Date: 20080916
Docket: T-1909-07
Citation: 2008 FC 1036
Ottawa, Ontario, September 16, 2008
PRESENT:
Mr. Justice Lemieux
BETWEEN:
GHYSLAIN LAPLANTE
Applicant
and
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND
JUDGMENT
Introduction
[1]
This
is an application by Ghyslain Laplante, a former customs inspector with the
Canada Border Services Agency (the applicant or the customs officer), for
judicial review of a decision by adjudicator Georges Nadeau of the Public
Service Labour Relations Board (the Board) dated October 4, 2007, dismissing
two grievances filed by the applicant: one against
his employer’s decision of June 21, 2004, to suspend him for an indefinite
period without pay during an investigation, and
the other against the decision to dismiss him for misconduct on April 21,
2005.
[2]
His
employer, the Canada Border Services Agency (the CBSA), alleges in its letter
of dismissal that Ghyslain Laplante was involved in a
plot to traffic cocaine in Canada in which he assisted his brother, Serge
Laplante, and his brother’s associates by
facilitating the importation of this narcotic from the United States to Canada.
Context
[3]
For some
time, the RCMP and the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) had been conducting a coordinated
investigation into the importation of narcotics from the United States into Canada.
[4]
As part of
“Project Busted Manatee”, the DEA used an American agent who posed as a cocaine
supplier, whom brothers Daniel and Tony Roy, from the Valleyfield area, contacted
in early 2004 to supply them with cocaine. A first transaction took place on
April 23, 2004, but it fell through when a trucker who took possession of
200 kilograms for delivery to Quebec was stopped soon after in a DEA operation.
[5]
A wiretap
showed that on May 6, 2004, Tony Roy told the agent, for the purposes of
conducting a second transaction, he had put together a new team made up of a
“driver”, a contact for a “door” and a “door”. Wiretaps enabled RCMP and DEA investigators
to decode the details of this second operation.
[6]
Alain
Charron, the driver, met with the agent to give him the money for the drugs. He
was arrested by the DEA on June 17, 2004, while taking delivery of the
cocaine; he agreed to cooperate with the investigation. At the DEA’s direction, he contacted Serge Laplante that same day to get
instructions for crossing the border. Serge Laplante told him which route to
take to get to the Frelighsburg border crossing, and to get there on
June 20, 2004, after 12:30 at night.
[7]
Ghyslain
Laplante’s work schedule, of which his brother Serge had a copy, confirms that he
was working the night of June 20, 2004, at Frelighsburg and that his shift
started at 11:30 p.m. on June 20, but most of it would be worked on
June 21, 2004, after midnight. At this border crossing on the night shift,
there is generally only one inspector on duty.
[8]
The
driver, Alain Charron, was replaced by an RCMP undercover officer identified by
the initials “AI”. He took possession of the pickup truck that had been used by
Alain Charron and arrived at the Frelighsburg border crossing on the night of
June 20 to 21, 2004, when the applicant was on duty. AI posed as Alain
Charron. His role was to determine whether Ghyslain Laplante was involved in
the plot to import cocaine; in other words, whether Ghyslain Laplante was the
“door”.
[9]
AI and the
applicant had a conversation. Ghyslain Laplante then gave AI a road map with
yellow highlighting showing the way to the town of Dunham. AI went to Dunham, where
Serge Laplante signalled his location. The RCMP then proceeded to arrest Serge
Laplante, and the applicant was arrested some time later.
Decision of the Board
[10]
The Board’s
reasons are very detailed and in two parts: a summary of the evidence followed
by an analysis of that evidence. First, the Board summarized the evidence of
the witnesses for the employer, the CBSA, which had the burden of establishing
that the suspension and dismissal were justified. The only witness for the
defence was Ghyslain Laplante.
a) Evidence
[11]
The CBSA’s
main witnesses were:
- Corporal Denis Turcotte,
an RCMP officer for 25 years. He supervised the investigation into the importation
of narcotics via a Canadian border crossing. He adduced all of the
documents related to the investigation in four volumes, including four compact discs and one DVD containing recordings
of conversations and transcripts of those conversations. He
confirmed the context surrounding the operation leading to the arrest of Serge
and Ghyslain Laplante on June 21, 2004. He also produced the
videotaped recording of the questioning of Ghyslain Laplante on
June 21, 2004, and highlighted the parts he
considered important. He indicated that
after considering all of the evidence, he was convinced of the applicant’s
involvement.
- Undercover RCMP officer
AI was the employer’s second main witness. He identified the notes he took
following the events of June 20/21, 2004. He has
worked for the RCMP since 1990 in the special investigations
section.
He confirmed that the goal the night of June 20 was to determine
whether Ghyslain Laplante was the “door”. To that end, he was to engage
the customs officer in conversation. His testimony was on the content of
that conversation.
[12]
The
applicant testified. The key parts of his testimony had to do with his version of
the conversation he had with AI, his 22 years working as a customs officer with
a clean record, his family and his relationship with his brother Serge.
b) Analysis of the evidence
[13]
Before
analyzing the evidence, the adjudicator pointed out “that the burden was on the
employer to show that the applicant was involved in a
plot to assist his brother and his brother’s associate in trafficking cocaine
in Canada, and that this had to be shown by
a preponderance of the evidence, not by a determination of criminal
involvement beyond reasonable doubt”. He also indicated:
“Accordingly, if I find that in fact, the grievor was willingly
involved in the plot, then dismissal would be the only logical conclusion.” At paragraph 139 of his reasons, he wrote: “Unfortunately,
after a careful examination of the evidence presented to me, I reach that
conclusion”.
[14]
According to the adjudicator, the evidence
showed that after their initial plot to import narcotics failed, the Roy
brothers established contact with Serge Laplante to get a
second large shipment of cocaine across the border, and the recorded telephone conversations between one of the Roy brothers
and the DEA agent revealed that preparations were made to get the
cocaine in Miami and bring it to Canada using a “door” at the border that had
to be paid.
[15]
The adjudicator noted that the evidence
referred to a plan to have Alain Charron bring the cocaine across the border
before midnight on Friday, June 11, 2004. The adjudicator acknowledged
that the plan did not at all match Ghyslain Laplante’s work schedule. He
wrote:
While this evidence might
lead us to conclude that the grievor was not involved in the plot, the rest of
the evidence adduced weighs in favour of his involvement.
[16]
The
adjudicator reviewed the evidence of the cocaine purchase by Alain Charron, his
taking possession of the cocaine on June 17, 2004, and subsequent
arrest by the DEA, and his contacting Serge Laplante, who informed him “to go ahead without any concern because the ‘door’ is open
on the night of June 20 to 21 after midnight.” He concluded: “The plan
coincides with the grievor’s work schedule and tends to incriminate him.” He added:
“It should be noted that at the time of his arrest, Serge Laplante was in
possession of a document containing information about the work schedule” of the
applicant, who “admits giving him information about his schedule...on May 22,
2004, at his uncle’s funeral, to facilitate delivery of a container that his
brother Serge had promised him. He indicated to his brother the dates that he
was working the night shift.”
[17]
The
adjudicator wrote: “I am not convinced by this
explanation.” He went on to explain:
The schedule as provided only
shows the night shifts even though the grievor is also at home and able to
receive the container on his rest days and when he works evenings. Moreover,
information contained in the document includes the dates before May 22, 2004. I
do not see any logical reason that Serge Laplante, on May 22, 2004, would have
noted the night shifts from May 17 to 21, 2004. The fact that the grievor admitted
that he gave the information to Serge Laplante, the fact that only the night
shifts are noted on the document found in Serge Laplante’s possession and the
fact that likely, it was not the day of the funeral, May 22, 2004, that this
information was provided leads me to believe that the grievor was involved in
the plot.
[18]
The
adjudicator then addressed the conversation between AI and the applicant,
noting that unfortunately no audio recording of the conversation was made when
AI crossed the border. He found that “although the
versions are different on certain points, they are nonetheless similar on
certain key points”:
- AI
indicated that he was looking for someone called Steve, and it was Ghyslain
Laplante who mentioned that he was perhaps looking for Serge. The
adjudicator rejected the applicant’s attempt to explain the fact that he
did not ask AI any questions to verify his assumption other than “Do you
mean Serge?” His explanation was that he had no need for a more thorough
verification because AI had first asked if he had seen a red vehicle; he
suddenly remembered that his brother Serge, who drives a red vehicle,
spoke to him about a friend who was to help him move a boat from the
United States. The adjudicator rejected that explanation for two reasons:
(1) AI’s notes made no mention of his telling the applicant that he was
looking for a red vehicle and (2) when questioned on June 21, 2004, after
his arrest, Ghyslain Laplante denied suggesting the name of Serge to AI,
who asked for Steve. According to the adjudicator, “He goes as far as to
ask the investigator ‘Who is this guy?’”;
- the fact
that at AI’s request, Ghyslain Laplante “did not hesitate to try to
contact his brother Serge in the middle of the night to inform him of the
arrival of his friend.” The adjudicator recognized that there was no
conversation between the applicant and his brother because the applicant was
only able to reach his brother’s cellphone voicemail. The adjudicator found:
It is difficult to attribute
to tiredness the grievor forgetting to say to the investigator that he
identified AI as a friend of Serge Laplante, who was supposed to help him tow a
boat. That omission tends to incriminate him and at the very least makes his
version less credible. Furthermore, that version is not corroborated by any
evidence.
[19]
The
adjudicator noted that “the evidence shows that
the vehicle containing the drugs crossed the border without being searched and
continued on its way until Serge Laplante signalled his presence.”
[20]
The
adjudicator found a contradiction in the customs officer’s testimony under
questioning on June 21, 2004: Ghyslain Laplante denies
on several occasions having spoken to his brother the previous day and denies
on two occasions trying to reach him by telephone. According to the adjudicator:
However, the record of
telephone calls (Exhibit E-1, Vol. III) confirms that there were two calls
between Serge Laplante’s telephone and the grievor’s home on June 20, 2004, and
confirms that at 01:15 on June 21, a collect call was made from the border
station to Serge Laplante’s cellphone. Moreover, during his testimony, the
grievor acknowledges making these calls and attributes the answers that he gave
to the investigator to tiredness and to his lawyer’s instructions.
[21]
Last,
the adjudicator mentioned the CBSA’s internal investigation of the applicant
and the summary of the interview in which Ghyslain Laplante stated: “I have no contact by telephone, mail, etc. with my brother Serge
Laplante.” The adjudicator pointed out: “However, the
evidence shows through the telephone call records that he has quite frequent
phone contact with his brother Serge.” After summarizing the applicant’s
testimony on his conversations with his brother Serge about a container that
his brother had promised him and various other reasons for their contact, the
adjudicator found:
All of this
tends to confirm the existence of a closer relationship between the two
brothers; a relationship that, apparently, the grievor took time to acknowledge.
[22]
The
adjudicator concluded his decision as follows:
149 Although the
initial dates identified for crossing the border do not coincide with the
grievor’s work schedule, overall the evidence adduced leads me to conclude that
there is a preponderance of evidence showing that the grievor was involved in
the plot. The consequence of that involvement can only be dismissal of the
grievance.
Analysis
1. Standard of review
[23]
Before the recent
Supreme Court of Canada decision in Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9,
three standards of review were available for tribunal decisions; after that
decision there are only two: correctness and reasonableness. The standard of
patent unreasonableness was subsumed under the reasonableness standard. Both
parties, in their written submissions, discussed the impact of Dunsmuir on
the standard of review in the case at bar. Counsel for the applicant, in his
factum, conducted a formal analysis of the review standard in light of the
factors identified by the Supreme Court in its previous decisions on this point.
He argued that:
- the Public
Service Labour Relations Act contains only a limited privative clause protecting
the Board’s decisions, and this points to lesser curial deference;
- when it comes to questions
of fact and the relative expertise of the Board and the Court, greater
curial deference should be shown because of the Board’s expertise in
labour relations;
- the third factor, the
purpose of the legislation – to maintain effective and harmonious labour‑management
relations – is neutral;
- on the fourth
factor, the nature of the question, because the issue before the Court is
a question of fact, this points to greater curial deference.
[24]
With
respect to the standard of review, counsel for the applicant concluded:
[TRANSLATION]
Weighing all of these factors, the
applicants [sic] submit that the standard of review applicable to the
issue of whether the adjudicator erred in finding that the employer had
established by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Laplante was
involved in a plot to import cocaine is the reasonableness standard. [Emphasis
added.]
[25]
Although
counsel for the Attorney General of Canada (AGC) advocated the same standard of
review as the applicant, he reached that conclusion in a different way. He
relied on the following paragraph from the reasons of Bastarache and LeBel JJ.,
writing for five of the nine judges (the other judges concurred):
62 In summary, the process of judicial
review involves two steps. First, courts ascertain whether the jurisprudence
has already determined in a satisfactory manner the degree of deference to be
accorded with regard to a particular category of question. Second, where the
first inquiry proves unfruitful, courts must proceed to an analysis of the
factors making it possible to identify the proper standard of review. [Emphasis added.]
[26]
The
two judges had previously pointed out at paragraph 51 of their reasons:
51 … As we will now demonstrate, questions of fact, discretion and policy
as well as questions where the legal issues cannot be easily separated from the
factual issues generally attract a standard of reasonableness while many legal issues attract a standard of correctness. Some
legal issues, however, attract the more deferential standard of reasonableness. [Emphasis added.]
[27]
Counsel
for the AGC submitted that on issues relating to dismissal, according to the
Federal Court of Appeal in Green v. Canada (Treasury Board), [2000] F.C.J.
No. 379, and this Court in Ayangma v. Canada (Treasury Board), 2007 FC 780,
an adjudicator’s expertise attracts the degree of curial deference associated
with the standard of patent unreasonableness.
[28]
Counsel
for the AGC concluded:
[TRANSLATION]
Based on these decisions, and in keeping
with the Supreme Court’s instructions in Dunsmuir, we submit that on
a question of fact decided by an adjudicator in a dismissal case, this Court
must show greater deference and apply the reasonableness standard. [Emphasis
added.]
[29]
It
should be noted that the review in Dunsmuir involved a provincial adjudicator,
and in the case at bar, it is a federal board; under section 18 of the Federal
Courts Act, and in particular section 18.1(4)(d), this Court is
authorized to intervene if the federal board “based its decision or order on an
erroneous finding of fact that it made in a perverse or capricious manner or
without regard for the material before it”.
[30]
In
Mugesera v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2005] 2 S.C.R.
100, the Supreme Court of Canada did not have to establish the standard of
review at first instance because it had before it a decision of the Federal
Court of Appeal quashing a decision of Nadon J. of the Trial Division, as he
then was. For the purposes of the case at bar, it is worth reproducing paragraphs 36,
37 and 38 of Mugesera:
36 In the case at bar, we
find that the FCA exceeded the scope of its judicial review function when it
engaged in a broad-ranging review and reassessment of the IAD’s findings of
fact. It set aside those findings and made its own evaluation of the evidence
even though it had not been demonstrated that the IAD had made a reviewable
error on the applicable standard of reasonableness. Based on its own improper
findings of fact, it then made errors of law in respect of legal issues which
should have been decided on a standard of correctness.
37 Applications for judicial
review of administrative decisions rendered pursuant to the Immigration Act
are subject to s. 18.1 of the Federal Court Act. Paragraphs (c)
and (d) of s. 18.1(4), in particular, allow the Court to grant
relief if the federal commission erred in law or based its decision on an
erroneous finding of fact. Under these provisions, questions of law are
reviewable on a standard of correctness.
38 On questions of fact, the reviewing court
can intervene only if it considers that the IAD “based its decision or order on an
erroneous finding of fact that it made in a perverse or capricious manner or
without regard for the material before it” (Federal Court Act, s. 18.1(4)(d)).
The IAD is entitled to base its decision on evidence adduced in the proceedings
which it considers credible and trustworthy in the circumstances: s.
69.4(3) of the Immigration Act. Its findings are entitled to great
deference by the reviewing court. Indeed, the FCA itself has held that the
standard of review as regards issues of credibility and relevance of evidence
is patent unreasonableness: Aguebor v. Minister of Employment &
Immigration (1993), 160 N.R. 315, at para. 4. [Emphasis added.]
[31]
The
Court would also refer to two other decisions, the first being the Federal
Court of Appeal decision in Aguebor v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration),
(1993) 160 N.R. 315, at paragraph 4; the Supreme Court of Canada endorsed
the reasons of Décary J.A. on credibility:
4 There is no longer any doubt
that the Refugee Division, which is a specialized tribunal, has complete
jurisdiction to determine the plausibility of testimony: who is in a better
position than the Refugee Division to gauge the credibility of an account and
to draw the necessary inferences? As long as the inferences drawn by the
tribunal are not so unreasonable as to warrant our intervention, its findings
are not open to judicial review. In Giron, the Court merely observed that in the area
of plausibility, the unreasonableness of a decision may be more palpable, and
so more easily identifiable, since the account appears on the face of the
record. In our opinion, Giron in no way reduces the burden that rests on
an appellant, of showing that the inferences drawn by the Refugee Division
could not reasonably have been drawn. In this case, the appellant has not
discharged this burden. [Emphasis added.]
[32]
The
Court would also reproduce paragraph 85 of the reasons of L’Heureux-Dubé
J., on behalf of the Supreme Court of Canada, in Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 301
v. Montreal (City), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 793:
[85] We must remember that the
standard of review on the factual findings of an administrative tribunal is an
extremely deferent one:
Ross v. New Brunswick School District No. 15, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 825, per
La Forest J., at pp. 849 and 852. Courts
must not revisit the facts or weigh the evidence. Only where the evidence
viewed reasonably is incapable of supporting the tribunal’s findings will a
fact finding be patently unreasonable. An example is the allegation in this
case, viz. that there is no evidence at all for a significant element of the
tribunal’s decision: see Toronto Board of Education, supra,
at para. 48, per Cory J.; Lester, supra, at p. 669, per
McLachlin J. Such a determination may well be made without an in-depth
examination of the record: National Corn Growers Assn. v. Canada (Import
Tribunal), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1324, per Gonthier J., at p. 1370. [Emphasis added.]
2. Arguments
a) Applicant’s
[33]
Counsel
for the applicant argued that the adjudicator erred in finding that the
employer established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Ghyslain
Laplante was involved in a plot to import cocaine by allowing a shipment to
cross the border on the night of June 20/21, 2004. He relied on the following:
- the RCMP investigation,
the night the shipment crossed the border, when the applicant was on duty,
was defective in that the evidence was based on the testimony of AI and
the applicant, whereas the RCMP could have used recording equipment. Furthermore,
the sound of the RCMP video recording that night was poor;
- there was no direct
evidence of Ghyslain Laplante’s involvement in the plot: no contact between
him and the Roy brothers, between him and Alain Charron or between him and
the DEA. He submitted that the evidence of his involvement was purely
circumstantial and speculative;
- it was implausible
that Ghyslain Laplante would have been involved in this kind of plot
because he had been informed by his CBSA supervisor that his brother Serge
was suspected of involvement in this kind of plot, and this would
reasonably have suggested to the applicant that he himself might be under
surveillance;
- in his testimony, Corporal
Turcotte admitted that the RCMP had never considered that the “door”
simply did not exist and that his brother had lied to the Roy brothers for
greater gain, especially when it was not disputed that his brother knew
inspectors worked alone and therefore did not usually search cars;
- the plan for the
shipment’s first crossing was for Friday, June 11, 2004, when the
applicant would not be on duty;
- the applicant’s
behaviour on the night of June 20/21, 2004, was inconsistent with that
of a customs officer who had been paid to let a drug shipment go through. This
claim was based on the fact that Ghyslain Laplante apparently asked AI the
usual questions;
- the RCMP admitted
that in spite of their efforts, they found no evidence of any payment into
the bank accounts of Mr. and Mrs. Ghyslain Laplante.
b) Respondent’s
[34]
First,
counsel for the respondent outlined how American and Canadian authorities,
using an American agent and wiretapping, discovered a plot to buy cocaine in
the United States for the drug‑trafficking Roy brothers of Valleyfield,
Quebec; how an initial attempt to import failed and one of the Roy brothers, on
May 6, 2004, told the American agent that they had set up a second team,
made up of a driver, a contact for a “door” and a “door”.
[35]
Second,
after driver Alain Charron was arrested while picking up the cocaine in the
United States on May 17, 2004, wiretaps revealed that Alain Charron, at the
DEA’s direction, called Serge Laplante that same day for instructions on when
and where to cross the Canadian border and was told by him how to get to the Frelighsburg
border crossing and to cross the border there on June 20, 2004, after
12:30 at night. Serge Laplante knew his brother was on duty that night,
starting his shift at 11 o’clock on the evening of June 20.
[36]
Third,
counsel for the respondent described the main parts of the undercover officer’s
conversation with the customs officer as he crossed the border:
- when the customs
officer asked him his name, he just said “Alain”;
- Ghyslain Laplante asked
him only one other question: how long had he been in the United States?;
- AI asked him a
trick question – whether “Steve” was around – to which the customs officer
spontaneously replied: “Do you mean Serge?”;
- AI asked him to
call Serge and tell him his “buddy” had arrived. Despite saying that he
did not like using the office telephone for that kind of business, Ghyslain
Laplante called his brother at 1:15 in the morning;
- AI was not
questioned on what he was transporting after telling the customs officer that
he did not like driving around with it in the back of the truck;
- without being
asked, the customs officer gave AI a road map showing the way to the town
of Dunham, where his brother Serge was waiting for him;
- on June 22,
2004, in a recorded conversation, Tony Roy told the American agent that
the driver, the “door” and the contact for the door had all been arrested.
[37]
Finally,
counsel for the applicant summarized the main parts of Ghyslain Laplante’s
questioning by a member of the RCMP, on June 21, 2004, in which he
denied having contacted his brother from the border crossing on June 21,
2004.
3. Discussion and conclusions
[38]
It
is important to point out that the adjudicator’s role was to hear the witnesses
and receive the documentary evidence (such as wiretaps), assess the weight and
credibility of that evidence, and then decide based on all of the evidence
before him whether it was more likely than not that the applicant was involved
in a plot to facilitate the importation of a shipment of cocaine into Canada.
[39]
According
to his counsel, the evidence that Ghyslain Laplante was involved in this kind
of plot was not direct; it was indirect or circumstantial. The purpose of
indirect evidence is to establish relevant facts from which a contentious fact
can be inferred, i.e. this kind of evidence establishes the facts that make the
contentious fact probable, in this case, the applicant’s involvement in the
plot.
[40]
Mr. Cameron,
for the applicant, acknowledged that the key issue before the Court was a
question of fact: whether there was sufficient evidence. The case law is quite
clear on this; a question of this kind requires the reviewing court to be
highly deferential, as Parliament indicated when it enacted section 18.1(4)
of the Federal Courts Act.
[41]
The
Court also notes that the adjudicator, in a number of places in his decision, rejected
the applicant’s testimony for various reasons: (1) inconsistency of that
testimony with the documentary evidence (the wiretaps), (2) contradictions between
his testimony and what he said either when questioned on June 21, 2004, or
during the internal investigation conducted by his employer, (3) plausibility
of that testimony based on evidence before the adjudicator, for example, the
fact that he gave his brother his work schedule, the fact that he called his
brother at 1:30 in the morning on June 21, 2004, among other things.
[42]
In
his submissions, counsel for Ghyslain Laplante did not argue that the Board erred
in its findings on Mr. Laplante’s credibility. The crux of his argument
was that the Board erred in its assessment of the evidence before it. He gave
as an example the fact that the plan for the second operation was initially to
cross the border on Friday, June 11, 2004, when the applicant was not on
duty. The Court cannot accept that argument. The adjudicator was well aware of
that fact; he mentioned it twice in his decision. However, having reviewed all
of the evidence, he was of the view that “the rest of
the evidence adduced weighs in favour of his involvement.”
[43]
He
also argued, based on the applicant’s testimony, that his brother had tricked
the Roy brothers by saying that a “door” had been arranged. The adjudicator was
aware of that theory. He found that the evidence before him established, on the
balance of probabilities, that he was involved in the plot. Counsel for the
applicant failed to satisfy the Court, on the evidence as a whole, that this
finding was unreasonable.
[44]
The
Court is of the view that the other arguments that counsel for the applicant put
forward were merely an invitation to reweigh the evidence; the Court is not
entitled to do that. The Court is also of the view that although it might find
in favour of the applicant on one or two points, those points would be of
marginal importance and would have no effect on the result, since the evidence
before the adjudicator, on the whole, enabled him to make a reasonable finding on
the preponderance of the evidence that neither of the applicant’s grievances
was well founded.
[45]
For
these reasons, the Court must dismiss this application for judicial review.
JUDGMENT
THE COURT ORDERS AND ADJUDGES that this application for judicial
review be dismissed with costs.
“François
Lemieux”
____________________________
Judge
Certified
true translation
Peter
Douglas
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