Docket: IMM-8340-14
Citation:
2016 FC 240
Ottawa, Ontario, February 23, 2016
PRESENT: The
Honourable Madam Justice Heneghan
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BETWEEN:
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BALVIR SINGH
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Applicant
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and
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
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Respondent
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JUDGMENT AND REASONS
[1]
Mr. Balvir Singh (the “Applicant”) seeks
judicial review of a decision of the Immigration and Refugee Board, Immigration
Appeal Division (the “IAD”), dated November 20, 2014. In that decision, the IAD
dismissed the appeal of the Applicant from the decision of an Officer of the
High Commission of Canada in New Delhi, India, refusing the sponsored
application for permanent residence of his spouse. The negative decision was
based upon the Officer’s opinion that the marriage between the Applicant and
his spouse, Gurpreet Kaur, was not genuine within the meaning of subsection
4(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR 2002-227
(the “Regulations”) and was entered into for the purpose of acquiring status
under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c. 27 (the
“Act”).
[2]
The Applicant is a Sikh and a citizen of India,
from the Punjab region. He came to Canada in May 2001 and made a refugee claim.
He first married in August 2002. Upon sponsorship of his wife, he attained
permanent residence status in May 2006. Two children were the issue of that
marriage, prior to the separation of the Applicant from his first wife, who had
engaged in adultery. The marriage ended by a divorce in July 2010.
[3]
In February 2009, his family began talking about
finding a new wife for the Applicant and approached a matchmaker, who suggested
pairing him with his current wife. The Applicant went to India, and met his
wife and her family in February 2010. The couple agreed to the match and their
families consented on the same day. An engagement ceremony was held a few days
later and the Applicant returned to Canada on February 28, 2010.
[4]
In November 2010, the Applicant’s father died. The
Applicant married his wife in India on January 28, 2011 and remained in India until
May 25, 2011. A spousal sponsorship application was submitted by the Applicant
on August 5, 2011.
[5]
The Applicant visited India between July and
September 2012. His daughter was born in India in May 2013. The Applicant
returned to India for a visit for three weeks in September 2014.
[6]
By letter dated May 16, 2012, the application
for permanent residence of the Applicant’s wife was refused, on the basis that,
pursuant to subsection 4(1) of the Regulations, the Applicant’s wife was not a
spouse because she entered into the marriage to acquire status or privilege
under the Act.
[7]
The hearing before the IAD was held on October
20, 2014. In its decision dismissing the appeal, the IAD concluded that the
marriage was not genuine and was entered into primarily for the purpose of
acquiring status in Canada.
[8]
The IAD said that the genuineness of the
Applicant’s prior marriage was a relevant factor in determining the genuineness
of his current marriage. It found there was no credible reason why the
Applicant stayed in his first marriage for as long as he did, nor why he did
not confront his first wife about the paternity of his children if she was
having an affair.
[9]
The IAD expressed concerns about the lack of
inquiry from the family of his second wife about his previous marriage, to
ensure that the match with his second wife was suitable. The IAD found that the
Applicant’s prior attempts to acquire status were not genuine and that he was
complicit in having his wife acquire status by a non-genuine marriage.
[10]
The IAD noted that the existence of a child of
the second marriage was insufficient to allay concerns about the marriage.
[11]
The parties addressed the following issues: the
applicable standard of review; whether there was a reasonable apprehension of
bias because the IAD had previously ruled only once in favour of an
applicant, in the 49 decisions published on CANLII; a reviewable error in
finding that the wife is not a spouse; and a reviewable error in failing to
consider the best interests of the child of the marriage.
[12]
The issue of bias, involving a question of
procedural fairness, is reviewable on the standard of correctness; see the
decision in Dang v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2014 FC 1195 at paragraph 32.
[13]
The finding that the wife is not a spouse,
because she is not a member of the family class, is a question of mixed fact
and law, and reviewable on the standard of reasonableness; see the decision in Khosa
v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2009] 1 S.C.R. 339 at
paragraphs 52-62. Likewise, the alleged failure to consider the best interests
of the child involves a question of mixed fact and law and is reviewable on the
standard of reasonableness; see the decision in Kanthasamy v. Canada
(Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 SCC 61 at paragraph 44.
[14]
According to the decision in Dunsmuir v. New
Brunswick, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 at paragraph 47, the standard of
“reasonableness” requires that the reasons enable the reviewing Court to
understand why the tribunal made its decision, and permit it to determine if
the conclusion is within the range of possible, acceptable outcomes.
[15]
I will first address the issue of bias. In this
regard, the Applicant relies upon statistics as to the rate of acceptance of applications
under the Act by the IAD Member where there was only one decision in favour of
an applicant.
[16]
I agree with the submissions of the Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration (the “Respondent”), that merely providing numbers
as to the acceptance rate of a particular member of the IAD does not
establish bias. There is no methodology to the so-called statistics presented
by the Applicant. I refer to the decision in Es-Sayyid v. Canada
(Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), [2013] 4 FCR 3 at paragraph 45.
[17]
I am satisfied that there is no reviewable error
arising from the manner in which the IAD addressed the best interests of the
child. According to the decision in Owusu v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration), [2004] 2 FCR 635, a duty to consider this issue
only arises when it is sufficiently clear from the evidence that an applicant
is relying on the best interests of a child, in the assessment of humanitarian
considerations by the IAD. Upon reviewing the record in this case, it appears
that there is insufficient evidence of reliance by the Applicant upon the best
interests of the child, in the evaluation of the sponsorship application in
issue.
[18]
However, I am not satisfied that the IAD reasonably
assessed the evidence before it about the genuineness of the Applicant’s
marriage with his current spouse.
[19]
A review of the transcript shows a dominant focus
on the circumstances of the Applicant’s first marriage, without much attention
to the circumstances surrounding his engagement to his current wife and the
development of their marital relationship. I acknowledge that the IAD may
consider an applicant’s prior immigration history; see the decision in Khera
v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 632.
[20]
In the present case, there is merit in the
Applicant’s arguments that the Board may have overlooked nuances about marriage
in the Sikh culture, for example relating to whether the marriage between the
Applicant and his current wife would be a “suitable match”, as referenced in
paragraphs 26 and 29 of the decision under review.
[21]
Considering the evidence in the Certified
Tribunal Record, including the transcript of the hearing before the IAD,
I am not satisfied that the IAD’s finding as to the genuineness of the
Applicant’s marriage meets the standard of reasonableness as discussed above.
[22]
In the result, this application for judicial
review is allowed, the decision of the IAD is set aside, and the matter
is remitted to a differently constituted panel of the IAD for redetermination.
[23]
The Applicant is seeking costs, if successful in
this application for judicial review. According to section 22 of the Federal
Courts Citizenship, Immigration and Refugee Protection Rules, SOR/93-22,
costs may be awarded in immigration judicial review proceedings where there are
"special reasons" for doing so.
[24]
I am not persuaded that the Applicant has
demonstrated any special reasons justifying costs and no costs will be
awarded.
[25]
The Applicant proposed the following questions
for certification:
1) Is the sponsor’s immigration history
relevant in determining whether a marriage is genuine
2) Does an officer breach the rules of procedural fairness by
asking questions pertaining to the sponsor’s previous marriage before examining
the current marriage; i.e. that is so discombobulates the sponsor and sponsoree
that it hinders their ability to answer questions with respect to the present
marriage
3) Does the ruling in Gill v. Canada FC 122 [sic],
affirming a presumption of genuineness of marriage where a child is born of the
marriage, constitutes good law
4) In assessing the bona fides of a relationship, do visa
officers and IAD members have an obligation to consider the best interests of a
child directly affected by the determination.
[26]
Considering the test for certification in the
decision Zazai v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)
(2004), 318 NR 365 (FCA), that is, “a serious
question of general importance which would be dispositive of an appeal”,
I am not satisfied that the proposed questions meet the test and no question
will be certified.
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