Date:
20071019
Dockets: T-986-05
T-1114-05
Citation: 2007 FC 1083
[ENGLISH
TRANSLATION]
Montréal, Quebec,
October 19, 2007
PRESENT:
The Honourable Mr. Justice Max M. Teitelbaum
T-986-05
BETWEEN:
THE
MINISTER OF NATIONAL REVENUE
Plaintiff
and
EC
GROUP INC.
Defendant
T-1114-05
AND
BETWEEN:
THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL REVENUE
Plaintiff
and
THERMO SERVICES V.I.P. INC.
Defendant
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND
JUDGMENT
Background
[1]
This
is a motion by the Minister of National Revenue (“MNR”) for an order declaring
Mr. Éric Adam, for EC Groupe Inc., and Ms. Roxanne Bourque, for the Thermo
Services V.I.P. Inc. company, guilty of contempt of Court for not having
complied with the order of Justice Luc Martineau, of this Court, issued on
November 28, 2005 (for Mr. Adam), and the order of Justice Yvon Pinard, of this
Court, issued on December 5, 2005 (for Ms. Bourque), enjoining each of them to
reply to the MNR’s requirement to provide information dated January 12, 2005
(for Mr. Adam), and April 13, 2005 (for Ms. Bourque).
[2]
Mr.
Adam and Ms. Bourque also failed to comply with an order issued by Justice Michel
M.J. Shore, of this Court, on June 19, 2006, which granted them an additional
60 days to provide the information required by the MNR.
Facts
[3]
On
January 12, 2005, the MNR sent a requirement to provide information to Mr. Adam
in his representative capacity as administrator of EC Group Inc. On April 13,
2005, the MNR sent the same request to Ms. Bourque in her representative
capacity as administrator of the Thermo Services V.I.P. Inc. company. Mr. Adam and
Ms. Bourque are married.
[4]
In
both of its requests, the MNR requested the following information: the payroll
records for 2003 and 2004, the T4 Summary and the statement of remuneration
paid for 2003 and 2004, the cash disbursement journal for 2003 and 2004, all
the cancelled cheques and monthly bank statements from 2003 and 2004, and the minutes
book. Mr. Adam’s request gave him 30 days to respond (until February 11, 2005),
while Ms. Bourque’s request gave her a little over 45 days (until May 30,
2005).
[5]
Neither
of these requests received a response. On August 16, 2005, Mr. Adam signed an
affidavit in which he affirmed that he could not satisfy the MNR’s request
because the documents in question had been lost. On November 28, 2005,
Martineau J. issued an order enjoining Mr. Adam to respond in part to the MNR’s
request by providing all the cancelled cheques and monthly bank statements from
2003 and 2004. On November 30, 2005, Ms. Bourque signed an affidavit in which
she affirmed she was willing to provide the requested documents, but she needed
additional time to execute this request. On December 5, 2005, Pinard J. issued
an order enjoining Ms. Bourque to fully respond to the MNR’s request.
[6]
Through
an order issued on June 19, 2006, Shore J. extended the orders from Martineau
and Pinard JJ. for a period of 60 days.
[7]
During
the following year, Mr. Adam and Ms. Bourque failed to comply with the Court’s
orders. On June 4, 2007, Prothonotary Richard Morneau issued an order enjoining
them to appear before the Court to respond to the allegations of contempt of
court put forward by MNR.
Issue
[8]
Did
Mr. Adam and Ms. Bourque disobey the orders of this Court with evidence beyond
reasonable doubt?
Submissions by the MNR
[9]
The
MNR’s position is simple: Mr. Adam and Ms. Bourque did not produce the
documents required by the requirement, which constitutes a violation of the
orders that this Court had issued to enjoin them to obey the request in
question. According to the MNR, this failure on the part of Mr. Adam and Ms.
Bourque proves beyond all reasonable doubt that they disobeyed the orders of
the Court, hence the offence of contempt of court.
[10]
The
MNR claims that Mr. Adam and Ms. Bourque repeatedly refused to produce these
documents in full knowledge of the facts, which forced him to initiate many
legal actions and incurred many costs. For this reason, the MNR is requesting
that Mr. Adam and Ms. Bourque each pay a fine of $1,500 in addition to
respective fees of over $5,300. In both cases, the MNR also requests that the
documents requested in the orders from Martineau and Pinard JJ. be produced.
Submissions by Mr. Adam and Ms.
Bourque
[11]
The
claims made by both spouses differ to a certain extent, which is why I am
addressing them separately.
[12]
First,
Mr. Adam claims that he has not been the administrator of EC Group since July
31, 2003. The Centre informatique du registre des entreprises du Québec (the “CIDREQ”)
dated August 6, 2003, and a judicial declaration made by the new administrator
of EC Group, Mr. Roger Sutherland, attest to the change of administrators that
took place within the company. Thus, according to Mr. Adam, there is no legal
link between him and the true defendant in this request, EC Group Inc. Besides,
Mr. Adam disposed of his property on June 17, 2004, and therefore could not—from
that date—be the administrator of the company. For these reasons, Mr. Adam
claims that this Court has no jurisdiction to issue an order against him
because the true party to the proceedings is EC Group Inc.
[13]
Furthermore,
Mr. Adam reiterates that on January 18, 2005, Mr. Sutherland, in his
representative capacity as administrator of EC Group, signed a letter
indicating that all the requested documents had disappeared or were still
missing.
[14]
Finally,
Mr. Adam claims that he did not disobey the orders beyond a reasonable doubt
because he acted in good faith at every stage, and the only reason he did not
provide the requested documents is that the fees for producing the documents—which
amounted to over $30,000—were too high. According to Mr. Adam, these high fees
represent a force majeure which, under article 1693 of the Civil Code
of Quebec (the “Civil Code”), releases him from his obligation.
[15]
For
her part, Ms. Bourque claims that she was also unaware that producing the
documents required by the MNR would entail expenses that amounted to several
thousands of dollars. Furthermore, she claims that she has not been the
administrator of the Thermo Services V.I.P. Inc. company since September 2004 and
that the company has not been active since December 2004. In any event, she
left all matters pertaining to the company’s administration to her spouse, Mr.
Adam; and, for this reason, he is the one who should have provided the
requested documents. During the hearing, Ms. Bourque claimed that she was
merely the cleaning lady for the Thermo Services company. She concluded by
affirming that since she provided all the requested documents, she believed in
good faith that she had been relieved of her obligation toward the MNR. For
this reason, she claims that she does not have the mens rea required by
the offence with which she is charged.
[16]
Mr.
Adam and Ms. Bourque both submit the case of Merck & Co. v. Apotex Inc. [2003]
F.C.J. No. 837; 2003 FCA 234, to support their position that they did not have mens
rea, that is to say, the intention required by the offence of contempt of
court. On the contrary, they claim they acted in good faith at every stage.
However, as I indicate later, Merck v. Apotex, above, actually confirms
that the presence of an intention is not necessary to commit the offence of
contempt of court.
Analysis
[17]
The
MNR’s requirement was issued in accordance with subsection 231.2(1) of the Income
Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.), up to date until August 31, 2004
(the “ITA”), which reads as follows:
|
231.2.(1)
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the Minister may, subject to
subsection (2), for any purpose related to the administration or enforcement
of this Act, including the collection of any amount payable under this Act by
any person, by notice served personally or by registered or certified mail,
require that any person provide, within such reasonable time as is stipulated
in the notice,
(a)
any information or additional information, including a return of income or a
supplementary return; or
(b)
any document.
|
231.2.(1)
Malgré les autres dispositions de la présente loi, le ministre peut, sous
réserve du paragraphe (2) et, pour l’application et l’exécution de la
présente loi, y compris la perception d’un montant payable par une personne
en vertu de la présente loi, par avis signifié à personne ou envoyé par
courrier recommandé ou certifié, exiger d’une personne, dans le délai
raisonnable que précise l’avis :
a) qu’elle fournisse
tout renseignement ou tout renseignement supplémentaire, y compris une
déclaration de revenu ou une déclaration supplémentaire;
b) qu’elle produise
des documents.
|
[18]
The
orders of Martineau and Pinard JJ. were issued in accordance with section 237.1
of the ITA, which reads as follows:
|
231.7.(1)
On summary application by the Minister, a judge may, notwithstanding
subsection 238(2), order a person to provide any access, assistance,
information or document sought by the Minister under section 231.1 or 231.2
if the judge is satisfied that
(a)
the person was required under section 231.1 or 231.2 to provide the access,
assistance, information or document and did not do so; and
(b)
in the case of information or a document, the information or document is not
protected from disclosure by solicitor-client privilege (within the meaning
of subsection 232(1)).
[…]
(4)
If a person fails or refuses to comply with an order, a judge may find the
person in contempt of court and the person is subject to the processes and
the punishments of the court to which the judge is appointed.
|
231.7.(1)
Sur demande sommaire du ministre, un juge peut, malgré le paragraphe 238(2),
ordonner à une personne de fournir l’accès, l’aide, les renseignement ou les
documents que le ministre cherche à obtenir en vertu des articles 231.1 ou
231.2 s’il est convaincu de ce qui suit :
a) la personne n’a
pas fourni l’accès, l’aide, les renseignements ou les documents bien qu’elle
en soit tenue par les articles 231.1 ou 231.2;
b) s’agissant de
renseignements ou de documents, le privilège des communications entre client
et avocat, au sens du paragraphe 232(1), ne peut être invoqué à leur égard.
[…]
(4)
Quiconque refuse ou fait défaut de se conformer à une ordonnance peut être
reconnu coupable d’outrage au tribunal; il est alors sujet aux procédures et
sanctions du tribunal l’ayant ainsi reconnu coupable.
|
[19]
Under
Rule 466(b) of the Federal Courts Rules, a person is guilty of contempt
of court if he or she disobeys a Court order as explained in the following
citation:
|
466.
Subject to rule 467, a person is guilty of contempt of Court who
[…]
(b)
disobeys a process or order of the Court;
|
466.
Sous réserve de la règle 467, est coupable d’outrage au tribunal
quiconque :
[…]
b) désobéit à un
moyen de contrainte ou à une ordonnance de la Cour;
|
[20]
Under
Rule 472, the sentences that can be imposed in the event of a conviction for
contempt of court are the following:
|
472.
Where a person is found to be in contempt, a judge
may order that
(a) the person be imprisoned for a
period of less than five years or until the person complies with the order;
(b) the person be imprisoned for a
period of less than five years if the person fails to comply with the order;
(c) the person pay a fine;
(d) the person do or refrain from
doing any act;
(e) in respect of a person
referred to in rule 429, the person's property be sequestered; and
(f) the person pay costs.
|
472.
Lorsqu’une personne est reconnue coupable d’outrage
au tribunal, le juge peut ordonner :
a) qu’elle
soit incarcérée pour une période de moins de cinq ans ou jusqu’à ce qu’elle
se conforme à l’ordonnance;
b) qu’elle
soit incarcérée pour une période de moins de cinq ans si elle ne se conforme
pas à l’ordonnance;
c) qu’elle
paie une amende;
d) qu’elle
accomplisse un acte ou s’abstienne de l’accomplir;
e) que les
biens de la personne soient mis sous séquestre, dans le cas visé à la règle
429;
f) qu’elle
soit condamnée aux dépens.
|
[21]
As
indicated at subsection 231.7(4) of the ITA and Rule 466(b), the offence of
contempt of court is determined by the sole defiance of a court order. Mr. Adam
and Ms. Bourque claim, to the contrary, that the intention of committing
contempt of court is necessary to commit the offence. However, the case of Merck
v. Apotex, above, which they submit to support their position,
unfortunately does not further their cause.
[22]
In
Merck v. Apotex, above, it was up to the Federal Court of Appeal to
determine whether Apotex had violated the order from Justice W. Andrew Mackay
of this Court, who is now a deputy judge, concluding that the patent developed
by Merck had been infringed and enjoining Apotex to cease all patent
infringement. The day after the judgment was filed, Apotex was selling—for a
total of $9 million—some generic medication identified in the order. In
response to Apotex’s argument regarding the issue of the intention required to
commit contempt of court, Justice J. Edgar Sexton affirms the following:
Nowhere in Baxter
v. Cutter does the Supreme Court of Canada indicate that it need be shown
that the defendant intended to act in such a way as to interfere with the
orderly administration of justice, or to impair the authority or dignity of the
Court.
[end of paragraph 54]
[…]
Therefore,
the jurisprudence establishes that it is not necessary to show that the alleged
contemnor intended, by doing the action, to “interfere with the orderly
administration of justice or to impair the authority or dignity of the Court”.
This is too high a level of intent to require in civil contempt cases. Rather,
it is sufficient to find that the Court’s intention was clear and that the
alleged contemnor knowingly committed the prohibited act.
[paragraph 60]
[23]
Here,
Sexton J. is referring to Baxter Travenol Laboratories of Canada, Ltd. v.
Cutter (Canada), Ltd., [1983] 2 S.C.R. 388, that is to say, that in the
case before the Supreme Court of Canada, during which it was decided that the
prohibitions contained in a judgment must be complied with as soon as the
reasons for the decision are delivered, even if the judgment in itself only
becomes effective the moment it is signed. Following this conclusion, the
Supreme Court referred the matter to the Trial Division of the Federal Court so
that it make a decision on the merits of the case. Justice Jean-Eudes Dubé then
concluded that the intention was not relevant to committing the offence of
contempt of court and sentenced Cutter (Canada), Ltd. (“Cutter”) to a fine of
$100,000 for contempt of court (Baxter Travenol Laboratories of Canada, Ltd.
v. Cutter (Canada), Ltd., [1984] F.C.J. No. 272). During an appeal of this
decision before the Federal Court of Appeal, Cutter did not contest the finding
of contempt of court, but the amount of the fine only. In a unanimous decision
that decreased the amount by half (Baxter Travenol Laboratories of Canada,
Ltd. v. Cutter (Canada), Ltd., [1987] F.C.J. No. 205; [1987] 2 F.C. 557), Justice
John J. Urie affirmed the following:
Having said
that, counsel conceded, correctly I think, that the presence or absence of good
faith on the part of an alleged contemnor is not relevant in the determination
of whether or not there was an act of contempt. It is relevant only in
considering the penalty to be imposed, as a mitigating factor.
[paragraph 13]
[24]
Thus,
it follows from the legislation and the case law cited that intention is not
necessary to commit the offence of contempt of court. The very fact that Mr.
Adam and Ms. Bourque failed to provide the documents requested by the MNR,
which they had been ordered to do by this Court, suffices to prove that the
offence of contempt of court was committed as defined in subsection 231.7(4) of
the ITA and Rule 466(b).
[25]
As
for the other reason put forward, Mr. Adam and Ms. Bourque claimed that they
were no longer the administrators of the defendant companies and, in the case
of Ms. Bourque in particular, that she in fact never held this position,
leaving this mandate to her husband. The preceding argument does not satisfy me
because Ms. Bourque signed documents produced by Thermo Services V.I.P. Inc. in
her representative capacity as administrator of the company. Furthermore, we
are not concerned with whether Mr. Adam and Ms. Bourque are still the
administrators of the defendant companies, but rather whether they were during
the periods of time identified by the requests for information issued by the
MNR, that is to say in 2003 and 2004. The evidence indicates that they in fact
were at the time. Therefore, the MNR was right to consider them to be the
legitimate addressees of his requests for information.
[26]
The
other arguments that were mainly raised by Mr. Adam do not further satisfy me
of the merits of his position. More specifically, I do not believe that article
1693 of the Civil Code, which applies in cases of force majeure, is
relevant to this case. Mr. Adam did not prove the existence of a force
majeure as required by the second paragraph of article 1693. A force
majeure event must not simply render the execution of the obligation more
onerous, but prevent it in an absolute and permanent way (Baudouin, Renaud, The
Annotated Civil Code of Quebec, Volume 2, 9th edition, 2006, p.
2235). The required costs to produce the documents, though they took Mr. Adam
and Ms. Bourque by surprise, do not represent a force majeure as such.
[27]
In
addition, I do not accept the position that Mr. Adam could not have violated a
directive from the MNR under the pretext that the request for information dated
January 12, 2005, was not sent by the MNR himself, but rather from an
individual named Ms. Pauline Bachand, who works for the Canada Customs and
Revenue Agency (now known as the Canada Revenue Agency). On this point, I would
like to remind Mr. Adam that the Canada Revenue Agency is the designation of
the department managed by the MNR and that the request for information made it
crystal clear that should Mr. Adam fail to produce the required documents, he
was liable to be prosecuted under the ITA, which is also managed by the MNR.
[28]
For
all these reasons, I find that Mr. Adam (on behalf of defendant company EC
Group Inc.) and Ms. Bourque (on behalf of defendant company Thermo Services
V.I.P. Inc.) both committed the offence of contempt of court as defined in subsection
231.7(4) of the ITA and Rule 466(b).
JUDGMENT
THIS COURT ORDERS AND
ADJUDGES that
the application be allowed and that Mr. Adam and Ms.
Bourque be found guilty of contempt of court. I summon Mr. Adam and Ms. Bourque
to appear before me at the Federal Court, 30, McGill Road, at Montréal, Quebec,
on October 26, 2007, at 10:30 am to submit their submissions on sentencing.
“Max
M. Teitelbaum”
FEDERAL COURT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKETS: T-986-05; T-1114-05
STYLE OF CAUSE: The
Minister of National Revenue v. EC Group Inc.
The Minister of
National Revenue v. Thermo Services V.I.P. Inc.
PLACE OF
HEARING: Montréal,
Quebec
DATE OF
HEARING: August
27, 2007
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT: Max M. Teitelbaum D.J.
DATED: October
19, 2007
APPEARANCES:
|
Véronica
Romagnino
|
FOR THE PLAINTIFF
|
|
Michel
Bélanger
|
FOR THE DEFENDANTS
|
SOLICITORS
OF RECORD:
|
John H. Sims,
Q.C.
Deputy
Attorney General of Canada
|
FOR THE PLAINTIFF
|
|
Michel
Bélanger
Saint-Hubert
(Québec)
|
FOR THE DEFENDANTS
|