Munderere v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 332

 

 

 

 

 

Date: 20070328

Docket: IMM-4723-06

Citation: 2007 FC 332

Ottawa, Ontario, March 28, 2007

PRESENT:     The Honourable Mr. Justice Beaudry

 

 

BETWEEN:

BAGAMBAKE EUGENE MUNDERERE

JUDITH RANGO

CYNTHIA MUNDERERE MUREKATETE

EUNICE MUNDERERE INGABIRE

SARAH MUNDERERE MUGENI

Applicants

and

 

THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP

AND IMMIGRATION

Respondent

 

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT

 

[1]               This is an application for judicial review pursuant to subsection 72(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (the Act), of a decision by Michel Venne,  Immigration and Refugee Board, Refugee Protection Division, (the Tribunal), dated July 26, 2006, which found that while the applicants were Convention refugees and persons in need of refugee protection with respect to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), they were not so with respect to their other country of nationality, Rwanda. While the impugned decision and most of the documentary evidence are in French, the parties’ submissions are in English. Therefore, these reasons will be in English.

 

ISSUES

[2]               The parties agree to the following points in issue:

a)       Did the Tribunal make a patently unreasonable finding of fact without regard to the evidence when it concluded that the grenade attack against the male applicant was a random, unmotivated act of violence?

b)      Did the Tribunal err in ignoring documentary evidence when it concluded that there was no objective evidence for the applicant’s fear of being ordered to return to DRC by the Rwandan President?

c)      Did the Tribunal err by failing to consider the cumulative effects of incidents that occurred both in DRC and Rwanda, when examining their claim for refugee protection with respect to Rwanda?

 

[3]               For the reasons outlined below, the response to each of these questions is positive. The application shall therefore be allowed.

 

BACKGROUND

[4]               Citizens of both DRC and Rwanda, the applicants sought asylum in Canada in November 2005 on the basis of the persecution they faced in DRC and Rwanda because of their ethnicity as Congolese Tutsis, (Banyamulenge). The applicants include the principal applicant, his spouse and their three children, the latter of whom were all born in Rwanda. Since their arrival in Canada, the family has welcomed the birth of another child who is not part of the present application.

 

[5]               The principal applicant worked as a merchant throughout his life in DRC, including in Goma, from 1990-1996; in Kinshasa, from 1996 to July 1998; and later in Rwanda, in Kigali from 1998 to 2000 and from 2000 to 2005 in Goma, DRC, as well as in its neighbouring Rwandan town of Gisenyi, where the family found refuge. His spouse was employed as a cashier at Telecel-Congo from January 1995 to January 2005, in Goma, DRC.

 

[6]               The couple has lived most of their life in DRC, a country in which the Tribunal esteemed they had established that there was a reasonable possibility of persecution if they were to return to that country. With respect to Rwanda, however, the Tribunal concluded that the principal applicant had failed to demonstrate that he and his dependent applicants were Convention refugees and people in need of protection.

 

[7]               The male applicant claimed a reasonable fear of persecution because the President of Rwanda would return him and his family to DRC because they were Congolese Tutsis, in order to further his political ambitions to seize control of North Kivu, DRC. In addition, the principal applicant claimed that he feared persecution because of the general state of insecurity in Rwanda and that he was a victim of a violent attack by unknown aggressors who threw a grenade in his direction, in front of his home, in September 2004.

 

[8]               In addition to his testimony, the applicant provided several documents about the situation in the Congolese-Rwandan border region including a 33-page article published in 2005 by Amnesty International entitled République Démocratique du Congo, Nord-Kivu : les civils paient le prix des rivalités  politiques et militaires.

 

[9]               Also, the principal applicant claimed that the cumulative effects of the persecution and hardship suffered in both the DRC and Rwanda should be taken into consideration as was the case in Mete v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2005] F.C.J. No. 1050 (F.C.) (QL)).

 

[10]           However, the Tribunal dismissed their claim. It is this negative decision that is now under judicial review.

 

DECISION UNDER REVIEW

[11]            Essentially, the Tribunal found that the applicants were indeed Convention refugees and people in need of protection from DRC. However, this was not the case with respect to Rwanda. The Tribunal found that the insecurity in Rwanda is a general phenomena faced by the entire population of that country due to the after effects of the 1994 genocide perpetrated by the Hutu armed forces who fled to DRC. In spite of the insecurity that reigned in Rwanda following the genocide, the country is under a democratically elected Tutsi President who holds a seven-year mandate. The applicant is Tutsi like the president. However, he was not a political figure who would be targeted or be deported to DRC. He was also not a witness to the genocide.

 

[12]           Furthermore, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant was targeted by the assailants in the grenade incident of September 2004. Indeed, based on the applicant’s testimony, he was not able to identify the aggressors such that the police could arrest them. But more importantly, the Tribunal found that the applicant and his wife continued to live and work in the same place, in Gisenyi, Rwanda, for well over a year, until their departure for Canada in November 2005. The applicants left Rwanda legally. The incident was an isolated one in which the male applicant happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. The Tribunal also held that the circumstances in Mete, above are inapplicable as that case involved cumulative events that took place in one country, Turkey, whereas the applicants are asking that it consider together the cumulative events in both DRC and Rwanda. Consequently, the applications were dismissed.

 

RELEVANT LEGISLATION

[13]           Sections 96 and 97 of the Act set out the criteria for the determination of refugee status and persons in need of protection. They provide as follows:

 

ANALYSIS

a)         Did the Tribunal make a patently unreasonable finding of fact without regard to the evidence when it concluded that the grenade attack against the male applicant was a random, unmotivated act of violence?

 

Standard of Review

 

[14]           The standard of review of fact based decisions under sections 96 and 97 of the Act is well established to be that of patent unreasonableness (see Umba v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 25, [2004] F.C.J. No. 17 (F.C.) (QL) at paragraph 31). This is particularly so in this issue, which asks whether the Tribunal erred in its assessment of the grenade attack against the male applicant.

 

[15]           The Tribunal did not question the credibility of the applicant’s story that he was the victim of a grenade attack on his car, in front of his house on the evening of September 9, 2004. The Tribunal observed as follows:

De tout ceci, compte tenu du fait qu’il y a une instabilité à Gisenyi en raison de la proximité de la frontière avec la ville de Goma dans la province du nord Kivu en RDC où des groupes armés de différentes ethnies s’affrontent avec l’aide de l’Ouganda, du Rwanda et de la RDC, le tribunal estime que le demandeur a été victime d’un acte isolé et que ni le demandeur ni sa famille n’était particulièrement visés. Le tribunal estime que le demandeur se trouvait au mauvais endroit au mauvais moment, d’autant plus qu’il ne fait pas de politique, n’est pas soupçonné d’avoir commis quelque exaction que ce soit à l’encontre de quiconque et n’est pas témoin auprès des tribunaux Gagaca qui jugent les génocidaires, ce qui aurait pu expliquer l’attaque dont il a fait l’objet en septembre 2004.

 

De tout ceci, le Tribunal estime que le demandeur a fait l’objet d’un acte gratuit de la part d’un ou des individus qui ne le visaient pas en particulier.

 

[16]           The applicant argues that there is no proof that this attack was motivated because of his ethnicity as a Congolese-Tutsis. As a result, by itself, this incident would not be enough to overturn the Tribunal’s decision. Nevertheless, the applicant is of the view that had the Tribunal considered the cumulative effect of the claims of persecution in DRC, the impact of this unexplained grenade attack in Gisenyi on that assessment would be substantially different if one considers it to have been a gratuitous act of violence than if one considers it to have been an attack for which there is no proof of its motivation. The applicant notes at paragraphs 113 and 114 of his Memorandum:

[…] In the former case, there is a definitive finding that there is no nexus between the attack and a Convention ground, while in the latter the nexus issue is simply ambiguous.

 

[…] The patently unreasonable finding that the attack was gratuitous corrupts any proper assessment of the cumulative grounds of persecution of the Applicants.

 

 

[17]           The respondent does not reply directly to this argument but notes that the Tribunal had a sound basis in the facts to infer that the applicant was at the wrong place at the wrong time and has been victim of an isolated act, a gratuitous act, which was not directed against him or his family. The respondent notes at paragraph 21 of its Memorandum of Argument that this conclusion was drawn from the following elements:

·        the applicant’s testimony that he did not know the persons who threw the grenade, in September 2004; he went to the police who could not help him as he could not identify his aggressors;

 

·        the applicant and his wife continued to live and work at the same place, in Gisenyi, until their departure in January 2005, during which time they prepared for their departure;

 

·        no threats nor any harassment were directed against the family during that whole period;

 

·        the whole family had passports and American visas since December 2004 and January 2005, respectively; they left Rwanda on November 2005;

 

·        the Board considered the explanation offered by the Applicant that he waited for his daughter Cynthia to finish her school and that he was helpless but considered this in light of the fact that the Applicant and his wife continued to work and live at their place and that during the following 14 months, no threats, no harassment were made [AR. p. 9] and

 

·        there is some instability in Gisenyi, which is located closely to the Border at Goma, in North Kivu, where armed groups of various ethnicities are in confrontation with the help of Uganda, Rwanda and DRC.

 

 

 

[18]           Finally, it is the respondent’s position that the Tribunal drew a reasonable inference from the evidence above. In this regard, the respondent relies on Justice Frederick Gibson’s decision in Burgess v. Canada (Attorney General), [2005] F.C.J. No 2152 (F.C.) (QL) at paragraph 20, where he quotes Justice MacGuigan in Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) v. Satiacum (1989), 99 N.R. 171 (F.C.A.), who dealt with the difference between a reasonable inference and a pure conjecture. The passage is as follows:

20     Once again in Satiacum, supra, Justice MacGuigan wrote at paragraphs [34] and [35]:

 

The common law has long recognized the difference between reasonable inference and pure conjecture. Lord Macmillan put the distinction this way in Jones v. Great Western Railway Co. ...:

 

The dividing line between conjecture and inference is often a very difficult one to draw. A conjecture may be plausible but it is of no legal value, for its essence is that it is a mere guess. An inference in the legal sense, on the other hand, is a deduction from the evidence, and if it is a reasonable deduction it may have the validity of legal proof. The attribution of an occurrence to a cause is, I take it, always a matter of inference.

 

In R. v. Fuller..., 1 N.R. 112, Hall J.A., held for the Manitoba Court of Appeal that "[t]he tribunal of fact cannot resort to speculative and conjectural conclusions." Subsequently a unanimous Supreme Court of Canada expressed itself as in complete agreement with his reasons: ... . [citations omitted]

 

On the facts of this matter, and based upon the urgings of counsel for the Respondent, I am satisfied that the conclusions of the Arbitrator regarding the nature of the "operational requirements" here in issue amounted to reasonable inference and not to conjecture.

 

[19]           Having read the transcripts of the hearing, as well as the 33-page document by Amnesty International that was before the Tribunal, although I note that the applicant only filed extracts of this article but the Tribunal undertook to get and consider the entire document, I come to the conclusion that it was pure conjecture for the Tribunal to characterize the grenade attack as a gratuitous act, of unfortunate timing. I am troubled particularly by the Tribunal’s recognition that there is some instability in Gisenyi, which is literally the Rwandan continuation of the Congolese town of Goma in North Kivu, where armed groups of various ethnicities are in confrontation with the help of Uganda, Rwanda and DRC. In this regard, the article states that there is indiscriminate violence between Congolese Hutus and Congolese Tutsis and other ethnic groups in the region. The article also gives chilling account of targeted attacks on civilians including merchants (commerçants), people of the very same profession as the principal applicant.

 

[20]           While there is no knowledge of the identity of the attackers or their motivation, it was an error for the Tribunal to dismiss this event as a gratuitous act of violence in which the applicant simply happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. There were other reasonable inferences which could be drawn from the documentary evidence that the Tribunal clearly overlooked. As a result of which, the Court finds that the Tribunal’s conclusion on this question is patently unreasonable.

 

b)         Did the Tribunal err in ignoring documentary evidence when it concluded that there was no objective evidence for the applicant’s fear of being ordered to return to DRC by the Rwandan President?

 

[21]           The Tribunal noted as follows at pages 4 and 5 of its decision:

Le demandeur craint de retourner au Rwanda parce que, selon lui, le président Paul Kagame va les retourner éventuellement en RDC, qu’il y a une insécurité générale qui règne dans le pays, qu’il a été l’objet d’une attaque à la grenade et enfin, parce que le Rwanda n’accepte pas les citoyens qui ont demandé l’asile à l’extérieur.

 

Sur le premier point, à savoir le fait que le président Paul Kagame du Rwanda pourrait retourner les Tutsis congolais en RDC, le tribunal estime qu’il s’agit là d’une pure hypothèse non supportée par la preuve documentaire de laquelle le tribunal ne peut tirer aucune conclusion, car cette affirmation ne repose sur aucun fait pertinent ou preuve documentaire.

 

[22]           However, the applicants submit that the 2005 Amnesty International Report substantiates their fear that President Kagame, might return Congolese-Tutsis to North Kivu. While the applicant does not enter into detail and contents himself with merely filing the article, I cannot dismiss his fears lightly after having made a careful reading of the Amnesty International report, which in my view was relevant to the finding the Tribunal was making.

 

[23]           While the article is devoted entirely to the ethnic tensions in North Kivu and hence not to events within the Rwandan border, the article clearly documents President Kagame’s involvement in the conflict in that region. The article states notably as follows:

Les opérations militaires et les attaques contre les civils s’inscrivent dans le cadre d’une exacerbation des antagonismes politiques et militaires entre Kinshasa et le RCD-Goma depuis les événements de Bukavu en juin 2004. À la fin de novembre, à la suite d’une attaque à la roquette qui aurait été menée sur son territoire par des membres des FDLR basés dans le Nord-Kivu(32), le Rwanda a dénoncé l’échec des efforts du gouvernement de la RDC et de la MONUC pour désarmer les FDLR. Le président rwandais, Paul Kagamé, a affirmé que les troupes gouvernementales rwandaises étaient peut-être déjà en RDC pour mener des «frappes chirurgicales» contre les FDLR. Une unité de l’armée rwandaise dont on ignore l’importance aurait pénétré au Nord-Kivu à la fin de novembre, apparemment pour attaquer les positions des FDLR ; elle aurait en même temps renforcé les unités du RCD-Goma (ANC) et les aurait ravitaillées. D’après certaines informations, au moins 13 civils ont trouvé la mort et des maisons ont été pillées et incendies dans 21 villages par des soldats rwandais. Le gouvernement rwandais a démenti cette incursion, mais des éléments de preuve fournis par la MONUC et le Groupe d’experts des Nations unies ainsi que les récits de témoins confirment qu’elle a bien eu lieu.

 

[…]

 

À la fin du mois de mai, d’autres affrontements plus sérieux ont éclaté à Bukavu lorsque le colonel Mutebutsi et des combattants du RCD-Goma (ANC) qui lui étaient fidèles ont pris les armes contre le général Mbuza Mabe. Les troupes de Mutebutsi ont été rapidement rejointes par une colonne de dissidents du RCD-Goma (ANC) du Nord-Kivu, dirigée par le général Laurent Nkunda, lequel avait été suspendu de ses fonctions par le gouvernement de transition pour avoir refusé un poste de commandement supérieur des FARDC(9). Nkunda a affirmé que son soutien à Mutebutsi avait pour but d’empêcher le «génocide» des Tutsis congolais (les Banyamulenges) minoritaires au Sud-Kivu. Toutefois, les combattants de Mutebutsi et de Nkunda se sont livrés à des homicides, des viols et des pillages dans la ville(10). Selon le Groupe d’experts des Nations unies chargé de veiller au respect de l’embargo sur les armes à destination de la RDC – et d’enquêter sur les violations de cet embargo –, ils ont reçu le soutien du gouvernement rwandais(11). Les dissidents semblaient également bénéficier du soutien, au moins tacite, des responsables du RCD-Goma du Nord-Kivu, et notamment du commandant militaire de la région, le général Obed Rwibasira, ainsi que du soutien du gouverneur du Nord-Kivu et membre du RCD-Goma, Eugène Serufuli. Ces deux hommes n’ont rien fait pour stopper la marche en direction du sud vers Bukavu de Laurent Nkunda et de ses troupes. Selon certaines sources, Eugène Serufuli est même allé jusqu’à leur fournir des camions, entre autre matériel(12).

 

Les forces de Nkunda se sont retirées de Bukavu le 10 juin 2004 et sont reparties en direction du Nord-Kivu où la plupart ont rejoint leurs unités sans faire l’objet de sanctions. Les troupes de Mutebutsi se sont repliées au sud de Bukavu puis au Rwanda. Les deux forces ont commis des exactions pendant leur repli. L’autorité militaire du gouvernement de transition et des FARDC, cette fois sans composante militaire appartenant au RCD-Goma, a été établie dans tout le Sud-Kivu, tandis que le RCD-Goma ne contrôlait plus que le Nord-Kivu.

 

L’enquête diligentée ultérieurement par la MONUC n’a trouvé aucun élément de nature à corroborer les allégations de massacres de Banyamulenges, bien qu’elle ait relevé que les troupes de Mbuza Mabe avaient commis des atteintes aux droits humains. La commission d’enquête estimait à plus d’une centaine le nombre des victimes civiles et militaires à Bukavu, la majorité des homicides étant imputables aux troupes de Mutebutsi et de Nkunda(13). Toutefois, les autorités congolaises et rwandaises n’ont pris aucune mesure pour traduire en justice les responsables présumés, dont les deux commandants militaires dissidents, ni pour les obliger à rendre compte de leurs actes. Le colonel Mutebutsi et le restant de ses troupes sont restés au Rwanda où le gouvernement leur a accordé le statut de réfugiés le 18 août 2005(14). Quelques jours plus tard, le gouvernement de la RDC a annoncé qu’il avait l’intention de demander l’extradition de Jules Mutebutsi du Rwanda(15). On ignore officiellement où se trouve Laurent Nkunda, bien que, selon des sources locales, il se trouve toujours au Nord-Kivu où il peut se déplacer, voire se rendre au Rwanda, sans que les autorités n’interviennent pour l’en empêcher.

 

[. . .]

 

Les accusations de génocide des Tutsis congolais formulées par les dissidents ont considérablement exacerbé les tensions ethniques et renforcé les craintes des populations banyarwandas du Nord-Kivu et du Sud-Kivu. La situation a été aggravée par des atteintes aux droits humains commises par des soldats progouvernementaux à l’encontre de civils banyarwandas durant les affrontements de Bukavu et lors de la poursuite des forces de Mutebutsi et de Nkunda au nord et au sud de la ville. Les combats de Bukavu auraient entraîné le déplacement massif de Tutsis, dont plusieurs milliers auraient trouvé refuge au Rwanda et au Burundi. Certains sont rentrés en RDC par la suite, mais la majorité sont toujours réfugiés dans les pays voisins.

 

[. . .]

 

Les Tutsis, en particulier, ont conservé des liens de parenté, de clientélisme et d’affaires avec les Tutsis du Rwanda et s’identifient étroitement au gouvernement du Front patriotique rwandais (FPR) dominé par les Tutsis.

 

[. . .]

 

B. Les communautés banyarwandas du Nord-Kivu

 

[…] Cet afflux de population a eu un effet profondément déstabilisateur sur la région : une bonne partie des Hundes ont été déplacés et presque tous les Tutsis ont été contraints de fuir au Rwanda pour échapper aux violences exercées par certains des réfugiés hutus rwandais ainsi que par des Hutus congolais. De nombreux Tutsis ont ensuite été encouragés à rentrer en RDC quand le RCD-Goma contrôlait les deux Kivus.

 

[24]           In addition, the article develops the strategy of the current regime in power in Rwanda to send an influx of Congolese-Tutsis who fled to Rwanda back to North Kivu to change the outcome of the elections to concretise the Rwandan stronghold in that region. In this regard, the document from Amnesty International analyses the influence of President Kagame and his ally in the region, with Gouverneur Serufuli to bring North Kivu under Rwandan control. Here are some of the passages in this detailed account of the role played by President Kagame and the precarious plight of Congolese Tutsis, such as the applicants who now live in Rwanda:

Le rôle controversé du gouverneur Serufuli

 

Nommé gouverneur de la province du Nord-Kivu par le Rwanda en 2000, Serufuli a joué un rôle central dans l’émergence d’une organisation politico-militaire qui se présente elle-même comme une ONG pour le développement et s’intitule Tous pour la paix et le développement (TPD). Cette organisation semble avoir de puissants soutiens au sein des élites banyarwandas du Congo et tutsis du Rwanda. Constituée à l’origine pour faciliter le rapatriement des réfugiés hutus vers le Rwanda, l’organisation TPD semble également avoir joué un rôle actif dans le rapatriement clandestin au Nord-Kivu de Tutsis congolais qui s’étaient réfugiés au Rwanda. Elle aurait en outre armé une milice majoritairement hutu au Nord-Kivu, les Forces de défense locales (FDL) et, plus récemment, distribué des armes aux civils banyarwandas de cette province.

 

B. Attiser les peurs ethniques

 

[. . .]

 

Les chefs de ces communautés ravivent des peurs anciennes quant à la création d’une nation autonome banyarwanda dans le Nord-Kivu, voire l’annexion pure et simple de la province par le Rwanda, ou la création d’un «empire» tutsi-hema s’étendant des Kivus à l’Ituri.

 

[. . .]

 

Dans cette optique, ils soupçonnent la communauté banyarwanda d’héberger de nombreux «intrus» arrivés du Rwanda depuis 1960. Ils craignent également que les résultats des élections ne soient faussés par le vote de Rwandais qui auront traversé la frontière, notoirement perméable, pour s’inscrire illégalement sur les listes électorales.

 

[. . .]

 

L’arrivée de milliers de Banyarwandas réfugiés au Rwanda qui, selon les prévisions, devraient retourner au Nord-Kivu, risque de poser de sérieux problèmes de sécurité au cours du processus d’inscription.

 

[25]           I am of the view that had the Tribunal considered this relevant documentary evidence, it could not possibly have arrived at the conclusion it did. In light of the evidence, it is not a mere hypothetical or an idle speculation for a Congolese Tutsis such as the applicant and his family to fear being returned en masse with their fellow Congolese Tutsis refugees back to DRC and into North Kivu to fulfill a politico-military strategy of President Kagame, to control that region of the country, which as the Amnesty International article amply explores, is noted for its economic riches in minerals and other natural resources. Based on the evidence collected by Amnesty International, it is a real fear that the President Kagame would return the thousands of Congolese Tutsis to North Kivu to determine the outcome of the elections and cement Rwanda’s stronghold in that part of DRC. It was therefore patently unreasonable for the Tribunal to discount this well founded fear as mere hypothetical.

 

c)         Did the Tribunal err by failing to consider the cumulative effects of incidents that occurred both in DRC and Rwanda, when examining their claim for refugee protection with respect to Rwanda?

 

[26]           The applicants advance that the Tribunal ought to have considered the cumulative effect of the incidents that occurred in DRC, when it turned its mind to the examination of its claim for refugee status with respect to their second country of nationality, Rwanda.

 

[27]           I agree with the respondent and the long line of jurisprudence in this domain which stands for the proposition that the Tribunal ought to consider the cumulative effects of incidents of harassment and discrimination, which over a period of time may amount to persecution based on sections 96 and 97 of the Act with respect to acts that took place in each of the country of nationality in respect of which the claim is being examined (see Bandula v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2003 FC 1062, [2003] F.C.J. No. 1341 (F.C.) (QL) at paragraph 9; Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Kaaib, 2006 FC 870, [2006] F.C.J. No. 1106 (F.C.) (QL) at paragraph 17; Canada (Attorney General of Canada) v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689 at paragraph 6; Bobrik v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1994] F.C.J. No. 1364 (F.C.T.D.) (QL) at paragraph 22).

 

[28]           Indeed the principles outlined in the jurisprudence are also those that underpin both national and international refugee law. In Canada, section 96 and subparagraphs 97(1)(b)(i) and (ii) of the Act embody this principle of multiple nationality and the need to consider the fear that would prevent a refugee claimant from availing him or herself of that state’s protection for each separate country.

 

[29]           Similarly, on the international stage, paragraph 53 of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status (the Guide), provides as follows:

In addition, an applicant may have been subjected to various measures not in themselves amounting to persecution (e.g. discrimination in different forms), in some cases combined with other adverse factors (e.g. general atmosphere of insecurity in the country of origin). In such situations, the various elements involved may, if taken together, produce an effect on the mind of the applicant that can reasonably justify a claim to well-founded fear of persecution on “cumulative grounds.” Needless to say, it is not possible to lay down a general rule as to what cumulative reasons can give rise to a valid claim to refugee status. This will necessarily depend on all the circumstances, including the particular geographical, historical and ethnological context.

 

[30]           I am also particularly grateful to the respondent for drawing my attention to passages from the seminal work of Grahl-Madsen, The Status of Refugees in International Law, volume 1, 1966 both with respect to multiple nationality (pages 257-58), and his discussion of the concept of “well-founded fear” (pages 173-76). I am mindful too that the Tribunal did turn its mind to the applicant’s claims of a well-founded fear both with respect to the DRC and to Rwanda, the twin countries of his nationality.

 

[31]           While it is ordinarily not required by the Tribunal to combine the cumulative effects of fear of persecution arising from incidents that occurred in two separate countries, the exceptional circumstances of this case provide the three conditions under which such a combined assessment may be considered as outlined in international refugee law in paragraph 53 of the Guide.

 

[32]           First, the geographical context is not without its similarities. Indeed, Goma where the applicants lived and worked for most of their lives is just on the other side of Gisenyi, Rwanda, where the applicants took refuge. The persecution suffered in Goma is well documented and the Tribunal has settled this matter.

 

[33]           Second, the conflict in this troubled region of North Kivu is historically linked to the neighbouring territories of Rwanda where many of the Congolese Tutsis fled following the massacres of Congolese Tutsis in DRC. Third, the fear of persecution and the cumulative effect of events that transpired on both sides of this troubled border cannot also be divorced from the ethnological context that has pitted the DRC against Banyamulenges and the FDLR:

Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda. Groupe dissident basé dans l’est de la RDC et opposé au gouvernement rwandais. Les FDLR sont en partie constituées de membres de l’Interahamwe («Ceux qui combattent ensemble») et des ex-Forces armées rwandaises (ex-FAR) qui ont perpétré le génocide de 1994 au Rwanda.

 

The Bandawange which consists of Rwandan Hutus and Rwandan Tutsis who arrived in DRC after the genocide on 1994 have deep ancestral roots in Rwanda. For their part, the minority Banyamulenges such as the applicants were born in DRC of Rwandan Tutsis parents who settled in DRC following the insecurity between 1959 and 1963 surrounding independence. The Bandawange are the majority ethnic group in certain parts of North Kivu.

 

[34]           It is in light of this exceptional triangular convergence of circumstances: geographical, historical and ethnological that the Court is of the opinion that the Tribunal should have taken into consideration the cumulative impact of years of persecution that have followed the Banyamulenges, such as the applicants from Goma to Gisenyi and back to Goma to give rise to a well founded fear of persecution, even though politically, these events span the frontiers of two separate countries.

 

[35]           In the case at bar, it is the analysis of the cumulative effects of persecution and hardship suffered in the DRC on the applicant’s fear of persecution in Rwanda that is missing.

 

[36]           The parties filed submissions on a proposed question for certification.  The Court agrees to certify the following question:  

Considering section 53 of the United Nations Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, and in particular the last sentence of that paragraph, "This will necessarily depend on all the circumstances, including the particular geographical, historical and ethnological context", is it an error in law to limit the analysis of the cumulative grounds to the events that occurred within one country of nationality or habitual residence, when the claimant alleges persecution on the basis of the same Convention ground in the two (or more) countries, and where the claimant's subject fear is related to events that occurred in more than one country?

 

 

 

JUDGMENT

 

THIS COURT ORDERS that:

1. The application for judicial review is allowed;
2. The matter is sent back for re-determination by a newly constituted panel;
3. The following question is certified:

Considering section 53 of the United Nations Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, and in particular the last sentence of that paragraph, "This will necessarily depend on all the circumstances, including the particular geographical, historical and ethnological context", is it an error in law to limit the analysis of the cumulative grounds to the events that occurred within one country of nationality or habitual residence, when the claimant alleges persecution on the basis of the same Convention ground in the two (or more) countries, and where the claimant's subject fear is related to events that occurred in more than one country?

 

 

 

“Michel Beaudry”

 

 

 

FEDERAL COURT

 

NAME OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD

 

 

DOCKET:                                          IMM-4723-06

 

STYLE OF CAUSE:                          BAGAMBAKE EUGENE MUNDERERE

JUDITH RANGO

CYNTHIA MUNDERERE MUREKATETE

EUNICE MUNDERERE INGABIRE v.                                         THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND                                  IMMIGRATION

                                                           

 

PLACE OF HEARING:                    Montreal, Quebec

 

DATE OF HEARING:                      March 21, 2007

 

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

AND JUDGMENT:                          Beaudry J.

 

DATED:                                             March 28, 2007

 

 

 

APPEARANCES:

 

Jared Will                                                                                 APPLICANT

                                                                                               

 

Louise-Marie Courtemanche, QC                                             FOR RESPONDENT

                                                                                               

SOLICITORS OF RECORD:

 

Jared Will                                                                                 FOR APPLICANT

Montreal, Quebec

 

John Sims, Q.C.                                                                       FOR RESPONDENT

Deputy Attorney General of Canada

Montreal, Quebec