Date:
20130307
Docket:
IMM-3245-12
Citation:
2013 FC 239
Ottawa, Ontario, March
7, 2013
PRESENT: The Honourable Madam Justice Simpson
BETWEEN:
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MOHSEN HAJMORADI
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Applicant
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and
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGRATION
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Respondent
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REASONS FOR
ORDER AND ORDER
[1]
Mohsen
Hajmoradi [the Applicant] has applied for judicial review of a
decision of a Pre‑Removal Risk Assessment Officer [the Officer] dated
March 6, 2012, wherein the Applicant’s application for a Pre‑Removal Risk
Assessment [PRRA] was denied [the Decision]. The application for judicial review
is made pursuant to subsection 72(1) of the Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [the Act].
The Refugee
Claim
[2]
The
Applicant, who is a citizen of Iran, initially claimed that he was pursued by
Iranian authorities because of his participation in the demonstrations which
took place following Iran’s presidential election in June 2009. This allegation
of persecution based on political grounds was addressed by the Refugee
Protection Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board [the Refugee Board].
It refused the Applicant’s claim on June 28, 2011. The Refugee Board found that
the Applicant lacked credibility and concluded that he did not participate in
anti-government demonstrations and that he was not being pursued by Iranian
authorities. The Applicant’s request for leave and judicial review of that
decision was dismissed.
The PRRA
Application
[3]
The
Applicant’s PRRA Application [the Application] offered new evidence including a
copy of a Judgment of the Chief of Iran’s Special Revolutionary Court, dated
July 27, 2011 [the Confiscation Judgment]. It stated that the authorities were
confiscating the Applicant’s home in Tehran and giving the proceeds to a
charitable organization because the Applicant had participated in uprisings and
demonstrations against the Islamic Republic and had cooperated with anti‑government
groups.
[4]
The
new evidence also included a copy of a letter from the Applicant’s sister,
dated November 16, 2011. She described events which had taken place in the
summer of 2009, including raids on the Applicant’s home by the authorities, and
her own arrest and detention. She also addressed the circumstances surrounding
her receipt of the Confiscation Judgment and the subsequent confiscation of the
Applicant’s home.
[5]
In
addition to claiming persecution on political grounds, the PRRA
Application also alleged a new risk by reason of the Applicant’s formal conversion
to Christianity as a result of his baptism in November 2011.
This event post-dated his hearing before the Refugee Board.
The PRRA Decision
[6]
The
Officer addressed the allegations of risk on both political and religious
grounds. With respect to the former, the Officer found that the fears presented
in the PRRA Application were essentially those which had been considered and
rejected by the Refugee Board. Turning to the new evidence, the Officer noted
that the Applicant had not provided the original of the Confiscation Judgment,
but rather a facsimile copy which contained no original security features. The Officer
found it problematic that the Applicant had not offered any information about
why the original was not available. In the absence of a explanation, the
Confiscation Judgment was given no weight.
[7]
In
reviewing the letter from the Applicant’s sister, the Officer accurately stated
that the information pertaining to events of 2009 did not constitute new
evidence. However, the Officer did recognize the sister’s references to the
Confiscation Judgment and the subsequent confiscation of the Applicant’s house
as new evidence. Nevertheless, the letter was given no weight principally
because the Applicant did not submit the original and did not explain its
absence.
[8]
Turning
to the Applicant’s allegation of risk arising from his baptism, the Officer
noted that although not yet baptized, the Applicant had been attending church
regularly for 18 months before his hearing before the Refugee Board. The
Officer found that the Applicant had failed to provide a reasonable explanation
for his failure to raise this risk before the Refugee Board and therefore
concluded that the baptism did not represent a new risk.
The Issues and
Discussion
[9]
The
Applicant has identified the Officer’s treatment of the baptism as the most
serious error. The Applicant argues that the Officer failed to appreciate its
significance. The materials submitted to the Officer indicated that the
Applicant feared for his life and safety on the account of his religious conversion.
The country documentation submitted with the Application detailed the risk to
those who renounce Islam by converting to Christianity. Counsel for the
Applicant emphasized that baptism is the act of conversion which exposes the
Applicant to a heightened risk and that the Officer erred in so far as he
failed to recognize that it was the baptism and not attendance at Christian
services that created the new risk.
[10]
The
Respondent argues that the Applicant’s formal conversion by way of baptism made
little difference to the risk he would have faced in Iran once he was perceived
to be a practicing Christian. I agree. In my view,
although his baptism may have heightened his risk, the risk of persecution on
religious grounds arose when the Applicant began attending Christian services.
Since this occurred well before his refugee hearing and since the Applicant did
not explain why he did not raise this fear before the Board, he is precluded from
relying on his baptism as evidence of a new risk.
[11]
The
Applicant also challenges the Officer’s failure to give any weight to the new
evidence related to the risk arising out of his participation in
anti-government demonstrations. The Applicant argues that since the Officer
rejected the new evidence because he did not find it credible, he was required
to at least consider whether or not to exercise his discretion in favour of
holding a hearing pursuant to s. 113(b) of the Act and s. 167 of the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227.
[12]
On
the other hand, the Respondent submits that the Officer’s treatment of the
evidence does not amount a negative credibility finding. Rather, the Respondent
argues, the Officer found that the copied documents submitted by the Applicant
without explanation were insufficient proof of their contents.
[13]
I
agree with the Respondent and conclude that the Officer did not make a negative
credibility finding. In my view, the Officer was simply unable to reach a
decision about the probative value of the new evidence.
[14]
For
these reasons, the application for Judicial Review will be dismissed.
[15]
Neither
party posed a question for certification under s. 74 of the Act.
ORDER
THIS
COURT ORDERS that:
The application
for judicial review of the Decision is dismissed.
“Sandra
J. Simpson”