Supreme Court of Canada
Corporation of Aubertgallion v. Roy, (1892) 21 SCR 456
Date: 1892-12-13
THE CORPORATION OF AUBERT GALLION
Appellant;
And
DAVID ROY
Respondent.
1892: Oct 4; 1892 Oct 5; 1892:
Dec 13
PRESENT:—Strong, Fournier, Taschereau, Gwynne and Patter son
JJ.
ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH FOR LOWER
CANADA (APPEAL SIDE.)
44 & 45 Vic. ch. 90 (P.Q.)—Toll-bridge—Franchise of—Free
bridge—Interference by—Injunction.
By 44 445 Vic. (P.Q.) ch. 90 sec. 3, granting to respondent a
statutory privilege to construct a toll-bridge across the Chaudière
River in the parish of St. George, it is enacted that "so soon as
the bridge shall be open to the use of the public as aforesaid during thirty
years no person shall erect, or cause to be erected, any bridge or bridges or
works or use or cause to be used any means of passage for the conveyance of any
persons, vehicles or cattle for lucre or gain, across the said river, within
the distance of one league above and one league below the bridge, which shall be
measured along the banks of the river and following its windings; and any
person or persons who shall build or cause to be built a toll-bridge or
toll-bridges or who shall use or cause to be used, for lucre or gain, any other
means of passage across the said river for the conveyance of persons, vehicles
or cattle, within such limits, shall pay to the said David Roy three times the
amount of the tolls imposed by the present act. for the persons, cattle or
vehicles which shall thus pass over such bridge or bridges; and if any person
or per sons shall, at any time, for lucre or gain convey across the river any
person or persons, cattle or vehicles within the above mentioned limits, such
offender shall incur a penalty not exceeding ten dollars for each person, animal
or vehicle which shall have thus passed the said river; provided always that
nothing contained in the present act shall be of a nature to prevent any
persons cattle, vehicles or loads from crossing such river within the said
limits by a ford or in a canoe or other vessel without charge."
After the bridge had been used for several years the appellant
municipality passed a by-law to erect a free bridge across the
[Page 457]
Chaudière River in
close proximity to the toll-bridge-in existence; the
respondent thereupon by petition for injunction prayed that the appellant
municipality be restrained from proceeding to the erection of a free bridge.
Held, affirming
the judgment of the court below, that the erection of the free bridge would be
an infringement of the respondent's franchise of a toll-bridge, and the
injunction should be granted.
Appeal from a judgment
of the Court of Queen's Bench for Lower Canada (appeal side) reversing the
judgment of the Superior Court.
The material facts are as follows: In 1881 the respondent, by
a statute passed by the legislature of Quebec, 44 & 45 Vic. ch. 90,
obtained the statutory privilege to erect a toll-bridge, on the Chaudière
River, in the parish of St. George, in the district of Beauce. In
addition to the clause of the statute given in the head note section one was
also referred to.
By that section it is provided that a after the expiration of
eight years from the passing of the act, it shall and may be lawful for the
municipality of St. George to assume the possession of the said bridge and
dependencies and to acquire the owner ship thereof, upon paying to the said
David Roy the value which the same shall at the time of such assumption bear
and be worth with an addition of twenty per centum, and after such assumption
it shall become a free bridge and shall be maintained by the municipality as
such free bridge."
The respondent maintained in good order his bridge collecting
tolls thereon for ten years, it being the only one erected on the Chaudière River within a distance of six miles. In 1891 the
appellant municipality, in order to avail itself of a subsidy of $17,500,
granted by the government of the province of Quebec to aid in the erection of
an iron bridge on the river Chaudière, determined to erect
within the limits of the municipality an iron bridge free and open to the
public,
[Page 458]
and passed a by-law on the 19th June,
1891, authorizing the erection of a free iron bridge opposite the parish church
of St. George, within a short distance of respondent's toll-bridge, without
paying to him the indemnity mentioned in the first section of 44 4 45 Vic. ch.
90.
After the passing of this by-law, on the 14th July, 1,891, the
respondent applied for and obtained a writ of injunction calling upon the
corporation, appellant, to suspend all action and operations under the by-law
of the 19th June and to stop all work of construction on the bridge, because,
amongst other reasons, the by-law was illegal null and void and also because
the act of the legislature, 44 & 43 Vic. ch. 90, had given him the
exclusive and perpetual privilege of building and maintaining a toll bridge
within the limits of three miles above and three miles below his own.
The superior court of the district of Beauce held that the
by-law of the 19th June was valid and that Roy did not have as against the
municipality of Aubert-Grallion, the exclusive privilege to build and maintain
an open bridge, and rejected the writ of injunction with costs.
The court of Queen's Bench also held the by-law of the 19th of
June to be legal and intra vires but held that the by-law could not be
carried out so long as the statutory privileges in question remained in force,
and maintained the injunction.
Linièrs Taschereau Q.C. and Lemïeux for the appellant.
The statute 44 & 45 Vic. ch. 90 cannot be relied on as a
prohibition to the municipality to erect a free bridge.
A municipal corporation has unrestricted and clearly defined
rights to build free bridges on rivers, water courses, etc.; and this power or
right cannot be taken
[Page 459]
away from it by a charter granted to
an individual, unless it be by a formal enactment to that effect.
The act recited forbids only private persons, for the space of
thirty years, from entering into competition with Roy by the erection and
building of a toll-bridge for lucre or gain, within three miles on either side
of this bridge but this prohibition does not extend to the corporation.
The act forbids the erection by individuals for lucre or gain,
but does not apply to the bridge intended by the corporation of Aubert-Gallion
which is to be for free and gratuitous use.
Roy answers this objection by a reason ab inconveuiente: " A free bridge "
he says i is even more ruinous to me than another bridge for lucre or
gain." That may be; but Roy has placed himself in that position for the
act of the legislature which forbids individuals to erect bridges for lucre or
gain, was passed at his request, on his own petition, addressed to the
legislature and which should have contained the terms under which the statute
was to be passed He de fined his own position, as appears by the preamble of
the act and he cannot to-day be allowed to improve it
Moreover, is it to be believed that if Roy had asked of the
legislature an enactment forbidding the building of a free bridge by the
corporation, such a monopoly would have been granted him? No, for it would have
been manifestly unjust to make the interest of the whole public subservient to
that of a simple individual.
To grant such a monopoly legislative authorization was required
in formal and express terms, and such was never given directly or indirectly to
municipal corporations in the province of Quebec. See Harrison's Municipal
Manual ().
[Page 460]
The authorities are unanimous in declaring that the terms of
grants conferred on individuals must always be applied and interpreted
strictly. See Endlich on the Interpretation of Statutes ();
Maxwell on Statutes ();
Sedgewick on the Interpretation of Statutory Law ();
and also arts. 520, 542, 485, 460, 84 M.C. (P.Q.)
Fitzpdtrick Q.C. for the respondent:
The question which arises on this appeal is: Whether a
corporation which, in the public interest, grants a perpetual and exclusive
franchise to any one to build a bridge, a franchise which has been confirmed by
the legislature with the condition that the said corporation may, after eight
years, convert the same into a free bridge on indemnifying the proprietor, has
a right to set at nought its promises and engagements, without any right on the
other hand, to those who are ruined by its conduct to complain of the same?
I contend that the statute 44 & 45 Vic. ch. 90, grants to
the respondent a perpetual and exclusive privilege, and that the appellant
cannot without breach of the most elementary good faith, violate a public contract,
repudiate a solemn engagement and not only ruin the respondent but tax him over
the bargain, in order to aid in the construction of a free bridge alongside of
his own.
The clause by which the appellant cannot convert this
toll-bridge into a free bridge, without paying the yalue thereof has not been
written to protect the public, for, to the latter, a free bridge is worth a
hundred-fold more than a toil-bridge. It was evidently framed in the interest
of the respondent so that he might not be ruined at the caprice of four
councillors.
[Page 461]
The following" cases and authorities were cited and
relied on: Galarneau v. Guilbault (); Corriveau
v. Corporation St. Valier ();
Charles River Bridge Co. v. Warren Bridge Co. ();and Kent's
Commentaries ().
The learned counsel also argued the question of the validity
of the by-law, but the grounds relied on for and against the validity are
sufficiently reviewed in the judgment of Mr. Justice Fournier.
STRONG J.
concurred with TASCHEREAU J.
FOURNIER J: Par un règlement
du conseil de la municipalité d'Aubert-Gallion, en date du deux novembre mil
huit cent quatre-vingt, ii fut ordonné et statue.
ART. ler.—Que M. David Roy est par le présent règlement autorisé à construire un
pont sur la rivière Chaudière, vis-à-vis l'église
paroissiale de St. Georges.
ART 2.—Qu'après que le pont aura été ouvert au public,
et tant qu'il restera en bon état, nulle personne et nulle compagnie ne
construira ni ne fera construire aucun pont ou ponts, ou n'emploiera comme
traversée aucun bateau ou vaisseau d'aucune espèce pour traverser aucune
personne, bestiaux ou voitures quelconques, soit en louant ou autrement les
susdits bateaux ou vaisseaux sur la dite rivière Chaudière,
à une distance de trois milles en haut et en bas du dit pont qui
sera construit par le dit David Roy, et si aucune personne construit un pont on
des ponts d'aucune espèce ou établit une traverse d'aucune espèce ou fait
traverser sur la dite rivière Chaudière dans les dites limite?, elle paiera au
dit David Roy pour chaque personne ou animal ou voiture qu'elle traversera pour
lucre trois Lois la valeur des taux imposés par le présent règlement pour
toutes les personnes et animaux qui passeront sur tels ponts ou par telles
traverses ainsi construits ou établis, en contravention des dispositions de cc
règlement, et toute contravention à la prohibition de traverser pour
rémunération d'un côté de la rivière \ l'autre entraînera une amende
n'excédant pas dix piastres. Cette amende recouvrable de
la même manière que celle imposée par le code municipal de la province de Québec.
[Page 462]
Avec le privilège de
construire un pont, i'intimé obtint aussi le droit de prélever des péages qui
furent fixés par le règlement.
Après le règlement, et
pendant qu'il était en force, la legislature
de la province de Québec, passa à
la session de 1881 un statut qui fut sanctionné le 30 de
juin accordant au dit intimé le droit exclusif de construire à ses dépens, au
même endroit, sur la rivière Chaudière, dans la paroisse de St-Georges, un pont
de péage avec dépendances, réservant cependant à l'expiration de huit années
après la passation du dit acte, à la dite municipalité, le droit de prendre
possession du dit pont et de ses dépendances et d'en acquérir la propriété, en
en payant la valeur au temps de la prise de possession et en payant 20 p.c.
en outre de la valeur, lequel pont deviendrait alors un pout libre et serait
main tenu par la municipalité.
Il est évident que par
le règlement ci-haut cité, la municipalité appelante s'est interdit le droit de
construire un pont libre, dans la limite indiquée, pendant toute la durée du
privilège accordé à l'intimé. Ce privilège ayant été confirmé par l'acte 44-45 Vic.
c. 90, ii n'est plus loisible à la municipalité de rien entre
prendre qui soit en contradiction avec son règlement ni avec le statut de la
législature accordant à l'intimé les mêmes droits et privilèges car tous deux
sont de la nature d'un contrat entre la législature et la municipalité d'une
part et l'intimé, de l'autre et sont également obligatoires pour les deux
parties.
En vertu des pouvoirs
qui lui étaient conférés par le règlement et le statut ci-haut cites l'intimé a
construit à l'endroit indiqué dans la dite municipalité, un pont offrant au
public toutes les conditions de sûreté et de commodité voulues. Ce pont a
existé depuis au delà de dix ans, et est encore en existence, et en état de
servir avantageusement pour l'utilité du public.
[Page 463]
Cependant la dite
municipalité, en violation du règle ment et du statut ci-haut cites, a passé
en date du 19 juin 1891, un règlement ordonnant la construction d'un
pont en fer qui devait être un pont municipal.
Ce règlement contient
entre autres les dispositions suivantes:
1 Que ce pont serait construit en
fer sous la direction du gouvernement de Québec, conformé gouvernement se
chargerait de tous les frais de la superstructure du dit pont, et la
municipalité construirait les culées et les piliers en pierre suivant les plans
et spécifications annexés au règlement.
3 Les clauses 5,
6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 et
15 fixent la date du commencement d es ouvrages et de leur achèvement, le
mode d'accorder le contrat, ainsi que le mode de paiement, les garanties
d'exécution du contrat les cotisations sur les contribuables pour frais
de construction, en outre une déclaration limitant la responsabilité de la
municipalité à $11,500, avec l'intérêt de trois ans se montant en tous
à $13340 le nom du surintendant, le mode d'entretien et de
réparation du dit pont et finalement que ce pont serait
libre et gratuitement ouvert au public.
Après l'adoption de ce
règlement, l'intimé a demandé à la cour Supérieure un bref d'injonction pour
faire ordonner à l'appelante de suspendre tons procédés en
vertu du règlement du 19 juin, et d'arrêter tous les onvrages de la construction
du dit pont, pour entre autres, les raisons suivantes: Que le
dit règlement était nul, et que l'acte de la législature 44-45 Vic.
c. 90, lui avait accordé un privilège exciusif de construire
et entretenir un pout de péage dans les trois milles au dessus et audessous du
lieu indiqué.
Le jugement de la cour
Supérieure, district de Beauce, a reconnu la validité du règlement du 19 juin,
et a dénié à l'intimé son privilège exciusif de construire un pont
[Page 464]
à l'encontre de la
municipalité. Ce jugement ayant été porte en appel à la cour du
Banc de la Reine a été infirmé.
Dans leur constestation
les parties out soulevé un grand nombre de questions dont ii est inutile de
s'occuper pour la décision du litige en cette cause.
La question se réduit à
savoir si, après le règlement adopté par la dite municipalité appelante,
accordant à l'intimé le privilège exclusif de construire un pont, privilège
reconnu plus tard, par l'acte de la législature 44-45 Vict. ch. 90 accordant
de nouveau au dit intimé, le même privilège, la municipalité peut-elle main
tenant entraver l'exercice du privilège de l'intimé, en construisant on
permettant de construire, au même endroit, dans la dite municipalité un pont
libre qui aurait l'effet de détruire complètement la valeur du pont de péage de
l'intime? Ne s'est-elle pas an con traire, par son dit règlement
interdit tout droit de construire un pout en opposition au privilège qu'elle a
accordé?
La décision de cette
question est réglée par les termes du règlement et par les sections 1 et 3 du
statut 44 45 Vict. ch. 90.
En déclarant, par son
règlement qu'après que le pont aura été ouvert au public, et tant qu'il restera
en bon état nulle personne et nulle compagnie ne construira ni ne fera
construire aucun pont ou pouts, etc., l'appelante a fait une prohibition générale et absolue dans laquelle elle est
nécessairement comprise elle même, puisqu'elle est la partie contractante et
l'autorité qui crée et accorde le privilège en question en faveur de l'intimé.
Il n'y a aucune réserve quelconque en sa faveur et cette déclaration doit être
interprétée comme s'appliquant à elle-même.
La même
prohibition est contenue dans l'acte 44-45
Vict. ch. 90 et
doit avoir le même effet. Elle est même
[Page 465]
encore plus étendue,
puisqu'elle ne fait qu'une exception en faveur de celui qui passerait à gué ou
en canot et sans charge, cette restriction prouve bien que la prohibition est
générale.
J'ai dit que le
règlement doit être considéré comme ayant l'effet d'un contrat entre la
municipalité d'une part et l'intimé Roy, de l'autre. Ceiui-ci, en construisant
un pont a accepté le privilège qui lui avait été accordé à ce sujet. Le fait
d'avoir demandé et obtenu de la législature la confirmation do ce privilège, ne
peut pas être considéré comme une renonciation à ses droits. Tout au contraire,
ce procédé ne peut être con sidéré que comme une mesure de prudence pour se
mettre à l'abri des contestations trop fréquentes des règlements municipaux. Il
sauvegardait ainsi ses droits en les mettant sous la protection d'un acte de la
législature qui lui en assurait la jouissance. Ce privilège doit, d'après le
statut, durer pendant trente ans, et d'après le règlement, tant que le pont
restera en bon état.
Dans un de ses
plaidoyers, l'appelante a prétendu quo le pout en question était en ruine et
dangereux pour le public. Ce motif n'a pas été invoqué comme raison d'ordonner
la construction d'un nouveau pont, parce qu'il eût alors été facile à l'intimé
de prouver que le pont existant était suffisant et en état de servir au public
et quo le public s'en servait alors. Ce fait a été établi par la preuve en
cette cause, ainsi que le comporte le jugement de la cour du Banc de la Reine,
déclarant qu'il n'appert pas quo le dit; pont n'est pas eu bon ºtat.
Dans la cause de GaIarneau
v. Guilbault () la
cour a en l'occasion d'examiner la question de l'étendue d'un semblable
privilège accordé pour la construction d'un pout. Une des conditions du
privilège était quo
[Page 466]
si le pout par accident
ou autrement était détruit, on devenait dangereux ou impassable, les demandeurs
seraient tenus dele rebâtir dans les 15 mois,
sous peine de forfaiture de tous les avantages accordés par le dit acte, et que
pendant tout le temps que le dit pont serait dangereux on impassable, les dits
demandeurs seraient obliges de maintenir une traverse sur la dite rivière, pour
laquelle ils pourraient percevoir des péages Ce pont ayant été entraîné par les
glaces, les demandeurs se mirent en frais d'en construire un autre et
entretinrent une traverse, les défendeurs prétendant que les prohibitions du
statut n'avaient pas d'autre effet que de protéger le pont, pendant qu'il était
en existence, et ne pouvaient nullement s'étendre à la protection de la
traverse. La cour décida que le privilège exclusif accordé par le statut
s'étendait à la traverse, et, tant qu'elle était maintenue par les demandeurs,
les défendeurs n'avaient aucun droit de bâtir un pont temporaire, etc.
L'étendue do ce
privilège a été portée encore plus loin dans la cause de Girard v. Bélanger
() où ii
avait été décidé, en cour Supérieure, à St-Hyacinthe, le 2 décembre
1872, par Sicotte, T., que la construction d'un pont sur lequel on n'exigerait
pas de péages n'était pas une atteinte aux privilèges des demandeurs.
Sur appel à la cour du
Banc de la Reine, () ce
juge ment fut infirmé et ii fut an contraire maintenu que c'était une atteinte
aux privilèges des demandeurs, appelants leur donnant le droit d'en demander la
démolition pour faire respecter leur privilège. Ce dernier judgment fut
rendu unanimement en 1874 par la cour du Banc de la Reine. On en trouve
la substance dans l'ouvrage de feu l'honorable juge Ramsay, où
l'on voit qu'il fut décidé que la construction d'un
[Page 467]
semblable pont n'était qu'un moyen d'éviter le
privilège accordé au propriétaire du pont de péage.
Ce privilège a encore été maintenu dans une
cause de Globensky et ux v. Lukin et al ()
dans laquelle il fat décidé '.
Que le
propriétaire d'un moulin qui a pratiqué ou fait pratiquer an moyen de bacs ou
chalans des voies de passage et traverses dans les limites du privilège d'un
pont de péage, pour y traverser les gens à son moulin gratuitement, mais dans
la vue de se procurer des gains par la mouture de lenrs grains, est passible de
dommages et intérêts envers le propriétaire de ce pont à raison de la perte de
ses profits, qui lui sont ainsi enlevés indirectement
Par tous ces motifs, je suis d'avis que l'appel
doit être renvoyé avec dépens,
TASCHEREAU J.—The respondent in this case attacks, by a petition for
injunction, a by-law passed by the municipality, appellant, in June, 1891, for
the erection of a free bridge across the Chaudière River,
and prays that the appellant be restrained from proceeding with the said
erection on the ground that it would be an unlawful interference of the
privilege granted to him by the legislature in 1881 by the act 44 & 45 Vie
ch. 90, under which he was authorized to build and has built a toll-bridge
across the said river, within the said municipality. Section 3 of the said act
reads as follows ().
The bridge projected by the municipality, appellant, would be
within one league from the respondent's, but they contend that a free bridge
would not be an un lawful interference with his franchisa. The
judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench, reversing the judgment of the Superior
Court, was adverse to their contention and ordered them not to proceed with the
erection of the said bridge. I am of opinion that this judgment was right
though on grounds different from those upon
[Page 468]
which the said judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench was
based.
The appellants would read section 3 above cited of the
respondent s charter, as if it said: " during thirty
years no person shall erect, or cause to be erected, any bridge or bridges or
works, for lucre or gain, within the distance of one league from the said
bridge " and hence argue that a bridge for lucre or gain only is
prohibited by the statute, and not a free bridge. But the words " for
lucre or gain " are not so to be found therein after the words " any
bridge or bridges or works," but only after the words " or use or
cause to be used any means of passage for the conveyance of any persons,
vehicles or cattle." I do not see. that these words " for lucre or
gain " are at all connected with the words " bridge or bridges or
works." I read the sentence as if the words " for lucre or gain
" were inserted immediately after " or use or cause to be
used." And I am fully justified in doing so, it seems to me, by the fact
that it is after the same words, "use or cause tobe used,"
that the words " lucre or gain " are to be found a few lines after,
in the same clause, when decreeing the penalty for in fringement of the
charter. And that penalty is " on any "person who shall build or
cause to be built a toll bridge or toll-bridges within the said limits,"
consisting in three times the amount of the tolls imposed by the act for the
persons cattle or vehicles, which shall thus pass over such bridge or bridges,
whether such persons, cattle or vehicle have passed free or not, such a
toll-bridge it is clear, not being absolutely prohibited, sed quœre? as
per Sir Montague Smith in Jones v. Stanstead, Shefford &
Chambly Ry. Co. ();
Leprohon v. Globensky ();
Globetisky v. Lukin (),—with a penalty
[Page 469]
of ten dollars for each person, animal, or vehicle conveyed
across the said river for lucre or gain, within the said limits, by any other
means of passage—here again, rising the words " for lucre or gain,"
only in connection with the means of "passage other than by a bridge.
Then the words " bridge for lucre or gain " are not
those generally used in statutes in pari materiâ to mean a toll-bridge.
Whenever a bridge for lucre or gain is meant, it is called a toll-bridge, not a
bridge for lucre or gain, and this very statute, nay this very clause itself,
when decreeing penalties, is an instance of it. And if the legislature had here
intended to for bid only the erection of a toll-bridge or of toll-bridges it
would have said, "no person shall erect or cause to be erected any
toll-bridge or toll-bridges.5' But it did not say so. The
prohibition extends to any bridge.
Neither can this section be read again as limiting the
prohibition to a bridge for lucre or gain as contended for by the appellants;
" no person shall erect or cause to be erected any bridge or bridges, or
works for the conveyance of any persons, vehicles or cattle for lucre or gain
across the said river." A bridge is built for the pas sage but not for the
conveyance of any one, and the words " for the conveyance of any persons,
vehicles or cattle for lucre or gain " are clearly governed by and relate
only to the preceding words " any means of passage." This section
must be read, and, in fact reads as follows, in the French as in the English
version: " During thirty years, no person shall erect or cause to be
erected any bridge or bridges or works across the said river within the
distance of one league." It thus expressly enacts that no bridge of any
kind shall, within a league, be erected in opposition to the respondent's
privilege, a prohibition which as against a free bridge was obviously, by the
legis
[Page 470]
lature itself considered as absolute, and which accordingly
was left to be enforced, when necessary, as has been done by the respondent
here, and by the grantee of a similar franchise, in an analogous case, in
Montreal, Leprohon v. Globensky (), by a
restraining order, the penalties imposed applying exclusively to the
infringement of the franchise by a toll-bridge or by the other prohibited means
of passage.
This is made still clearer by the proviso of the section which
specially exempts a free passage by a ford, or in a canoe, or other vessel from
the prohibition to cross the river within the said limits. Does not that infer
that a free bridge is to be prohibited? If not, why a proviso to allow free
passage by a ford or canoe or other vessel without mention of a free bridge? If the legislature had intended to permit a free
bridge, it would not so have exclusively provided for a free passage by a ford
or canoe or other vessel. Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius. Comp.
Garnier, Reg. des Eaux ().
The appellant would have us read this proviso as if it
extended to a free bridge. But there is no rule or construction of statutes
that I know of to authorize it. Quite the contrary, when the statute says that,
notwithstanding the privilege granted, a free passage by a ford or in a canoe
or other vessel, shall be permitted, it clearly, it seems to me, though
impliedly only, decrees, or assumes rather, that a free bridge or a free
passage by a bridge shall not be permitted. And is it not evident that if the
legislature had, by the act, allowed the erection of a free bridge at any time,
by this corporation or by any one else, in opposition to the respondent's
privilege, the public would then have had no bridge at all?
[Page 471]
Suppose (says Putnam J.) ()
for example, a free bridge should be placed by the side of the toll-bridge, it
would seem a mere mockery to tell the proprietors of the toll-bridge that they
might still have all the toll that they could collect over their bridge. This
free bridge would as effectually destroy their franchise as if an armed force
were stationed to prevent any one passing over it. Who does not see that their
charter would be subverted by this construction?
Charters creating a monopoly or granting a franchise, it is
true, are, as argued by the appellants, strictissimi juris. But they,
like all other statutes, must receive, if possible, a construction which will
promote the object of the law giver, not one which would defeat his intentions.
And
in every case, (says Story J.) the rule is made to bend to the
real justice and integrity of the case. No strained or extravagant construction
is to be made in favour of the king. And, if the intention of the grant is
obvious, a fair and liberal interpretation of its terms is enforced. Whenever
the grant is upon valuable consideration this rule of construction ceases and
the rule is expounded, exactly as it would be in the case of a private grant,
in favour of the grantee ().
Such a grant is always made in
the interest of the public, to ensure an easy access from one side of a
river to the other which it has previously been impossible to get, and which
without it, it must be assumed, cannot be obtained. And this very grant itself
was, on its face and in express terms, so made to the respondent for the
benefit of the public:
"Whereas (says its preamble) the construction of a
toll-bridge over the river Chaudière, in the parish of St
Greorge, in the county of Beauce, would greatly tend to promote the welfare and
to facilitate the inter course of the inhabitants of the said parish and of the
neighbouring parishes, and whereas David Roy has, by petition, prayed to be
authorized to construct such a toll-bridge."
[Page 472]
Could anything be clearer? Is it not solely upon these
considerations of public utility and in return for his assuming an enterprise
needed by the public, that the legislature granted this franchise to the
respondent?
These franchises (says Chancellor Kent) ()
are presumed to be founded on a valuable consideration and. to involve public
duties, and to be made for the public accommodation and to be affected with a jus
publicum, and they are necessarily exclusive in their nature.
See also Perrine v. Chesapeake ().
The obligation between the Government and the grantee of such
a franchise is mutual. He is obliged to provide and maintain facilities for
accommodating the public, at all times, with an easy crossing. The law on the
other hand, in consideration of this duty, provides him a recompense by means
of an inclusive toll, to be exacted from persons who use the bridge, and, of
course, it will protect him against any new establishment calculated to draw
away his custom to his prejudice.
Or, in the words of the same learned Chancellor:
The grant must be so construed as to give it due effect, by
excluding all contiguous and injurious competition. Ogden v. Gibbons ().
For it has been said long ago
where the use is granted, everything is granted by which the
grantee may have and enjoy the use ().
And if two constructions may be made one to mate the grant
good. the other to make it void then for the honour of the king and the benefit
of the subject such construction shall be made that the grant shall be
good.'" Bacon's Abridg. Prerog, F. 2.
And, (says Mr. Justice Story) ():
Wherever a grant is made for a valuable consideration which involves public
duties and charges, the grant shall be so construed as to
make the indemnity co-extensive with the burden
McLean J. in the same case said:
Much discussion has been had at the bar, as to the rule of
construing a charter or grant. In ordinary cases, a grant is construed favour-
[Page 473]
ably to the grantee, and against the grantor. But it is
contended that in government grants nothing is taken by implication. The broad
rule thus laid down cannot be supported by authority. Whatever is essential to
the enjoyment of the thing granted must be taken by implication, and this rule
holds good whether the grant emanates from the royal prerogative of the King in
England, or under an act of legisla-ture in this
country. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge (11 Peters 557.)
In Newburg Turnpike Co. v. Miller (), it was
held, in that sense that where one has a franchise of a
bridge with the exclusive right of taking toll, though no limit above or below
are defined by the charter the erection of a free bridge, by another person, so
near as to create a competition injurious to such franchise, is an infringement
of the grant and will be prohibited by injunction.
No rival road bridge ferry or other establishment of a similar
kind (said the court), can be tolerated so near to the other as materially to
affect or take away its custom. It operates as a fraud upon the grant and goes
to defeat it. The consideration by which individuals are invited to expend
money upon great, expensive, and hazard ous public works, as roads and bridges,
and to become bound to keep them in constant and good repair, is the grant of a
right to an ex elusive toll. This right, thus purchased for a valuable
consideration, cannot be taken away by direct or indirect means.
I need not remark that the respondent's case here is still
more favourable, as his charter clearly defines the limits of his privilege.
In Reg. v. Gambrian Railway Co. () Blackburn J.
said:
The prosecutors right is to a ferry, or franchise, by which he
had the exclusive right of carrying passengers across the river. It is well
established that if that right is interfeded with, without the authority of an
act of parliament, an action would lie for that disturbance.
That case was, it is true, overruled by Hopkins v. The
Great Northern (),
but only on the ground that a railway bridge, authorized by act of parliament,
is not
[Page 474]
an infringement of the franchise of a ferry. A question of the
same nature as to a toll-bridge arose in the province of Quebec in the case of
Jones v. Stanstead (),
which was ultimately determined by the Privy Council (), but upon
grounds which have no application to the present case.
In the United States it was also held in Re Lake v. Virginia
(),
upon the principle that any ambiguity in the terms of the grant of a franchise
must operate against the grantee and in favour of the public, that a railway
bridge is not an infringement of a previous grant of the exclusive right of a
toll-bridge. But neither does that case help the appellants here. It is in fact
their construction of the respondent's charter which would, if adopted, then
have clearly, in 1881, not been in favour of the public, since the public would
not then have had the bridge which the act itself says was needed to promote
the welfare of the inhabitants.
In the well known case of Charles River Bridge Co. v. Warren
Bridge Co. ()
to which I have already referred, the grantees of the franchise of a
toll-bridge were, it is true, defeated in their attempt to restrain the
erection of another bridge near theirs; but they had no limits defined by their
charter above and below their bridge for the exclusive exercise of their
franchise, and moreover the bridge of the defendants had been authorized by a
special act of the legislature; and the great controversy before the courts was
as to the power of the legislature to pass such an act, it being contended by
the plaintiffs that the act was ultra uires under the constitution of
the United States, as impairing the obligation of a contract. But the case is
no authority in favour of the appellants here. On the contrary, it
[Page 475]
is evident by a reference to the opinion of Taney C.J., who
gave the judgment of the court, that the plaintiffs would have been successful
if their charter had defined certain limits for their privilege, and, I assume
from the report even without any such limits being defined in their charter, if
the defendant's bridge had not been authorized by statute See also Tuckahoe Canal
Co. v. Tuckahoe Railroad Co. (). Such according to Garnier, Reg. des. Eaux ()
would be the decision, in France, under similar circumstances. See also Daniel Cours d'Eaux ().
And it cannot be doubted in fact it must be assumed, that if
the legislature here had been asked, or were asked at any time during the
thirty years of the respondent's privilege, to grant a charter, or a permission
for another bridge whether a free bridge or a toll bridge, within three miles
from the respondent's, such a petition would not have been, or would not he
granted, if the respondent performed all his obligations, or if granted at all,
would have been so, or he so, only upon providing for due compensation to the
respondent. It would have been an expropriation of the franchise. It cannot be
presumed that the legislature would by a clear abuse of power, have destroyed
its own grant and committed a fraud on its grantee.
As said in Dalloz Repertoire ().
Par le fait même de la concession, l'état contracte envers les adjudi cataires de
constructions de ponts l'obligation de les mainteuir dans la jouissance du droit de péage, et de
n'apporter dans la situation des choses aucun changement qui serait de nature à
porter prejudice aux intérêts des concessionnaires.
A case noted in Ramsay's Digest of Girard v. Belanger () decided by
the Court of Appeal in Montreal, in 1874 is on all
fours with the present one. There the
[Page 476]
court, reversing the judgment reported at 17 L. C. Jur. 263, distinctly held that a free bridge was an
infringement of a charter for a toll-bridge similar to the respondent's here,
and, in one respect, not so favourable to the exclusiveness of the franchise
For there the proviso exempted from the operation of the act the free crossing
by a ford or in a canoe or otherwise ()
whilst here these words "or otherwise" have been replaced by the
words " or other vessel,l removing one of the grounds that had given, rise
to the controversy in that case of Girurd v Belager. And this
decision of the highest court in the province which, as I have said was
rendered in 1874 furnishes an additional argument against the appellants'
contention here, the respondent's charter having been granted in 1881 after
that decision. For it is a well settled rule of construction (unaffected by
legislation in the province of Quebec as it is. for Dominion statutes,
hype Vic. ch. 7 (D.) that where a statute has received a judicial
interpretation, and the legislature has after-wards
re-enacted one in pari materia it must be considered to have adopted the
construction which the courts had given to it See Per Strong J. Nicholls v.
Cumming ().
See also cases cited in Endlich on Interpretation of Statutes (). This rule
it seems to me applies here with the more force, as by the replacing
1 have noticed above of the words " or Otherwise," by the words
"any other vessel," the legislature must be assumed in view of the
anterior decision of the Court of Appeal to have intended the decree more
clearly, and so as to remove any room for doubt that a free bridge would be an
infringement of the grant to the respondent.
In the case of Gralarneau v. Guilbault (), in
this court, Mr. Justice Fournier, delivering the judgment
[Page 477]
of the court, was clearly of opinion that a free bridge, under
similar circumstances, is an infringement of the franchise of a toll bridge. It
was not necessary, how ever, for the determination of that case to decide the
point.
A case of Motz v. Rouleau, noted in Globensky
v. Lukin, et at. (), decided in
the Court of Appeal, Quebec, in 1848 is the
other way. On cite ces
arrêts comme on signale des écueils, says
Boncenne. It was there held that a free bridge was not an infringement of a
charter for a toll-bridge granted in 1818, by the 58 Geo. III. ch. 25 Lower
Canada, to one Verrault, of Ste. Marie, Beauce. That
decision, however., was overruled by the legislature itself in 1853, by a
declaratory act, the 16th Vic. ch. 260, wherein it is declared to remove all
doubt, that the intention of the legislature, in the afore said act of 1818,
was to prohibit the building of any bridge or bridges whatsoever in opposition
to Verrault's toll-bridge. To show how similar on this point the charter there
in question was to the one now under consideration, I quote it at length.
Sec. 6. No person or persons shall erect or cause to be
erected any bridge or bridges or works, or use any ferry for the carriage of
any persons, cattle or carriages whatsoever, for hire (pour gages) across the
said river Etchemins, within half a league and if any person or persons shall
erect a toll-bridge or toll-bridges over the said river Etchemins within the
said limits, he or they shall pay to the said Verrault treble the tolls hereby
imposed for the persons, cattle and carriages which shall pass over such bridge
or bridges; and if any person or persons shall at any time, for hire or
gain (pour gages ou gam) pass or convey any person or
persons, cattle or carriages across the said river, within the said limits,
such offender or offenders shall for each person, animal or carriage so carried
across forfeit and pay a sum not exceeding forty shillings. Provided that
nothing in this act contained shall be construed to prevent the public from passing
any of the fords in the said river or in canoes without gain or hire (sans
lucre ou gages).
[Page 478]
The court had construed that clause as the appellants here
would construe section 3 of the respondent s charter, that
is to say, as prohibiting only a toll-bridge within the grantee's limits and
not a free bridge. That construction the legislature declared to have been
erroneous, and contrary to its intentions. Could it not be argued here, if it
was at all necessary for respondent's case, that, by this declaration of the
legislature of what is the construction to be given to that section of Ver
rault's charter, the court must give a similar section re-enacted in a
subsequent charter in pari materia, even to another party, that same
construction that the legislature has declared must be the true construction of
the previous one? In other words, what the legislature meant in 1881, by
section 3 of the respondent's charter must be what it meant by the same section
enacted in 1818.
It is exactly, it seems to me, as if the legislature, in 1881
had contracted with the respondent that he would have, as to this bridge, the
same rights that were con ceded to Verrault, in 1818, as to his bridge.
An additional argument against the appellant's contention is
derived from the very first section of the respondent's charter, whereby the
legislature provided for the case, and the only case, where they might, after
eight years, have a free bridge in this locality. It reads as follows:—
After the expiration of eight years from the passing of the
act, it shall and may be lawful for the municipality of St. George to assume
the possession of the said bridge and dependencies and to acquire the ownership
thereof, upon paying to the said David Roy the value which the same shall, at
the time of such assumption, bear and be worth, with an addition of twenty per
centum, and after such assumption, it shall become a free bridge and shall be
maintained by the municipality as such free bridge.
The appellants would contend, for they are driven to go so
far, (and the superior court had supported
[Page 479]
their contention) that they had the right
to build a free bridge in the locality at any time immediately after the
erection of the respondent's toll-bridge, or even simultaneously with it. That
cannot be, in my opinion. Such a contention, if ii were to prevail, I have
already remarked, would clearly render vain and illusory, and nullify the grant
made to the respondent. Comp. Anderson v. Jellet (). And apart
from the reasons I have hereinbefore attempted to explain, this first section
further demonstrates, in my opinion, the unsoundness of the appellant's
proposition. It is only after eight years from the passing of the act that this
municipality can, there, have a free bridge, and then, not one in opposition or
adverse to the respondent's grant, but only upon expropriating his bridge and
paying him, not merely the actual value thereof, as in ordinary expropriations,
but an addition of 20 per cent over and above such value, the legislature thereby
clearly, it seems to me, showing that, in its intention, such an expropriai
ion, at the end of eight years, would deprive the respondent of a
privilege for the balance of the thirty years against any bridge whatever, the
20 per cent above the value being for that privilege and franchise. Such a
clause would not be found in the statute if, as they contend, this
municipality, appellant, had, and has had, the right, at any time, to erect a
free bridge within one league from the respondent's toll-bridge. It would have
been futile, and ironical almost, to grant to the municipality appellant the
right of expropriating the respondent's bridge, without any privilege in their
favour thereafter on their paying him 20 per cent more than its value if they
always had an independent right to build one themselves.
[Page 480]
And, it must not be lost sight of the erection of a free
bridge by the appellants would not relieve the respondent from the duties and
obligations cast upon him by the statute. He would be deprived of all the
benefit of the franchise whilst he continued liable during the unexpired term
of thirty years to all the burdens imposed upon him. He would have to keep his
bridge in repair under a penalty of ten dollars a day, and give to the public
without distinction the right to pass over it. For though the bridge is his
property, yet he could not in law, refuse to any one the right of passage over
it, upon payment of the statutory tolls.
Upon the consideration of the right to an exclusive toll for
30 years he disbursed a large amount to build it, and. to repay to Cahill and
Gilbert, as obliged to by his charter, their cost of a temporary bridge they
had erected in this same locality. This consideration the appellants would take
away from him and leave nothing but the charges and obligations. They have not
the right to do so, in my opinion. The rights of a grantee are not to be
extended by implication they say. Spoliation is not to be authorized by
implication, I would say.
In France, as in England and the Unites States, as might well
be expected, it is held that the right to a franchise of this nature called droit
de bac and de pon tonage must necessarily be
exclusive and entitle the grantee ex necessitate rei to restrain all interference
with his right. Daniel des Cours d'Eaux (); Bacquet, des Droits de justice (); Henrys Ferrière dic. de Droit vo. Péage
();
Dupont, Actions possess ();
Dalloz, rép. vo. Voirie par Eau (); Domat, Dr. publ. tit. ();
3 Despeisses ().
[Page 481]
We See in Lebret's decisions ()
that the King Louis XIII. having run great danger in crossing the Seine at
Neuilly in a scow decided that a bridge should there be built, and that this
bridge be built by private parties, upon the king granting them an exclusive
right to tolls during a certain time. By an arrêt of March
4th, 1705 (5 Journ. des audiences 507), it appears that
the king himself, Louis XIV., successor to the grantor, paid an annual sum for
the passage of the officers of his household.
And in Anc. Dénizart (), the following
case is reported:
The Seignior of Coulonge, owner of the franchise of a ferry
across the River Saône, took proceedings against one
Bourdance, to prohibit him and his servants from crossing the river in his own
scow opposite his residence, twelve hundred feet from the ferry. In the Court
of first instance, the Seignior obtained a judgment in his favour. This
judgment, however, was reversed in appeal on the 9th January, 1758, but only
upon a de claration by Bourdance that he admitted the, plaintiffs right to the
franchise, and upon his binding himself not to allow any one else but members
of his family and his servant to cross at all in his scow. This is a clear case
where; long ago, a free passage to the public was held to be an infringement of
the franchise of a ferry.
In modern times, this doctrine, in a case under analogous
circumstances, of Turquand v. Goagon (), has
received the sanction of the Court of Cassation.
In another case reported in Sirey (), the grantee
of a toil-bridge was held to be entitled to recover damages from the state for
a breach of the state's contract, by having allowed the construction of a
railway bridge
[Page 482]
within the limit of the toll-bridge
privilege. See also Sirey 59, 2, 461.
In 1875 also Sirey () Re Société des Ponts de St. Michel, the state was declared to be responsible in
damages for the erection of a free way of crossing within 40 metres of a
toll-bridge. A prior case in Sirey (),
and another one in Sirey (),
seem to have been determined in a contrary sense. However, they merely declare
the right generally of the state to build a new bridge, without compensation,
near a toll bridge, and have no application here. They are, moreover, overruled
by the more recent cases, and, at most, demonstrate, if demonstration was
needed, that Sirey, like Dalloz, may well be termed '.
Un arsenal du
droit francais on toutes les erreurs peuvent trouver
des' arrêts et tous les paradoxes des autorités ().
A case of Guerin v. l'Etat
(),
before the Conseil d'Etat in 1869, is absolutely in point.
The plaintiff had obtained from the state, in 1851, the grant of the franchise
of a toll-bridge of which he was in possession. The state subsequently built a
free bridge on the same river three thousand metres from the plaintiff's toll-bridge.
Thereupon, an action of damages against the state was
instituted. The action was dismissed, but only upon the ground that the
distance between the new bridge and the toll-bridge was such that the plaintiff
could not be admitted to contend that his privilege extended so far, and
without questioning at all his right to an exclusive privilege, even against a
free bridge, within a certain distance below and above his own bridge, though
such was not expressly reserved to him in his charter.
Le requérant (said the Minister of the
Interior for the state) se borne à soutenir que l'interdiction
qui ne se trouve pas écrite dans son con
[Page 483]
trat. y est sous
entendue c'est-à-dire qu'en lui
concédant le droit de
se rembourser au moyen d'un péage d'un partie lu capital engagé pour la construction du pont de Magné,
le gouvernement n'a pas Pu se réserver la faculté de lui enlever les. bénéfices
qu'il croyait pouvoir retirer de ce péage. Cette observation est exacte sans
doute; le con cessionnaire d'un pont
à péage doit avoir le monopole du passage dans une certaine étendue de la
rivière; mais évidemment aussi cette
étendue a des limites. Le perimètre de protection reservé
aux entrepreneurs ne peut pas être illimité.
And on this last ground alone, as I
have said the grantee's claim was dismissed.
GWYNNE J.—I cannot
entertain a doubt that the true construction of the act which has conferred
upon the plaintiff his franchise is that so long as the franchise continues in
force it is not competent for the appellants to erect or maintain a free bridge
within the limits over which the franchise operates without expropriation of
the plaintiff's franchise rights by compensating him as the act provides after
expiration of eight years. I entirely concur in the judgment
of my brother Taschereau, and that the appeal be dismissed with costs.
PATTERSON J.
concurred.
Appeal dismissed with
costs.
Solicitors for appellants : Taschereau & Pacaud.
Solicitor for respondent : F. X Drouin.
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