Docket: IMM-7-13
Citation:
2014 FC 729
Ottawa, Ontario, July 22, 2014
PRESENT: The
Honourable Mr. Justice Phelan
|
BETWEEN:
|
|
CHRISTINE TJIKARI KAMAHEKE
|
|
CLAUDIA KAZAKU
|
|
Applicants
|
|
and
|
|
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
|
|
Respondent
|
JUDGMENT AND REASONS
I.
Introduction
[1]
This is a judicial review of a decision of the
Refugee Protection Division [RPD] holding that the Applicant and her daughter
are neither Convention refugees nor persons in need of protection.
II.
Background
[2]
The Applicant is a citizen of Namibia. Her husband is in Zimbabwe, two of her children are somewhere outside Namibia, one other is in Namibia and the youngest is with the Applicant in Canada.
[3]
The Applicant is HIV positive and has been on
medication since 2010.
[4]
The crux of the Applicant’s claim is that her
uncle is angry at her for not marrying a cousin. He has been threatening her
since 1993. Her husband was allegedly arrested on false charges and he and the
other daughters have left Namibia.
[5]
The Applicant also asserts that she will be
discriminated against because of her HIV status.
[6]
The RPD’s decision centres on the lack of
credibility of the refugee claim based on 18 years of her uncle’s efforts
to have the Applicant marry his son. The Applicant took no steps to engage
state protection. The Applicant also failed to mention in the Port of Entry
notes a later allegation that a daughter had been kidnapped.
[7]
The RPD dismissed the psychological report by
Dr. Pilowsky because little weight should be given to a report that reiterates
the patient’s details and diagnoses (PTSD and depression) based on only a five
minute conversation.
[8]
As an alternate finding, the RPD found that
state protection was available. It did so after a thorough consideration of
Namibian laws, available medical assistance and the effectiveness of state
protection in the context of this type of claim.
[9]
The only troubling aspect of this state
protection analysis is the comment that “the state of Namibia is making serious efforts to protect its citizens” (underlining by
Court).
III.
Analysis
[10]
The standard of review applicable to this
decision is reasonableness (Hou v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2012 FC 993, 417 FTR 19).
[11]
The finding on state protection was reasonable.
A review of the actual analysis shows that the RPD in fact considered
operational issues and effectiveness. The criticism of a tribunal’s use of “serious efforts” is based on the assumption that the
tribunal considered only the efforts not the effectiveness of any state
protection measures.
[12]
Where, as here, a fair review of the analysis
shows that “effectiveness” was considered, the
criticism of the use of words like “serious efforts”
loses significance.
[13]
The credibility findings, particularly as they
attract considerable deference, were reasonable. Justice O’Keefe in Rios v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 276, 214 ACWS (3d) 240,
summarized the applicable principles for the review of credibility findings at
paragraph 68:
It is well established that credibility
findings demand a high level of judicial deference and should only be
overturned in the clearest of cases (see Khan v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 1330, [2011] FCJ No 1633 at paragraph
30). As such, the Court should generally not substitute its opinion unless it
finds that the decision was based on erroneous findings of fact made in either
a perverse or capricious manner or without regard for the material before it
(see Bobic v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC
1488, [2004] FCJ No 1869 at paragraph 3). In reviewing a board's decision,
isolated sections should not be scrutinized. Rather, the Court must consider
whether the decision as a whole supports a negative credibility finding (see Caicedo
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 1092, [2010]
FCJ No 1365 at paragraph 30).
[14]
The RPD’s conclusion that discrimination due to
HIV status does not rise to the level of persecution is reasonable. It was
fairly open to the RPD to reach that conclusion.
[15]
The other issues raised were peripheral.
However, the Court does observe that the RPD was well within its mandate to
give little weight to the psychological report for the reasons it gave.
IV.
Conclusion
[16]
Therefore, this judicial review will be
dismissed. There is no question for certification.