Date: 20070417
Docket: IMM-1341-07
Citation: 2007 FC 402
Toronto, Ontario, April 17, 2007
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Shore
BETWEEN:
CURLAND
ANY NATOO
Applicant
and
THE MINISTER OF PUBLIC SAFETY
AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
OVERVIEW
[1]
The Applicant is
applying for a stay of removal pending the disposition of his application for
leave and judicial review. The Applicant raises serious issues related to the
removal officer’s decision not to defer removal in light of the best interests
of his two Canadian citizen nephews, at issue in a pending humanitarian and
compassionate (H&C) application. The Applicant, his nephews, his family,
his employees and his clients will all suffer irreparable harm if he is removed
from Canada. The balance of convenience favours the
Applicant in these exceptional circumstances.
BACKGROUND
[2]
The Applicant is a
26-year-old citizen of Grenada and of no other country. He came to Canada in September 1999, to stay with his sister, Gillian
Thorney. He had graduated from high school and came to study and work. He has
been in Canada since that time. (Motion Record, p. 57.)
[3]
He retained previous
counsel to assist him in obtaining a study and work permit. He obtained a work
permit and worked in Canada. Unknown to him, the counsel filed a
refugee claim on his behalf. The claim was declared abandoned without his
knowledge. (Motion Record, pp. 57-58.)
[4]
In 2002, he retained
previous counsel to file an H&C application for him. He paid the government
processing fee and a retainer, and believed that the application had been filed
and was pending, until 2006, when he consulted present counsel who advised him
upon searching that no application had been filed. (Motion Record, pp. 58,
360.)
[5]
In October 2006, he
filed an H&C application. In December 2002, Citizenship and Immigration
Canada (CIC) purported to return the application for non-payment of the
processing fee; however, the application was never received by counsel nor the
Applicant. (Motion Record, pp. 17, 20.)
[6]
At a pre-removal
interview with the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), on March 13, 2007, the
Applicant and counsel were first made aware that the H&C application was
not being processed and allegedly had been returned. On March 14, 2007, the
Applicant paid the processing fee, and faxed and couriered the H&C
application to CIC with updated forms and a processing fee receipt. The
application is in process. (Motion Record, pp. 18, 247, 286, 356.)
[7]
The
Applicant’s H&C application is based in large part on his establishment in Canada through his businesses,
as follows:
a) He has taught himself
bookkeeping, and has worked continuously as a bookkeeper for several companies;
b) He has opened two
businesses that he now operates as sole owner: a bookkeeping company and a
temporary employment agency;
c) His temporary employment
agency, Contract Staffing, earned him a net income from its inception in
September 2005 to the end of 2005 of $358,105, and earned a net income of
$155,380 for 2006 to October. As of October 2006, he had placed 890 employees
in positions. The Applicant collectively earned and employed a staff of 8
employees on a full-time basis. He still employs this staff and has placed 180
persons in employment positions through the agency;
d) His bookkeeping company,
Natoo’s Bookkeeping Services, earned a net income in 2005 of $24,077. He
provides tax preparation services to 60 clients, and bookkeeping services to
14;
e) He has paid income tax
on all earnings in Canada, and has not received
social assistance; and
(Motion Record, pp. 20-21, 22-26.)
[8]
The
Applicant’s H&C application was further based on his establishment through
his family and community, as follows:
a) He is a primary
caregiver to his eleven-year-old Canadian citizen nephew, Trai Thorney, whom he
sees on a daily basis. He provides emotional support and stability to Trai as
his parents undergo a difficult divorce, and is a vital role model to the young
man;
b) He is in a serious
relationship with his Canadian citizen, fiancée, Jennifer Shearer;
c) He is very close to his
Canadian citizen sister (Trai’s mother) Gillian Thorney, who depends on him for
emotional support;
d) He is also very close to
his sister, Yolande Natoo, who is approved for permanent residence to Canada;
e) He provides primary
financial support to his mother, and Canadian citizen nephew Shemair Lewis, in Grenada; and
f)
He
is captain and treasurer of a local cricket team.
(Motion Record, pp. 21,
26-29.)
[9]
The
Applicant’s H&C application was further based on the hardship that he and
others would suffer if he were removed from Canada, including: the loss of his
business and the income that it generates for him, his family (in particular
his Canadian citizen nephews) and his employees; and the loss of the emotional
and social support that he provides to his family, in particular his nephews. (Motion
Record, pp. 30-33.
[10]
In
March 2007, the Applicant purchased his own airline ticket and was issued a
Direction to Report for removal for April 20, 2007. On March 22, 2007, he
submitted a written request for deferral of removal to the removal officer. On
March 27, 2007, a removal officer refused to defer, in writing.
(Motion Record, pp. 11, 13, 347, 349, 353.)
ISSUES
Application for the tripartite
test:
[11]
(1) Does
the Applicant raise a serious issue?
(2) Would
the Applicant or another person suffer irreparable harm should the Applicant be
removed from Canada?
(3) Does
the balance of convenience favour the Applicant?
[12]
To
describe the object of an interlocutory injunction, the Court of Appeal has
adopted the words of the House of Lords, as follows:
…The
object of an interlocutory injunction is to protect the plaintiff against
injury by violation of his right for which he could not be adequately
compensated in damages recoverable in the action if the uncertainty were
resolved in his favour at the trial;…
(Turbo Resources Ltd. v. Petro Canada Inc,
[1989] 2 F.C. 451 (F.C.A.), [1989] F.C.J. No. 14 (QL).)
[13]
The
test to be applied when determining whether or not to grant a stay of removal
has been clearly enunciated in Toth, where the Federal Court of Appeal
adopted the following formulation:
The tri-partite test of Cyanamid requires, for the granting of such an
order, that the applicant demonstrate, firstly, that he has raised a serious
issue to be tried; secondly that he would suffer irreparable harm if no order
was granted; and thirdly that the balance of convenience considering the total
situation of both parties, favours the order.
(Toth v. Canada (Minister
of Employment and Immigration) (1988), 86 N.R. 302 (F.C.A.), [1988] F.C”J.
No. 587 (QL); American Cyanamide Co. v. Ethicon Ltd., [1975] A.C. 396
(House of Lords)
SERIOUS ISSUE
[14]
In
respect of the question of serious issue, the Court has concluded that in order
to obtain a stay it is necessary to show that the application before the Court
is not frivolous and vexatious. The Federal Court of Appeal in Turbo,
above, adopted the threshold test as articulated in Eng Mee Yong and
Others v. Letchomonon s/o Valcyothan, [1980] A.C. 331:
The guiding principle in granting an
interlocutory injunction is the balance of convenience; there is no requirement
that before an interlocutory injunction is granted the plaintiff should satisfy
the court that there is a "probability", a "prima facie
case" or a "strong prima facie case": that if the action goes to
trial he will succeed; but before any question of balance of convenience can
arise the party seeking the injunction must satisfy the court that his claim is
neither frivolous nor vexatious; in other words that the evidence before the
court discloses that there is a serious question to be tried…
[15]
In
the case of North American Gateway Inc. v. Canada (Canadian Radio
Television and Telecommunications Commission), McDonald J. provided a clear
statement of the test to be applied when considering whether or not an
applicant for an interim injunction or stay had made out a serious issue to be
tried. He noted:
[10] The jurisprudence directs that the threshold of "serious
issue to be tried" is a low one. The earlier jurisprudence suggested that
the applicant had to establish a prima facie case before a stay would be
granted. Since the decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada in Metropolitan
Stores Limited v. Manitoba Food and Commercial Workers et al., [1987] 1
S.C.R. 110 and R.J.R. MacDonald, supra, the courts have held that the
threshold is much lower: the applicant need only satisfy the Court that the
matter on appeal is neither frivolous nor vexatious.
[11] I am mindful that this lower threshold is most often applied
in Charter cases and where fundamental issues of public policy are at stake. I
note, though, that this Court has applied this same low threshold in
non-Charter cases: see, e.g., Toth v. M.E.I. (1988), 86 N,.R. 302 (F.C.A.).
In any event, I am of the view that where the Court is asked to review a
decision of a party vested with the pubic interest like the CRTC, the lower
standard of "frivolous or vexatious" should apply. I am satisfied
that the applicant meets this low threshold in this case.
(North American
Gateway Inc. v. Canada (Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications
Commission), [1997] F.C.J. No. 628 (QL).)
[16]
This
Court has established that a removal officer is compelled to consider whether
exigent personal circumstances, particularly those related to children, justify
deferral of removal. This was clearly held by Justice James O’Reilly in the
decision in Ramada v. Canada (Solicitor General), 2005 FC 1112, [2005]
F.C.J. No. 1384 (QL):
[3] Enforcement
officers have a limited discretion to defer the removal of persons who have
been ordered to leave Canada. Generally speaking, officers have an obligation
to remove persons as soon as reasonably practicable (s. 48(2), Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27; set out in the attached
Annex). However, consistent with that duty, officers can consider whether there
are good reasons to delay removal. Valid reasons may be related to the person's
ability to travel (e.g. illness or a lack of proper travel documents), the need
to accommodate other commitments (e.g. school or family obligations), or
compelling personal circumstances (e.g. humanitarian and compassionate
considerations). (See: Simoes v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), [2000] F.C.J. No. 936 (T.D.) (QL), Wang v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2001] 3 F.C. 682 (T.D.) (QL), Prasad
v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2003] F.C.J. No. 805
(T.D.) (QL); Padda v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2003]
F.C.J. No. 1353 (F.C.) (QL)). It is clear, however, that the mere fact that a
person has an outstanding application for humanitarian and compassionate relief
is not a sufficient ground to defer removal. On the other hand, an officer must
consider whether exigent personal circumstances, particularly those involving
children, justify delay.
[17]
In
granting that application for judicial review of the decision of the removal
officer not to defer removal, Justice O’Reilly, in Ramada, above, concluded
that the officer in that case had failed to properly assess the best interests
of the minor Applicant, who was suffering from a medical condition and would be
adversely affected by removal:
[6] However, there was evidence before the officer that Ruthe,
then three years old, was experiencing serious seizures of unknown cause. She
was being treated at Sick Children's Hospital in Toronto. It was uncertain
whether she could obtain appropriate treatment in Portugal. Yet, the officer
did not consider Ruthe's circumstances. As a Canadian citizen, Ruthe was
entitled to remain in Canada and take advantage of her health benefits here.
She had no similar expectation or entitlement in Portugal. The officer was
aware that Ms. Ramada's children were entitled to remain here, but she did not
specifically consider the impact on Ruthe of leaving Canada, given Ms. Ramada's
natural desire, as a single parent, to take her children with her to Portugal.
[7] I have some reluctance in
granting this application for judicial review, out of concern for imposing on
enforcement officers an obligation to engage in an extensive analysis of the
personal circumstances of persons subject to removal orders. Obviously,
officers are not in a position to evaluate all of the evidence that might be
relevant in an application for humanitarian and compassionate relief. Their
role is important, but limited. In my view, it is only where they have
overlooked an important factor, or seriously misapprehended the circumstances
of a person to be removed, that their discretion should be second-guessed on judicial
review.
[18]
The
decision in Ramada, above, has been followed by this Court,
including by Justice Eleanor Dawson in her decision in Mateka v. Canada (Minister of Public
Safety and Emergency Preparedness), (Order rendered December 20, 2005 in Docket
No. IMM-7291-05). At paragraph 3 of that decision:
When a question of the best interest of a
child is raised, it is settled law, I believe, that an expulsions officer is
not required to perform a full assessment of humanitarian and compassionate
considerations. At the same time, an officer is obliged to give consideration
to a child’s interests whose exigent personal circumstances are put before the
officer. As my colleague Mr Justice O’Reilly wrote in Ramada v. Canada (Solicitor General), [2005] FCJ No. 1384, where an officer
overlooks an important factor or misapprehends the circumstances of the person
to be removed, a reviewable error occurs.
[19]
In
the case at bar, the evidence before the removal officer and in the Applicant’s
pending H&C application was that he provides essential emotional and
financial support to his 11-year-old Canadian citizen nephew in Canada, Trai
Thorney, and essential financial support to his 14-year-old Canadian citizen
nephew in Grenada, Shemair Lewis. (Motion Record, pp. 338-346.)
[20]
With
respect to Trai’s best interests, the removal officer had before her a
psychological assessment from Dr. Rabie. In her assessment, Dr. Rabie indicated
a serious concern for the child’s development and emotional well-being if the
Applicant is removed from Canada, given that he plays a parental role in the child’s life:
…[Trai] would certainly benefit
enormously from the continues involvement of a loving and caring uncle such as
Mr Natoo who is an excellent male role model and is able to fill in for the biological
father who has far less access to the child. In the opinion of the writer Trai
would suffer significantly, and possibly endure an emotional setback in his
development if his uncle were to be extradited [sic] from this country.
(Motion Record, pp. 342-343.)
[21]
The
assessment was based on interviews with the Applicant, Trai, and Trai’s mother,
and observation and testing. The assessment describes the concerns expressed by
Trai’s mother as follows:
Mr
Natoo’s sister. Gillian, declares that although there is a 10 year difference
in age between herself and her younger brother, she cherishes Andy because he
stands out among the four brothers in the family as a high achiever and vital
source of support for all of them, while the other brothers have achieved
little or are on their own, and do not actively help the family…
In addition to his financial
contributions to everyone’s wellbeing, Gillian states that her brother is an
invaluable source of support to herself and her son. She adds that she could
not have done without him during the stressful period of her divorce, and that
he now continues to assist her in any way he can, particularly when it comes to
helping out with Trai, and especially because of the proximity of their
residences in the city. Gillian notes that since she herself does not drive,
Andy is always available to assist her by driving her wherever she needs to go,
and provides general support to both her emotionally, and sometimes
financially. She notes that if Andy were compelled to leave Canada, her son
would be much aggrieved, and surely experience a sense of loss and insecurity.
She stated that at present, her custody arrangement with her ex-husband is not
a formal one, but that Trai sees his father and paternal grandparents every
second weekend, as well as for holidays and tennis camp in the summertime. She
affirmed with tears that if her brother were to be forced to return to their
home country, her son would suffer a considerable setback emotionally and could
not pursue many of the activities or enjoy the privileges that his loving uncle
now gives him. She lamented that if Andy were to leave, both she and her son
‘would be lost without him’.
(Motion Record, p. 341.)
[22]
With
respect to Shemair’s best interests, the Applicant submitted evidence that he
provides primary financial support to him from Canada to Grenada, where he lives. This was confirmed by the
Applicant in his affidavit material, and by his sister Gillian as cited in Dr. Rabie’s
assessment. The Applicant describes his support for Shemair in his affidavit
material in his H&C application (before the removal officer), as follows:
My
brother’s son Shemair Lewis.
He is a Canadian citizen, as he was born in Canada.
He lives with my mother: my brother is busy with work and earns very little;
and Shemair’s mother is not very involved in his life. Because of this, it has
fallen to me to be the primary financial supporter to him. In addition to the
support I send my mother (which goes to his care and upkeep) I also send
additional amounts to pay for his schooling. This includes books,
transportation, and school supplies. For this purpose, I sent $800 this past
summer. I put my younger sister, Shevon Natoo, through college, and I intend to
do the same for Shemair. He is doing very well in school. I place an extremely
high value on education, and believe that it is essential to Shemair’s
development to continue with his studies. It will be difficult or impossible
for me to pay for his tuition if I cannot remain in Canada, due to the inevitable drop in income. [emphasis in
original]
(Motion Record, pp.
66-67.)
[23]
In
the case at bar, in light of the evidence of the best interests of the child,
as evidenced by the psychological assessment and affidavit material, which
established that Trai would lose the Applicant’s emotional and financial
support in the nature of a parent, and that Shemair would lose his primary
source of financial support, and so his livelihood and schooling would be at
risk.
[24]
The
evidence before the removal officer, as submitted in the H&C application,
was that both depend on the Applicant’s Canadian income for financial support,
and that Trai additionally depends on the Applicant for emotional and social
support. (Motion Record, pp. 7, 63-64, 66-67, 338-343.)
[25]
The
removal officer’s “notes to file” provided in response to the Applicant’s
request for reasons do not refer to the concerns raised by the Applicant with
respect to the children, or to any of the corroborative evidence, including the
psychological assessment of Dr. Rabie. The only apparent reference to Trai in
the “notes to file” is a brief note that the “issues raised” include “BIOC (CC
nephew, 11 years old)”. (Motion Record, p. 355.)
[26]
As
indicated above, this Court has established that the officer is required to
consider – and be “alive and attentive” to – the best interests of the child
raised in the context of a request for deferral of removal. (Mateka, above.)
[27]
In
the case of Simoes v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
[2000] F.C.J. No. 936 (QL), Justice Marc Nadon stated that, in considering a
request for deferral of removal, “a removal officer may consider various
factors such as illness, other impediments to travelling, and pending H&C
applications that were brought on a timely basis but have yet to be resolved
due to backlogs in the system.”
[28]
Justice
Nadon, in Simoes, above, relied on the case of Paterson v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), [2000] F.C.J. No. 139. In Paterson,
Justice Barbara Reed found a serious issue and granted a stay to the applicant
pending her challenge to an officer’s refusal to defer removal, where the
applicant had filed an H&C application four months prior to removal. Justice
Reed noted:
[8] The
respondent Minister controls the speed with which the applicant's H&C
application can be dealt with. The respondent controls the timing of the
execution of the removal order (subject of course to the applicant not
disappearing "underground").
[29]
In Harry
v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2000] F.C.J. No.
1727.Justice Frederick Gibson relied on both Simoes and Paterson
to find a serious issue and grant a stay to the Applicants pending their
judicial review of an officer’s refusal to defer removal, where the Applicants
had submitted an H&C application a year prior to their scheduled removal.
Gibson J. found that
[15] …
Taking into account the length of time for which the H&C application has
been outstanding and the issue of the best interests of the child, I am
satisfied that, on the particular facts of this matter and against a relatively
low threshold test, there is a serious issue to be tried as to whether the
removals officer's decision not to defer removal was reasonably open in the
light of Canada's international commitments regarding the rights of children.
[30]
In
the circumstances of the case at bar, the Applicant has resided in Canada some 7 years. His
establishment in Canada and the hardship that
he and others would suffer has been set out in his H&C application. In
particular, the application raised issues of the best interests of two
children, as discussed earlier. He has been attempting to file an H&C
application since he paid the processing fee and retained counsel in 2002 to do
so, and believed that it had been filed. When he learned in 2006 that this had
not been done, he filed a new H&C application immediately; however, the
processing of the H&C application has been delayed by intervening events,
namely: the omission of a processing fee receipt; and a lack of notification of
the matter. It appears that, due to unusual, exceptional
circumstances, a deferral, pending review of the H&C application, was
required. (Motion Record, pp. 17-19, 247, 286.)
IRREPARABLE HARM
[31]
The
test for irreparable harm refers to the “nature of the harm”. It requires that
the harm be irreparable, and not curable nor compensable in damages. The
Supreme Court has set out:
"Irreparable" refers to the
nature of the harm suffered rather than its magnitude. It is harm which either
cannot be quantified in monetary terms or which cannot be cured, usually
because one party cannot collect damages from the other. Examples of the former
include instances where one party will be put out of business by the
court's decision; where one party will suffer permanent market loss or irrevocable
damage to its business reputation (American Cyanamid, supra); or where a
permanent loss of natural resources will be the result when a challenged
activity is not enjoined. The fact that one party may be impecunious does
not automatically determine the application in favour of the other party who
will not ultimately be able to collect damages, although it may be a relevant
consideration.
(R.J.R.-MacDonald
Limited v. Canada, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199.)
[32]
In Toth,
above, the Court of Appeal set out the following threshold: “I think that at
least part of this harm is irreparable and not compensable in damages.”
[33]
The
Court of Appeal decision in Toth, above, is illustrative of the notion
that the magnitude or seriousness of the harm is not determinative, but rather
whether on not it is irreparable and compensatory in damages:
… the evidence is to the effect that if
the application is deported now, there is a reasonable likelihood that the
family business will fail and that his immediate family as well as others who
are dependant upon the family business for their livelihood will suffer. I
think that at least a portion of this potential harm is irreparable and not
compensable in damages.
[34]
The
decision in Toth, above, also serves to illustrate that the same principles
will apply in immigration cases as in other legal contexts. For example, in
immigration matters as well as other contexts, economic factors can constitute
irreparable harm.
[35]
In Toth,
above, the Court again found irreparable harm in the fact that the applicant's
business might fail if he were deported from Canada. Thus, economic factors can constitute
irreparable harm in applications for a stay in an immigration context and the
same principles will apply in immigration cases as in other contexts.
[36]
In Toth,
above, the Court considered the impact of the removal on “his immediate family
as well as others who are dependant upon the family business for their
livelihood”.
[37]
There
is irreparable harm in this case, due to the combination of multiple factors,
as specified.
a) The loss of his
businesses.
The Applicant operates a successful employment placement agency and bookkeeping
business. He has over 180 persons placed in employment through his agency at
present. He also has 8 full-time staff members in his employment placement
agency. All of these employees, and their families, depend on the continued
operation of his business for their livelihood. The clients of both businesses
depend on him to continue to provide them with staffing and bookkeeping services.
His businesses will fail if he is forced to leave Canada, as he has no partner,
associate, or anyone else who can continue to operate these businesses in his
absence, and he cannot operate them properly from abroad. (Motion Record, pp.
7-9, 20-21, 22-25, 294-337.)
b) Emotional and financial
hardship to his Canadian citizen nephew, Trai Thorney. The Applicant plays a
parental role in the daily financial and emotional support of Trai. He lives
near Trai and sees him daily. Trai is especially dependent on the Applicant as
his parents have separated and he is being raised by his single mother. If
removed, Trai will lose the benefit of this support, at a critical point in his
childhood development. (Motion Record, pp. 7, 21, 27-29, 32, 338-346.)
c) Financial hardship to
his family in Grenada, including his Canadian citizen nephew, Shemair Lewis. The Applicant supports
his mother and Canadian citizen nephew, Shemair, through his income in Canada. He will lose this
income if removed from Canada. (Motion Record, pp. 7,
21, 31, 338-346.)
d) Emotional and financial
hardship to his fiancée, Jennifer Shearer. The Applicant and Ms Shearer are in a
close relationship and intend to marry. Ms Shearer will suffer hardship if the
Applicant is removed: either she will remain in Canada to maintain her
employment to support them, thereby imposing separation on the couple; or she
will leave with him to Grenada, to live in a country with she is not familiar,
away from her family in Canada. Removal in either case would also impose the
significant financial hardship on them of the loss of the Applicant’s ongoing
business income. (Motion Record, pp. 7-8, 21, 28-29, 32-33, 126-135.)
e) Emotional and financial
hardship to his Canadian citizen sister, Gillian Thorney (Trai’s mother). The Applicant and his
sister are very close. They see each other every day and depend on each other
for emotional support. She would suffer the emotional hardship of separation
from the Applicant if he were removed, and would additionally lose the benefit
of his assistance in raising her child Trai. She would also lose the benefit of
his financial support through his Canadian income. (Motion Record, pp. 8, 21,
27, 338-346.)
f)
The
loss of his H&C application. It is submitted that the Applicant’s H&C
application would be rendered nugatory if he is removed, as his H&C
application is premised on his establishment in Canada through his business, and the financial
support that he provides to his family from that income. If he is removed, the
business would be lost, and his establishment in Canada fundamentally undermined. (Motion Record,
pp. 8-9, 20; Owusu v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2003 FCA 470, [2003] F.C.J. 1976 (QL).)
BALANCE OF CONVENIENCE
[38]
The
balance of convenience should be found to favour the applicant. This
proposition was clearly stated in the case of Membreno-Garcia v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1992] F.C.J. No. 535 (QL),
where Justice Reed concluded that once the applicant had made out an arguable
case and irreparable harm, the balance of convenience would be with the
applicant. (Mahadeo v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992]
F.C.J. 1077 (QL).)
[39]
When
considering whether or not to grant a stay the Court ought to consider the
dicta of the Court in Turbo, above, wherein Justice Stone stated:
... where other
factors appear to be evenly balanced, it is prudent to take such measures as
will preserve the status quo.
CONCLUSION
[40]
Due
to unusual and exceptional circumstances, as this case revolves on its distinct
merits, the stay of removal from Canada is granted until the
Applicant’s application for leave and judicial review be finally determined.
JUDGMENT
THIS COURT ORDERS that the stay of
removal from Canada be granted
until the Applicant’s application for leave and judicial review is finally
determined.
“Michel M.J. Shore”
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