Docket: T-2274-12
Citation: 2014 FC 1005
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BETWEEN:
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CHIEF R. DONALD MARACLE IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY AND IN A
REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY ON BEHALF OF THE MEMBERS OF THE MOHAWKS OF THE BAY OF
QUINTE, CHIEF WILLIAM MONTOUR IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY AND IN A
REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY ON BEHALF OF THE MEMBERS OF THE SIX NATIONS OF THE
GRAND RIVER, CHIEF JOEL ABRAM IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY AND IN A
REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY ON BEHALF OF THE MEMBERS OF THE ONEIDA NATION OF THE
THAMES, AND CHIEF HAZEL FOX-RECOLLET IN HER PERSONAL CAPACITY AND IN A
REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY ON BEHALF OF THE MEMBERS OF WIKWEMIKONG UNCEDED
INDIAN RESERVE
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Applicants
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and
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ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
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Respondent
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REASONS
FOR ASSESSMENT OF COSTS
BRUCE PRESTON – ASSESSMENT
OFFFICER
[1]
By way of Judgment and Reasons dated May 30, 2014, the Court dismissed
the Application with costs payable to the Respondent at the middle of Column
III.
[2]
On July 24, 2014, the Respondent filed a Bill of Costs. Upon contacting
the Respondent, it was determined that this was an assessment which could
proceed in writing. Therefore, on July 30, 2014, a direction setting a schedule
for the exchange of submissions was issued. As the parties have filed their
submissions concerning costs, I will proceed with the assessment.
[3]
In the Respondent’s Submissions Regarding Costs, counsel submits that
the Items claimed at the upper-middle of Column III are reasonable given the
factors enumerated in Rule 400(3) of the Federal Courts Rules, namely, the Respondent’s
success and the importance and complexity of the issues. Then at paragraph 14,
counsel refers to Simpson Strong-Tie co v Peak Innovations Inc, 2012 FC
63, at paragraph 43 and Bayer Healthcare AG v Sandoz Canada Inc, 2009 FC
691, at paragraph 12, in support of the contention that what constitutes the
middle of Column III is open to interpretation and that an Assessment Officer
is not bound by the same unit number in respect of different items in Tariff B.
Counsel also submits that although the Assessment Officer in Simpson
allowed a unit value below the mid-point of the range, the particulars of that
case do not remove the general ability of an Assessment Officer to decide the
appropriate number of units to be allowed in respect of each Item claimed.
Concerning disbursements, counsel argues that the amounts claimed are supported
by the Affidavit of Jennifer Multari, affirmed July 24, 2014 and represent a
fair and reasonable claim given the volume of materials.
[4]
In their Submissions Regarding Costs, the Applicants submit that the
Bill of Costs is excessive because the Respondent claimed counsel fees at the
upper range of Column III while the Court ordered fees to be assessed at the
middle of Column III. Counsel argues that the Court’s award permits an exception
to Tariff B2(2) (concerning fractional units) and that the Respondent’s costs
should be allowed “at the middle of Column III” and where the middle results is
a fractional unit, the Assessment Officer must allow costs at the mid-point of
Column III in accordance with the Courts decision. In support of this
contention, counsel refers to Mercury Launch & Tug Ltd v Texada
Quarrying Ltd, 2009 FC 331, at paragraph 2 and Aird v Country Park
Village Properties (Mainland) Ltd, 2005 FC 1170, at paragraph 6. In the
alternative counsel for the Applicants submits that an Assessment Officer
should consider the factors set out in Rule 400(3), specifically Rule 400(3)(c)
(complexity) and Rule 400(3)(g) (amount of work). Counsel argues that, based on
the factors set out in Rule 400(3), Item 2 should be allowed at 5 units as the
Respondents Record contained only one affidavit, Item 13(a) should be allowed
at 3 units as this matter was a judicial review with no witnesses and Item
14(a) should be allowed at 2 units per hour. Finally, counsel argues that Item
14(b) should not be allowed as the Court has not awarded costs for second
counsel.
[5]
Concerning disbursements, the Applicants submit that the Respondent has
claimed $965.66 for photocopies but has not provided evidence of the purpose or
reasonableness of the photocopying. Counsel asserts that three of the invoices
for photocopying were either irrelevant or unnecessary for the proceeding
because neither their dates nor their descriptions match the sequential steps
of the proceeding. Concerning the two invoices dated March 28, 2013, the
Applicants contend that these costs were incurred only after the Applicants
were served with the Respondent’s Affidavit of Marc Roy. Concerning the invoice
dated May 24, 2013, the Applicants argue that there was not a three volume
Record filed in the proceeding and the date does not correspond with a step in
the proceeding. The Applicants do not contest the other disbursements claimed.
Counsel concludes by submitting that photocopying should be allowed at $566.68
and that the Bill of Costs should be allowed for a total of $2,630.93.
[6]
In the Respondent’s Rebuttal Submissions, counsel withdraws the claim
for Item 14(b). Counsel reiterates that an Assessment Officer is entitled to
interpret the “middle of Column III” to mean the upper middle unit value in the
range and that an Assessment Officer may be guided by the factors enumerated in
Rule 400(3), specifically the result of the hearing and complexity. Also,
referring to Hoffman-La Roche Ltd v Apotex Inc, 2013 FC 1265, at
paragraph 7, counsel submits that each item is assessable in its own
circumstances and that it is not necessary to use the same point throughout the
range for each Item.
[7]
Concerning photocopies, in the Respondent’s Rebuttal Submissions,
counsel submits that the disbursements are particularized in the Affidavit of
Jennifer Multari and supported by invoices from an external service provider.
Counsel contends that as the Applicants have not provided evidence to support
their contention that “neither their
dates nor their descriptions match the sequential steps of the proceeding”.
Counsel continues by arguing that a cross reference between the dates in the
recorded entries and the invoice dates indicates a correlation. At paragraph 8
of the Respondent’s Rebuttal Submissions, counsel provides a table setting out
this correlation.
Assessment
[8]
As noted above, counsel for the Respondent has withdrawn the claim for
second counsel under Item 14(b). Concerning the remaining fees claimed by the Respondent,
It is noted that, although the Applicants have contested the number of units
claimed for each Item, they have not contested the individual Items included in
the Bill of Costs. The parties’ dispute centers on the parties’ interpretation
of the award. In the assessment before me, the Court has awarded costs “at the
middle of Column III”. In both Aird (supra) and Mercury Launch
(supra), the Court awarded costs at the mid or middle “range” of Column
III. At paragraph 6 of Aird, the Assessment Officer held that the costs
decision “permits … an exception to
Tariff B2(2) concerning fractions of units” and allowed all
assessable services at the mid-point of the range of Column III, including
fractions. A similar approach was taken in Mercury Launch. In Simpson
(supra), the Court awarded costs “in accordance with the middle of
Column III” and, as indicated by the Respondent, the Assessment Officer allowed
costs below the mid-point of the range. Taking these decisions into account, it
is of note that the Assessment Officer in Aird and Mercury Launch
held that the award “permitted” an exception to Tariff B2(2). Although I find
that when the Court awards costs “at the middle of Column III”, it permits an
Assessment Officer to allow fractions of units, I do not read this as requiring
an Assessment Officer to allow costs at the “mid-point” in all circumstances.
On the other hand, I find that while the approach taken in Simpson may
appear to be inconsistent with the approaches taken in Aird and Mercury
Launch, it is consistent with Bayer (supra) and Hoffman (supra)
which held that Assessment Officers are not bound by the same unit number in
respect of different items in Tariff B. Therefore, I find that faced with an
award of costs “at the middle of Column III”, it is open to an Assessment
Officer to allow individual Items at the points in the middle of the range (ie:
for a range of 4 to 7 the middle points of the range would be 5 or 6 units) but
does not prohibit an allowance at the mid-point of the range (ie: 5.5 units).
Having reached these conclusions, I will assess each item claimed individually.
[9]
Concerning Item 2, the Respondent has claimed 6 units. I have reviewed
the Judgment and Reasons of the Court and Respondent’s Record. Although the
Respondent’s Record contains two volumes, as indicated by the Applicants, it
contains only one Affidavit and a Memorandum of Fact and Law. Further, although
the complaint before the Court was broad, affecting several First Nations in Ontario, the two issues before the Court were procedural fairness and whether the screening
decision of the Canadian Human Rights Commission was reasonable. As a result, I
find that there is nothing to indicate that an allowance at the high end of the
mid-range is warranted. Therefore, Item 2 is allowed at 5.5 Units.
[10]
Concerning Item 13(a), the Respondent has claimed 4 units. As submitted
by the Applicants, the matter before the Court was a judicial review
application. Given the nature of judicial review hearings, there is no viva
voce evidence and therefore no witnesses to prepare for the hearing thereby
reducing the complexity of the work required to prepare for the hearing. For
this reason, I find that an allowance at the low end of the mid-range is
warranted. Therefore, Item 13(a) is allowed at 3 units.
[11]
Concerning Item 14(a), the Respondent has claimed 3 units per hour for 2
hours. It is noted that the Applicants have contested the number of units
claimed but not the duration of the hearing. In keeping with my decision
concerning Item 2 above, I find that there is nothing about the nature of this
matter which would justify an allowance of costs at the high end of the
mid-range of Column III, there were two legal issues to argue and no witnesses
to examine or cross-examine. Therefore, Item 14(a) is allowed at 2.5 units per
hour for 2 hours.
[12]
Concerning photocopying, I have reviewed the submissions of both parties
and the invoices attached to the Affidavit of Jennifer Multari and as argued by
the Applicants and confirmed by the Respondent, the invoice dated March 28,
2013 relates to the Affidavit of Marc Roy, served by the Respondent on March
27, 2013. Even though the Respondent has confirmed the step in the proceeding
to which the invoice relates, counsel has not explained the necessity of
producing photocopies, totaling $215.89, the day after the affidavit was served
on the Applicants. For this reason, I find that the photocopies from March 28,
2013 have not been justified as being reasonable and necessary for the
advancement of the proceeding and are not allowed. As the Respondent’s Rebuttal
Submissions satisfactorily clarifies the necessity for the remaining
expenditures, all other photocopies claimed are allowed as presented in the
Bill of Costs.
[13]
As the Applicants have not contested the other disbursements claimed, I
have reviewed the materials and file and find the claims to be reasonable and
necessary. Therefore, the claims for process server and courier services are
allowed as presented.
[14]
For the above reasons, the Respondent’s Bill of Costs is assessed and
allowed at $2,744.02. A Certificate of Assessment will be issued.
“Bruce Preston”
Toronto, Ontario
October 21, 2014