Date: 20070511
Docket: IMM-4184-06
Citation:2007 FC 508
Ottawa, Ontario, May 11, 2007
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Lemieux
BETWEEN:
MOHAMED
HARKAT
Applicant
and
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGRATION
THE MINISTER OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND EMERGENCY
PREPAREDNESS
Respondents
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
Introduction
[1] Mohamed Harkat (the applicant), a Convention Refugee
and the subject of a deportation order which is the direct result of a finding
by my colleague Madam Justice Dawson the security certificate issued against
him was reasonable, seeks a stay/adjournment of the hearing of this judicial
review application scheduled for May 15, 2007. In his judicial review
application, Mr. Harkat seeks to quash a decision, rendered on July 11, 2006,
with an addendum signed on July 28, 2006, by Mr. James Schultz, the Minister’s
Delegate, (the Delegate) who found:
“On the basis of information considered by me, I am of the
opinion, pursuant to paragraph 115(2)(b) of the Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act that:
Mohamed Harkat,
DOB: August 6, 1968
should not be allowed to remain in Canada based on danger to the security of Canada.”
[2] He also urges upon the Court the application of rule
399(2) of the Federal Courts Rules, 1998 for the same purpose.
[3] At yesterday’s hearing of the applicant’s motion,
his counsel indicated to the Court he was not seeking a permanent stay of the
Delegate’s decision but rather, an adjournment sine die until Parliament has
enacted its new security certificate review process as directed by the Supreme
Court of Canada in Charkaoui v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration) 2007 SCC 9.
[4] By order dated February 14, 2007, the Chief Justice
of this Court granted Mr. Harkat leave to judicially review the Delegate’s
decision, set out various procedural steps and fixed Mr. Harkat’s application
for hearing on May 15, 2007.
[5] Paragraph 115(2)(b) of the Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act, (the Act) is an exception to the principle of non-refoulement
which stipulates a protected person such as a Convention Refugee shall not be
removed from Canada to a country [in this case Algeria, the applicant’s country
of birth] if he would be at risk of persecution, at risk of torture or cruel
and unusual treatment or punishment. This exception is provided for in
subsection 115(2) of the Act which reads:
Principle
of Non-refoulement
Protection
115.
(1) A protected person or a person who is recognized as a Convention
refugee by another country to which the person may be returned shall not
be removed from Canada to a country where they would be at risk of
persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group or political opinion or at risk of torture or cruel and
unusual treatment or punishment.
Exceptions
(2)
Subsection (1) does not apply in the case of a person
(a)
who is inadmissible on grounds of serious criminality and who constitutes, in
the opinion of the Minister, a danger to the public in Canada; or
(b)
who is inadmissible on grounds of security, violating human or
international rights or organized criminality if, in the opinion of the
Minister, the person should not be allowed to remain in Canada on the basis
of the nature and severity of acts committed or of danger to the security of Canada.
[Emphasis
mine]
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Principe
du non-refoulement
Principe
115.
(1) Ne peut être renvoyée dans un pays où elle risque la persécution du fait
de sa race, de sa religion, de sa nationalité, de son appartenance à un groupe
social ou de ses opinions politiques, la torture ou des traitements ou peines
cruels et inusités, la personne protégée ou la personne dont il est statué
que la qualité de réfugié lui a été reconnue par un autre pays vers lequel
elle peut être renvoyée.
Exclusion
(2)
Le paragraphe (1) ne s’applique pas à l’interdit de territoire :
a)
pour grande criminalité qui, selon le ministre, constitue un danger pour le
public au Canada;
b)
pour raison de sécurité ou pour atteinte aux droits humains ou internationaux
ou criminalité organisée si, selon le ministre, il ne devrait pas être
présent au Canada en raison soit de la nature et de la gravité de ses actes
passés, soit du danger qu’il constitue pour la sécurité du Canada.
|
[6] Whether a stay/adjournment of the scheduled hearing
should be granted requires an in-depth consideration of the recent unanimous
decision of the Supreme Court of Canada released on February 23, 2007 involving
Adil Charkaoui, Mohamed Harkat and Hassan Almrei, (Charkaoui, above). The
Court’s reasons were written by the Chief Justice of Canada, who, at paragraph
139, dealing with the lawfulness of the review procedures relating to security
certificates, expressed herself in the following manner:
139 The first is that s. 78(g) allows for the use of
evidence that is never disclosed to the named person without providing adequate
measures to compensate for this non-disclosure and the constitutional problems
it causes. It is clear from approaches adopted in other democracies, and in Canada
itself in other security situations, that solutions can be devised that protect
confidential security information and at the same time are less intrusive on
the person's rights. It follows that the IRPA's procedure for the judicial
confirmation of certificates and review of detention violates s. 7 of the
Charter and has not been shown to be justified under s. 1 of the Charter. I
would declare the procedure to be inconsistent with the Charter, and hence of
no force or effect. [Emphasis mine]
[7] The Court, however, suspended the operation of the
declaration at paragraph 140:
140 However, in order to give Parliament time to
amend the law, I would suspend this declaration for one year from the date of
this judgment. If the government chooses to go forward with the proceedings to
have the reasonableness of Mr. Charkaoui's certificate determined during the
one-year suspension period, the existing process under the IRPA will apply.
After one year, the certificates of Mr. Harkat and Mr. Almrei (and of any other
individuals whose certificates have been deemed reasonable) will lose the
"reasonable" status that has been conferred on them, and it will be
open to them to apply to have the certificates quashed. If the government
intends to employ a certificate after the one-year delay, it will need to seek
a fresh determination of reasonableness under the new process devised by
Parliament. Likewise, any detention review occurring after the delay will
be subject to the new process. [Emphasis mine]
[8] I mention that of the three appellants before the
Supreme Court of Canada, Mr. Charkaoui is the only one whose security
certificate had not been reviewed for reasonableness.
[9] Finally, by way of introduction, Mr. Harkat was
released from detention on May 23, 2006 on very strict conditions imposed by
Justice Dawson and recently essentially maintained on further review at the
request of the applicant by my colleague Justice Simon Noël on April 20, 2007.
[10] The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada
characterized the release conditions imposed on Mr. Harkat as placing him under
house arrest and continuous surveillance by the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), and the
RCMP (see paragraph 103, Charkaoui, above).
The Delegate’s Opinion
[11] The Delegate’s opinion in respect of Mr. Harkat was
rendered one month after the Supreme Court of Canada had heard the
constitutional challenge against the security certificate review process and
eight months before that Court issued its judgment.
[12] Guided by the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in
Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [2002]
1 S.C.R. 3, the Delegate first assessed whether Mr. Harkat’s continued presence
in Canada constituted a danger to the security of Canada adopting the test laid
out in Suresh, above, at paragraph 90 in the following terms:
90 These considerations lead us to conclude that a
person constitutes a "danger to the security of Canada" if he or
she poses a serious threat to the security of Canada, whether direct or
indirect, and bearing in mind the fact that the security of one country is
often dependent on the security of other nations. The threat must be
"serious", in the sense that it must be grounded on objectively reasonable
suspicion based on evidence and in the sense that the threatened harm must be
substantial rather than negligible. [Emphasis mine]
[13] The Delegate was aware he could not simply rely on
Justice Dawson’s decision of March 22, 2005, reported as 2005 F.C. 393, finding
the security certificate issued against Mr. Harkat was reasonable.
[14] According to the applicable jurisprudence namely Suresh,
above, and Mahjoub v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration) 2005 FC 156 and other cases, the Delegate had to undertake an
independent and objective review of the evidence which had been submitted to
him and arrive at an original assessment, essentially a finding of fact, Mr.
Harkat was, on the balance of probabilities, a danger to the security of Canada,
a determination which requires an assessment of the nature or extent of the
risk Mr. Harkat poses to Canada’s security. According to Suresh,
above, the Delegate was not required to hear Mr. Harkat in person and he did
not do so. Rather, as he indicated in his decision, he reviewed the evidence
which had been submitted to him and he considered the submissions made by
counsel.
1. Is Mr. Harkat a danger to Canada’s security?
[15] The Delegate found Mr. Harkat to be a danger to the
security of Canada based on his travel,
employment activities in Pakistan, his Bin Laden Network associations in Canada and abroad and his use of
aliases. He stated “in addition to other information I am not publicly able to
disclose, I am of the opinion Mr. Harkat is an important member of the Bin
Laden Network.” He was of the further opinion Mr. Harkat participated in
terrorist-support activities in Pakistan
and in Canada prior to the curtailment of
those activities by his detention. He noted the Bin Laden Network has identified
Canada as an enemy and a legitimate
target. According to him, violence is an intrinsic component of the Bin Laden
Network’s ideology, in addition to being a means of achieving broader
objectives. He was also of the opinion detention had not diminished his
capability or motivation over time and he would re-establish links with the Bin
Laden Network and participate actively in terrorist or terrorist-support
activities at any point at which he believed he had the opportunity to function
undetected in that capacity.
[16] There is no doubt the Delegate considered
voluminous public and considerable secret evidence in coming to conclusion that
Mr. Harkat constitutes a danger to the security of Canada.
[17] In terms of the secret evidence, the Delegate
reviewed substantially all of the secret evidence that was before Justice
Dawson when she reviewed the security certificate for reasonableness.
[18] Also available to the Delegate was updated secret
evidence which I reviewed (as well as reviewing the secret evidence which was
before Justice Dawson) when seized with Mr. Harkat’s first attempt for release
from detention (see Harkat v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration)
2005 FC 1740). No additional, new, or other secret evidence was available to
the Delegate in respect of Mr. Harkat.
[19] In my judgment, the secret evidence reviewed by the
Delegate was significant, material and determinative of his conclusion on Mr.
Harkat’s dangerousness to the security of Canada. It also underpins the Delegate’s
determination the seriousness of his threat to Canada’s security trumps a possible deportation
to torture.
[20] Indeed, in the judicial review proceeding before
me, counsel for the Respondents brought a section 87 application for non-disclosure.
Section 87 of the Act reads:
Consideration
During Judicial Review
Application
for non-disclosure — Court
87.
(1) The Minister may, in the course of a judicial review, make an application
to the judge for the non-disclosure of any information with respect to
information protected under subsection 86(1) or information considered under
section 11, 112 or 115.
Procedure
(2)
Section 78, except for the provisions relating to the obligation to provide a
summary and the time limit referred to in paragraph 78(d), applies to the
determination of the application, with any modifications that the
circumstances require.
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Examen
dans le cadre du contrôle judiciaire
Interdiction
de divulgation
87.
(1) Le ministre peut, dans le cadre d’un contrôle judiciaire, demander au
juge d’interdire la divulgation de tout renseignement protégé au titre du
paragraphe 86(1) ou pris en compte dans le cadre des articles 11, 112 ou 115.
Application
(2)
L’article 78 s’applique à l’examen de la demande, avec les adaptations
nécessaires, sauf quant à l’obligation de fournir un résumé et au délai.
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[21] After reviewing the secret evidence referred to
above, after holding an in-camera ex parte hearing with the respondents
on May 7, 2007, and considering submissions yesterday at the public hearing, I
am issuing an order today prohibiting the disclosure of the secret evidence
referred to above which forms part of the certified tribunal record, on the
grounds disclosure would be capricious to the security of Canada or of a person.
2. Is Mr. Harkat at risk if
returned to Algeria?
[22] Having made his determination Mr. Harkat
constituted a serious and substantial threat to the security of Canada, the
Delegate then embarked upon the question of what, if any, risk Mr. Harkat may
face if he is returned to Algeria and expressly to determine if he will be at
risk of torture or cruel and unusual treatment if deportation results in a
return to Algeria.
[23] The evidence reviewed by the Delegate to assess the
risk to Mr. Harkat consisted of:
• Algeria’s past human rights record, particularly, during
the insurgency which began in 1988 leading to a declaration of state emergency
in 1993 evidencing a climate of violence in Algeria which included detention,
torture and disappearances;
• Current country conditions in Algeria which he found to have evolved
significantly since the outset of the insurgency and the worst period of the
atrocities in the mid to late 80’s.
• Credible human rights reporting which, according to him,
“recorded improvements in respect for human rights, and reduction in reports of
torture and cruel and unusual treatment for several years.” Included in
country conditions was the fact Algeria has embarked upon a concentrated effort
at legislated and institutionalized national reconciliation leading, according
to the Delegate to “effectively extinguishing legal proceedings against persons
who were involved in terrorism-support activities and pardoned persons
convicted and detained for terrorism-support activities” cautioning, however,
that the terms of the amnesty did not apply to persons who actually committed
massacres, rape, or attacks in public places which used explosive
devices;
• Algeria’s as a current partner with various foreign
counter-terrorism authorities involved in the international “war on terror” and
whether Algeria might be co-opted to its allies in detaining individuals who
are believed to have access to current information which would contribute in
thwarting terrorist operations in foreign countries and thus increase the risk
to Mr. Harkat;
• Factors which might mitigate risk of torture including
Algeria’s legal framework, international obligations, the effectiveness of
legal protection, the climate of impunity, the control of security forces;
• Diplomatic assurances both at a general level and the
specific diplomatic assurances given by the government of Algeria to the
government of Canada in respect of Mr. Harkat;
• Evidence on the treatment of returnees to Algeria believed linked to terrorism;
• Mr. Harkat’s personal circumstances including whether Mr.
Harkat would personally be at greater risk of torture because of his linkage to
the Bin Laden terrorist Network. The Minister’s delegate concluded Mr. Harkat
would be of security interest to the Algerian authorities on return based on
the evidence before him particularly because of an Algerian note verbale
referring to a “watch card” on Mr. Harkat as the result of his stay in Afghanistan where the note indicates he
participated in the “Afghan resistance.” In this connection, he also reviewed
the evidence submitted on Mr. Harkat’s behalf from Professors Joffé and
Entelis;
• Specifically, he weighed the diplomatic assurances
specific to Mr. Harkat. He found them wanting somewhat because noting “the
Algerian response does not specifically, simply, and unequivocally state that
Mr. Harkat personally would not be subject to torture or unusual treatment if
returned to Algerian and remains couched in more general terms.” However, he
continued stating that “he was not persuaded that the lack of specificity in
the Algerian assurances decreased their value to zero” adding “what is
deficient may nonetheless retain some value.”;
• Factors relevant to Mr. Harkat’s circumstances which he
gave most significance and the greatest weight. They included his personal
situation as an individual identified as having had GIA sympathies and
association with the Bin Laden Network;
[24]
He expressed his conclusion on risk as follows:
“Given Mr. Harkat’s terrorist affiliations it is not certain
that he will be able to benefit from amnesty provisions of the national
reconciliation program eg. after an initial 12 day period of investigation and
questioning. This is possible but will depend on numerous factors which cannot
be known in advance. If he is considered a danger to Canada, he may well be found to be a danger to Algeria as well. I believe that he
faces a strong possibility of lengthy detention in uncomfortable and disagreeable
circumstances consistent with local prison conditions and at least initially, a
probability of aggressive interrogation short of the kind of brutality which
would constitute torture.
But on balance I believe that improvements in Algeria’s
overall security and human rights situation, diplomatic assurances received in
Mr. Harkat’s case, and the international attention his case will generate
operate to significantly reduce the probability of torture or cruel and unusual
treatment, particularly the most serious possible consequences he might have
faced at an earlier point in Algeria’s history, or in the absence of diplomatic
assurances and international attention.
I cannot in conscience say that these factors eliminate all
possibility of torture or cruel and unusual practice. But in reducing both the
probability of occurrence and the probable gravity of consequences, any serious
risk to Mr. Harkat is in my opinion substantially diminished. I therefore
conclude that there is a possibility of risk to him, but that the evidence does
not establish on a balance of probabilities that he will actually be subjected
to torture or cruel and unusual treatment if he is returned to Algeria.” [Emphasis mine]
3. Is this case so
exceptional, if wrong on the risk, Mr. Harkat should be deported to torture?
[25] Finally, the Minister’s delegate addressed an issue
raised but not determined in Suresh, above, that is deportation to
torture.
[26] He introduced this topic by writing at page 48
under the heading “Risk and Security to Canada”:
“But the consequences of error for Mr.
Harkat is potentially very serious
I have said already that I consider extra-judicial
execution in Mr. Harkat’s case improbable, whereas lengthy detention in
circumstances which do not provide him with safeguards against the possibility
of torture or cruel and unusual treatment is highly likely. But whether or
not torture, or cruel and unusual treatment, will actually occur in conditions
which include diplomatic assurances, improvements in Algeria’s human rights situation, and evidence
that this has not occurred in all other similar cases is a judgement that
can only be made on the balance of probabilities. Risk by definition is not
certainty.
In the event I am wrong in my conclusion that
Mr. Harkat is not at substantial risk of torture or cruel and unusual
treatment, I will now proceed to determine whether removal is nonetheless
permissible due to the existence of exceptional circumstances by balancing the
assumed risk to Mr. Harkat against the danger he poses to the security of
Canada.”
[Emphasis mine]
[27] In Suresh, above, at paragraphs 71 to 78,
the Supreme Court of Canada discussed Canada’s rejection of torture which is
reflected in the international conventions to which Canada is a party
concluding that, barring extraordinary circumstances, deportation to torture
will generally violate the principles of fundamental justice protected by
section 7 of the Charter and that the Minister should generally decline
to deport refugee’s where on the evidence there is substantial risk of
torture. The Court then wrote paragraph 78 in Suresh, above:
78 We do not exclude the possibility that in exceptional
circumstances, deportation to face torture might be justified, either as a
consequence of the balancing process mandated by s. 7 of the Charter or under
s. 1. (A violation of s. 7 will be saved by s. 1 "only in cases arising
out of exceptional conditions, such as natural disasters, the outbreak of war,
epidemics and the like": see Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, supra, at p. 518;
and New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. G. (J.),
[1999] 3 S.C.R. 46, at para. 99.) Insofar as Canada is unable to deport a
person where there are substantial grounds to believe he or she would be
tortured on return, this is not because Article 3 of the CAT directly
constrains the actions of the Canadian government, but because the fundamental
justice balance under s. 7 of the Charter generally precludes [page47]
deportation to torture when applied on a case-by-case basis. We may predict
that it will rarely be struck in favour of expulsion where there is a serious
risk of torture. However, as the matter is one of balance, precise prediction
is elusive. The ambit of an exceptional discretion to deport to torture, if
any, must await future cases.
[28] The Delegate’s conclusion exceptional circumstances
had been made out in Mr. Harkat’s case was premised on the fact if he was not deported
he would be unconditionally released in Canada and, being a member of the
terrorist Bin Laden Network, would ultimately provide him with the opportunity
to engage in acts of terrorism which would place Canadian security including
the security of individual Canadians in grave danger.
The Supreme Court of Canada’s Decision in Charkaoui
[29] As noted, in this case, the Supreme Court of Canada
declared the security certificate and detention review process in violation of
section 7 of the Charter and not saved by its section 1 because section
78(g) of the Act allows the use of evidence that is never disclosed to
the named person without providing adequate measures to compensate for the
non-disclosure and the constitutional problems it causes. It was of the view
from approaches adopted in other democracies and in Canada itself in other security situations
solutions could be devised to protect confidential security information and at
the same time are less intrusive to the person’s rights. It discussed four
possible less intrusive alternatives: (1) the now repealed Security
Intelligence Review Committee, certificate review process, (SIRC) at paragraph
71; (2) the special advocate such as exists in England at paragraph 80; (3) the
current legislation in Canada under the Canada Evidence Act for the
review of sensitive information at paragraph 77 and (4) the use of special
counsel such as was the case in the Arar Inquiry.
[30] Specifically, at paragraph 3 of her reasons, the
Chief Justice found the certificate review process under the Act unjustifiably
violated section 7 of the Charter by allowing the issuance of a
certificate of inadmissibility based on secret material without providing for
an independent agent at the stage of judicial review to better protect the
named person’s interests.
[31] The Chief Justice recognized, and this is important
in my view, that if a security certificate is determined to be reasonable it is
a removal order that may not be appealed against and that is in force without
the necessity of holding or continuing an examination or an admissibility
hearing and the person named in it may not apply for protection under
subsection 112(1).
[32] The Court also appreciated in coming to the
conclusion the review procedures in place for security certificates and
immediate detention on issuance for foreign nationals such as Mr. Harkat,
fundamental justice had to be met taking into account the exigencies of the
security context which must be recognized: full disclosure of information
relied on may not be possible ( see paragraph 24).
[33] At paragraph 58 of her reasons, the Chief Justice
of Canada cited several cases including Canada (Minister of Employment and
Immigration) v. Chiarelli [1992] 1 S.C.R. 711 where it found SIRC
could, in investigating certificates under the former Immigration Act,
refuse to disclose details of investigation techniques and police sources.
Likewise, in Suresh, above, the Supreme Court determined a refugee
facing possibility of deportation to torture was entitled to disclosure of all
the information on which the Minister was basing his or her decision, “subject
to privilege or similar valid reasons for reduced disclosure, such as
safeguarding confidential public security documents”, (see paragraph 122).
[34] The focus of the Chief Justice’s reasons was on the
relevant principles of fundamental justice. She was satisfied two requirements
were clearly met: the right to a hearing and the hearing be before an
independent and impartial magistrate, i.e., a designated judge of this Court.
[35] She identified as paragraph 31 of her reasons other
requirements of fundamental justice, namely, the judge must make a judicial
decision based on the facts and the law and the named person be afforded an
opportunity to meet the case put against him or her by being informed of that
case and being allowed to question and counter it. It is with respect to these
two last requirements the Chief Justice found infringement of section 7 of the Charter.
[36] As to the requirement the decision be based on the
facts and the law the Chief Justice found the requirements were not met because
the named person may be shown little or none of the material relied on by the
Ministers and the judge and may not be in a position to know or challenge the
case against him or her concluding “It follows that the judge’s decision while
based on the evidence before him or her, may not be based on all of the
evidence available.” [Emphasis mine]
[37] She identified two types of judicial systems that
ensure the full case is placed before the judge. She mentioned the
inquisitorial system where the judge takes charge of the gathering of evidence
in an independent and impartial way in contrast to the adversarial system which
relies on the parties who are entitled to disclosure of the case to meet and
the full participation in open proceedings to produce the relevant evidence.
She concluded the designated judge under the Act does not possess the
full and independent powers to gather evidence that exists in the inquisitorial
process and at the same time the named person is not given the disclosure and
the right to participate in the proceedings that characterize the adversarial
process. She concluded, at paragraph 50, “the result is a concern that the
designated judge, despite his or her best efforts to get all the relevant
evidence, may be obliged – perhaps unknowingly- to make the required
decision based on only part of the relevant evidence. [Emphasis mine]
[38] Because the judge is not afforded power to
independently investigate all relevant facts that the true inquisitorial judges
enjoy and since the named person is not given a full picture of the case to
meet, the judge cannot rely on the parties to present missing evidence
concluding at paragraph 51, “the result is that, at the end of the day, one
cannot be sure that the judge has been exposed to the whole factual picture.”
[Emphasis mine]
[39] At paragraph 52, she then expressed similar
concerns which arise with respect to the requirement that the decision be based
on the law. She wrote:
“Similar concerns arise with respect to the requirement that
the decision be based on the law. Without knowledge of the information put
against him or her, the named person may not be in a position to raise legal
objections relating to the evidence, or to develop legal arguments based on the
evidence. The named person is, to be sure, permitted to make legal
representations. But without disclosure and full participation throughout
the process, he or she may not be in a position to put forward a full legal
argument. [Emphasis mine]
[40] The Chief Justice, in her reasons, then discussed
whether the “case to meet” principle was satisfied stating at paragraph 53
“last but not least, a fair hearing requires that the affected person be
informed of the case against him or her, and be permitted to respond to that
case” and at paragraph 54 she reiterated under the certificate scheme, “the
named person may be deprived of access to some or all of the information put
against him or her which would deny the person the ability to know the case
to meet.” She added “without this information, the named person may not be in
a position to contradict errors, identify omissions, challenge the credibility
of informants and refute false allegations” stating “the problem is serious in
itself.” [Emphasis mine]
[41] She recognized at paragraph 57 “the right to know
the case to be met is not absolute” and identified Canadian statutes which
provide ex parte or in-camera hearings in which judges must decide
important issues after hearing only one side. She referred to a recent
decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Rodgers, [2006]
1 S.C.R. 554, writing “the majority of this Court declined to recognize notice
and participation as invariable constitutional norms, emphasising a
context-sensitive approach to procedural fairness.” At paragraph 59, she
identified in some context, substitutes for full disclosure may permit
compliance with section 7 of the Charter citing Chiarelli, above,
where the Court upheld the lack of disclosure on the basis that the information
disclosed by way of summary and the opportunity to call witnesses and cross
examine RCMP witnesses who testified in-camera satisfied the requirement of
fundamental justice. In the next paragraph she noted “where limited disclosure
or ex parte hearing have been found to satisfy the principles of
fundamental justice, the intrusion on liberty and security has typically been
less serious than that effected by the IRPA.” She wrote “It is one
thing to deprive a person of full information where finger printing is at
stake, and quite another to deny him or her information where the consequences
are removal from the county or indefinite detention.” Moreover, even in the
less intrusive situations, Courts have insisted that disclosure be as specific
and complete as possible.
[Emphasis mine]
[42] She added the following at paragraph 61 of her
reasons:
“In the context of national security, non-disclosure, which
may be extensive, coupled with the grave intrusions on liberty imposed on a
detainee, makes it difficult, if not impossible, to find substitute procedures
that will satisfy s. 7. Fundamental justice requires substantial compliance
with the venerated principle that a person whose liberty is in jeopardy must be
given an opportunity to know the case to meet, and an opportunity to meet the
case. Yet the imperative of the protection of society may preclude this.
Information may be obtained from other countries or from informers on condition
that it not be disclosed. Or it may simply be so critical that it cannot be
disclosed without risking public security. This is a reality of our modern world.
If s. 7 is to be satisfied, either the person must be given the necessary
information, or a substantial substitute for that information must be found.
Neither is the case here.” [Emphasis mine]
[43] At paragraph 63 of her reasons, she expressed the
view the designated judge working under the constraints imposed by the Act
“simply cannot fill the vacuum left by the removal of the traditional
guarantees of a fair hearing.” After discussing a number of problems arising
from the constraints of the Act, the Chief Justice concluded the judge
is placed in the situation of deciding the issues on the basis of incomplete
and potentially unreliable information. [Emphasis mine]
[44] She concluded on the principle of the case to meet
that the principle has not merely been limited in the case of IRPA: “It
has been effectively gutted. How can one meet a case one does not know”,
(see paragraph 64). [Emphasis mine]
The Stay/Adjournment Motion
(1) The Position of the
Parties
(a) The Applicant
[45] Mr. Harkat’s counsel raises three essential points
in favour of the adjournment/stay of the judicial review hearing in respect of
the Delegate’s opinion.
[46] First, he argues the Delegate relied upon the
secret evidence tendered to Justice Dawson when she reviewed the reasonableness
of the security certificate issued against Mr. Harkat coupled with the
Delegate’s reliance also on the updated secret evidence before me tendered
during the first release attempt by Mr. Harkat.
[47] Second, he argues the evidentiary record in respect
of Mr. Harkat before the Delegate was found deficient in the security
certificate review process prescribed under the Act and in violation of
section 7 of the Charter by the Supreme Court of Canada in Charkaoui,
above. It has been noted the Delegate’s decision was rendered before the
Supreme Court of Canada’s February, 2007 decision. Counsel for Mr. Harkat
argues the Delegate’s decision in July, 2006 cannot serve as a foundation for
his danger opinion and his danger/risk balancing to conclude exceptional
circumstances.
[48] Third, he reviewed a number of cases where the
Supreme Court of Canada had suspended a declaration of invalidity arguing the
suspension in Mr. Harkat’s case was for a limited purpose and its underlying
impact of invalidity did not justify the federal government continuing to seek
Mr. Harkat’s removal from Canada.
(2) The Ministers’ Position
[49] Counsel for the Ministers argued in favour of
proceeding with the judicial review application which, as noted in Suresh,
above, is the final step in Mr. Harkat’s deportation process. His position is
as follows.
[50] First, he argues Charkaoui, above, was a
case dealing with the security certificate review process which cannot be
conflated with the case now before this Court – a judicial review application
in respect of the Delegate’s opinion Mr. Harkat constitutes a danger to the
security of Canada and should not be allowed to remain in Canada.
[51] Second, he argues Suresh, above, is
determinative because that case was a danger opinion case and the Supreme Court
of Canada established the parameters of procedural fairness applicable in such
circumstances: no right to an oral hearing and protection of secret evidence
with a high deferential standard of review, namely, patent unreasonableness
where the test is whether the Delegate’s opinion was made arbitrarily or in bad
faith, cannot be supported on the evidence, or the Minister failed to consider
the appropriate factors. The Supreme Court of Canada warned that on judicial
review of the Delegate’s opinion, the Court should not re-weigh the factors or
interfere merely because it would have come to a different conclusion.
[52] Third, he argued that it cannot reasonably be said
the evidentiary record before the Delegate is deficient in this case noting the
holding in Suresh, above, confidential security documents did not need
to be disclosed to the person affected by Delegate’s decision. He argues Mr.
Harkat has sufficient information to comply with the principles of fundamental
justice applicable in an administrative tribunal setting and he has sufficient
information to argue the Delegate’s decision should be set aside on the basis
that he erred in law based on the factors enumerated in section 18.1 of the Federal
Court Act. In this respect, he draws a distinction between the security
review process and a determination that a person constitutes a danger to the
security of Canada.
[53] Finally, he argues Mr. Harkat has made out none of
the three-part test for the grant of a stay/adjournment, namely, serious issue,
irreparable harm and balance of convenience.
Analysis
[54] In my view, the applicant’s motion can be resolved
by considering whether the applicant has made out the test for a
stay/adjournment which will be considered on the basis of the tripartite test
set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in RJR McDonald Inc. v. Canada
(Attorney General) [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311. I need not deal with whether Rule
399 (2) would provide the applicant the same relief.
[55] The tri-partite test set out in RJR-MacDonald
Inc., above, is well-known namely: (1) the existence of a serious issue to
be tried, (2) the showing of irreparable harm and (3) the determination of the
balance of convenience. The applicant must make out each of the three elements
in order to obtain an injunction.
[56] I would apply the RJR-MacDonald test because
what Mr. Harkat is effectively seeking is a stay of his removal from Canada for some time and this
Court’s order is tantamount to a stay of his removal for that time.
[57] I stress the limited purpose of the motion before
me. Mr. Harkat does not seek to render the Delegate’s decision devoid of any
substance. The Delegate’s decision will still have some life if this stay
motion is granted. The purpose of his stay motion is to delay the judicial
review hearing of the Delegate’s decision that Mr. Harkat is a danger to the
security of Canada and should not be allowed to
remain in this country. As mentioned, the delay sought is until Parliament has
put into place a new security certificate review process which would conform to
the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Charkaoui, above. I set out
the following factors which form the matrix surrounding my decision on this
motion.
[58] First, as set out in Suresh, above, the
Delegate’s opinion is the last stage required to effect Mr. Harkat’s
deportation from Canada. The consequences for him
are very serious. On the other hand, the findings made against him are equally
serious because it has been found by the Delegate he is an important member of
a terrorist organization. In an appeal in which Mr. Harkat participated to
challenge the constitutionality of the security certificate review process
provided for under the Act the Supreme Court of Canada found that
process wanting because of the reliance placed on secret evidence considered by
a designated judge of this Court in ex parte in-camera hearing without
the presence of an independent agent to better protect Mr. Harkat’s interest
did infringe the principles of fundamental justice in the ways described
above. I agree, however, with counsel for the Ministers the Supreme Court of
Canada focused on the manner in which the evidence-gathering process took place
and was assessed under the impugned provisions of the Act. As such, the
Court was not required to review the secret evidence. Such was also the case
in Suresh, above, (see paragraph 27).
[59] Second, nevertheless, according to the Supreme
Court of Canada, the manner in which the evidence was gathered and assessed in
Mr. Harkat’s case as well as in the case of the two other appellants contained
serious flaws which affected fact-finding. The following defects were
identified: all of the available evidence may not have been before the
designated judge and only part of the relevant evidence may have been before
him/her such that at the end of the day “one cannot be sure that judge has been
exposed to the whole factual picture.” In addition, without disclosure and
full participation, the Supreme Court of Canada held Mr. Harkat may not have
been in a position to put forward a full legal argument. As important was his
ability to know the case to meet which may have been such that he was not in a
position “to contradict errors, identify omissions, challenge the credibility
of informants or refute false allegations.” A further consequence is if Mr.
Harkat did not know the case to meet this may have affected the judge’s
assessment the information before him or she is sufficient or reliable, thus
placing the judge in a position of deciding issues on the basis of incomplete
and potentially unreliable information.
[60] Third, there is no question the Delegate relied
upon substantial secret evidence gathered and assessed through the security
certificate review process which the Supreme Court found violated his section 7
Charter rights. That secret evidence was material and determinative in the
Delegate’s fact-finding. It is clear from paragraph 31 of Suresh,
above, the Delegate’s inquiry as to whether Mr. Harkat is a danger to the
security of Canada is “highly fact-based and
contextual.” The bottom line is that the decision of the Supreme Court of
Canada materially impugned the fact-finding process utilized in reviewing the
reasonableness of security certificates. This is why that Court essentially
ordered a new trial for Mr. Harkat and Mr. Almeri. It is clear that the
Delegate arrived at his fact-finding based on a flawed gathering and assessment
process according to the Supreme Court of Canada.
[61] Fourth, the Supreme Court of Canada, while
suspending the declaration of invalidity of certain portions of the Act,
did provide Mr. Harkat and others a remedy for the violation of his Charter
rights. As stated above, when paragraph 140 of the Chief Justice’s reasons in Charkaoui,
above, are read as a whole the essential remedy provided by it was to order, as
stated above, a new security certificate review for Mr. Harkat. It is useful,
at this juncture, to reproduce once again paragraph 140 of Charkaoui,
above.
140 However, in order to give Parliament time to amend
the law, I would suspend this declaration for one year from the date of this
judgment. If the government chooses to go forward with the proceedings to have
the reasonableness of Mr. Charkaoui's certificate determined during the
one-year suspension period, the existing process under the IRPA will apply.
After one year, the certificates of Mr. Harkat and Mr. Almrei (and of any other
individuals whose certificates have been deemed reasonable) will lose the
"reasonable" status that has been conferred on them, and it will be
open to them to apply to have the certificates quashed. If the government
intends to employ a certificate after the one-year delay, it will need to seek
a fresh determination of reasonableness under the new process devised by
Parliament. Likewise, any detention review occurring after the delay will be
subject to the new process.
[62] As seen, Parliament is to put into place a new
security certificate review process in terms of fact-finding which will better
protect his rights while at the same time recognizing the necessity of
protecting evidence the disclosure of which would be injurious to the security
of Canada or any person. It stated,
after one year, the security certificate against him which was found reasonable
would lose the “reasonable” status that had been conferred upon it and that it
would be open to Mr. Harkat to apply to have the security certificate quashed.
This means that on February 24, 2008, the Ministers will have no authority to
remove Mr. Harkat under the existing certificate because the existence of the
reasonableness of that certificate is necessary for it to continue to be a
removal order. Finally, the Supreme Court of Canada stated, “If the government
intended to employ a certificate after the one-year delay, it will need to seek
a fresh determination of reasonableness under the new process devised by
Parliament” in order to better protect Mr. Harkat’s rights.
[63] Finally, I do not accept counsel for the Minister’s
submission the Ministers must make efforts now to deport Mr. Harkat
because failing to do so would affect the ability of the government to detain
Mr. Harkat or maintain his release on strict conditions of his release. In my
view, Mr. Harkat’s detention is lawful during the one-year suspension because
the validity of the security certificate issued against Mr. Harkat upon which
his lawful detention is based is not affected (see section 82(2) of the Act).
Moreover, the Supreme Court of Canada in Charkaoui, above, at paragraph
123 concluded “that extended periods of detention pending deportation under the
certificate provisions of the Act do not violate sections 7 or 12 of the
Charter provided that reviewing Courts adhere to the guidelines set out
above for detention reviews.” After the one-year period the certificate will
still need to be quashed if it is to lose its value as an instrument justifying
detention. The Supreme Court of Canada has given time for Parliament to react
during the period of suspension. In the meantime, Mr. Harkat has been released
from detention on strick terms which if one is breached will lead to his
automatic re-arrest, see, Charkaoui, above, at paragraph 103. Madam
Justice Dawson and Mr. Justice Noël, in fashioning and maintaining conditions
of his release were satisfied such conditions were proportional to the risk Mr.
Harkat posed to the security of Canada
and had the effect of neutralizing that risk.
Conclusion
[64] The grant of the interim stay requested by Mr.
Harkat is a discretionary decision which must be made on the application of
proper principles. In this case, as mentioned, the test set out in RJR-MacDonald
is appropriate. For the reasons set out below, I have concluded Mr. Harkat has
made out the three conditions required to obtain a stay.
(a) Serious Issue
[65] I am satisfied the applicant has raised one or more
serious issues in the context of this stay motion. One such question is the
scope of the remedy accorded to Mr. Harkat by the Supreme Court of Canada as a
result of his successful appeal and the effect of its suspension of invalidity
for one year.
[66] Formulated in a different way, the question posed
is whether there is any purpose for this Court to embark upon a judicial review
of the Delegate’s opinion when the factual foundation for his critical
fact-based findings were the direct result of a flawed evidentiary gathering
and assessment process during the security certificate review exercise. In my
view, the determination of these questions are serious.
(b) Irreparable
Harm
[67] The applicant has satisfied me he would suffer
irreparable harm if the stay is not granted. A central question in this
judicial review application is whether the evidentiary basis which was before
the Delegate provides a non-arbitrary or non-capricious support for his
opinion. That review, if not stayed, would necessarily proceed on the evidence
determined by the Supreme Court of Canada to have been gathered and assessed in
a flawed manner. Such an assessment would proceed to take place as if the
highest court in Canada had not found his Charter
rights had been infringed. Such an assessment would proceed on the basis which
would ignore the fact the Supreme Court of Canada provided Mr. Harkat a
remedy-the equivalent of a new security certificate review under a new process
defined by Parliament which would better protect his Charter rights.
[68] At worst, and counsel for the Ministers did not
seriously challenge this proposition, if Mr. Harkat was deported to Algeria
within the one-year suspension period, the relief provided by the Supreme Court
of Canada to remedy the violation of his Charter rights would be nugatory.
(c) Balance of
Convenience
[69] The balance of convenience test is a determination
of which of the two parties will suffer the greater harm from the grant or
refusal of an interlocutory injunction, pending a decision on the merits.
[70] I find the balance of convenience favours the
applicant. I have found Mr. Harkat would suffer irreparable harm if the stay
is not granted. I can find no countervailing reason why this judicial review
should proceed now.
[71] I find no merit in counsel for the Ministers’
suggestion the Court should now proceed to determine some of the questions the
applicant raised in his leave application, such as whether the Delegate applied
the appropriate standard of proof to assess his risk of torture or cruel and
unusual treatment if returned to Algeria.
[72] I do not see any purpose of embarking upon such a
limited review at this stage as it would unnecessarily truncate the review
process and waste scarce judicial and other resources. I conclude that it is
best that all issues raised by the applicant in respect of the Delegate’s
decision be determined at the same time on a more solid factual foundation as
directed by the Supreme Court of Canada.
ORDER
THIS COURT ORDERS THAT: This judicial review
proceeding is stayed sine die until after the enactment by Parliament of
a new security certificate review process. The applicant did not request costs
of this motion.
“François Lemieux”