Docket:
T-2293-12
Citation: 2014 FC 215
Ottawa, Ontario, March 5, 2014
PRESENT: The
Honourable Mr. Justice Scott
BETWEEN:
|
PARADIS HONEY LTD.,
|
HONEY BEE ENTERPRISES LTD. AND
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ROCKLANE APIARIES LTD.
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Plaintiffs
(Respondents)
|
and
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THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
|
Defendant
(Applicant)
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REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
I. Introduction
[1]
The Defendant has brought a motion pursuant to
Rules 369 and 221(1)a) of the Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106
[the FCR] for an order striking the statement of claim, in its entirety,
without leave to amend, on grounds that it discloses no reasonable cause of
action.
[2]
At the onset the Court has changed the style of
cause, as the Plaintiffs’ claim is based on section 23 of the Crown
Liability and Proceedings Act, RSC 1985, c C-50.
[3]
The Defendant submits that the claim is
deficient in that:
a) It advances a tort claim based on an alleged breach of
statute which is a tort not known at law;
b) The
claim is framed as one of direct liability against the Crown; it does not
identify a Crown servant; and
c) The facts do not give
rise to a private law duty of care.
[4]
The Plaintiffs’ statement of claim seeks to
obtain damages based on:
1) The
Defendant’s negligence in imposing or enforcing a prohibition on, or denying
import permits for, the importation into Canada of live honeybee packages from
the continental United States after December 31, 2006 to the present day,
thereby breaching his duty of care; and
2) The
Defendant’s acting without lawful authority by imposing a prohibition on, and
denying import permits for, the importation into Canada of live honeybee
packages from the continental United States after December 31, 2006 to the
present day and abdicating his authority to an improper third party to make
decisions on improper considerations.
II. The
facts
[5]
The import of live bees into Canada from the US was restricted in the late 1980s due to concerns about the presence of mites and
other pests on such bees. From that time on until 2004, imports from the US of
live bees (whether of a queen honeybee or a package of honeybees) were
prohibited by the Honeybee Prohibition Order, 1987, SOR/87-607 and
successor orders that were enacted pursuant to subsection 20(1) of the Animal
Disease and Protection Regulations, CRC c 296 [the ADPR], as well as
the Honeybee Prohibition Regulations, 1991, SOR/92-24 and its successor
regulations, enacted pursuant to section 14 of the Health of Animals Act,
SC 1990, c 21 [the HAA].
[6]
These restrictions were based on risk
assessments conducted by the Canadian Food Inspection Agency [the CFIA]. The
CFIA is responsible for the administration and enforcement of the HAA
(see the Canadian Food Inspection Agency Act, SC 1997, c 6, subsection
4(1) [CFIAA]). The last risk assessment and industry consultation
regarding the risks of disease or toxic substances resulting from allowing the
importation of live bees from the US was conducted in 2003. At that time, the
prohibition on live bee imports from the US was continued by the Honeybee
Importation Prohibition Regulations, 2004, SOR/2004-136 [the HIPR-2004],
enacted pursuant to section 14 of the HAA, subject to an exception which
allowed the Minister to issue an import permit to import queens.
[7]
The Minister’s authority to issue a permit arises
pursuant to section 64 of the HAA and sections 12 and subsection 160(1.1)
of the Health of Animals Regulations, CRC, c 296 [the HAR].
Subsection 160(1.1) of the HAR specifies that if the Minister is satisfied
that the issuance of the permit “would not, or would not be likely to, result
in the introduction into Canada, the introduction into another country from
Canada or the spread within Canada, of a vector, disease or toxic substance”,
he may grant it.
[8]
Between 2004 and 2006 the Minister exercised his
discretion under subsection 160(1.1) of the HAR to grant such permits
for the importation of queens from the US, however the importation of packages
of honeybees remained subject to the prohibition. The prohibition under HIPR-2004
expired on December 31, 2006 and has not been renewed by Regulation or
formal Ministerial Order or Directive. Notwithstanding the expiry of the
HIPR-2004 prohibition, the Defendant has continued to enforce a
complete prohibition on the import of honeybee packages from the US, but has
continued to grant permits for the importation of US queens pursuant to subsection
160(1.1) of the HAR.
[9]
The Plaintiffs allege that after the prohibition
lapsed, imports of US packaged honeybees became subject to the same
administrative scheme (sections 12 and 160 of the HAR) that governed US
queen bee imports and live animal imports in general, but that the Defendant
imposed a de facto prohibition notwithstanding this change (see the
Plaintiffs’ Statement of Claim of December 28, 2012, page 7). The Plaintiffs
argue that by prohibiting and denying them an opportunity to obtain permits for
the importation of US honeybee packages the Defendant has breached his duty of
care and acted without lawful authority.
III. Points
in issue
A.
Is it plain and obvious that the Plaintiffs’
claim for acting without lawful authority is bound to fail?
B.
Is it plain and obvious that Plaintiffs’ claim
in negligence is bound to fail? and
C.
Should costs be awarded?
IV. Parties’
position
A.
The Defendant’s position
[10]
The Defendant, in his reply representations,
claims that the Plaintiffs cannot amend their statement of claim because the
pleadings have been closed since February 8, 2013, when they filed their
statement of defence (see Rule 202 of the FCR). The Defendant argues
that the Plaintiffs’ proposed amended statement of claim is improper and should
be struck or wholly disregarded, as should any paragraphs referring to it in
the Plaintiffs’ response written representations (see the Defendant’s reply to
motion record at page 3, para 10). The Defendant bases his position on Rules
200 and 202 of the FCR that Plaintiffs could not amend as of right; they
are required to seek leave of this Court by way of motion.
[11]
The Defendant argues that the Plaintiffs, having
failed to bring forward a motion to amend their pleadings, cannot purport to do
so by tendering the Proposed Amended Claim in response to the Defendant’s
motion to strike. Furthermore, the Defendant submits that the Plaintiffs are
estopped from amending because the proceeding is case managed and the issue of
scheduling interlocutory motions addressed by the parties at the case
management conference on October 1, 2013. Moreover, the Defendant claims that
the Plaintiffs have admitted that the proposed amendments are not new matters
of which they had just become aware (see Defendant’s reply to motion record at
page 4, para 12).
[12]
The Defendant contends that the Plaintiffs are
attempting to tender an amended claim after receiving the full benefit of the
Defendant’s argument on his motion. The Defendant also submits that Rule 75(2)
of the FCR provides that no amendment is to be allowed during a hearing
and argues that since the motion is in writing, the parties are in a hearing.
The Defendant submits that the Federal Court has rejected attempts to file amended
pleadings in response to motions to strike without leave to amend and held that
no steps can be taken that could affect the rights of a moving party. The
Defendant relies on the Direction of a prothonotary which cited Bruce v John
Northway & Sons Ltd, [1962] OWN 150. The Defendant also notes that the
Plaintiffs relied on Los Angeles Salad Company Inc v Canadian Food
Inspection Agency et al, 2013 BCCA 34 [Los Angeles Salad Company],
but this case could be distinguished because a formal application for leave to
amend had been made.
[13]
As to Plaintiffs’ reference to Simon v Canada,
2011 FCA 6 at paragraph 14 [Simon] and Collins v Canada, 2011 FCA
140 at paragraph 26 [Collins], the Defendant argues that the pleadings
in those cases had not been closed. The defendants had not filed their
statement of defence prior to bringing their motions to strike; therefore, in
both cases, they were entitled to amend as of right. Finally, the Defendant
argues that the cases relied upon by the Plaintiffs do not appear to have been
under case management where the parties would have committed to expressly
address the issue of all interlocutory motions to be heard prior or
concurrently with the Plaintiffs’ certification motion.
[14]
The Defendant also emphasizes that contrary to
the Plaintiffs’ submission, he did not receive the proposed amended statement
of claim on September 25, 2013. Rather, it was first seen on November 29, 2013,
when he received the Plaintiffs’ motion record in response to his motion to
strike without leave to amend.
[15]
In the alternative, the Defendant submits that
the Plaintiffs’ pleading in negligence is not cured by the amended statement of
claim because the proper statutory construction and interpretation of the HAA
and HAR do not create a private law duty of care to the individual
Plaintiffs. The duties owed by the CFIA are to the public as a whole and not to
any specific members of the public and the proposed amendments cannot alter
this statutory intent.
i. Claim
for acting without lawful authority
[16]
The Defendant submits that this claim is bound
to fail because there has been statutory authority to prohibit or refuse to
grant a permit for the importation of US honeybee packages since January 1,
2007 to the present day. The HAA and the HAR expressly confer
authority on the CFIA to make decisions on whether a “regulated animal” can be
imported to Canada. The Defendant submits that this legislation generally
prohibits the importation of animals unless certain conditions are met.
[17]
The Defendant asserts that even if the
Plaintiffs’ claim that the CFIA acted without lawful authority was construed as
an allegation that the CFIA failed to act in accordance with the authorizing
act and regulations, this would amount to a claim of breach of statutory duty
and such a claim is not a cause of action recognized in law (see Holland v
Saskatchewan, 2008 SCC 42 at paras 7-9 and 11 [Holland]). He also
states that the civil consequences of breach of statute are subsumed under the
law of negligence (R v Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, [1983] 1 S.C.R. 205 at para
37 [Saskatchewan Wheat Pool]) and this aspect of the Plaintiffs’ claim
is addressed in the context of the duty of care analysis.
ii. Claim
in negligence
[18]
The Defendant submits that the HAA and HAR
do not impose on the CFIA a prima facie duty of care to protect the
Plaintiffs from economic loss when performing its statutory duties and exercising
its statutory powers related to the importation of animals into Canada. The Defendant claims that the public purpose of the legislative scheme to protect
animal health is inconsistent with a private law duty to protect the private
economic and commercial interests of any individual. Moreover, the Defendant
argues that the conduct alleged in the claim does not rise to the level or type
of interaction for which courts have found the existence of a close and direct
relationship between the regulator and the claimant. Finally, the Defendant
submits that these are core government policy decisions and the prospect of
indeterminate liability would negate even a prima facie duty of care, if
such a duty exists.
[19]
The Defendant outlines the analysis for
determining government liability in negligence as follows. The starting point
is to determine whether there are analogous categories of cases in which such a
duty has been identified (see Childs v Desormeaux, 2006 SCC 18 at para
15 [Childs]). If the facts amount to a claim within a category that has
previously been identified by the jurisprudence, a duty of care is established
and it is unnecessary to continue the analysis. If no analogous cases exist,
the question is whether a new duty of care should be recognized in the
circumstances based on a two stage test to establish liability in tort, as set
out in Anns v Merton London Borough Council, [1978] AC 728 [Anns].
The test
[20]
The first stage is to ask whether the facts
disclose a sufficiently close and direct relationship between the parties, such
that it is just and reasonable to obligate one party to take reasonable care to
prevent foreseeable loss or harm to the other party. These foreseeable losses
must be grounded in a sufficiently close, direct or proximate relationship (see
R v Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., 2011 SCC 42 at para 41 [Imperial
Tobacco] and Cooper v Hobart, 2001 SCC 79 at para 32 [Cooper]).
In Imperial Tobacco, it was clarified that proximity may be established
either through a statutory intent or through a series of specific interactions
between the regulator and the claimant, or where it is based both on
interactions between the parties and the government’s statutory duties. The
Court stated, in paragraphs 44-46, that:
“44. The
argument in the first kind of case is that the statute itself creates a private
relationship of proximity giving rise to a prima facie duty of care. It
may be difficult to find that a statute creates sufficient proximity to give
rise to a duty of care. Some statutes may impose duties on state actors with
respect to particular claimants. However, more often, statutes are aimed at
public goods, like regulating an industry (Cooper), or removing children
from harmful environments (Syl Apps). In such cases, it may be difficult
to infer that the legislature intended to create private law tort duties to
claimants. This may be even more difficult if the recognition of a private law
duty would conflict with the public authority's duty to the public: see, e.g., Cooper
and Syl Apps. As stated in Syl Apps, "[w]here an alleged
duty of care is found to conflict with an overarching statutory or public duty,
this may constitute a compelling policy reason for refusing to find
proximity" (at para. 28; see also Fullowka v. Pinkerton's of Canada
Ltd., 2010 SCC 5, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 132, at para. 39).
45. The second situation is where the proximity essential to the
private duty of care is alleged to arise from a series of specific interactions
between the government and the claimant. The argument in these cases is that
the government has, through its conduct, entered into a special relationship
with the plaintiff sufficient to establish the necessary proximity for a duty
of care. In these cases, the governing statutes are still relevant to the
analysis. For instance, if a finding of proximity would conflict with the
state's general public duty established by the statute, the court may hold that
no proximity arises: Syl Apps; see also Heaslip Estate v. Mansfield
Ski Club Inc., 2009 ONCA 594, 96 O.R. (3d) 401. However, the factor that
gives rise to a duty of care in these types of cases is the specific
interactions between the government actor and the claimant
46. Finally, it is possible to envision a claim where proximity is
based both on interactions between the parties and the government’s statutory
duties”.
If such proximity
is found there is a prima facie duty of care.
[21]
When a prima facie duty of care is found,
the second stage is to verify whether there are any countervailing policy
considerations that would negate that duty (see Childs, cited above at
para 13 and Imperial Tobacco, cited above at para 39).
Analogous cases
[22]
The Defendant submits that no analogous cases
have previously recognized that the government owes a private law duty of care
to be mindful of an individual’s private economic interests when making a core
policy decision to prohibit the importation of animals into Canada under the HAA and HAR. Neither have there been analogous cases recognizing that
the CFIA owes such a duty when deciding whether or not to grant permits for the
importation of animals under this legislation.
[23]
Instead, the Defendant relies on the Berg v Saskatchewan, 2003 SKQB 456 [Berg] decision, which determined that there was no
proximity, in circumstances that he claims are similar to the present matter.
In this decision, import permits for elks were refused based on concerns that
they would result in the introduction of disease in Saskatchewan pursuant to the
Wildlife Act, 1997, SS 1997, c W-13.11 (now repealed) [the Wildlife
Act 1997]. The Plaintiffs, in that case, alleged that the ban was negligent
because made without verifying the factual circumstances and the absence of
reasonable grounds for believing that the animals were or could be infected
with disease. The Court concluded that the economic interests of a small group
of people who may have been impacted by the operation of the Wildlife Act 1997
must be subordinated to the greater purpose of that act which benefits the
public as a whole. It also stated that the statute was not concerned with the
economic impact of the permit system (see Berg cited above at para 76).
The Defendant submits that this case is persuasive given the similarity of the
allegations and the legislative schemes.
[24]
The Defendant also relies on the River Valley
Poultry Farm Ltd v Canada (Attorney General), 2009 ONCA 326 [River
Valley] case, in which the Ontario Court of Appeal reviewed the purpose and
intent of the HAA and found that it did not create a private law duty of
care to protect the plaintiff producer’s economic interests (see River
Valley at paras 66-83).
[25]
The Defendant distinguishes the Adams v
Borrel, 2008 NBCA 62 [Adams] and Sauer v Canada (Attorney
General), 2007 ONCA 454 [Sauer] cases, cited by the Plaintiffs which
found either that the government owed a private law duty of care or that it was
not plain and obvious that there was no duty of care, based on the legislative
schemes at issue. The Defendant argues that the legislative schemes, the
impugned actions and the relationship between the regulator and the claimants
are not analogous to those alleged in the case at bar. In Adams, the
Court determined that the scheme was intended to protect a limited class of
producers, rather than to protect the public at large (see Adams at para
44). In Sauer, the impugned action was the failure to have taken
appropriate measures to prevent the transmission of an outbreak of disease in
the plaintiffs’ cattle through contaminated feed.
[26]
Because no courts have recognized a duty of care
in a case analogous to this claim, the Defendant submits that it is necessary
to consider the two part test established in Anns, cited above.
Application of
the Anns test to the facts at issue
a)
Step one: proximity
1) Statutory
intent
[27]
The Defendant claims that there are no
allegations that fall outside the regulator’s role and therefore if proximity
exists it must arise from the governing statutes (Imperial Tobacco,
cited above at para 49 and Cooper, cited above, at para 43).
[28]
The Defendant argues that the HAA and HAR
impose on the CFIA only duties to the public as a whole when carrying out or
exercising its regulatory functions and authority. Concluding that Parliament
intended there be a duty to safeguard the economic interests of individuals who
wish to use imported animals in their commercial ventures would run counter to
Parliament’s intention to entrust the CFIA with broad regulatory authority to
protect animal health for the public good.
[29]
The Defendant submits that the material time in
the claim is from 2007 to the date the claim was filed and therefore only the
construction and interpretation of the HAA and HAR after 2007
need be addressed.
[30]
The construction of the statutory scheme is
central to the question of whether or not there is sufficient proximity between
the parties. The Defendant refers to the Nielson v Kamloops (City),
[1984] 2 S.C.R. 2 case in which it was stated that economic losses are recoverable
only if, as a matter of statutory interpretation, it is the type of loss the
statute intended to guard against (see pages 27 and 28 of the decision).
[31]
The Defendant alleges that the HAA
imposes obligations and prohibitions on persons in situations where animals are
known or suspected of being infected with disease and grants authority to the
regulator to take measures to remedy or mitigate concerns with public safety,
life, health, property or the environment (see HAA, cited above, sections
22-28). The Defendant claims that the general provisions of the HAA and HAR
are directed to the mandate of protecting animal health. As to the specific
provisions regulating the importation of honeybee packages found in the HAA,
HAR and Import Reference Document, the Defendant submits that
they do not disclose a legislative intent to create a private law duty of care.
[32]
For example, section 14 of the HAA provides
that the Minister may make regulations prohibiting the importation of any
animal into Canada for the purpose of preventing a disease from being
introduced into or spread within the Country. Section 12 of the HAR
enacts a general prohibition on the importation of regulated animals unless
certain conditions are met, such as obtaining a permit. These provisions state:
Section 14 of the HAA:
“14. The
Minister may make regulations prohibiting the importation of any animal or
other thing into Canada, any part of Canada or any Canadian port, either
generally or from any place named in the regulations, for such period as the
Minister considers necessary for the purpose of preventing a disease or toxic
substance from being introduced into or spread within Canada”.
Section 12 of the HAR:
“12. (1)
Subject to section 51, no person shall import a regulated animal except
(a) in accordance
with a permit issued by the Minister under section 160; or
(b) in accordance
with subsections (2) to (6) and all applicable provisions of the import
reference document”.
Subsection
160(1.1) of the HAR, during the applicable period, provides for
an exception to prohibitions on imports and reads as follows:
“160. (1.1)
The Minister may, subject to paragraph 37(1)(b) of the Canadian
Environmental Assessment Act, issue a permit or licence required under
these Regulations if the Minister is satisfied that, to the best of the
Minister’s knowledge and belief, the activity for which the permit or licence
is issued would not, or would not be likely to, result in the introduction into
Canada, the introduction into another country from Canada or the spread within
Canada, of a vector, disease or toxic substance”.
[33]
The Defendant submits that if the Minister or
the CFIA are not satisfied to the best of their knowledge and belief, they are
not authorized to issue a permit to import animals into Canada since Parliament gave broad discretion to the Minister in order to give effect to a public
duty to protect animal health in Canada. Public duties of this nature are not
aimed at protecting private interests of specific individuals and do not give
rise to a private law duty of care (see Wellington v Ontario, 2011 ONCA 274 at para 44). The Defendant rejects the Plaintiffs’ argument that
the HAR require the decision to issue or not to issue a permit be based
on formal risk assessments conducted by the CFIA. The Defendant submits that
the HAA and HAR do not contain provisions requiring risk
assessments on the importation of regulated animals nor do they restrict or
prescribe the kind of information upon which the Minister’s or the CFIA’s
“knowledge and belief” is to be based. The Defendant also notes that subsection
160(1.1) of the HAR does not direct the Minister or the CFIA to consider
the private or commercial or economic interests of individual industry
participants when exercising this discretion, nor do the HAA or HAR
in general.
[34]
According to the Defendant, the HAA
contemplates that individual industry participants may suffer economic loss as
a result of the enforcement of or the duty to comply with the statutes and
provides for statutory compensation in certain cases. The Defendant argues that
it is clear, from this compensation scheme, that there is no legislative intent
to create a private law duty of care.
[35]
The Defendant also relies on section 50 of the HAA
which provides for immunity and limits the Crown’s liability for loss or
damage suffered by persons as a result of complying with their obligations
under the HAA and HAR. This statutory immunity was referred to in
River Valley, cited above, and the Court concluded that when read
together with the legislative purpose of the HAA, it showed an absence
of proximity (see para 83). In that decision, the Court also distinguished the Adams case, cited above, which had found a prima facie duty of care to potato
producers. The Court concluded that contrary to the Plant Protection Act,
SC 1990, c 22, the HAA showed no legislative purpose to protect the
interests of individual farmers (see para 81).
[36]
Referring to allegations of law in paragraph 25
of the Plaintiffs’ statement of claim, as to what the stated purpose of the
restrictions on importations of bees has been, the Defendant submits that the
Court is not obliged to assume that these allegations are true in a motion to
strike. He also notes that there is no indication in the legislative scheme of
an intention to protect the economic interests of the industry. Even if it were
accepted that the purpose of the legislative scheme is to protect the economic
interests of the Canadian beekeeping industry, the Defendant argues that the
policy choice as to how to protect these interests is via the power to not
allow possibly diseased animals to be imported rather than to allow possibly
diseased animals to be imported into the Country. And even if this proposition
was broadly construed as serving the economic interests of the Canadian
beekeeping industry, this does not disclose a legislative intent to protect the
private economic interests of individual industry participants like the
Plaintiffs (see River Valley, cited above, at paras 66-73 and Berg,
cited above, at paras 76-77).
[37]
The Defendant, in his reply, further refutes the
Plaintiffs’ submission that the legislative scheme is primarily concerned with
the industry’s economic interests. Noting that not all insects are regulated
under the HAA, the Defendant underlines that honeybees are,
because they generate a product for human consumption, but equally because of
their potential impact on human health and the whole of the agricultural
sector. The regulator must balance diverging interest in performing its functions
and the primary interest is the public concern for the health of animals and
the prevention of animal diseases in Canada.
[38]
As to the Plaintiffs’ reliance on the regulatory
impact analysis statements [RIASs], which the Defendant qualifies as exclusive
reliance, the Defendant submits that these RIASs are associated with specific
regulations which were no longer in force during the material time of the
Plaintiffs’ complaint. The relevant period being January 1, 2007 to December
28, 2012, the Defendant argues that the RIASs are irrelevant as they were not
applicable during the period. Moreover, although courts have received RIASs in
the context of statutory construction, the Defendant emphasizes that the
delegated legislation has to be interpreted in a manner consistent with the
overall purpose and intent of the governing statute, in this case the HAA
(see Bristol-Myers Squibb Co v Canada (Attorney General), 2005 SCC 26 at
para 38 [Bristol-Myers]).
[39]
The Defendant underlines that the RIASs relied
on by the Plaintiffs do not support their argument that the purpose of the HAA
and HAR is the protection of the economic interests of the industry. The
Defendant claims that they disclose a public interest which goes well beyond
the beekeeping industry and refers to the RIASs of December 12, 1991 in which
it is stated that the regulations control the importation of animals into Canada to prevent the introduction of diseases.
2) Interactions between the parties
[40]
Referring to the Imperial Tobacco case,
cited above, the Defendant submits it is the basis for the principle that
governing statutes are relevant to the analysis of the interaction between the
parties (see para 45). The Defendant argues that no specific interactions
between the CFIA and the Plaintiffs were alleged in the claim and furthermore,
no allegation was made that any of the Plaintiffs even applied for a permit to
import bee packages from the US. The only interactions enumerated in the Claim
were with the “industry”, such as consultations and annual reviews of the
health of Canadian bees. Defendant concludes that such interactions do not
create a close and direct relationship with the Plaintiffs and points to the Imperial
Tobacco case that establishes that the test of proximity requires
specific interactions that show that the regulator “[…] through its conduct,
entered into a special relationship with the plaintiff sufficient to establish
the necessary proximity for a duty of care” (see para 45).
[41]
The Defendant also relies on the Taylor v Canada (Attorney General), 2012 ONCA 479 case, at paragraphs 94-95
and 97, which found that the prevailing jurisprudence applies a detailed
analysis of proximity instead of a single conclusory observation such as in the
Sauer case, cited above. In the Sauer case, the numerous “public
representations” declaring the intention to protect cattle farmers was
sufficient to conclude that it was not plain and obvious that the claim of a prima
facie duty of care would not succeed. However, subsequent cases such as Imperial
Tobacco and Attis v Canada (Ministry of Health), 2008 ONCA 660 [Attis]
addressed the requirement in detail. In Attis, the Ontario Court of
Appeal distinguished actions of government regulators in the interest of the
public good and other instances where it directly interacted with specific,
identifiable individuals (see para 65). When regulatory control over a product
was enforced through a policy for the benefit of the public, it was concluded
that there was no close and direct relationship with individual participants
even though that policy might have impacts on some individuals.
[42]
In sum, it is the Defendant’s position that the
Claim is insufficient to establish a close and direct relationship between the
CFIA and the individual commercial beekeepers.
b)
Step two: policy considerations
[43]
The Defendant submits that if a prima facie
duty of care is found, such a duty is negated for broader policy reasons. The
Defendant alleges that two countervailing policy reasons negate any such duty:
1) the risk of indeterminate liability; and 2) the immunity of government’s
core policy decisions.
1) Indeterminate
liability
[44]
Finding that the CFIA owes a duty of care to
protect the Plaintiffs’ private economic interests would expose it to
indeterminate liability to an indeterminate class of people (Cooper, cited
above, at para 37 and Bow Valley Husky (Bermuda) Ltd v Saint John
Shipbuilding Ltd, [1997], 3 SCR 1210 at para 62 [Bow Valley Husky]).
The Defendant submits that there must be a principled basis to apply the duty
of care to some and not to others and no such principled basis exists in this
case. The Defendant notes that if such a duty of care was recognized, the CFIA
could also be found to owe a similar duty of care to others, involved in other
industries. In the Attis case, cited above, it was determined that the
spectre of indeterminate liability negated the imposition of government
liability. Since the HAA and HAR do not solely affect the
Canadian beekeeping industry and the regime is not confined to regulating the
importation of one kind of animal, the Defendant has no control over the number
or kind of individuals or industries that have an interest in importing a
variety of animals into Canada for commercial or other purposes, and therefore
has no control over the nature and extent of the losses that could be claimed.
[45]
In his reply, the Defendant submits that the
Plaintiffs, in their proposed amended claim, state that there are other
factions in the industry that have divergent interests in the importation ban
which is different from their interest (see paragraph 26 d.1 of the Proposed
Amended Claim). The Defendant submits that by doing so, the Plaintiffs are
actually supporting his argument that the recognition of a private law duty of
care to protect the private economic interests of every participant in the
industry would create an untenable conflict of duties and would come at the
expense of animal health. The Defendant refers to Bow Valley Husky, paragraph
64, in which the Supreme Court stated:
“There must be something
which, for policy reasons, permits the court to say this category of person can
recover and that category cannot, something which justified the line being
drawn at one point rather than another”.
[46]
The Defendant argues that no such principled
basis is disclosed in the Plaintiffs’ proposed amended claim or otherwise.
[47]
The Defendant refutes the Plaintiffs’ submission
that the Minister does not have any discretion to refuse import permits if he
is satisfied that the conditions in subsection 160(1.1) of the HAR, as
amended in 2012, have been met. The Defendant argues that these allegations
amount to a claim of breach of statutory duty. He also submits that these
allegations would need to be pursued through judicial review and refers to Holland and Saskatchewan Wheat Pool cited above.
2) Immunity
[48]
According to the Defendant, the Plaintiffs’ claim
challenges pure policy decisions which are immune from claims based on
liability. Decisions of a political, social or economic nature do not give rise
to a private law duty of care (see A.O Farms Inc v Canada, [2000] FCJ No 1771 [A.O Farms]). The Defendant refers to the Berg case,
cited above, where the Court concluded that the complete ban imposed constituted
a policy decision not giving rise to a duty of care (see para 78). Since the
decision was general and not directed at a particular person and based on a
broad consideration of public policy rather than facts pertaining to the
individual, it was considered to have a legislative function (see Berg,
cited above, at para 76).
[49]
In his reply, the Defendant refutes the
Plaintiffs’ allegation that the Crown’s regulatory decisions were not made in
good faith. The Defendant notes that such allegations amount to a claim of
misfeasance in public office or abuse of public office and the public officer
allegedly responsible needs to be identified. The Defendant submits that the
failure to identify the officer is fatal to the claim and relies on St. John’s Port Authority v Adventure Tours Inc, 2011 FCA 198 and Collins
cited by the Plaintiffs at paragraph 33.
[50]
The Defendant responds to the Plaintiffs’ claim
that the regulator refused to update its honeybee pest information without the
approval of the Canadian Honey Council [CHC]. The Plaintiffs allege that the
CHC is dominated by certain commercial beekeeping factions at their exclusion
(see paragraphs 26 c.(vi), 26 d.1 and 26 d.2 of the Proposed Amended Claim).
The Defendant relies on A.O Farms, cited above, in which this Court
stated that the government owes a duty to the public, but it is to the public
collectively. Therefore, the remedy for someone who thinks that the duty has
not been fulfilled is not before the courts but rather at the polls (see A.O
Farms at para 11).
B.
The Plaintiffs’ position
[51]
The Plaintiffs rely on sections 3 and 23 of the Crown
Liability and Proceedings Act, cited above, as the basis for their claim in
negligence. They submit that the Defendant owed them a duty of care with
respect to restrictions he imposed on the importation of honeybees from the US which he breached on or after January 1, 2007 and continues to do so since then. They
argue that the Defendant refuses to consider or make any decisions concerning
applications for US packaged honeybee imports, imposing a de facto
honeybee package prohibition. They also allege that Defendant knew or ought to
have known that his negligence and the improper continuation of the prohibition
would cause losses and damages to the Plaintiffs who relied on package imports
to sustain and grow their beekeeping operations and business (see the
Plaintiffs’ Statement of Claim of December 28, 2012, para 29).
[52]
The Plaintiffs argue that if the Court decides
to strike a pleading, it must determine whether said pleading may be cured by
granting leave to the responding party to amend the pleadings (see Simon,
cited above, at para 14). Leave to amend must be given unless the defect
cannot be cured by amendment (see Collins, cited above, at para 26).
i. Claim
for acting without lawful authority
[53]
In their amended statement of claim, the
Plaintiffs removed their allegations that the Defendant acted without lawful
authority.
ii. Claim
in negligence
Analogous cases
[54]
The Plaintiffs submit that there are analogous
categories of cases in which a duty of care has been identified. They rely on
the Adams case, cited above, at paragraphs 43 to 44 in which the New
Brunswick Court of Appeal concluded that the Federal Crown owed a prima
facie duty of care to New Brunswick potato farmers based on the Plant
Protection Act. They claim that the RIASs express an equivalent legislative
intent; therefore it should suffice to establish a duty of care.
[55]
The Plaintiffs refer to the Sauer case,
cited above, in which public representations were made by the Crown with
regards to protecting the economic interests of Ontario cattle farmers thereby
establishing a prima facie duty of care. They submit that in the present
case, the representations made by the Crown and its conduct provides a stronger
basis for concluding that the Crown owed them such a duty. They also refute the
Defendant’s argument claiming that the Court of Appeal in Taylor, cited
above, appears to have retreated from Sauer. They argue that the Court
did not overrule Sauer, but rather clarified that it does not accept the
proposition that the Crown’s duty of care can be based “entirely on a
regulator’s public acknowledgment of its public duties to those affected by its
actions”. However, the Court found that they can form part of the “factual
matrix” (see Taylor at paras 94 to 97).
[56]
The Plaintiffs also respond to the Defendant’s
allegation that their relationship with the Crown was more akin to that between
the parties in Berg, River Valley and Los
Angeles Salad Company. They argue that all three cases are negligent
inspection cases which involve substantially different considerations. The
Court, in these cases, found that the regulator had an overarching duty which
conflicted with a duty to protect the economic interests of the producers being
inspected (see Berg at para 76; River Valley at para 67; Los
Angeles Salad Company at para 55). The Plaintiffs argue that in the
present instance, the stated purpose of the statutory scheme and the
interactions between the parties demonstrate that the Defendant’s duty in
regulating honeybee imports was the protection of commercial beekeepers’
interests. This duty was, at times, superseded by the interest of the
commercial beekeeping industry as a whole, but that “any interest of the public
in factors relating to the bees are secondary in nature” (see Plaintiffs’
motion record at page 22).
[57]
The Plaintiffs also submit that there is no
statutory immunity provision that protects the Defendant from refusing or
failing to implement his own statutory scheme, or acting for improper purposes
outside of the statutory scheme. They conclude that even if the Court found
that the HAA and HAR impose a general duty to act in the public
interest; this would not conflict with the duty to regulate honeybee imports in
the interests of commercial beekeepers and the industry.
[58]
The Plaintiffs submit that there are cases in
which a duty of care was found on the basis of similar relationships but also
acknowledge that the case law is diverse and therefore it may not fall in a
settled category (see the Plaintiffs’ motion record at para 30). Consequently,
they proceed to the two-step Anns test in order to demonstrate that a prima
facie duty of care can be established and that there are no valid policy
reasons to negate this duty.
Application of
the Anns test to the facts at issue
a)
Step one: proximity
1) Statutory
intent
[59]
The Plaintiffs submit that an RIAS was published
concurrently with an amendment of the HAR and it is apparent from these
documents that the purpose of the HAA and HAR is the protection
of the economic interests of commercial beekeepers and the industry (see Health
of Animals Regulations, amendment & RIAS, Canada Gazette Part II,
Vol. 126, No.1 at 71, Plaintiffs’ Authorities, tab 1). The Plaintiffs argue
that RIASs are indicators of legislative intent and rely on Bayer Inc v
Canada (Attorney General) (1999), 166 FTR 160 at paragraph 7 [Bayer]
for that proposition.
[60]
Plaintiffs equally refer to other RIASs, among
which the RIAS that accompanied the 1986 regulatory prohibition on US honeybee imports in which it was stated that “[…] the survival of the whole industry is
at stake […]”. They claim that there is no mention of the general public (see Bee
Prohibition Order, 1986 amendment at 314-315, Plaintiffs’ Authorities, tab
3). According to the Plaintiffs, the RIASs repeatedly recognize that the
purpose of the HAA and HAR is to prevent the introduction of
diseases which could have significant effects, including economic ones, on the
agricultural industry (see Plaintiffs’ Authorities, tabs 8 to 12).
[61]
Based on their reference to the RIAS, they
submit that the purpose of the statutory scheme, with respect to honeybee
imports, was to protect the survival and economic well-being of the commercial
beekeeping industry.
[62]
The Plaintiffs refer to regulations enacted by
the Defendant and claim that it was stated therein that the US bee importation situation would be assessed on an annual basis. This regular assessment was to
ensure that the continuing ban was appropriate.
[63]
The Plaintiffs submit that the legislative
scheme establishes a relationship of proximity between the parties.
2) Interactions between the parties
[64]
The Plaintiffs claim that it is apparent, from
their pleadings and the RIASs, that the Defendant cooperated and consulted with
commercial beekeepers, on an ongoing basis, to justify his import policy before
December 31, 2006. The Plaintiffs allege that the close and direct relationship
with the industry continued beyond that date. They also submit that the
Defendant delegated his authority to certain factions of commercial beekeepers,
allegedly allowing them to dictate the operation of the US importation scheme. Plaintiffs conclude that this relationship with a faction of the industry
points to a “close and direct” relationship of proximity and establishes a prima
facie duty of care. They argue that it is an element of both the duty and
the breach that they allege (see Plaintiffs’ motion record, page 18, para 50).
b)
Step two: policy considerations
[65]
The Plaintiffs note that the primary concern, at
this stage, is whether the duty of care sought to be imposed would result in
the government being liable for a policy decision from which it is generally
immune (Cooper, cited above at paras 37 and 38). However, the decision
must be “neither irrational nor taken in bad faith” (Imperial Tobacco,
cited above, at para 76 and Roncarelli v Duplessis, [1959] S.C.R. 121 at
140).
[66]
They also rely on Brown v British Columbia,
[1994] 1 S.C.R. 420 [Brown] which clarified the distinction between mere
operational decisions and true policy decisions. True policy decisions “[…]
will usually be dictated by financial, economic, social and political factors
or constraints” (see Brown at page 441). Whereas operational decisions
primarily cover “the performance or carrying out of a policy” (see Brown
at page 441). They also rely on this case because it was determined that
inaction, for an improper reason or for no reason at all, cannot be a policy
decision taken in good faith. The Supreme Court stated, at page 436, that:
“Where the question whether the requisite action should be taken has
not even been considered by the public authority, or at least has not been
considered in good faith, it seems clear that for that very reason the
authority has not acted with reasonable care”.
[67]
The Plaintiffs argue that in the present case,
the applicable statutory scheme after December 31, 2006 was not concerned with
the making of policy but rather with the actual implementation of a policy.
They claim that by enacting orders and regulations that resulted in the bee package
prohibition, it is arguable that the Minister engaged in policy decision-making.
The Minister had to balance economic, social and political considerations of
beekeeper groups in relation to the commercial beekeeping industry as a whole.
However, after the prohibition lapsed, the applications for import permits from
individual commercial beekeepers were considered on a case by case basis
pursuant to sections 12 and 160 of the HAR.
[68]
The Plaintiffs submit that because the decisions
were made on a case by case basis they could not be characterized as “core
policy decisions” that are immune from action. They also argue that the
statutory conditions set out in subsection 160(1.1) of the HAR do not
contemplate any balancing of economic social and political considerations because
the Minister was authorized (and later required) to grant import permits if
satisfied that the conditions set out in that section were met.
[69]
The Plaintiffs respond to the Defendant’s claim
that they were policy decisions because they involved the use of discretion, as
demonstrated by the presence of the word “may” in subsection 160(1.1) until the
regulatory amendment in December 2012. They rely on Imperial Tobacco in
which the Supreme Court ruled that discretionary decision-making does not in
itself qualify the decision as core policy (see Imperial Tobacco at
paras 84 and 88).
[70]
The Plaintiffs also argue that should the
Defendant’s actions after December 31, 2006 be characterized as policy-making, then
that exercise was improper because the Defendant abdicated his discretion to
the industry who dictated the availability of US packaged honeybees for its own
purposes, which were outside of the statutory scheme. They claim that a faction
of the commercial beekeeping industry was given the power to determine when to
approve the lifting of the prohibition by updating their risk assessments and
that said faction refused to provide approvals for reasons of its own (see the
Plaintiffs’ motion record at page 8, para 15).
[71]
The Plaintiffs refer to the Sauer case,
cited above and to Fullowka v Pinkerton's of Canada Ltd, 2010 SCC 5 [Pinkerton’s]
and argue that the Court held that a prima facie duty of care is not
negated by a regulator’s general duty to regulate in the public interest, by
speculative or potential conflict, nor by the fact that there must be weighing
and balancing of competing interests (see Pinkerton’s at paras 72 to
73).
[72]
They argue that they do not challenge the
Defendant’s authority to make decisions under subsection 160(1.1) of the HAR
on the basis of risk of animal disease, rather they challenge the Defendant’s
failure or refusal to make such decisions (see Plaintiffs’ motion record at
para 91).
[73]
The Plaintiffs also submit that the duty of care
sought to be imposed to individual commercial beekeepers would not conflict
with the Defendant’s duty to the industry as a whole to prevent animal disease.
In fact, it would not conflict with any other overarching duty because the
Defendant’s primary duty is to regulate in the interests of both commercial
beekeepers and the industry and any duty to the public is secondary and would
not involve competing considerations.
1) Indeterminate
liability
[74]
The Plaintiffs submit that no indeterminate
liability arises from finding that the Defendant owed a duty of care, because
the parties would be limited to commercial beekeepers only. The risk of a duty
to the public at large does not arise. They claim that their situation is akin
to that of the potato farmers in Adams, which was a limited class of
potential plaintiffs and not the public at large (see Adams at para
45).
[75]
They also refer to Pinkerton’s in which
the Supreme Court explained that the principle of indeterminate liability is
closely related to the question of proximity. The question is whether the alleged
relationship giving rise to a duty involves special factors such that the duty
of care would not result in indeterminate liability (see Pinkerton’s at
para 70). The Plaintiffs allege that in the present case special factors such
as the case-by-case nature of the import scheme, the Defendant’s
representations of his regulation in the economic interests of the beekeepers
and his ongoing interactions with them limits the liability of the Defendant.
In fact, it would be limited to those to whom the Defendant made such
representations and with whom he had interactions, in this case, commercial
beekeepers.
[76]
The Plaintiffs refute the Defendant’s argument
suggesting that indeterminate liability arises in a claim for pure economic
loss. They rely on Pinkerton’s to argue that a claim for economic loss
does not automatically give rise to a risk of indeterminate liability (see Pinkerton’s
at para 70). They submit that the Defendant knew the class with whom he was
dealing and the specific nature of the losses suffered by the people subject to
their negligent action or inaction.
[77]
The Plaintiffs conclude by stating that the onus
is on the Defendant to establish that it is plain and obvious that the prima
facie duty of care is negated by a policy consideration and if he fails to
do so the Court should not look further (see Sauer, cited above, at para
63).
2) Immunity
[78]
The Plaintiffs’ arguments related to the issue
of immunity were stated in paragraphs 66 to 74 of this order. They claim that
no such statutory provisions exist and that the decisions were not policy
decisions, nor taken in good faith.
V. Analysis
The Test on a
motion to strike
[79]
The parties agree that on a motion to strike,
the Court must assume that the facts pleaded are true and the plaintiff will be
able to prove its allegations, unless they are manifestly incapable of being
proven (see Imperial Tobacco, cited above, at paras 17 and 22-24)
[80]
A claim will be struck only if it is plain
and obvious that the pleading discloses no reasonable cause of action. “Where
a reasonable prospect of success exists, the matter should be allowed to
proceed to trial” (see Imperial Tobacco, cited above, at para 17). This
Court should therefore grant the motion only if it is satisfied beyond a doubt
that the statement of claim “[…] is certain to fail because it contains a ‘radical
defect’” (see Odhavji Estate v Woodhouse, 2003 SCC 69 at para 15).
Finally, it is also important to underline that the Court does not need to
consider what future evidence might or might not demonstrate (see Imperial
Tobacco at para 23).
[81]
The Court will grant the Defendant’s motion for
the following reasons.
The amended
statement of claim
[82]
The Court must firstly deal with the Plaintiffs’
amended statement of claim filed with their motion record in response to the
motion to strike. Rule 75 of the FCR is clear; the Plaintiffs should
have proceeded with a motion seeking the Court’s permission to amend as the
Defendant had already filed his statement of defence on February 8, 2013. The
case being specially managed, it was incumbent on the Plaintiffs to advise the
Court of their intention to amend their pleadings. During the case management
conference held on October 1, 2013, which led to the Court setting a timetable
for the filing of the Defendant’s motion based on both parties’
representations, the Plaintiffs never mentioned their intention to amend their
statement of claim.
Since the case was being specially managed, upon being served with
the Defendant’s motion to strike, the Plaintiffs could still have asked the
Court to amend the time table in order to comply with the court rules and file
a motion to amend.
[83]
In Canderel Ltd v Canada, [1994] 1 FC 3,
the Court of Appeal decided that an amendment, when leave is sought, should be
allowed at any stage of an action, for determining the real questions in
controversy. However, the amendments should not result in an injustice to the
other party which will not be adequately compensated by an award of costs. As
the Court reviewed the amended statement of claim, it is clear that all the
amendments purport to facts that were well known to the Plaintiffs prior to
October 1, 2013. The Court, having reviewed the proposed amendments, is not
convinced that they cure the fundamental deficiency in the claim and establish
proximity even if they were allowed. Furthermore, the Plaintiffs should have
been forthright as stated in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v Apotex Inc, 2011
FCA 34, at paragraph 28. Consequently, the Court strikes paragraphs 5, 14, 15,
16, 23, 24, 25, 49, 50 and 72 to 86 of the Plaintiffs’ response submissions.
[84]
Although the Court considers that the amendments
must be struck out, it will nonetheless consider the arguments therein to
ensure that notwithstanding their rejection, the Plaintiffs’ claim would still
be dismissed.
A. Is it
plain and obvious that the Plaintiffs’ claim for acting without lawful
authority is bound to fail?
[85]
The Plaintiffs contend that the Defendant acted
without lawful authority and breached his duty of care owed to commercial
beekeepers between January 1, 2007 and December 28, 2012 by refusing or failing
to make any good faith decisions on applications to import packaged honeybees
from the United States. The Court must look to the authority under which the
Defendant acted to determine, firstly, whether there is an enabling statute and,
secondly, the extent of the duty, if any, owed to the Plaintiffs.
[86]
The relevant statutory authorities are section
14 of the HAA, subsection 4(1) of the CFIAA and sections 12 and subsection
160(1.1) of the HAR. It is clear from these sections that the CFIA had
express authority to make decisions related to the importation of regulated
animals in Canada including packaged honeybees. The facts pleaded by the
Plaintiffs in support of their claim, even if proven, cannot lead to a
successful claim because it is settled law that a breach of statutory duty does
not constitute negligence (see Holland, cited above at paras 7-9 and
11). Potential tort liability for the Federal Crown pursuant to section 3 of
the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, cited above, is dependent upon
a tort committed by a servant of the Crown. However, the Plaintiffs’ claim is
framed as one of direct liability against the Crown; therefore it does not
disclose a reasonable cause of action.
[87]
Furthermore, the Court notes that the
Plaintiffs, in their amended statement of claim, removed their allegations that
the Defendant acted without lawful authority.
B. Is it plain and obvious that Plaintiffs’
claim in negligence is bound to fail?
[88]
In their statement of claim, at paragraphs 24 to
28, the Plaintiffs allege:
“24. The Plaintiff relies upon the Crown Liability and
Proceedings Act, RSC 1985, c C-50, especially ss.3 and 23.
25. The stated purpose of restrictions
on the importation of bees from the United States, whether by regulation or
exercise of Ministerial discretion, is and has been to promote the health and
interests of the Canadian bee industry and Canadian beekeepers by protecting
them from risks associated with the importation of bees from the United States. Similarly, the stated purpose of the exception from the Prohibition for
queens contained in HIPR-2004 was to assist the Canadian bee industry
and Canadian beekeepers by providing access to an enhanced supply of queens to
allow them to replenish bee stocks after winter losses. Consistent with this
stated purpose the Crown engaged in consultation with the industry respecting
its proposed restrictions.
26. The Defendants owed a duty of care
to the Plaintiffs and the Class with respect to restrictions on the importation
of honeybees from the United States, which duty of care arose from, inter
alia:
a. The implied and express purpose of the HAA and the
Regulations including the HAR and HIPR-2004 to regulate bee
imports for the good and the economic interests of Canadian beekeepers and the
Canadian beekeeping industry;
b. The Crown’s repeated representations to the Canadian beekeeping
industry that it regulated bee imports for the purpose of protecting the
beekeeping industry and in particular the economic viability of the beekeeping
industry;
c. The Crown’s actions regarding the importation of live bees from
the US, including the Prohibition and the partial relaxation of the Prohibition
by HIPR-2004, which were mainly aimed at fostering and protecting the viability
of the beekeeping industry;
d. The Crown’s knowledge of the economic hardship suffered by
certain beekeepers and beekeeping regions as a result of the continuation of
the Prohibition;
e. The Crown’s actions to alleviate the economic hardship suffered
by certain beekeepers and beekeeping regions by measures such as partially
relaxing the prohibition on the importation of queens from the US in 2004;
f. The Crown’s extensive consultation with the beekeeping industry
and beekeepers on US bee import policy;
g. Other factors that may prove relevant.
27. The Crown owed a duty of care to
each of the Plaintiffs and the Class with respect to restrictions on the
importation of honeybees from the United States including to:
a. Take reasonable steps to avoid causing foreseeable economic
hardship and other harms to the Plaintiffs and the Class without legal
justification;
b. Not to continue the Prohibition after 2006 without lawful
authority or lawful purpose;
c. Not to unreasonably, or without lawful authority or lawful
purpose, deny the Plaintiffs or the Class import permits to import US packages;
d. Take reasonable care to act on timely and proper information in
determining whether to allow imports of US packages;
e. Conduct timely monitoring, investigation, research and assessment
of the beekeeping industry in Canada in determining whether to allow imports of
US packages;
f. Not impose a blanket prohibition on the import of US packages
under the guise of Ministerial discretion;
g. Not to abdicate its responsibilities under the HAA or the HAR
but to exercise its own judgment and discretion.
28. The Crown breached its duty of care
to the Plaintiff and the Class on or after January 1, 2007, by:
a. Improperly, and without lawful authority, continuing the
Prohibition after the expiry of the HIPR-2004 on December 31, 2006;
b. Improperly and without lawful authority, denying the Plaintiffs
and the Class on a blanket basis the opportunity to seek or obtain import
permits for bee packages from the US;
c. Representing to the Plaintiffs and the Class that all
applications for import permits for US packages would not be considered or
would be automatically denied;
d. Basing its decisions to maintain the Prohibition on outdated and
inaccurate information including the 2003 Risk Assessment;
e. Failing to conduct timely monitoring, research, investigation,
assessment or consultation with respect to the ongoing necessity for the
Prohibition;
f. Failing to conduct and obtain a current Risk Assessment with
respect to the importation of bee packages from the US;
g. Misusing or failing to exercise ministerial responsibility and
discretion under the HAA and HAR with respect to permitting or
denying the import of bee packages from the US;
h. Abdicating its responsibilities to conduct proper and timely risk
assessment and exercise its independent judgment with respect to permitting or
denying the import of bee packages from the US.”
Analogous cases
[89]
The parties agree that the starting point is to
determine whether there exists similar cases where the duty of care has been
recognized (see Imperial Tobacco, cited above, at para 37). Plaintiffs
acknowledge, at paragraph 30 of their memorandum, that:
“While there are cases that find a duty of care on the basis of a
relationship similar to that alleged in this case, the case law is diverse and
it is doubtful that the alleged relationship in this case falls within a
‘settled’ category either establishing or negating the duty of care”.
They
consequently argue that the matter can only be settled at trial.
[90]
While it is true that no cases have determined
that the HAA and HAR impose on the CFIA a private law duty of
care to be mindful of the economic effects of decisions to grant or refuse
import permits, there are nonetheless cases that are analogous, though based on
different statutes and regulatory schemes.
[91]
The Court having reviewed the case of Berg,
cited by the Defendant, agrees that though not identical, the Wildlife Act
1997 does embody provisions and, more importantly, an intent that offers
important similarities with the HAA and HAR. This case is
therefore relevant to the present case though not totally persuasive. Both acts
(the HAR and Wildlife Act 1997) restrict the importation
of animals to prevent existing species already in the territory from being
infected with diseases. Permits are required, in both instances, before animals
can be imported. Equally of note is the stated purpose of the legislation which,
in both cases, aims to protect existing animals in the territory, primarily for
the public good.
[92]
The Court considers the main finding in River Valley noteworthy. The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal considered the
legislative purpose of the HAA, together with the provisions for
statutory compensation and statutory immunity and found that this showed an
absence of proximity (see River Valley at para 83). As to the Los
Angeles Salad Company case, the Court finds that the British Columbia Court
of Appeal’s conclusion can be transposed to the present case. The Court of
Appeal determined that recognizing a private law duty of care to food sellers
would conflict with the purpose of protecting the health of Canadians by
preventing the sale of contaminated food. The Court of Appeal, at paragraph 55,
stated that:
“It would put food
inspectors in the untenable position of having to balance the paramount
interests of the public with private interests of food sellers and would
thereby have a chilling effect on the proper performance of their duties”.
Similarly, recognizing
a private law duty of care to the Plaintiffs would also put the CFIA in the
untenable position of having to balance the paramount interests of the public
(preventing the import of honeybees which could potentially be infected with
disease) with private interests of commercial beekeepers, and could have a
chilling effect on the proper performance of its duties. The Court agrees with
the Defendant that honeybees generate a product for human consumption and
protecting them is important because of their potential impact on the whole of
the agricultural sector and for human health concerns.
[93]
The Court also agrees with the Defendant that
the cases of Adams and Sauer can be distinguished from the
present case inasmuch as the regulatory scheme was significantly different. In Adams,
the New Brunswick Court of Appeal found a statutory obligation to protect a
limited class of producers (see Adams at para 44). The Court also notes
a relevant paragraph in the River Valley case, in which it was concluded
that contrary to the Plant Protection Act (the basis of the claim in Adams),
the HAA showed no legislative purpose to protect the interests of
individual farmers (see River Valley, at para 80). As to Sauer, Canada had publicly assumed a duty to ensure the safety of cattle feed. In neither
case was the question of Canada’s duty to the broader public at issue.
[94]
In sum, there are no court decisions that have
determined the existence of a private law duty of care in circumstances similar
to the present claim; consequently the Court needs to apply the two part Anns
test.
Application of
the Anns test to the facts at issue
Part 1: Do the
facts, as pleaded by the Plaintiffs, reveal the existence of a relationship
that is sufficiently close to create a duty on the Defendant to take reasonable
measures to protect the Plaintiffs from foreseeable economic losses?
[95]
The Supreme Court in Imperial Tobacco,
cited above, clearly laid out the applicable principle to establish proximity
and, hence, a duty of care. This proximity can be found in some instances from
a statute. More often than not however, a relationship of proximity arises from
the conduct of the government and its interactions with a claimant that is such
to create a special relationship sufficient to establish the required proximity
for the existence of a duty of care. As explained by the Court, the governing
statutes are nonetheless important since there may be provisions therein that
negate the possibility because of the existence of a duty to the public at
large (see Imperial Tobacco at paras 41 to 49).
[96]
In the present case, the Plaintiffs argue that
the Defendant’s prima facie duty of care is apparent from the statutory
scheme alone or based on the statute and the interactions that existed between
them and the government. Consequently, the Court must firstly turn to the
statute to see if its scheme and provisions create such a prima facie
duty of care.
[97]
To begin, the title of the HAA is “An Act
respecting diseases and toxic substances that may affect animals or that may be
transmitted by animals to persons, and respecting the protection of animals”
which does not reveal any duty to a specific group but rather aims to protect
the public and the animal population at large. Section 33 of the HAA
relates to the powers of the CFIA and states that “An inspector or officer may,
subject to any restrictions or limitations specified by the Minister, exercise
any of the powers and perform any of the duties or functions of the Minister
under this Act, except the powers mentioned in section 27”.
[98]
Sections 5 to 21 of the HAA impose
obligations and prohibitions on persons when animals are known or suspected of
being infected. They aim the control of diseases and toxic substances. Sections
14 to 18 relate to the importation of animals and animal products or
byproducts. Finally, sections 22 to 28 give the Minister the authority to take
measures to remedy or mitigate concerns “[…] with public safety to remedy any
dangerous condition or mitigate any danger to life, health, property or the
environment that results, or may reasonably be expected to result, from the
existence of a disease or toxic substance in a control area” (see subsection 27
(2) HAA, during the applicable period).
[99]
Subsection 27(3) of the HAA, during the
applicable period, provides that:
“The
Minister may make regulations for the purposes of controlling or eliminating
diseases or toxic substances in a control area and of preventing their spread,
including regulations
(a)
prohibiting or regulating the movement of persons, animals or things, including
conveyances, within, into or out of a control area;
(b)
providing for the establishment of zones within a control area and varying
measures of control for each zone; and
(c)
authorizing the disposal or treatment of animals or other things that are or
have been in a control area”.
[100]
Finally, section 14 of the HAA allows the
Minister to make regulations prohibiting the importation of animals into Canada.
[101]
As to the HAR, section 12 enacts a
general prohibition on the importation of regulated animals unless certain
conditions are met and section 10 defines regulated animals as:
“‘Regulated
animal’ means a hatching egg, turtle, tortoise, bird, honeybee or mammal, […]”.
[102]
Both parties acknowledge, in their written
representations, that the HAA and HAR authorize the Defendant to
regulate the importation of US packaged honeybees. Where they differ is on the
intent of the statute. The Defendant asserts that the legislative scheme is
aimed primarily at entrusting the CFIA with broad regulatory authority to
protect animal health for the public good and excludes any duty to safeguard
the economic interests of individuals who want to use imported animals in the
exploitation of their commercial ventures.
[103]
The Court agrees. It is apparent from these
general provisions that the objective is to protect animal health and public
safety. The Minister is entrusted with the authority to take measures in order
to remedy or mitigate any danger to life, health, property or the environment.
Therefore, the Minister’s duty is to the people of Canada as a whole, not to
individual industry participants like the Plaintiffs. To recognize a private
duty of care to the beekeeping industry and its economic interests would
conflict with that purpose.
[104]
The Plaintiffs take the position that the orders
and regulations enacted prior to 2007 and their RIASs clearly establish a duty
of care since it is stated that they aim to “protect the economic interest of
the industry”. They refer to the following regulations in support of their
position and claim that there is little thought for the general public:
-Honeybee
Prohibition Order, 1988 & RIAS at 355-356 (see the Plaintiffs’
Authorities, Tab 5);
-Honeybee
Prohibition Order, 1990 & RIAS at 331-332 (see the Plaintiffs’ Authorities,
Tab 6);
-Honeybee
Prohibition Order, 1991 & RIAS at 71-74 (see the Plaintiffs’
Authorities, Tab 7).
[105]
The Plaintiffs’ amendments rely on several other
honeybee importation prohibition regulations and their RIASs which they claim
have stated that the purpose of these regulations is to prevent the
introduction of disease which could seriously affect or have a significant
economic effect on Canada’s agricultural industry (see the Plaintiffs’ motion
record at p 16, para 44).
[106]
The Defendant takes the position that since the
claim aims his actions or inactions after 2007, these regulations were not
applicable and are therefore irrelevant. The Court disagrees with the
Defendant’s position. The decision not to issue permits for the importation of
honeybee packages, after 2007, had, amongst its considerations, decisions taken
prior to 2007. These decisions were based on the determination that the health
of Canadian bees needed to be protected because US bees were potential carriers
of disease. The Court finds these regulations relevant, as they form part of
the legislative history of the general scheme surrounding the importation of
honeybees.
[107]
The Court agrees with the Defendant that RIASs
have been received by Courts in the context of statutory construction. They do
not, however, establish the purpose and intent of the governing statute. These
statements accompany regulations in order to provide information as to their
purpose and effect but do not form part of them. They are used as an aid in the
interpretation of regulatory provisions (see Bristol-Myers, cited above,
at para 156 and Bayer, cited above, at para 7) and as alleged by
the Defendant, it is necessary to read the words of the regulations in the
whole context of the authorizing statute (see Bristol-Myers at para 38).
[108]
The Court notes that the RIASs accompanying the
1996, 1998, 2000 and 2004 regulations clearly indicate that: “The Health of
Animals Act controls the importation of animals into Canada in order to prevent the introduction of diseases which pose a threat to human health and
safety or could have a serious effect on Canada’s animal agricultural
industry”. These statements reinforce the general objective of the HAA,
which is the public interest, as a whole, and not protecting the economic interest
of the beekeeping industry.
[109]
The Court “[…] fails to see how it could be
possible to convert any of the Minister’s public law discretionary powers, to
be exercised in the general public interest, into private law duties owed to
specific individuals” (see Imperial Tobacco at para 50). Consequently,
it cannot find proximity based on statutory intent and must consider whether
interactions between the parties create a special relationship sufficient to
establish proximity.
[110]
It is obvious to the Court, further to a review
of the HAA, that it does not contain any provisions creating the
obligation to consult industry. The fact that consultations took place does not
alter the primary duty that is the protection of animal health in Canada and public safety. Industry representations were taken into consideration but this
fact does not alter the main purpose of the Act either.
[111]
The Plaintiffs argue that the regulations and
consultations created a prima facie duty of care towards them since the
eight page RIAS accompanying the 2004 honeybee importation regulations
discussed at length costs and measures to alleviate the impact on the industry,
and that concerns related to the public at large were barely mentioned. They
also assert that since industry consultations continued after December 31,
2006, the Defendant’s conduct, namely these numerous interactions with the
industry, created a relationship of proximity.
[112]
The Supreme Court in Imperial Tobacco
stated, at paragraph 47, that:
“[…] where the asserted basis for proximity is grounded in specific
conduct and interactions, ruling a claim out at the proximity stage may be
difficult. So long as there is a reasonable prospect that the asserted
interactions could, if true, result in a finding of sufficient proximity, and
the statute does not exclude that possibility, the matter must be allowed to
proceed to trial, subject to any policy considerations that may negate the prima
facie duty of care at the second stage of the analysis”.
It was also
determined that there had to be a direct relationship between Canada and the Plaintiffs, in that case consumers of light cigarettes. The Supreme Court
found that the relationship between the parties was limited to Canada’s statements to the general public and there were no specific interactions between
the two. It concluded that consequently, a finding of proximity in that
relationship had to arise from the governing statutes (see Imperial Tobacco
at para 49).
[113]
In Berg, cited above, at paragraph 75, it
was held that:
“[…] there was no
relationship at all between these plaintiffs and the defendants. These
plaintiffs did not even attempt to apply for a permit to import their elk, let
alone be denied a permit. […] The defendants, in these circumstances, cannot be
held to have a duty to a group of people it was not aware existed”.
[114]
The Court, in the present instance, having taken
into consideration the allegations in the Plaintiffs’ proposed amended
statement of claim, notes that the Plaintiffs’ allegations of interaction with
the industry are purely based on the consultations that took place in assessing
the need to prolong or not the prohibition and are very general. These alleged
interactions were not with the individual Plaintiffs. As in Berg, the
Plaintiffs did not attempt to apply for a permit to import honeybee packages,
let alone denied a permit. The Court does not consider that there were
interactions between the parties that created a special relationship sufficient
to establish proximity. However, the Court believes it is preferable to apply
the second stage of the Anns test, as it is not convinced that this
allegation of proximity is certain to fail.
Part two: Is
the prima facie duty of care negated by overriding policy considerations
as defined by the Supreme Court in Imperial Tobacco?
[115]
The Court agrees with the Defendant that finding
that the Plaintiffs were owed a duty of care to protect the economic interests
of Plaintiffs would lead to an exposure of indeterminate liability.
[116]
The question in determining whether there is a
risk of indeterminate liability is whether there are sufficient special factors
that arise out of the relationship between the parties so that indeterminate
liability is not the result of imposing a duty of care (see Pinkerton’s,
cited above, at para 70). The Court must be able to draw the line between those
to whom the duty is owed and those to whom it is not (see Bow Valley Husky,
cited above, at para 64). The HAA and HAR apply to the vast
majority of players in the agricultural industry, as animals are frequently
imported in order to refine genetics, to increase productivity and to improve
performance. The Court acknowledges that the number of participants in the
agricultural sector that could possibly entertain claims, as a result of the
Act, is indeterminate and surely diverse and conflicting within segments of the
same agricultural sector, as in the present case. Consequently, this fact alone
negates any duty of care because it places the Defendant in an untenable
position, that of indeterminate liability. The Court also notes that when
claims are for pure economic loss, the risk of indeterminate liability is
enhanced (see Imperial Tobacco, cited above, at para 100).
[117]
The Court finds that the decision, as described
by the Plaintiffs, not to grant import permits for packaged honeybees after
December 31, 2006, is a true policy decision for the following reasons. The
test to determine whether a decision represents a core policy decision was
elaborated in Imperial Tobacco, cited above, at paragraph 90:
“[…] ‘core policy’
government decisions protected from suit are decisions as to a course or
principle of action that are based on public policy considerations, such as
economic, social and political factors, provided they are neither irrational
nor taken in bad faith”.
The Court also acknowledges in paragraph 90 that:
“Difficult cases may
be expected to arise from time to time where it is not easy to decide whether
the degree of "policy" involved suffices for protection from
negligence liability. A black and white test that will provide a ready and
irrefutable answer for every decision in the infinite variety of decisions that
government actors may produce is likely chimerical. Nevertheless, most
government decisions that represent a course or principle of action based on a
balancing of economic, social and political considerations will be readily
identifiable”.
[118]
In the present instance, the impugned decision
to “enforce a complete prohibition on the import of bee packages” from the US represents a course or principle of action based on a balancing of public policy
considerations, such as social and economic considerations. This prohibition
has been imposed since the 1980s and is permitted by section 12 of the HAR
which prohibits the import of regulated animals, unless a permit is issued by
the Minister.
[119]
The Court does not consider the Plaintiffs’
arguments on Defendant’s alleged bad faith convincing. Furthermore, the
Plaintiffs did not identify a Crown servant; therefore their claim cannot
amount to a claim of misfeasance in public office or abuse of public office.
Absent such a tort, the claim does not disclose a reasonable cause of action.
The policy decision was developed out of concern for the health and security of
Canadians and the health of honeybees. As they were matters of government
policy, the Plaintiffs’ claims for negligence are certain to fail and must be
struck out.
[120]
The Plaintiffs have also argued that the
Defendant abdicated his discretion to an improper third party. Having reviewed
the statement of claim including the intended amendments thereto and since
there is no specific allegation that the Defendant was not the one who took the
decision to prohibit import permits for honeybee packages, the Plaintiffs’
argument related to the Minister delegating his authority to a third party must
be rejected.
[121]
In sum, having assumed that the facts pleaded
are true and that Plaintiffs are able to prove their allegations, the Court
having considered the claim in negligence and applied the Anns test taking
into account all the allegations in the statement of claim and proposed amended
statement, comes to the conclusion that the Defendant’s motion must be granted
as the Plaintiffs’ pleadings do not disclose any reasonable cause of action.
Costs
[122]
The Plaintiffs argue that no costs should be
awarded against them on the basis that Rule 334.39 of the FCR specifies that no
costs may be awarded against any party to a motion for certification of a
proceeding as a class proceeding. In Pearson v Canada, 2008 FC 1367, at
paragraph 52, the Federal Court determined that a motion to strike a statement
of claim, brought before the action had been certified, does not engage the
class action rules and, in particular, the provision of Rule 334.39.
[123]
The Court therefore dismisses the claim with costs
against the Plaintiffs.