Date: 20150626
Docket:
T-785-15
Citation: 2015 FC 803
Ottawa, Ontario, June 26, 2015
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Martineau
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BETWEEN:
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THE INFORMATION
COMMISSIONER OF CANADA
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Applicant
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and
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THE MINISTER OF
PUBLIC SAFETY AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
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Respondent
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REASONS FOR ORDER
[1]
These reasons accompany the interlocutory
injunction and preservation order issued on June 22, 2015 in this matter pending
before the Court, which involves the Information Commissioner of Canada
[Information Commissioner or applicant] and the Minister of Public Safety and
Emergency Preparedness [Minister or respondent].
[2]
In her review application filed on May 14, 2015
[Application], pursuant to paragraph 42(1)(a) of the Access to Information
Act, RSC 1985, c A-1 [Act], the Information Commissioner, Ms Suzanne
Legault, seeks from the Court the following:
1. A declaration that the Minister, in his capacity as head of the
government institution responsible for the Royal Canadian Mounted Police
[RCMP], has failed to provide access to responsive records requested under the
Act; and,
2.
An Order directing the Minister to process the
request made on March 27, 2012 by Mr Bill Clennet [complainant] in keeping with
the Information Commissioner’s recommendations made on March 26, 2015 following
her investigation [Section 37 Report] within thirty days of judgment.
[3]
The Application has been filed with the consent
of the complainant. The responsive records requested by the complainant under
the Act (RCMP Institutional File No. A-2012-00085; OIC Investigation File No.
3212-01427) include an electronic copy of all records contained in the Canadian
Firearms Registry [Registry] related to the registration of non-restricted
firearms, commonly referred to as “long-guns”. In particular, information
related to the registration of non-restricted firearms is contained within the
Canadian Firearm Information System [CFIS]. The data fields in the CFIS for
firearm information are the same for firearms, whether they are restricted,
prohibited or non-restricted.
[4]
The following salient facts emerge from the
Application, motion records, affidavits, documentary and oral evidence
(including the transcript of the examination of Jennifer Walsh) and public
instruments referred to by the parties or their counsel.
[5]
On April 5, 2012, the Ending the Long-gun
Registry Act, SC 2012, c 6 [ELRA] came into force. Subsection 29(1)
of the ELRA requires the Commissioner of Firearms to destroy “as soon as feasible”
all records in the Registry which are related to the registration of non-restricted
firearms. Despite the assurances given by the Minister to the Information
Commissioner in May 2012 that “[w]ith respect to your
question on destruction of records in the [Canadian Firearms Information
System], please be assured that the RCMP will abide by the right of access
described in section 4 of the Act and its obligations in that regard”, between
October 25 and October 29, 2012, the RCMP apparently destroyed all electronic
records (live database and back-up tapes), including those from National Archives,
relating to the registration of non-restricted firearms in the CFIS, other than
those registered to residents of Quebec.
[6]
On February 1, 2013, the complainant made a
complaint to the Information Commissioner regarding records missing from the
response he received from the RCMP. On February 5, 2013, the Minister informed
the Information Commissioner that “[w]ith respect to
your question on destruction of records in the CFIS, I am assured by the RCMP
Commissioner that the RCMP will abide by the right of access described in
section 4 of the Act and its obligations in that regard.”
[7]
On July 8, 2014, the Information Commissioner
issued an order for the production of records pursuant to paragraph 36(1)(a) of
the Act and on July 28, 2014, she issued a further production order. The RCMP
completed its response to these production orders on October 31, 2014, but as later
confessed by a RCMP official, “[t]he RCMP can in no way
recreate the destroyed records pertaining to non-restricted firearms.”
[8]
On January 15, 2015, the Information
Commissioner wrote to the Commissioner of the RCMP to inform him that she had
reached the preliminary view that the information provided by the RCMP to the
complainant did not constitute all of the responsive records and requested assurances
from the Commissioner that the RCMP would ensure the records she had identified
as being responsive would be preserved. On January 19, 2015, the Information
Commissioner wrote to the Commissioner of the RCMP to provide him with an
opportunity to make representations with respect to the Information
Commissioner’s preliminary findings, pursuant to paragraph 35(2)(b) of the Act.
[9]
On February 20, 2015, the RCMP Commissioner
provided his comments. He has taken the position that “[i]t
was not until January 7, 2013 that the [Office of the Information Commissioner]
first indicated that A-2012-00183 would not be responsive to A-2012-0085”,
while “[t]he information relating to non-restricted
firearms outside of Quebec had by that time been deleted.” Moreover, the
RCMP Commissioner indicates: “While the original
request, A-2012-0085, was never actioned (as the issue of fees was not resolved
until after the deletion of records relating to non-restricted firearms), the
RCMP is of the position that the requestor did receive the information to which
they are entitled”. Finally, the RCMP Commissioner indicated that it
would not “re-process the remaining records relating to
non-restricted firearms within the CFIS” and that “[t]he complainant has already received the records relating
to non-restricted firearms for Quebec residents within the disclosure package
of A-2012-00183.”
[10]
On March 26, 2015, the Information Commissioner
wrote to the Minister pursuant to subsection 37(1) of the Act reporting the
results of her investigation. In her Section 37 Report, the Information
Commissioner has determined that the complaint is well-founded. She recommends
not only that the RCMP process and release to the complainant all of the
information responsive to his request that had not been destroyed between
October 25 and October 29, 2012, but also that it preserve these responsive
records until the conclusion of her investigation and any related proceedings.
[11]
Also on March 26, 2015, pursuant to subsection
63(2) of the Act, the Information Commissioner referred to the Attorney General
of Canada information relating to the possible commission of an offence under
paragraph 67.1(1)(a) of the Act, which provides that no person shall, with the
intent to deny a right of access under the Act, destroy, mutilate or alter a
record. The Information Commissioner indicated that the investigation conducted
by the Office of the Information Commissioner had established that the RCMP
destroyed records responsive to an outstanding access to information request with
the knowledge that these records were subject to the right of access guaranteed
by subsection 4(1) of the Act.
[12]
On March 27, 2015, the Supreme Court of Canada
dismissed an appeal by the Attorney General of Quebec with respect to the
constitutionality of section 29 of the ELRA and in a split decision (5-4), concluded
that the province of Quebec had no legal right to obtain the data of the
long-gun registry concerning Quebec residents (Quebec (Attorney General) v
Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 14 [Quebec (Attorney General) (SCC)]).
On April 3, 2015, the RCMP expired 1.6 million non-restricted firearm
registration records for residents of Quebec. Between April 10 and April 12,
2015, the RCMP permanently destroyed the 1.6 million Quebec non-restricted firearm
registration records in CFIS. However, this time, a back-up copy of the deleted
information was kept [the records at issue].
[13]
Prior to the expiration of the Quebec
registration records for non-restricted firearms, two steps were taken by the
institution to retain the records that had not been already destroyed between
October 25 and October 29, 2012:
1. First, the RCMP made a complete copy of CFIS as it existed on April
3, 2015; the same resides currently on a virtual server within the RCMP Data
Centre [final back-up];
2.
Second, the RCMP created a copy of the Quebec
registration records for non-restricted firearms, selecting any data that may
have been associated to the 64 fields identified by the Information
Commissioner as relevant to registration records. This data, in a delimited
text file, resides on an external hard drive [hard drive].
[14]
On April 30, 2015, in response to the Section 37
Report referred to earlier, the Minister informed the Information Commissioner
that, in light of the representations made to her by the RCMP, he was of the
view that the complainant had already received the records responsive to his
request and that he had no intention of following her recommendations to
process additional information. The Minister also indicated that it seemed the
RCMP had kept a copy (final back-up) of the relevant documents for the purpose
of the access to information investigation.
[15]
On May 7, 2015, Bill C-59 entitled “An Act to
implement certain provisions of the budget tabled in Parliament on April 21, 2015
and other measures” received a first reading in the House of Commons. The Information
Commissioner understood that section 230 of Bill C-59 would, in effect, amend
section 29 of the ELRA as it now read, and retroactively authorize the
destruction of all records in the long-gun registry (and copies), despite the
existence of a request for information under the Act and despite the present
Application. The amendments would exclude the application of the Act
retroactively as of October 25, 2011 with respect to the destruction of
long-gun registry records (and copies) and records with respect to their
destruction. Furthermore, the amendments would also retroactively immunize the
Crown, Crown servants, the Commissioner of Firearms, a government institution
or the head of a government institution from any administrative, civil or
criminal proceedings with respect to the destruction of the long-gun registry
information on or after April 5, 2012, and also, for any act or omission done between
October 25, 2011 and the date section 231 would come into force in purported
compliance with the Act in relation to the long-gun registry information in the
Registry.
[16]
On May 14, 2015, the present Application
was filed with the Court. The government wanted to move quickly with the
proposed legislative changes. A May 25, 2015 Globe and Mail story
reported that Government House Leader Peter Van Loan stated that the
government’s priority was passing its budget, which would be enacted by Bill
C-59, before the House of Commons adjourns on June 23, 2015. At that time, Bill
C-59 had received the second reading and was referred to committee. This is
what prompted, on June 3, 2015, the making of the present motion by the
Information Commissioner and concurrent letter of request to the Judicial
Administrator for a special sitting of the Court to hear the same on an urgent
basis. Justice Harrington, who was the Duty Judge that week, was seized of this
urgent matter. On June 5, 2015, this matter was put
under special management, upon having received an undertaking by the
Attorney General of Canada on behalf of the Minister and the Commissioner of
Firearms that “the status quo will be maintained
concerning the preservation of data in question (as referenced in Exhibits H,
J, K and HH of Mr. O’Brien’s affidavit) pending a resolution of this
interim/interlocutory motion, even if Bill C-59 comes into force in the interim.”
[17]
On June 11, 2015, the
Case Management Judge (Prothonotary Tabib) issued Directions which provided for
the prompt filing of the respondent’s affidavits, cross-examinations and respondent’s motion record, and the motion was set
down for hearing before the undersigned Judge on June 22, 2015. In the meantime,
on June 5, 2015, the Standing Committee of Finance reported Bill C‑59
without amendment. The third reading of Bill C-59 in the House of Commons
happened on June 15, 2015. In the Senate, Bill C-59 received a first reading on
June 15, 2015, a second reading on June 17, 2015 and was referred to the
Standing Senate Committee on National Finance on June 17, 2015. When the Court
heard the motion on June 22, 2015, the Senate had not yet voted with respect to
the third reading of Bill C-59.
[18]
While at the hearing, Counsel for the respondent
recognized that should the Application have been decided on the merits that
day, the Court would have had access to the records at issue (sealed in an
envelope) and full consultation would be unnecessary (samples would be
sufficient), Counsel made it clear before the Court that the government would
not make a commitment not to destroy the records at issue pending the final
determination of the Application, which meant that the protection of these
records could only be guaranteed by the issuance of an interlocutory Order of
the Court.
[19]
Rule 373 of the Federal Court Rules,
SOR/98-106 [Rules], provides that the Court may grant an interlocutory
injunction, while Rule 377 empowers it to make an order for the custody or
preservation of property that is, or will be, the subject-matter of a
proceeding or as to which a question may arise therein. These are discretionary
decisions. The three test part of RJR-Macdonald Inc v Canada (Attorney
General), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311 [RJR-Macdonald] applies to both types of order.
Therefore, the applicant must demonstrate that there is a serious issue to be
tried; that the applicant will suffer irreparable harm if the relief is not
granted; and that the balance of convenience favours the moving party.
[20]
Being satisfied that all three conditions were met
by the applicant, late afternoon, on June 22, 2015, the Court ordered from the
bench:
1. The records at issue in this Application shall be preserved in their
current form and shall not be destroyed by the Minister and the Commissioner of
Firearms or any person acting on their behalf until the final disposition of
this Application or the Court orders otherwise;
2. The Minister and the Commissioner of Firearms shall ensure that the
external hard drive, as described in paragraph 13 of the affidavit of Jennifer
Walsh affirmed on June 15, 2015, shall be delivered in person to the Registry
of the Federal Court no later than 10:00 a.m. on June 23, 2015;
3. The external hard drive shall be filed with the Registry of the
Federal Court under seal until the final disposition of this Application (and
all other appeals have been exhausted) or the Court orders otherwise;
4. Without costs; and
5.
The reasons for this Order will follow.
[21]
The applicant has presented compelling arguments
that there are serious issues to be tried. On the basis of the evidence and
material before the Court, I am satisfied that the complainant (and other
persons in a similar situation who have made requests for access to the RCMP)
will suffer irreparable harm if the relief requested by the Information
Commissioner is not granted. Finally, the balance of convenience clearly
favours the maintenance of the status quo and the preservation of the final
back-up and the conservation of the hard drive pending a final determination of
the present review application. I generally endorse the reasoning made by the
Information Commissioner at paragraphs 67 to 108 of her memorandum of fact and
law. I dismiss the arguments for dismissal made by the Minister. Clearly, it is
in the interest of justice to preserve from destruction the records at issue (final
back-up) and the data contained on the hard drive.
[22]
In the Court’s opinion, the Application is
neither vexatious nor frivolous. The threshold for meeting the serious issue
branch of the test is a low one and involves an “extremely limited review of
the case” (RJR-Macdonald, at 348). The applicant argued that the issue
to be tried in the Application was whether the respondent was without
justification in refusing to further process the complainant’s request and in
refusing to provide to the complainant the records at issue. The applicant also
argued that in order to be able to determine the merits of the Application, the
Court and counsel must have access to the records at issue since an application
pursuant to section 42 of the Act is a de novo hearing. The respondent took
no position on these issues except to state that courts are bound to apply the
laws as they currently exist, subject to the power of the judicial branch to
examine their constitutionality.
[23]
Section 29 of the ELRA, as it read when the
Court made the Order, made no reference whatsoever to the Act, and the evidence
submitted to the Court by the Information Commissioner clearly established that
the Minister always considered that the ELRA did not prevent the complainant
and other members of the public from pursuing or making requests under the Act
to access information contained in the Registry. Subject to the constitutional
challenge of Bill C‑59, the Court will eventually have to decide on the
proper interpretation and scope of sections 230 and 231, and whether, as
claimed by the Information Commissioner, the complainant has a vested right of
access. By that time, the issue raised by the applicant may or may not be moot,
or may have evolved, but those are external factors which should have no
bearing on the serious question analysis. It would be improper for the motion
Judge to express at this stage any opinion on the merits of the Application.
[24]
On the second branch of the test, the
preservation of the records at issue is fundamental to safeguarding the complainant’s
right of access to government information and this right will be irreparably
harmed if the final back-up or the hard drive are permanently destroyed prior
to the final determination of this Application, as there is no ability to
recreate deleted records once the final back-up, as well as the hard drive, are
destroyed. As stated by Justice Blanchard in Quebec (Attorney General) v
Canada (Attorney General), 2012 QCCS 1614 [Quebec (Attorney General)
(QCCS)], “[c]learly, for the party claiming the information
in the registry, its destruction is an irreparable loss” (at para 58).
Again, the respondent took no position with respect to irreparable harm and I
have no reason not to endorse the applicant’s arguments.
[25]
Moreover, the risk of destruction alleged by the
applicant in this case is not speculative. Past emails and briefing notes
produced by the Information Commissioner show that the Minister was apparently attempting
to accelerate the destruction of the long-gun registry information, while at
the same time he was apparently giving assurances to the Information
Commissioner that the status quo would be maintained. Therefore, the
Information Commissioner’s suspicions are grounded on the evidence on record.
Absent an explicit order directed to the Minister and the Commissioner of
Firearms, or any person acting on their behalf, precious material evidence for
the purpose of the present Application may well disappear forever.
[26]
Finally, section 46 of the Act expressly states that
“[n]otwithstanding any other Act of Parliament or any
privilege under the law of evidence, the Court may…examine any record to which
this Act applies that is under the control of a government institution, and
no such record may be withheld from the Court on any grounds” [emphasis
added]. The broad scope of this provision has already been recognized by the
Federal Court of Appeal in Canada (Information Commissioner) v Canada
(Minister of the Environment), 2000 CanLII 15247 (FCA). Not only will the contemplated
destruction of the records at issue completely deny the Information
Commissioner’s right to seek judicial review and undermine her mandate, but the
Court’s power of examination under section 46 of the Act will become
meaningless if these records no longer exist. It is therefore necessary to
ensure that the courts –the Federal Court included– who are responsible to
uphold the Rule of Law are not be confronted with a “fait accompli.”
[27]
On the third branch of the test, the balance of
convenience clearly favours the applicant. Indeed, the interim injunctive
relief sought by the applicant simply seeks to maintain the status quo,
while there will be no prejudice to the respondent if the back-up is preserved
and the hard drive – which will be kept in a secure area – is delivered to the
Court’s Registry. On the other hand, if the order is refused, the complainant’s
right of access will be eradicated and the Court’s ability to engage in the
second level of independent review under the Act will be ousted. In making this
assessment, the Court also considered the arguments made by the respondent with
respect to “public interest” in light of what has been said notably by the
Supreme Court of Canada in RJR-Macdonald and Manitoba (Attorney
General) v Metropolitan Stores Ltd, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 110 [Metropolitan
Stores].
[28]
Although Bill C-59 was not yet law and was not
in force when the Court made its Order, the respondent argued that the Court should
proceed on the basis that Bill C-59 was directed to the public good and served
a valid public purpose, and that once enacted, it should be presumed to be
valid and constitutional (Metropolitan Stores, at para 56). The
respondent also argued that sections 230 and 231 of Bill C-59 reflect a policy
choice of the government and that these provisions constitute a lawful exercise
of Parliament’s criminal law legislative power, as decided by the Supreme Court
of Canada in the Reference re Firearms Act (Can), 2000 SCC 31 and
reiterated recently in Quebec (Attorney General) (SCC). The respondent
also distinguished the interlocutory relief issued by the Superior Court in the
case of Quebec (Attorney General) (QCCS), since the present Application does
not directly question the constitutionality of Bill C‑59 and concerns
solely the right of access by one individual to records that Parliament has
determined should be destroyed. At the hearing, respondent’s counsel ventured
to suggest that Bill C-59 was pursuing the same public interest aims as the
ERLA: assuring public safety and restoring the privacy rights of all long-guns
owners in Canada.
[29]
It is not surprising that the constitutionality
of Bill C-59 has not been directly questioned in the Application as there is
case law from this Court which suggests that such an attack would be premature:
“The courts exercise a supervisory jurisdiction once a
law has been enacted. Until that time, a court cannot review, enjoin or
otherwise engage in the legislative process unless asked by way of a reference
framed under the relevant legislation.” Galati v Canada (Governor
General), 2015 FC 91 at para 35. I will only venture to note that Bill C-59
contained no declared purpose for sections 230 and 231 that amend the ERLA.
Bill C-59 was simply entitled “An Act to implement
certain provisions of the budget tabled in Parliament on April 21, 2015 and other
measures”. Although the purpose of Bill C-59 was to implement the
Government’s Budget, sections 230 and 231 would retroactively expunge the
complainant’s right to access government information and oust this Court’s
jurisdiction to decide the Application.
[30]
In Jamieson Laboratories Ltd v Reckitt
Benckiser LLC, 2015 FCA 104, the Federal Court of Appeal urged judges
seized of a motion for an interlocutory injunction not to go “beyond the bounds
of necessity” in the context of the balance of convenience analysis (para 25). The
Court was informed by applicant’s counsel on June 22, 2015 that sections 230
and 231 of Bill C-59 would be constitutionally challenged as soon as Bill C-59
was enacted and would come into force. That said, the Court considered the
public interest in light of the existing law and precedents. In RJR-Macdonald,
the Supreme Court observed: “ ‘Public interest’
includes both the concerns of society generally and the particular interests of
identifiable groups” (at 344). In Bronskill
v Canada (Canadian Heritage), 2011 FC 983 [Bronskill], my colleague,
Justice Simon Noël, states at paragraph 10: “Suffice to
say that the Information Commissioner’s mandate is one that should be taken
with the utmost vigour and energy. Truly, the Information Commissioner is one
of the custodians of our democracy.”
[31]
Justice Noël further states in Bronskill,
at paragraph 215:
Secondly, it is
important to note there is no direct consideration of the “public interest” in disclosure
of information, as is the case in the Canada
Evidence Act and under some provincial statutes,
namely Ontario’s, which has been considered by the Supreme Court in Ontario
(Public Safety and Security) v Criminal Lawyers' Association, above.
However, given the principles of the Act and the qualification of LAC’s mandate
of preserving and facilitating access to information as being contributory to
our democratic life, there is an arguable implicit public interest in access
to information requests. While not directly at play and not as a
stand-alone argument to counter necessary exemptions, the public’s right to
know is always at the heart of any ATI request, not least because of the Act’s
quasi-constitutional nature. Further to this argument, the Act itself cannot be
used to hide embarrassments or illegal acts (see para 131 of these reasons),
thereby recognizing an inherent public interest in the application of the Act.
[Emphasis added]
[32]
As an agent of Parliament, like his counterpart,
the Privacy Commissioner, the Information Commissioner “is
charged with carrying out impartial, independent and non-partisan
investigations into the violation of, respectively, the right of access to
information and privacy rights”, and, as stated by the Supreme Court of
Canada, both of them “benefit not only individuals who
request access or object to disclosure, but also the Canadian public at large,
by holding the government accountable for its information practices”: HJ
Heinz Co of Canada Ltd v Canada (Attorney General), 2006 SCC 13 at paras 33
and 34. It must be reiterated that in the present proceeding under section 42
of the Act, the Information Commissioner acts in the public interest. Accordingly, I have concluded that the public interest flowing
from the exercise of any such rights of access and intervention by the
Information Commissioner to enforce government accountability outweighs any public
interest invoked by the Minister to pre-emptively destroy the records at issue
before the matter is heard by the Court.
[33]
When costs are sought by private parties, they
usually follow the result of the motion or proceeding. While the respondent has
sought costs, the applicant’s learned counsel elegantly advised the Court at
the hearing that no costs were sought by his client in this matter. This was
sound advice as both the Minister and the Information Commissioner represent
the public interest.
[34]
As a final note to these reasons, further to the
Order made on June 22, 2015, upon being advised that the hard drive had been
delivered in person to the Registry of the Federal Court prior to 10:00 a.m. on
June 23, 2015, the Court directed that the hard drive be kept in a secure area
in the Designated Proceedings Section until the Court directs otherwise. On
that day, Bill C‑59 received Royal Assent (it was adopted in third
lecture by the Senate in the evening of June 22, 2015) and is now in force in
Canada: Economic Action Plan 2015 Act, No. 1, 2015, c 36. The
constitutionality of sections 29 and 30 of the ELRA, as amended by sections 230
and 231 of the Economic Action Plan 2015 Act, No. 1 is now pending
before the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Court File No. 15-64739). Whether
such development constitutes proper ground or not for seeking a stay of the
present proceeding under section 50 of the Federal Courts Act, RSC 1985,
c F-7 is something that may have to be addressed by the Federal Court sometime
in the future.
“Luc Martineau”