Docket: T-1280-13
Citation:
2016 FC 685
Ottawa, Ontario, June 17, 2016
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Bell
BETWEEN:
|
NOV DOWNHOLE
EURASIA LIMITED AND DRECO ENERGY SERVICES ULC
|
Appellants/Plaintiffs
|
and
|
TLL OILFIELD
CONSULTING LTD. AND ACURA MACHINE INC.
|
Respondents/Defendants
|
ORDER AND REASONS
[1]
This is an appeal by the plaintiffs from the Order
of Prothonotary Milczynski dated April 7, 2016, in which she dismissed the
plaintiffs’ (now the appellants’) motion to amend their Statement of Claim in
the form set out in Schedule A attached to the Notice of Motion. Essentially
the plaintiffs sought to add Troy Lorenson, David Nicholson and Petr Macek as
defendants in the underlying action. In that Order, Prothonotary Milczynski
also dismissed the plaintiffs’ alternative request that they be relieved from
their implied undertaking not to rely on documents produced in the underlying
proceeding to commence a separate proceeding against those three individuals. I
note that throughout the proceedings Prothonotary Milczynski was acting in her
capacity as the case management judge, having been so assigned by the Chief
Justice on November 7, 2013.
[2]
The appellants face a heavy burden in requesting
this Court set aside the discretionary order of a case management judge. On
appeal, this Court is to afford significant deference to the discretionary
order of a prothonotary. Such orders ought not to be disturbed unless the
questions raised are vital to the final issue of the case, or unless the order
is based upon a wrong legal principle or upon a misapprehension of the facts: Merck
& Co Inc v Apotex Inc, 2003 FCA 488, [2003] FCJ No 1925 at para 19; Canada
v Aqua-Gem Investments Ltd, [1993] 2 FC 425, [1993] FCJ No 103. In addition
to the discretionary nature of her Order, I also note that Prothonotary
Milczynski made the impugned Order in her capacity of a case management judge.
In that role, she is very familiar with the context and complexities of the
case. This Court should not interfere with a case management judge’s decision
except “[…] in the clearest case of misuse of judicial
discretion” (Apotex Inc v Sanofi-Aventis, 2011 FC 52, [2011] FCJ
No 402).
[3]
Mr. Lorenson is a director, officer and
shareholder of TLL Oilfield Consulting Inc. [TLL], Mr. Nicholson is a director,
officer and shareholder of Acura Machine Inc. [Acura]. Petr Macek worked in the
oil and gas industry, and has designed and manufactured machined parts for oil
and gas equipment. Mr. Macek is not an employee, officer or director of either
of the corporate defendants. The underlying motion states that during the
discovery process, the appellants learned that those three individuals designed
and developed the “Jigger tool” which is the
subject of two patent applications. Messrs. Lorenson, Nicholson and Macek are
named as inventors of the patents and have assigned their rights to the
corporate defendants TLL and Acura.
[4]
Before Prothonotary Milczynski, the appellants asserted
that Mr. Lorenson, Mr. Nicholson and Mr. Macek are personally profiting from
the transfer of monies from TLL and Acura through excessive payments of
salaries, dividends and royalties. The appellants fear that should they be
successful in the underlying action, TLL and Acura will be judgment proof.
[5]
With respect to Messrs. Lorenson and Nicholson,
the plaintiffs essentially seek a piercing of the corporate veil. In order to
do so, it is incumbent upon them to plead facts that, if true, would
demonstrate that Messrs. Lorenson and Nicholson stepped outside their roles and
duties as corporate officers and directors: Mentmore Manufacturing Co v
National Merchandise Manufacturing Co (1978), 40 CPR (2d) 164 FCA and Zero
Spill Systems (Intl) Inc v 614248 Alberta Ltd, 2009 FC 70. Prothonotary
Milczynski concluded the facts pleaded were insufficient to demonstrate they
acted beyond the scope of corporate and normal business activities or that they
intended to convert the corporate defendants into shell corporations. With
respect to Mr. Macek, she concluded there were insufficient facts pleaded of
infringement, induced or direct.
[6]
The appellants assert that Prothonotary
Milczynski mischaracterized and failed to consider certain allegations set out
in the Statement of Claim. After careful review of the appellants assertions
and Prothonotary Milczynski’s Order, I am satisfied the appellants have not
established a clear case of misuse of judicial discretion by Prothonotary
Milczynski, nor have they established that the questions raised are vital to
the final issue of the case or that her Order was based upon a wrong principle
or upon a misapprehension of the facts.
[7]
The appellants contend Prothonotary Milczynski
improperly weighed the evidence and failed to presume the facts pleaded could
be proven. While I understand the appellants’ contention given the analysis
conducted by Prothonotary Milczynski, her approach is understandable given her
role as the case management judge. I do not find it inappropriate for her to
summarize her knowledge of the facts in reaching her conclusion on the
plaintiff’s motion. More importantly, however, I note she applied the correct
test. She specifically refers to the “facts pleaded”,
not to the sufficiency of the evidence, when she concluded at page 5 of her
Order:
There are insufficient material facts
pleaded to support the relief sought that they [Mr. Lorensen, Mr. Nicholson and
Mr. Macek] should be personally, and jointly and severally liable with the
corporate defendants for any infringement found of the 065 Patent.
[8]
With respect to the implied undertaking,
Prothonotary Milczynski concluded:
[…] there is no basis to relieve the
Plaintiffs of their obligations under the implied undertaken rule. The main
concern appears to be whether the corporate defendants are judgment proof, but
the satisfaction of any judgment is no basis to add parties to a proceeding or
to permit the Plaintiffs to rely on documents produced in the within proceeding
to commence an action in the provincial courts for unjust enrichment.
[9]
Prothonotary Milczynski adequately addressed the
issues raised in the plaintiff’s motion. I am in substantial agreement with her
analysis and conclusions and see no meritorious basis for reversal.
[10]
In the circumstances, I would award costs in the
cause to be paid by the appellants to the respondents. In the event the parties
cannot agree upon the costs on appeal, I will fix them following the receipt of
written submissions which are to be received by the Court no later than 4:30
p.m. (EDT) on July 5, 2016.
ORDER
THIS COURT ORDERS that the appeal from
the Order of Prothonotary Milczynski dated April 7, 2016 be dismissed with
costs payable jointly and severally, in the cause, by the appellants to the
respondents.
“B. Richard Bell”