Date: 20080422
Docket: T-895-07
Citation: 2008 FC 519
BETWEEN:
association des crabiers acadiens inc.,
a company duly
incorporated under the laws
of New
Brunswick, JEAN-GILLES CHIASSON,
on
his own behalf and in his capacity as President of
the
Association des crabiers acadiens inc.,
ASSOCIATION DES
CRABIERS GASPÉSIENS INC.,
an incorporated
association registered under the laws
of Quebec, MARC
COUTURE, on his own behalf
and in his capacity as
Administrator of the Association des crabiers
gaspésiens inc.,
ASSOCIATION DES CRABIERS DE LA BAIE,
an unincorporated
association registered under the laws
of Quebec, DANIEL
DESBOIS, on his own behalf
and in his capacity as
Administrator of the Association des crabiers de la Baie,
and ROBERT F. HACHÉ
Applicants
and
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER
PROTHONOTARY
MORNEAU
[1]
This is a motion by the applicants under, firstly,
subsection 18.4(2) of the Federal Courts Act, R.S.C. (1985),
c. F-7, as amended, (the Act) seeking an order that the application for
judicial review in this case (the Application) be treated and proceeded with as
an action.
[2]
If this Court agrees to the first remedy, the applicants
also seek under paragraph 105(a) of the Federal Courts Rules
(the rules) to have the Application consolidated with Court file T‑1271‑07, in which an action for damages was brought against the Federal Crown
on July 11, 2007.
[3]
Finally, an extension of the time limit under rule 309 for
the filing of the applicants’ record is sought if the applicants’ motion is
dismissed.
[4]
I will examine each of these remedies in order after
reviewing the facts underlying this motion.
Background
[5]
The applicants essentially consist of three associations of
traditional snow crab fishers.
[TRANSLATION]
This application for
judicial review concerns the adoption, by the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans
(the Minister), of a Snow Crab Fishery Management Plan for the southern
Gulf (the Plan), which was publicly announced on or about April 25,
2007. . . .
[8]
The applicants are essentially seeking in their Application
to have these aspects of the Plan cancelled on the basis that the Minister
based his decision on reasons unrelated to the Fisheries Act, R.S.C.
(1985), c. F-14, as amended, thereby exceeding his jurisdiction.
[9]
After filing the Application in May 2007, the applicants
brought a motion under rule 318 to obtain from the respondent an extensive
series of documents. In a decision dated July 27, 2007, this Court
denied the motion because the documents sought were not before the Minister
when the Plan was adopted and because this request for documents was similar to
the discovery of information and documents that occurs at the interlocutory
stage of an action, not on an application for judicial review.
[10]
Following that decision, which was not appealed, the
applicants filed on August 27, 2007, under rule 306, a single
affidavit, namely the detailed affidavit of Robert Haché, one of the applicants
in this case. On October 12, 2007, the respondent filed in response the
detailed affidavit of Rhéal Vienneau under rule 307. Mr. Vienneau is Regional
Director of the Resource Management Division of Fisheries and Oceans Canada
(Gulf Region).
[11]
On November 23, 2007, Mr. Vienneau underwent a lengthy examination on affidavit. During
that examination, counsel for the defence objected, inter alia, to the
production of additional documents.
[TRANSLATION]
(…) the proof that the applicants intend to make in support
of their claims cannot be made by affidavit and requires that the applicants
follow the procedures applicable to the discovery of documents and examinations
for discovery;
[13]
It should be noted, however, that on July 11, 2007,
almost all of the individual applicants in this case joined with other
applicants who were also members of associations of crab fishers in filing an
action for damages against the respondent (file T‑1271‑07, or,
sometimes, the action for damages).
[14]
In file T‑1271‑07, which deals with the history
of the snow crab fishery, including the Plan, the applicants in this case
sought damages for breach of contract, fault in the exercise of a public
office, expropriation without compensation, negligence in the exercise of
discretionary power, misrepresentations, unjustified enrichment and breach of a
fiduciary obligation.
[15]
As to the respective progress of this file T‑895‑07
and the action for damages, it should be noted that this case T‑895‑07
is in a relatively advanced stage, the affidavits having been filed and the
examinations on affidavit having been conducted. File T‑1271‑07, on
the other hand, is still in the initial stages. File T‑1271‑07 is
currently subject to a motion to strike brought by the respondent on the
principal allegation that the applicants failed to have the ministerial
decisions invalidated before bringing an action for damages. A hearing by a
judge of this Court on the motion to strike is pending by virtue of the order
made by this Court on April 14, 2008.
Analysis
[16]
I intend to dismiss the applicants’ motion with regard to
the principal remedies for the following reasons.
[17]
The text itself of section 18.4 provides that the
possibility of conversion set out in subsection 18.4(2) is an exception to
the general rule in subsection 18.4(1) that applications shall be heard
without delay and in a summary way.
[18]
Section 18.4 reads as follows:
|
18.4 (1) Hearings in
a summary way ‑ Subject to subsection (2), an application or reference
to the Federal Court under any of sections 18.1 to 18.3 shall be heard and
determined without delay and in a summary way.
(2) Exception ‑ The Federal Court
may, if it considers it appropriate, direct that an application for judicial
review be treated and proceeded with as an action.
|
18.4 (1) Procédure sommaire d’audition ‑ Sous
réserve du paragraphe (2), la Cour fédérale statue à bref délai et selon une
procédure sommaire sur les demandes et les renvois qui lui sont présentés
dans le cadre des articles 18.1 à 18.3.
(2) Exception ‑ Elle peut, si elle
l'estime indiqué, ordonner qu'une demande de contrôle judiciaire soit
instruite comme s'il s'agissait d'une action.
|
[19]
Although Drapeau v. Canada (Minister of National
Defence), [1995] F.C.J. No. 536 establishes that, in certain circumstances,
there are no limits placed on the considerations which may be taken into
account when the Court is seized of an application for conversion under
subsection 18.4(2) of the Act, it seems to me that paragraph [1] of the
reasons of the majority of the Federal Court of Appeal in Drapeau lead
us to conclude nevertheless that when a party raises evidentiary constraints,
as in this case, Federal Court of Appeal decision Macinnis v. Canada,
[1994] 2 F.C. 464 (Macinnis) remains the leading applicable case.
[20]
At pages 470 to 472 of Macinnis, the Court
cites the following central principles:
|
It is, in general, only where facts of whatever nature
cannot be satisfactorily established or weighed through affidavit evidence
that consideration should be given to using subsection 18.4(2) of the Act.
One should not lose sight of the clear intention of Parliament to have
applications for judicial review determined whenever possible with as much
speed and as little encumbrances and delays of the kind associated with
trials as are possible. The “clearest of circumstances”, to use the words of
Muldoon J., where that subsection may be used, is where there is a need for viva
voce evidence, either to assess demeanour and credibility of witnesses or
to allow the Court to have a full grasp of the whole of the evidence whenever
it feels the case cries out for the full panoply of a trial.7 The
decision of this Court in Bayer AG and Miles Canada Inc. v. Minister of
National Health and Welfare and Apotex Inc.8 where Mahoney
J.A. to some extent commented adversely on a decision made by Rouleau J. in
the same file,9 is a recent illustration of the reluctance of the
Court to proceed by way of an action rather than by way of an application.
Strayer J. in Vancouver Island Peace Society, and
Reed J. in Derrickson have indicated that it is important to
remember the true nature of the questions to be answered by the Court in
judicial review proceedings and to consider the adequacy of affidavit
evidence for answering those questions. Thus, a judge would err in
accepting that a party could only introduce the evidence it wants by way of a
trial if that evidence was not related to the narrow issues to be answered by
the Court. The complexity of the factual issues would be, taken by itself, an
irrelevant consideration if the conflicting expert affidavits on which they
are based are related to the issues before the tribunal rather than issues
before the Court. In the same vein, speculation that hidden evidence will
come to light is not a basis for ordering a trial.10 A judge
might be justified in holding otherwise if there were good grounds for
believing that such evidence would only come to light in a trial, but the
key test is whether the judge can see that affidavit evidence will be
inadequate, not that trial evidence might be superior.
[Emphasis added.]
7 See Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. Matsqui
Indian Band, [1993] 2 F.C. 641 (C.A.), at pp. 649‑650; Edwards
v. Canada (Minister of Agriculture) (1992),
53 F.T.R. 265 (F.C.T.D.), at p. 267, Pinard J.
8 (25 October 1993), A‑389‑93,
not yet reported.
9 [Bayer AG et al. v. Canada
(Minister of National Health and Welfare) et al.] (1993), 66 F.T.R. 137
(F.C.T.D.).
10 Oduro v. Canada
(Minister of Employment and Immigration), 9 December
1993, IMM‑903‑93 (F.C.T.D.), McKeown J. (not yet reported).
|
En général, c'est seulement lorsque les faits, de
quelque nature qu'ils soient, ne peuvent pas être évalués ou établis avec
satisfaction au moyen d'un affidavit que l'on devrait envisager d'utiliser le
paragraphe 18.4(2) de la Loi. Il ne faudrait pas perdre de vue
l'intention clairement exprimée par le Parlement, qu'il soit statué le plus
tôt possible sur les demandes de contrôle judiciaire, avec toute la célérité
possible, et le moins possible d'obstacles et de retards du type de ceux
qu'il est fréquent de rencontrer dans les procès. On a des « motifs très
clairs » d'avoir recours à ce paragraphe, pour utiliser les mots du juge
Muldoon, lorsqu'il faut obtenir une preuve de vive voix soit pour évaluer
l'attitude et la crédibilité des témoins ou pour permettre à la Cour de
saisir l'ensemble de la preuve lorsqu'elle considère que l'affaire requiert
tout l'appareillage d'un procès tenu en bonne et due forme7.
L'arrêt rendu par la présente Cour dans l'affaire Bayer AG et Miles Canada
Inc. c. Ministre de la Santé nationale et du Bien-être social et Apotex Inc.8,
où le juge Mahoney, J.C.A. s'est montré jusqu'à un certain point en désaccord
avec la décision rendue par le juge Rouleau dans la même affaire9,
est un exemple récent de l'hésitation de la Cour à instruire une affaire par
voie d'action plutôt qu'au moyen d'une demande.
Le juge Strayer, dans l'arrêt Vancouver Island Peace
Society, et le juge Reed dans l'arrêt Derrickson, ont mentionné
qu'il est important de se rappeler la vraie nature des questions
auxquelles la Cour doit répondre dans une procédure de contrôle judiciaire,
et de considérer la pertinence d'utiliser la preuve déposée par affidavit
pour répondre à ces questions. Par conséquent, un juge commettrait une
erreur en acceptant qu'une partie puisse seulement présenter la preuve
qu'elle veut au moyen d'un procès si cette preuve n'était pas liée aux
questions très précises auxquelles la Cour doit répondre. La complexité,
comme telle, des questions de faits ne saurait être prise en considération si
les affidavits contradictoires des experts qui s'appuient sur ces faits se
rapportent aux questions soumises au tribunal plutôt qu'aux questions
soumises à la Cour. Par conséquent, supposer qu'on pourra mettre au jour
une preuve cachée n'est pas une raison suffisante pour ordonner la tenue d'un
procès10. Un juge peut être justifié de statuer autrement s'il
a de bonnes raisons de croire qu'une telle preuve ne pourrait être mise au
jour qu'au moyen d'un procès. Mais le vrai critère que le juge doit
appliquer est de se demander si la preuve présentée au moyen d'affidavits
sera suffisante, et non de se demander si la preuve qui pourrait être
présentée au cours d'un procès pourrait être supérieure.
[Je souligne.]
7 Voir Canadien
Pacifique Ltée. c. Bande indienne de Matsqui, [1993] 2 C.F. 641
(C.A.), aux p. 649 et 650; Edwards c. Canada (Ministre de
l'Agriculture) (1992), 53 F.T.R. 265 (1re inst.), à la p. 267, le
juge Pinard.
8 (25 octobre 1993), A‑389‑93,
encore inédit.
9 [Bayer AG et
autre c. Canada (Ministre de la Santé nationale et du Bien-être social) et
autre] (1993), 66 F.T.R. 137 (C.F. 1re inst.).
10 Oduro c. Canada
(Ministre de l'Emploi et de l'Immigration), 9 décembre
1993, IMM‑903‑93 (C.F. 1re inst.), le juge McKeown, (encore
inédit).
|
[21]
Based on the above, and without disregarding other relevant
factors, I believe that the joint assessment of the following three criteria or
factors will be sufficient to deal with the application for conversion in this
case:
1 - The true nature of the questions the Court must
answer in the Application;
2 - The adequacy of affidavit evidence;
3 - The need to assess demeanour and credibility of
witnesses.
[22]
I agree with the respondent that in hearing the
Application, the Court must decide whether the Minister, in developing and
implementing the Plan, acted in accordance with the powers and obligations
conferred on him by the Fisheries Act and whether the exercise of his
discretionary powers was based on appropriate considerations rather than considerations
unrelated to the Act.
[23]
Therefore, I agree that the history of the relationship
between the parties, the history of the development of the snow crab fishery
and the validity of the existence of possible agreements between the parties in
1990, 1997 and 2002 are not relevant issues in the context of this
Application. At the very least, these issues are not central to the
Application. The difficulties encountered by the applicants during the
examination of Mr. Vienneau on these points, including the argument that
he had no personal knowledge of certain facts, therefore cannot militate in
favour of the full panoply of a trial.
[24]
As for the issues related more directly to the Plan that
should be considered once again here, I do not find that the dynamic surrounding
the parties’ affidavits and Mr. Vienneau’s examination calls for the
conversion sought on the basis of the inadequacy of proof by affidavit or the
need to assess viva voce the demeanour and credibility of the witnesses.
[25]
In the same vein, with respect to the delayed opening of
the fishery in zone 12, Mr. Vienneau adequately stated what he knew. The
fact that during this examination the applicants were refused the production of
an exchange of correspondence potentially relevant to a decision note produced
by the respondent is a situation that could have been settled in a timely
fashion by a motion to decide an objection, and not by an application for
conversion.
[26]
The applicants could also have sought affidavits to that
effect from fishers in zone 19.
[27]
Affidavits could also have been sought from, inter alia,
the Maritime Fishermen’s Union (MFU) about thei own lobster fishing
rationalization plan or about their obligation to return their lobster trap
tags directly to the Minister.
[28]
I think it is safe to assume that any steps taken to obtain
affidavits would have been met with failure. At least such a result would have
been clear.
[29]
As for the allegations that the Minister was acting in bad
faith, raised by the applicants in their written representations in support of
the motion under review, I must take note of the respondent’s comment that
neither the Application nor Mr. Haché’s affidavit under rule 306
raises this issue in a clear and precise manner. It would therefore not be
appropriate here to rely on bad faith to apply the decision of this Court in Jazz
Air LP v. Toronto Port Authority, [2006] F.C.J. No. 1053 (F.C. –
prot), aff’d [2006] F.C.J. No. 1155 (F.C.)).
[30]
As for mesh size restrictions, the particulars supplied by
Mr. Vienneau during his examination on discovery were adequate, and the
applicants are now able to maintain the line of argument they set forth at
paragraph 50 of their written representations.
[31]
Therefore, the Court dismisses the applicants’ motion under
subsection 18.4(2) of the Act.
[32]
Moreover, as regards the applicants’ application to have
this file consolidated with file T‑1271-07 under paragraph 105 (a)
of the Rules, the Court is not required to answer that question because it is
dismissing the application for conversion.
[33]
However, if it were to consider the issue formally, the
Court would dismiss the application for the reasons raised by the respondent in
Part B of his written representations, and more particularly on the basis of
paragraphs 79 and 82 of those representations.
[34]
Finally, with respect to the extension of the time limit
under rule 309, the motion is granted, the whole without costs. The applicants
shall serve and file their record under rule 309 within thirty days of the
final judgment with regard to the motion under review. This extension overrides
and replaces the similar extension contained in the order of this Court dated
January 7, 2008.
“Richard Morneau”
Certified
true translation
Francie
Gow, BCL, LLB
Email this Content