Docket: IMM-6683-14
Citation:
2015 FC 1296
Ottawa, Ontario, November 20, 2015
PRESENT: The
Honourable Mr. Justice O'Reilly
BETWEEN:
|
DO MEE TUNG
|
Applicant
|
and
|
THE MINISTER OF
CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
|
Respondent
|
JUDGMENT AND REASONS
I.
Overview
[1]
In April 2014, the Minister applied to the
Immigration and Refugee Board to cease Ms Do Mee Tung’s refugee status. At the
time, Ms Tung was out of the country. She learned about the Minister’s
application in early June 2014. By then, the hearing had been set down for July
18, 2014.
[2]
Ms Tung engaged an immigration consultant who
sought an adjournment from the Board so that he could prepare properly for the
hearing. The Board refused. The consultant asked again at the hearing but the
Board again refused to adjourn. The Board proceeded with the hearing and, in
due course, found that Ms Tung’s refugee status had ceased because she had
reavailed herself of the protection of her native China.
[3]
Ms Tung maintains that the Board treated her
unfairly by denying her an adjournment without considering the relevant
circumstances. She asks me to overturn the Board’s decision and order another
panel to reconsider the question of cessation.
[4]
I agree that the Board unreasonably denied Ms
Tung an adjournment and will allow this application for judicial review on that
basis. Ms Tung also argued that the Board’s decision on cessation was
unreasonable, but I need not deal with that question given my conclusion on the
issue of fairness.
II.
Adjournments before the Board
[5]
A person can apply to change the date or time of
a hearing before the Board, but a change can only occur in exceptional
circumstances, including where it is necessary to accommodate a vulnerable
person, or to respond to an emergency or other development beyond the person’s
control (Refugee Protection Division Rules, SOR/2012-256, s
54(1)(4)). The Rules also permit a person to request a change of date or time
where counsel was engaged after the hearing date has been fixed (s 54(5)). In
certain circumstances (not applicable here), the Board must grant the person’s
request.
[6]
The Board’s discretion must generally take into
account all relevant factors, including:
•
whether the applicant has done everything in her
power to be represented by counsel;
•
the number of previous adjournments granted,
including any peremptory adjournments;
•
the duration of the requested adjournment;
•
the effect on the immigration system;
•
whether needless delay would result; and
•
whether the applicant is to blame.
(Siloch
v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1993] FCJ No 10.)
III.
Did the Board unreasonably refuse an
adjournment?
[7]
In my view, the Board failed to take into
account the relevant factors cited above and, therefore, unreasonably denied Ms
Tung an adjournment. The Board refused an adjournment because Ms Tung had not
shown that there were exceptional circumstances, such as vulnerability or an
emergency beyond her control. But the latter are merely examples of exceptional
circumstances. The Board appeared not to consider whether Ms Tung’s personal
situation amounted to exceptional circumstances in the broader sense.
[8]
In addition, the Board did not consider the
applicability of Rule 54(5). As mentioned above, there are circumstances where
the Board must grant an adjournment under that provision. Where those
circumstances do not exist, the Board nonetheless has the discretion to grant
an adjournment where the applicant’s personal situation warrants it.
[9]
Had the Board taken account of Ms Tung’s
personal situation, it would have considered that:
•
Ms Tung had not made any prior adjournment
requests;
•
She was requesting a short delay;
•
There was no evidence of any prejudice; and
•
Neither Ms Tung nor her counsel was prepared for
the hearing.
[10]
In the circumstances, therefore, I find that the
Board’s rejection of Ms Tung’s request was unreasonable for failure to consider
her personal situation.
IV.
Conclusion and Disposition
[11]
The Board failed to take into account the
relevant Rules and factors in refusing Ms Tung’s adjournment. I must,
therefore, allow this application for judicial review and order another panel
to reconsider the issue of cessation. Neither party proposed a question of
general importance for me to certify, and none is stated.