deceased, their attorney in 1790. Only eleven days before, however, the Attorney General had served his petition en reprise d'instance on this same Barthelot ME Dartigny at the Prothonotary's office. No further proceedings, it would appear, were taken on that notice; a but on the 15th of April following, upon a rule nisi taken by the curator defendant, it was ordered that upon the intervening parties' default to name a new attorney within thirty days thereafter, their intervention would be dismissed, and accordingly, upon such default on the 9th of June the intervention was dismissed, with the consent, the judgment adds, of the plaintiff and of the defendant, A. and B. consenting that C.'s intervention be dismissed This rule nisi, I notice, had also been served on the intervening parties at the Prothonotary's office, the bailiff solemnly making his return upon oath that he had not been able to find the parties in the District of Quebec. There was it is evident no reason to doubt the truth of this return for when their intervention was fyled, in 1791, the youngest of these claimants must have been at least 21 years old so that in 1884 when this return was made he, if living, would have attained the respectable age of one hundred and fourteen Then the curator strange to say, who so obtained, upon motion, the dismissal of this intervention, was not a party to the contestation thereon. The crown alone had appeared and joined issue upon it. Now, what right he had to move to dismiss a proceeding to which he was not a party, or what interest he had, as curator, on a contestation between the crown and the heirs Piery I fail to see. The present appellant it is true may not have the right to invoke jus tertii and to impugn proceedings which do not concern him, but I have referred to them as evidence of the means resorted to by the interested parties to get at a final judgment on the information.

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The intervention having been so disposed, of in this singular way the parties interested found no difficulty, with the ready assistance of the curator Fontaine in obtaining a judgment in their favor, and on the 14th of June, 1884, the Superior Court declared Marie Piery's succession, and more especially that part of the Seigniory of Grondines described in the supplementary inventory, escheated to the crown, with order to this curator to deliver up possession thereof.

On the 24th of July following the Quebec Government, according to the promise of sale previously passed, executed a deed of sale to Eugene Pierre Lafontaine, here again falsely pretending to act as agent for Tancrède Toussaint Moreau of all its rights under the aforesaid judgment for the sum of $300.

Upon this sale, in March, 1885, an action in Moreu's name was brought against the present appellant, alleging that he, the appellant, by himself and his auteurs, had been in possession of that part of the Seigniory of Grondines declared escheated to the crown by the judgment of the 14th of June, 1884, and had illegally received the rents and revenues thereof for at least fifty years with conclusions that he Moreau, as assignee of the crown's rights be declared to be the proprietor of the said part of the said seigniory, and that the appellant be condemned to deliver it up and to account for its revenues since 1871, unless he prefer to pay $100,000.

Upon the service of this action Price the present appellant, filed an opposition tierce opposition to the said judgment of June, 1884. On this opposition Moreau filed an intervention by which and the moyens in support thereof, he alleged that Price had no title to the property in question, and had never been in possession thereof, and that the said property had been duly declared escheated to the crown in whose rights he, the said Moreau, claimed to be.

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This intervention and the tierce opposition Were submitted together to the Superior Court, where, on the 1st February, 1887, a judgment was given dismissing loreau's intervention, maintaining Price's tierce opposition and avoiding the judgment of the 14th June, 1884, so far as the same might affect the said opposant or the said Seigniory of Girondines. Upon an appeal to the Court of Queen's Bench, by the crown and by Moreau jointly, this judgment of the Superior Court was reversed, and Price's ticrce opposition was dismissed. Hence the present appeal by Price, upon which, as in the court below, the crown joined with Moreau as respondent.

The first of these proceedings that obviously comes up for our consideration on this appeal is IMoreau's intervention (though there is no reference whatever to it in the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench), and on that intervention IMoreau's locus standi and right to intervene on Price's tierce opposition is the first question that suggests itself for enquiry. He, of course, alleges as the basis of his right to intervene the sale to him by the Government of the 24th of July 1864. Now this sale it seems to me is null of a nullité de plein droit. It was, as the promise of sale itself was, clearly a sale of litigious rights, without warranty and for a nominal price (1). And the sale of litigious rights to advocates or attornies practising before the courts under the jurisdiction of which those rights would fall is expressly prohibited by art 1485 CO. And by art. 14 C.C. (not in express terms in the Code Napoleon), all prohibitive laws import nullity. Then, by art. 989 C.C. a contract with an unlawful consideration has no effect and the consideration is unlawful when it is prohibited by law or contrary to public order, 990 C.C. And on this point,

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I may at once remark, it is immaterial whether this sale is to be considered as made to Moreau or to Lafontaine, as both are practising attornies. As well said by the Supreme Court of Louisiana in a recent case under the article of their code corresponding with our art. 1485 " The elevated standard which the learned profession must occupy in public esteem makes it the imperative duty of courts to exact a rigid compliance with a rule calculated to enhance the honor and usefulness of the profession" (1). It is also immaterial that this objection has not been taken. The courts are bound to take cognizance of infractions of laws enacted in the public interest, even when passed sub silentio by the litigating parties (2).

I have not failed to notice that this litigation is pending in the District of Quebec and that Moreau, examined as a witness, swears that he is generally practising in Montreal. But as such he is entitled, I take it, to practise anywhere in the Province before the Court of Queen's Bench and I would say in any of the judicial districts before the Superior Court. I should judge from this record itself by the fact that in this very case, his own action against Price taken at Quebec is signed by MM. Robidoux & Fortin, who, it is in evidence usually practise in Montreal. Then, apart from the consideration that this sale was made to a practising attorney it seems to be unlawful and void as tainted with champerty, an offence punishable under

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the criminal law of the country; see arts. 14, 989, 990 C.C. Wharton, law lexicon vo. Champerty; Earle v. Hopwood (1); GreIl v. Levey (1). Upon these ground alone, the judgment of the Superior Court which dismissed Moreau's intervention could, in my opinion, be supported. But if in addition, we take into consideration the fact admitted by Moreau himself, that he has no interest whatsoever in the case that the sale by the Government to him was a sham to cover a sale to Eugene P. Lafontaine, it seems to me unquestionable that his intervention must, in any case, be thrown out. To be allowed to intervene in a case an interest in the event of the suit must be shown. Art 154 C.P.C.; Dorion v. Dorion (1); and an intervening party who has no interest must be mis hors de cour.

I now come to the appellant's tierce opposition, One of the allegations of this opposition is, that all the proceedings taken in 1884 on the information of 1790 were fraudulent and collusive. Now, of this allegation there is, on this record, abundant and cogent evidence, as well directly from the depositions of the witnesses examined as indirectly from the proceedings themselves. I have already alluded to the fact that, as admitted by Moreau himself he has no interest whatever in the case. It is falsely, fictitiously and with intent to deceive (no euphemism is possible) that his name appears as vendee in the deeds of January 12th and July 2th, 1884, and. it was EugŁand. Lafontaine, the prime minister's partner at the bar who was the real purchaser. One Joseph Martin, also a practising attorney, and who, as such, appeared for Lafontaine in this case on the proceedings of 1884, brought up as a witness on the intervention by the intervening party himself also clearly proves this fact, giving as the reason why this contrivance was resorted to :

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That as Lafontaine was the\n the law partner of Mr. Mousseau, the then prime minister, the adversaries of the prime minister, and of La-fontaine himself who might later on enter the political career, might . have caused some trouble to the government or to Lafontaine, and that as the transaction appeared more advantageous to the purchaser than to the Government it might be cristicised by Lafontaine's or the prime minister's adyersaries.

This witness, Martin, further admits that, in payment of his services as attorney for Lafontaine in this case it was agreed, between him and. Lafontaine that he, Martin, would share in the profits of the suit. The following passage of his deposition leaves no room for doubt as to this :

Q. Vous ĉtes intéressé dans le process? R. Oui.

Q Voulez-vous dire à la cour quel est votre intérêt? R. Mr. La-fontaine m'avait chargé de le représenter ici dans toutes les procedures et recherches qu'il devait faire; et pour cela il m'a dit qu'il me don-nerat une part dans le résultat du procès.

Q. Au lieu de vous rémunérer en argent pour les services que vous lui rendiez il vous a interessé de cette manière? R. Oui.

They, in other words, he and Lafontaine, agreed to a pact de quotâ litis and were to be associates in this traffic on litigation. Now, though this so very reprehensible conduct on the part of these two members of the bar cannot, in any way, affect the solution of the questions in controversy in the case yet the court cannot allow it to pass unnoticed. À. reference to the following authorities, inter alia, will show how strictly forbidden to advocates and attorneys stipulations of that nature have always been. Laurent, on pacte de quota litis, says (1):

C'est toujours avilir le saint ministère de la justice cue de le souill v par les sordides calculs de la cupidité.

And Morin, de la discipline, says (1) :

Ce qui est surtout interdit, c'est toute stipulation qui impliquerait, ou sous entendrait plus ou moins une participation réelle aux bénefides espérés du procès. Ou sait combien est antipathique à la profession

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d'avocat le pacte de quotâ litis, trop souvent proposé par lea plaideurs. De tout temps la loi a trouvé contraire à la morale, et consquemment nul, tout traité entre plaideur et avocat, associant celui-ci au gain du procès, lui piomettant une partie de I'objet en litige ou de sa valeur. On doit réputer tel tout pacte analogue entre avocat et client, par example, celui qui promettrait conditionnellement à l'avocat une chose déterminée, ou bien un honoraire proportionné un résultat recherché

Favard de Langlade Repert. and Merlin Repert. vo. pacte de quod litis, Marcadé (1), and Blackstone (1), also condemn severely all transactions tainted with champerty, more especially when entered into by practising attorneys.

Now to return to the case and to the fact I have alluded to that it was Lafontaine and not Moreau, who purchased the rights of the crown, we have thereby unquestionable evidence from these parties themselves that, at its very inception, they resorted to simulation in the furtherance of their scheme Let us see now what was their subsequent mode of action in the matter. Clothed with the permission to use the Attorney General's name they began their proceedings on the information by a " reprise d'instance " on the 11th of March, 1884, as I have already stated, signed " per Joseph Marilin, duly authorised"; the same J Joseph Martin " I have alluded to. It was then 94 years since the last contentious proceeding had been taken by the crown on the information (25th September, 1790), and 93 years since the last contentious proceeding upon the intervention of the heirs Piery (15th July, 1791).

I have already stated that, on the 8th of March preceeding, one Adalbert Fontaine had been appointed curator to the vacant estate of Marie Fiery in lieu of Gueyrault, who had been appointed in 1785. This Adalbert Fontaine also an advocate, and as such, as

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partner of Joseph Martin, himself testifies that he was so appointed upon the suggestion of Joseph Martin, acting for Lafontaine, in the name of the Attorney General. Immediately after his appointment he declared that he took up the instance', and again, upon the suggestion of Joseph Martin, consented to re-make the inventory. And to further avoid all possibility of obstruction and delay to the plaintiff he appeared as attorney of record for himself as defendant. Later on only one witness is examined for the plaintiff, and that witness is this same Fontaine, who thus appears on the record in the threefold capacity, of defendant, of attorney and of a witness. So much for that aspect of the proceedings.

I now come to the merits of the judgment of the 14th June, 1884, itself.

It seems to me plain that, even if the plaintiff had been entitled to a judgment at all on this information, the description given in the amended inventory, and in this judgment, of the part of the seigniory of Grondines, left by Marie Piery at her death, is altogether unsupported by the documents of record. This judgment declares escheated to the Crown two separate parts of this seigniory, described by metes and bounds. Now, Marie Piery, as far as I can make oat from the record never had a title to any part of that seigniory, but to an undivided share of it. Her own title is her marriage contract, in virtue of which, at her husband's death she inherited all of his estate Now her husband's title was a sale to him, on the 8th April, 1762, by one Langanièré, and all what that deed conveyed to him was one-fourth of one-half of the said seigniory "indivis avec les autres héritiers." Further a deed of " foi et hommage," of the 15th June, 1781, by Marie Fiery herself jointly with her coseignors, purports to be as to her for her undivided part,

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and an undivided part only, of the seigniory. " A cause du fief et seigneurie de Grondines dont ils jouissent tous en commun et par indivis;"relevant en plein fief de Sa Majesté dont ils jouissent tons sans. . Ta partage et par indivis," are words in that deed which it seems to me leave no uncertainty upon that point. Two " procès verbal de bornage " of the 15th November, 1783, were relied upon by the respondents as evidence of a partition of the seigniory between the owners thereof. But I cannot see anything of that kind in these deeds alone and by themselves. The first is nothing but the location of a division line between the Grondines and Lachevrotière seigniories and the second was never completed and signed by the surveyor with-out which signature it is an absolute nullity, besides being, as it seems to me, unintelligible and further, not signed by Augustin Hamelin upon whose requisition it appears to have been made but most illegally only by his wife for him. Moreover no partition was ever concluded by this deed of “bornarge" It does not even purport to make any, but was probably made in view of a partition which the parties, it may be assumed, intended to proceed to later, but which was never made from the fact perhaps that Marie Fiery died not long afterwards. Then there is no evidence whatever of the possession by Marie Fiery or her husband of a separate and divided part. The extract of the inventory of 1787 cannot be taken as affording such evidence. Such an inventory could not in any case be evidence of possession or of any other fact whatever against third parties. The curator, in 1790, in his plea to the information denied that he was in possession of the part of this seigniory claimed by the crown and not only has no evidence to the contrary ever been brought forward but it appears on the record that a comparatively short time afterwards on the

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10th September, 1806, this seigniory of Grondines was sold by the sheriff to one Moses Hart in a case 01 Blanchard v- McNider under the express reserve (I assume upon an opposition by the crown) of two un-divided parts declared in the sheriffs deed to he claimed by the crown and this upon a motion of the Attorney General himself, who appeared in the case for the plaintiff Blanchard. Now it seems to me that the crown, as a necessary consequence of this sheriff's sale, never had since the right, under any circumstances, to claim any part of this seigniory but the undivided parts so reserved in this sale, assuming they ever had any, and that the judgment of the Superior Court of 1884 which declared escheated other distinct and divided parts thereof, is, on that ground alone, utterly erroneous and would not have been obtained but for the collusion between the parties

This judgment adjudicates up on property which has never been in the possession of either of the curators. When the first curator pleaded to the information that he was not in possession of any part of this seigniory, admitting that he was in possession of the other property claimed, the crown merely replied that he should render an account of what he had in his hands. That was equivalent to a withdrawal of the claim as to the seigniory. The crown officers, aware, it may be presumed, of the truth of the fact pleaded by the curator evidently saw that it would have been as useless as illegal to get a judgment against the curator ordering him to deliver up or account for a property he never had the possession of (1).

When the first curator further pleaded that not he but Boisvert.& Hamelin,were then in possession of the property claimed by the crown, and that the crown should not further proceed upon the information as to

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this seigniory without bringing them in the case, the crown ought to have so brought them in, and have its claim to this property adjudicated upon contradictorily with the parties in possession of it animo domini.

1 may add further that there may he doubts as to the legality of Fontaine's nomination as curator. Can a succession be deemed vacant when the crown comes forward to claim it? See Art. 1331 C.P.C. Arts. 637, 638, 639, 684, 687 C.C.

Une succession (says Laurent) (1) réclamée par l'état, à défaut d'héritiers ou autres successeurs irréguliers, ne peut étrereputée vacant, et dés lors lee arts. 811 et seq. (684 of our code) ne lui sont pas applicables.

En conséquence, il n'y a pas lied à la nomination d'un curateur à cette succession en attendant le jugement d'envoi en possession au profit de l'état; et Si un curateur a été nommé par le tribunal avant la reclamation de l'état, ce curateur doit être révoqué, sauf au tribunal à remettre l'administration provision de la succession à tel gérant qu'il trouve convenable.

I simply refer for the decisions and the authorities in support of these propositions to Sirey's Code Civil Annoté, under Art. 768 Nos. 8 et. seq. without further investigating the question or coming to any determination upon it. The new curator may, perhaps, be considered as the gérant chargé de administration provisoire.

Another objection to the reprise d' instance of 1884, taken by the appellant in his factum, one which the curator Fontaine did not, of course, take, as he was appointed not to take objections, is that the action was then prescribed. I refer on this point to Arts. 2216, 2242, 2265 C. C. and to the following authorities :—

Merlin (1)

On ne doit pas confondre, en fait d'instance, la prescription avec la péremption.

And citing Brodeau :

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La partie qui, après la dernière procédure, demeure 30 ans dans l'inaction, est censée avoir abandonné son droit après 30 ans tout est péri et prescrit. Les assignations, les jugements, tout se prescrit par 30 ans, indépendamment du décès des parties.

Aubry & Rau (1).

L interruption (de prescription par une action) est également regarder comme non avenue, si l'instance vient à s'éteindre par la discontinuation de poursuites pendant 30 ans.

Le loux de Bretagne (1).

Si même il y avait eu discontinuation de poursuites pendant 30 ans, l'instance serait éteinte par la prescription.

And at No. 510

La discontinuation de poursuite? pendant 30 ans teint tout à la fois l'instance et l'action.

Rodière, Proceed. (1).

L'instance, à défaut de la péremption peut s'éteindre par la prescription trentenaire. Comment supposer, en effet, qu'une instance puisse subsister pendant une série indefinite de siècles.

Laurent (1).

Tout droit s'éteint par le laps de 30 ans; donc s'il y a eu discontinuation de poursuites pendant 30 ans, l'instance sera éteinte. La jurisprudence est en ce sens, quoique la question soit controversée.

Re Marcnnay (1).

Indépendamment de la péremption pour discontinuation de poursuites pendant 3 ans, les instances sont soumises à la prescription de 30 ans pour défaut de poursuites pendant ce laps de temps.

Habitans de Langlet (1).

L'instance en cassation se prescrit par défaut de procédures pendant 30 ans. Plus de demande en reprise d'instance aprés, cette date.

Villegouan, C. Talhouet. Cassation(1).

L'instance ne conserve l'action qu'autant que l'instance n'est pas elle-même prescrite pas une discontinuation de poursuites pendant plus de 30 ans.

Le droit de demander la peremption d'instance se prescrit par 30 ans. a partir de lexpiration de 3 ans sans poursuites (1).

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Delmas v. Bruvois (1).

La prescription de 30 ans éteint les instances discontinuées pendant ce laps de temps.

And in the Journal du Palais 1887 (1) Rodière on that case says,

Cette décision nous paraît fort bien rendue malgré l'opinion de Carré Chauveau & Bourbeau

In 1886, in re Boueix (1).

Lorsqu'une instance a été suspendue pendant plus de 30 ans l'action et l'instance elle-même se trouvent teintes en mime temps par la prescription, et dans ce cas la reprise d'instance faite postérieurement est sans effet et doit éitre rejeté comme non recevable. Cette solution est aujourd'hui définitivement admise.

It follows from these authorities, that; if Fontaine, instead of taking up the instance, had waited till an action en reprise d'instance was taken and had met such action with a plea of prescription, he would have had it dismissed. A. clearer proof of collusion between him and the parties acting as plaintiffs cannot be had. The appellant, under art. 2187 C.C., has now the right to avail himself of this prescription.

As to the appellant's right to a "tierce opposition" in this case, it is not, in my opinion open to controversy. The respondents cannot argue that, because the judgment of 1884 was as to him res inter alios judicala he the appellant, is estopped from impeaching it. It is precisely against a judgment to Which he is not privy, that a party aggrieved by it is given the right to a "tierce opposition," as the very name of this proceeding implies. (1). And the fact that the appellant here might, in another case, avail himself of the illegality of the said judgment,

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does not deprive him of his remedy by a ^u tierce opposition." (1). So to hold, would obviously be to deny the right, under any circumstances, to that proceeding. Then, it seems to me unquestionable, that the appellant here has sufficient interest and qualité " to impeach this judgment. (1). As to his" qualité," it cannot he denied. He was clearly not privy to it. As to his interest, it is to me equally clear. Why was it obtained by Moreau? Or by Lafontaine and Martin rather? If not only for the very purpose of laying the foundation of an action against him, and to enable them to impugn his rights to this seigniory of Grondines. Would they now treat it as of no value to them as a nugatory proceeding towards their interests, it might then well be asked why they intervened at all on the present issue between the appellant and the crown what induced them to join on this contestation; if it did not concern them what motives prompted them to so strenuously contend for the legality of a judgment foreign to the rights they assert? They obtained, behind his back, a judgment declaring escheated to the crown a property of which he, the appellant, is in possession animodomini since fifty years, and they "would forsooth say to him that he has no interest whatever in the matter that it is none of his business Their contention is untenable The measure of their interest to uphold this judgment is the measure of his interest to have it annulled

It is obvious that even if no action had been taken against him upon it, that judgment, as long as it stands must have the effect to cast a cloud on his title and possession, a trouble de droit. It could be registered at

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any time, and thereby be the cause, in case of a sale for instance, of serious embarrassment to him. And. if no action were taken upon it how could he contest it? Ivey a direct action perhaps, as in Thouin Leblanc (1) but how much more simple and direct under the circumstances is the remedy that the law has provided the " tierce opposition." A case in the Cour de Cassation of Commune de Lalley c. Commune de Prébois (2) is precisely in point :

Une décision judiciaire qui declare une personne propriétaire peut être invoquée adversus omnes, sauf aux tiers à l'egard desquels cette décision n'a pas l'autorité de la chose jugeê à Ia faire tomber la voie de la tierce opposition.

Or as given in Sirey :

Si la décision judiciaire qui déclare une personne propriétaire d'un fonds n'a point l'autorité de la chose jugéecontre le possesseur qui n'y a point été partie, elle équivaut toutefois à un titre vis-à-vis do celui-ci comme tout autre, sauf la voie de la tierce-opposition ouverte (1).

That decision, it seems to me, entirely supports the appellant's s right to a tierce-opposition in the present case.

The respondents argued that as a " tiers opposant " must show a right superior to the right of the party who has recovered the judgment impeached, therefore the appellant's opposition here must be dismissed, as it is not based on any title. But the fallacy of this argument is apparent. It is a petitio principii. It assumes that the crown has proved a title to the property declared escheated. Now, that is precisely what the appellant controverts, and, in my opinion, has established. As to him, his possession of fifty years alleged in Moreau's action itself fyled with the "tierce opposition" is his title and a sufficient one to entitle him to his conclusions against a plaintiff who has neither title

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nor possession. He has established his rights on the rescindant and the rescisoire.

In connection with that point I have not failed to notice a case, of Tercinet v. Tripier (1), though it was not cited. In that case the Cour de Cassation held that

L'arrêt qui déclare l'existence an profit de l'une des parties d'un droit de propriété est opposable aux tiers, sauf à ces derniers à l'égard desquels cet arrêt n'a pas l'autorité de la chose jugée à l'attaquer au moyen de la tierce opposition on même directement, mais la charge de détruire la preuve qui en result en établissant en leur favour soit un droit de propriété préférable, soit possession antérienre légalement acquisitive.

This last part of the "arrêt" supports the legal proposition submitted by the respondents, that a "tiers opposant " must show a right superior to the right of the party whom judgment has declared proprietor. But this obligation imposed on a " tiers opposant" has been fulfilled by the appellant here. Having proved that the Crown has no title to the pro-perty declared escheated and never had the possession thereof he has the right, as I said before, to rely on his actual possession alone, to have the judgment of 1884 set aside. He has not got to prove a " possession legalement acquisitive," where the party who obtained the judgment adverse to his rights had neither title nor possession, and this, aside from the further consideration, a weighty one here, that this judgment could not have been obtained but for the connivance of the defendant a feature of this case which distinguishes it from all the authorities cited by the respondents, and upon which the appellant might, perhaps have contended, that it was not necessary for him to show a superior right to the right of the plain-tiff.

The objection has been taken by the respondents to the conclusions of the "tierce opposition," that they are

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too restricted in that they do not ask that the information of the crown be dismissed. I am rather inclined to think the point well taken, and that the appellant might have asked more than he did. but that is not, in my opinion, a reason why we should refuse him what he asks.

There is one point more to which I deem it necessary to refer, from an observation made by my learned colleague, whose concurrence in this judgment, I very much regret we have failed to get. I understood the learned judge to say that Price could never have acquired the ownership of a certain part of this seigniory by prescription, because his primary title, the sheriff's sale I have alluded to and other subsequent conveyances of the seigniory, expressly reserve a part of it to the crown. Now, there is no question of perscription raised by the pleadings, and we do not determine anything whatever on this point. I simply refer to it, with deference to my learned colleague, lest our silence should be construed as an acquiescence in what has been said on the matter.

I am of opinion that we must allow the appeal and restore the judgment of the Superior Court with costs in Queen's Bench and in this court in favor of appellant against the crown and Moreau, jointly and severally.

GWYNNE and PATTERSON JJ. concurred with TASCHEREAU J.

Appeal allowed with costs.

Solicitors for appellant : Caron, Pentland & Stuart.

Solicitors for respondent : Beîque, Lafontaine & Martin.