Supreme Court of Canada
Rodier v. Lapierre, (1892) 21 SCR 69
Date: 1892-06-15
Dame M. J. Blanche Rodier et vir (Plaintiffs)
Appellants
And
Dame Angélique Lapierre, ès qual., (Defendant.)
Respondent.
1892: May 31; 1892: June 15.
Present:—Sir W.J. Ritchie C.J., and Strong, Taschereau,
Gwynne and Patterson JJ.
ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH FOR LOWER CANADA
(APPEAL SIDE).
Appeal—Monthly allowance of $200—Amount in controversy—Annual
rent—R.S.C. ch. 139 sec. 29 (b)—Jurisdiction.
B. R. claimed, under the will
of Hon. C. S. Rodier and an act of the legislature of the province of Quebec
(54 Vic. ch. 96), from A. L. testamentary executrix of the estate the sum of
$200, being for an instalment of the monthly allowance which A.L. was
authorized to pay to each of the testator's daughters out of the revenues of
his estate. The action was dismissed by the Court of Queen's Bench for Lower
Canada, and on an appeal to the Supreme Court it was
Held, that the amount in controversy being only $200, and
there being no "future rights" of B.R. which might be bound within
the meaning of those words in section 29 (b) of the Supreme and
Exchequer Courts Acts, the case was not appealable.
Annual rents in subset. (b) of
sec. 29 of R.S.C. ch. 135 mean "ground rents " (rentes foncières) and
not an annuity or any other like charges or obligations.
APPEAL from the judgment of the
Court of Queen's Bench for Lower Canada (appeal side) reversing the judgment of
the Superior Court for Lower Canada.
The appellant by her action
alleged that she was entitled to receive $100 monthly out of the revenues of
the estate of her father the late Honourable C.S. Rodier under his will, which
monthly allowance had been increased to $300 by an act of the legislature of
[Page 70]
the province of Quebec (54 Vic.
ch. 16) and claimed from the respondent as testamentary executrix the
additional $200 for the month of February, 1891.
The respondent pleaded that the
act of the legislature, 54 Victoria chap. 96, imposed no obligation on her, but
simply an authorization to pay whenever she might deem proper to do so.
The Superior Court for the
province of Quebec, district of Montreal (Davidson J.) held that the respondent
was bound to pay, but this decision was reversed by the Court of Queen's Bench
for Lower Canada (appeal side) (Wurtele J., dissenting.)
On an appeal to the Supreme
Court the respondent objected to the jurisdiction of the court on the ground
that the case was not appealable under sec. 29 of the Supreme and Exchequer
Courts Act.
Geofrion Q.C., and Beaudin Q.C., for respondent, cited
and relied on Gilbert v. Gilman;
Dominion Salvage Co. v. Brown,
and art. 1241 C.C.
Lash Q.C. and DeMartigny for appellants contended
that the claim was for rent within the meaning of that word in subset. (b) sec.
29 of the Supreme and Exchequer Courts Act, and that this case was
distinguishable from that of Gilbert v. Gilman and other cases since
decided.
The judgment of the court was delivered by:—
TASCHEREAU J.—This appellant
claims from the respondent by her action, a sum of $200 for an instalment of a
monthly allowance due to her as she alleges in virtue of her late father's
will, and of the act 54 Vic. ch. 96 of the province of Quebec passed in
relation to that will. Her action has been dismissed and she now appeals.
[Page 71]
The respondent moves to quash
the appeal for want 1892 of jurisdiction. This motion must be allowed. This is
clearly not an appealable case. The appellant argued that her appeal could be entertained on the ground
that as the judgment dismissing her action, if allowed to stand would be resjudicata
between her and the respondent, and a bar for ever of her claim, her appeal
came within the words “where the rights in future might be bound” of section 29
of the Supreme Court Act. But that contention cannot prevail. We have in
numerous cases determined that these words of the statute are governed by the
preceding words of the clause “fee of office, duty, rent, revenue or any sum of
money payable to Her Majesty or any title to lands or tenements, annual rents,
or such like matters or things.” The words “annual rents” cannot support the
appeal. They mean ground rents (rentes foncières), and not an annuity or
any other like charges or obligations.
Neither can the appeal be
entertained on the ground that the appellant's claim, being for a monthly
allowance of $200, should be considered as being for an amount exceeding
$2,000. The only amount actually in controversy in the present case is $200.
The consequences of the judgment and its effect on the appellant's future
rights in the matter cannot render the case appealable as being a case of
$2,000. This monthly allowance is liable to be extinguished at any time by the
death or re-marriage of the respondent for instance, according to the terms of
the will in question.
Appeal quashed with costs.
Solicitors for appellants:
Beïque, Lafontaine & Turgeon.
Solicitors for respondents:
Beaudin & Cardinal.
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