Docket: IMM-12705-12
Citation:
2014 FC 731
Ottawa, Ontario, July 22, 2014
PRESENT: The
Honourable Mr. Justice Phelan
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BETWEEN:
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AGNES MARGIT VERES-SZOGI
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AGNES VERES-SZOGI
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GERGO GALAMBOS
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EMOKE VERES-SZOGI
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Applicants
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and
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
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Respondent
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JUDGMENT AND REASONS
I.
Introduction
[1]
This is the judicial review of a decision by the
Refugee Protection Division [RPD] determining that neither the Principal
Applicant (the mother) nor the children (collectively referred to as the
Applicants) were Convention refugees or persons in need of protection.
II.
Background
[2]
The Applicants are citizens of Hungary. The Principal Applicant outlined several incidents of spousal abuse including
drunkenness, assault, failure to provide financial and emotional support and
threats of murder.
[3]
The RPD found that the determinative issue was
state protection. The RPD reviewed the status of Hungary’s legal and democratic
organization, and the establishment and operation of police services. The
Applicants had not rebutted the presumption in favour of state protection.
[4]
The RPD’s crucial finding was that the Principal
Applicant made “very little, if any, effort to seek state
protection in Hungary prior to seeking international protection in Canada”.
[5]
As noted by the RPD, the Principal Applicant
never reported the assaults by her husband to the police. The most that could
be said is that when the husband was arrested on a weapons charge in September
2001 and when police checked her workplace in September 2003, she mentioned “abuse” to the police on those occasions.
[6]
The RPD concluded that the Principal Applicant
did not take advantage of the avenues of protection available to her and that
there was recourse available if the police failed to act. The RPD acknowledged
that measures directed at domestic violence were not perfect but found that the
efforts to improve the situation were effective.
[7]
Therefore, the RPD concluded that effective
state protection was available if the Principal Applicant had attempted to seek
such protection.
III.
Analysis
[8]
The standard of review with respect to the
adequacy of state protection is reasonableness (Carrillo v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FCA 94, [2008] 4 FCR 636).
[9]
It was reasonable to conclude that merely
mentioning “abuse” in the context of a police
action on weapons charges is insufficient to constitute engaging state
protection from that spousal abuse.
[10]
This finding is especially cogent given that the
Principal Applicant reported her husband for weapons violations but never
reported him for spousal or family abuse.
[11]
It is not sufficient for the Principal Applicant
to state that she believed that state protection was inadequate without any
objective basis for that belief.
[12]
Justice Russell in Mejia v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 354, well summarized the principles
applicable here:
70 Essentially, she says that Mexico provides no protection for women like her who find themselves the victims of sexual
abuse. The problem with this assertion is that it is highly subjective and the
Applicant has supplied little in the way of objective support for her personal
experiences or for her assertion that state protection and an IFA are not
available to her.
…
73 The Board provided a detailed
analysis of state protection in Mexico that identified its shortcomings, but
reasonably concluded that police and legal protection would be available to the
Applicant if she chose to access it. The Board did not just look at the
theoretical framework and expressions of good intention; it examined actual
practice on the ground.
74 Against this background, the Board
also examined what the Applicant herself had done to avail herself of
protection. All she did was take DIF psychological counseling which, according
to her PIF, was of significant assistance to her. But she did nothing else.
75 Her explanation that she did not go
to the police about her uncle because she felt he had connections was
considered and reasonably rejected by the Board.
76 There were many options available to
her but she chose to use none of them. Her various explanations were considered
by the Board and were found to be unsatisfactory. According to her own
testimony, she knew of the existence of relevant agencies but she simply chose
not to seek the help of the police or any other means of assistance apart from
the psychological counseling which, when she tried it, obviously worked for
her. As Justice Snider pointed out in Judge v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration) 2004 FC 1089, at paragraphs 8 and 10, it is not sufficient
for an applicant to simply believe that state protection is not available.
77 The Applicant has not given the
Mexican police and the Mexican state an opportunity to help her.
[13]
The Applicants, in essence, ask this Court to
substitute its assessment of the facts for that of the RPD. That is not the
function of this Court, nor if it were, would this Court find any differently
than the RPD.
IV.
Conclusion
[14]
Therefore, for these reasons, this judicial
review will be dismissed.
[15]
There is no question for certification.
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