Date: 20070208
Docket: IMM-3034-06
Citation: 2007 FC 137
Ottawa,
Ontario, February 8, 2007
PRESENT:
The Honourable Mr. Justice Beaudry
BETWEEN:
MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
Applicant
and
AJEMA MOLEBE
LESLIE KAKRA
NAOMI
MOTEMONA AMBA
Respondents
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND
JUDGMENT
[1]
This
is an application for judicial review under subsection 72(1) of the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (the Act), of the decision of
the Immigration and Refugee Board, Refugee Protection Division (the panel), dated
May 16, 2006, according to which the principal respondent, Ajema Molebe,
is not excluded under paragraphs 1(F)(a) and 1(F)(c) of the United
Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S.
137 (the Convention).
[2]
In
a related case (IMM-3269-06), which was heard on the same day, the respondents
are applying for judicial review of the same panel decision. Although the facts
in question are the same, the issues are different. The reasons for judgment
are therefore rendered separately.
ISSUE
[3]
The
applicant raises two issues. However, I agree with respondent’s counsel, who
states in his memorandum that there is only one fundamental issue in this case:
Did the panel err in law or in fact when it refused to exclude the principal respondent
under the Convention?
[4]
For
the following reasons, the answer to this question is affirmative, and the
application for judicial review will be allowed.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
[5]
The
principal respondent (the respondent) is a citizen of the Democratic Republic
of the Congo (DRC). She worked as a flight attendant with Air Zaire from 1993
to 1999. She arrived in Canada on December 15, 2002, with her baby Leslie
Kakra.
[6]
She
is from a privileged family whose parents had close ties to President Mobutu. Her
father was a senator and elected representative, and her mother was a senior
leader of the Mouvement populaire de la révolution (MPR), the single
party under the Mobutu regime.
[7]
In
1997, President Mobutu was replaced by President Laurent Désiré Kabila, who installed
a dictatorial regime in the country. Senior leaders of the former regime were
hunted, persecuted and imprisoned. The respondent’s father, who was suffering
from a serious illness shortly before the change in regime, was imprisoned and
died. The family lost everything.
[8]
Following
the persecution of her parents, the respondent joined an underground group
fighting against President Kabila’s regime to seek revenge. From 1997 to 2002,
she was an active member of the Mouvement de libération du Congo (MLC),
whose goal was to overthrow and eliminate President Kabila using any means
possible, including assassination.
[9]
The
respondent attended secret meetings with Colonel Muamba, the former pilot of
President Mobutu’s plane and a close friend of Jean-Pierre Mbimba, the MLC
leader. The respondent admits she was a spy for the MLC. In her travels as a
flight attendant, she carried envelopes between Kinshasa and various African
countries for Colonel Muamba in order to further the MLC’s objectives.
[10]
According
to the documentary evidence, the MLC is a violent movement that has resorted to
torture, rape, assassination and cannibalism in the furtherance of its
objectives. The respondent acknowledges that Colonel Muamba’s goal was to
assassinate President Kabila. The respondent testified as follows regarding
President Kabila (certified copies of the tribunal, Vol. 2, p. 1384):
[translation]
. . . But I knew he would die, because
people were plotting to, to, to make him go away, to kill him, in fact, to
physically eliminate him . . .
[11]
The
respondent alleges that she has reason to fear a potential return to the DRC
because of her romantic relationship with another Colonel, Eddy Kapend, the
chief of security and President Laurent Kabila’s aide de camp. Colonel Kapend
was one of the many people implicated in President Laurent Kabila’s
assassination on January 13, 2001. In January 2003, a military
tribunal sentenced him to death for assassinating the president.
[12]
The
respondent submits that she could also face the death penalty if she returned
to her country, as she caused the death of a soldier in a traffic accident in
1998. She was arrested and detained by the military police on the evening of
the accident. She was released thanks to the support of Colonel Kapend.
[13]
Finally,
the respondent alleges that she was a member of the MPR and that her mother was
the regional president of the MPR. According to the documentary evidence, the
MPR has a reputation for human and international rights abuses against civilians
under President Mobutu’s regime.
[14]
Following
a notice of intervention from the Minister, the Deputy Attorney General of
Canada asked the panel to exclude the respondent under paragraphs 1(F)(a)
and 1(F)(c) of the Convention because of the murder and her activities in
the MLC and MPR. It is the dismissal of the application for exclusion that is
the subject of this judicial review.
IMPUGNED
DECISION
[15]
After
examining the documentary and testimonial evidence, the panel came to the
following conclusions regarding the respondent’s exclusion.
Regarding the murder:
(a) The
description of the murder given by the applicant did not establish that the
murder really did occur; and
(b) The panel is
of the opinion that it was a traffic accident, that nobody died and that the
police used this incident to extort money from the respondent before releasing
her.
Regarding human rights
abuses within the MLC:
(a) The
respondent allegedly carried mail for some members of the politico-military
group and attended meetings held to discuss forcing President Laurent Kabila
from power;
(b) The applicant
did not demonstrate that the respondent knew of the atrocities committed by the
MLC and that meeting participants did not keep a tally of their victims; and
(c) With respect
to the evidence that the MLC is a movement principally directed to a limited,
brutal purpose, the applicant did not demonstrate that a group without the
legal means to change a dictatorial regime is wrong in resorting to legitimate
violence.
Regarding
human rights abuses within the MPR:
(a)
The
applicant did not demonstrate that, as a Congolese citizen, the respondent was
the only one who knew about the abuses of Mobutu’s dictatorship. All Congolese
had to be members of the MPR, the single party, considered to be the state
party;
(b) It would seem
that the respondent was aware only of general information available to the
public; and
(c) In the
panel’s view, the respondent was not aware, as an intelligence officer or
torturer would be, of the serious human rights violations committed by the
Mobutu regime.
RELEVANT
LEGISLATION
[16]
The
definition of Convention refugee in subsection 2(1) of the Act includes
the following provision:
2(1)
“Refugee Convention” means
the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, signed at
Geneva on July 28, 1951, and the Protocol to that Convention,
signed at New York on January 31, 1967. Sections E and F of
Article 1 of the Refugee Convention are set out in the schedule.
|
2(1)
« Convention sur les réfugiés » La Convention des Nations Unies
relative au statut des réfugiés, signée à Genève le
28 juillet 1951, dont les sections E et F de l’article premier
sont reproduites en annexe et le protocole afférent signé à New York le
31 janvier 1967.
|
[17]
Section
F of Article 1 of the Convention, specifically paragraphs 1(F)(a) and
1(F)(c), is the root of the applicant’s extraordinary intervention.
These paragraphs stipulate as follows:
SCHEDULE
|
ANNEXE
|
(Subsection 2(1))
|
(paragraphe 2(1))
|
SECTIONS
E AND F OF ARTICLE 1 OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS
OF REFUGEES
|
SECTIONS
E ET F DE L’ARTICLE PREMIER DE LA CONVENTION DES NATIONS UNIES RELATIVE AU
STATUT DES RÉFUGIÉS
|
. .
.
|
[.
. .]
|
F.
The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person with respect
to whom there are serious reasons for considering that:
|
F.
Les dispositions de cette Convention ne seront pas applicables aux personnes
dont on aura des raisons sérieuses de penser :
|
(a)
he has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against
humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make
provision in respect of such crimes;
|
a) Qu’elles ont commis un
crime contre la paix, un crime de guerre ou un crime contre l’humanité, au
sens des instruments internationaux élaborés pour prévoir des dispositions relatives
à ces crimes;
|
. .
.
|
[.
. .]
|
(c)
he has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the
United Nations.
|
c) Qu’elles se sont rendues
coupables d’agissements contraires aux buts et aux principes des Nations
Unies.
|
[18]
Section 98
of the Act excludes persons referred to in section F of Article 1 of the
Convention:
Exclusion
— Refugee Convention
|
Exclusion
par application de la Convention sur les réfugiés
|
98.
A person referred to in section E or F of Article 1 of the Refugee
Convention is not a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection.
|
98.
La personne visée aux sections E ou F de l’article premier de la
Convention sur les réfugiés ne peut avoir la qualité de réfugié ni de
personne à protéger.
|
AnalysIS
Standard of review
[19]
In
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Yaqoob, 2005 FC
1017, [2005] F.C.J. No. 1260 (F.C.) (QL), my colleague Richard Mosley J. identified
the appropriate standard of review in a judicial review that raises the issue
of exclusion under paragraphs 1(F)(a) and 1(F)(c) of the
Convention. At paragraphs 10 and 11, he stated that, in general, the
appropriate standard of review is patent unreasonableness, except for questions
relating to the interpretation of the law, where the standard is correctness.
[20]
In
Harb v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2003 FCA 39,
[2003] F.C.J. No. 108 (F.C.A.) (QL), the Federal Court of Appeal held as
follows at paragraph 14:
In so far as these
are findings of fact they can only be reviewed if they are erroneous and made
in a perverse or capricious manner or without regard for the material before
the Refugee Division (this standard of review is laid down in s. 18.1(4)(d)
of the Federal Court Act, and is defined in other jurisdictions by the
phrase “patently unreasonable”). These findings, in so far as they apply the
law to the facts of the case, can only be reviewed if they are unreasonable. In
so far as they interpret the meaning of the exclusion clause, the findings can
be reviewed if they are erroneous. (On the standard of review, see Shrestha
v. The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, [2002] F.C.J. No. 1154, 2002 FCT 887, Lemieux J. at
paras. 10, 11 and 12.)
[21]
To
succeed, the applicant must demonstrate that the panel committed a patently
unreasonable error.
[22]
The
applicant alleges that the panel circumvented the applicable principles of
justice and disregarded the evidence dealing with the respondent’s exclusion. The
applicant argues that the panel erred in concluding that the respondent had no
knowledge of the atrocities committed by the MLC and did not share its intent. Moreover,
the applicant criticizes the panel for entertaining the notion that the goal
sought by the MLC justifies the illicit means it employed to achieve its ends.
Exclusion under
paragraphs 1(F)(a) and 1(F)(c) of the Convention
[23]
The
panel’s conclusions regarding the applicant’s allegation that the respondent
had committed murder in a traffic accident in 1998 are not patently
unreasonable. The evidence the panel had supports its view that there was no
proof that murder had been committed.
Complicity
[24]
The
Court must first establish which criteria need to be considered in identifying
complicity within the context of paragraph 1(F)(a) of the Convention. The
Federal Court of Appeal has examined the issue in three decisions: Ramirez v.
Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] 2 F.C. 306 (C.A.), Moreno
v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1994] 1 F.C. 298
(C.A.) and Sivakumar v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration),
[1994] 1 F.C. 433 (C.A.). In Ramirez, MacGuigan J.A. stated as follows
at paragraph 16:
What degree of complicity, then,
is required to be an accomplice or abettor? A first conclusion I come to is
that mere membership in an organization which from time to time commits
international offences is not normally sufficient for exclusion from refugee
status.
. . .
It seems apparent, however, that
where an organization is principally directed to a limited, brutal purpose,
such as a secret police activity, mere membership may by necessity involve
personal and knowing participation in persecutorial acts.
[25]
In
the case at bar, the panel stated as follows at page 2 of its decision:
After giving the
principal claimant the opportunity to present her oral and documentary
evidence, the panel assessed all the evidence in order to determine whether
the two factors constituting complicity—shared common purpose and knowledge—are
present in this case.
[Emphasis
added]
[26]
The
applicant submitted a large volume of evidence concerning MLC’s activities as a
perpetrator of human rights violations. However, the panel stated as follows
with regard to how this organization should be qualified:
With regard to
the MLC being a movement with a limited, brutal purpose, the Minister’s
representative failed to demonstrate that a group deprived of any legal means
to change a dictatorial regime would be wrong to turn to justifiable violence.
In fact, the documentary evidence demonstrates that as soon as he came into power,
President Kabila put an end to the democratic process and established a
dictatorship. The MLC rebellion was aimed at establishing democracy, which
does not clear the perpetrators of the atrocities committed against civilians
from being denounced.
[27]
In
light of the magnitude of the documentary evidence, the Court finds the panel’s
statement to be patently unreasonable. No analysis of very relevant evidence
about the MLC was done or mentioned. The Court’s intervention is therefore
required, since the panel did not consider important and relevant elements in
qualifying the MLC. The burden of
explanation increases with the relevance of the evidence in question (Cepeda-Gutierrez
v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] F.C.J. 1425
(F.C.T.D.) (QL)).
[28]
In
addition, the panel did not comment on or analyze the many contradictions in
the respondent’s oral testimony regarding the written documentation she submitted
when she entered the country and the documentation submitted to the Americans
when she claimed refugee status in the U.S. This constitutes important evidence
needed to establish whether or not the respondent should be excluded.
[29]
The
parties did not submit any questions for certification, and this case does not
involve any.
JUDGMENT
THE COURT
ORDERS that:
1. The
application for judicial review is allowed, and the matter is remitted to a
differently constituted panel for redetermination. No question is certified.
“Michel
Beaudry”
Certified true translation
Jason Oettel