Date: 20110802
Docket: IMM-7167-10
Citation: 2011 FC 969
Ottawa, Ontario,
August 2, 2011
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Russell
BETWEEN:
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JIU XIN WANG
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Applicant
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and
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
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Respondent
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REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND
JUDGMENT
[1]
This is an application pursuant to subsection 72(1) of the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (Act) for judicial
review of the decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) of the
Immigration and Refugee Board, dated 17 November 2010 (Decision), which refused
the Applicant’s application to be deemed a Convention refugee or a person in
need of protection under sections 96 and 97 of the Act.
BACKGROUND
[2]
The
Applicant alleges that he is a former restaurant owner from Liaoning Province in the
People’s Republic of China. He was introduced to
Christianity by a friend and became a Christian after his restaurant, which had
been rebuilt following a fire, failed to make an economic recovery. He began
attending an underground Protestant church on 29 April 2007. The church was
raided on 25 May 2007. The Applicant escaped and went into hiding. The next
day, the Public Security Bureau (PSB) came to his home looking for him and left
a summons with his wife. The PSB also searched for the Applicant at the homes
of his parents and in-laws. Fearing for his life, the Applicant enlisted the
help of a smuggler and fled to Canada under a fraudulent South Korean passport. He arrived in Canada via commercial airline on
7 July 2008 and made his claim for refugee protection on 10 July 2008.
[3]
The
Applicant appeared before the RPD on 12 October 2010. He was represented by
counsel and an interpreter was present. The RPD questioned the Applicant on his
reasons for fleeing China and on his knowledge
regarding Christianity. In a written Decision, dated 17 November 2010, the RPD
rejected the Applicant’s refugee claim, based on its finding that the Applicant
had failed to establish his identity. This is the Decision under review.
DECISION UNDER REVIEW
The Applicant Failed to Establish
His Identity
[4]
Section
106 of the Act imposes a duty on a refugee claimant to provide acceptable
documents establishing his identity, including documents that the claimant does
not possess but can reasonably obtain. In assessing the claimant’s credibility,
the RPD must consider the lack of such documents, explanations given for not
providing them and the steps taken to obtain them. Documents that are not genuine,
that have been altered or that are otherwise improper are generally not
acceptable proof of identity.
[5]
The
Decision states that the Applicant failed to establish his identity through
acceptable documents and testimony and to provide reasonable explanations for
not adducing such evidence. Although the Applicant provided his hukou, his
school certificate and his marriage license in support of his personal
identity, the RPD assigned little weight to these documents, given its concerns
regarding their authenticity. The RPD also found the Applicant’s explanations
of how the documents were delivered from China to Canada to be implausible. It found that the only
document that could be genuine was the Applicant’s driver’s license. However,
given the concerns with the other identity documents and the availability of
fraudulent documents throughout China, the RPD found that the evidence as a whole did
not constitute sufficient credible and trustworthy evidence of the Applicant’s
identity.
The Resident Identity Card
(RIC)
[6]
The
Applicant claimed that his wife attempted to send his RIC through the mail but
that post office officials seized it and sent it to the PSB. A seizure notice
was submitted attesting to this. The RPD found that it could not place
“significant weight on the seizure notice as an explanation for the
[Applicant’s] failure to provide the [RPD] with acceptable identity documents,”
given its concerns relating to the authenticity of the other identity documents
and the availability of fraudulent documents in China.
[7]
The
Applicant also testified that his wife was taken to the police station
following the seizure of the RIC, but the RPD had no documents to support this
allegation and no satisfactory explanation for failing to provide them.
[8]
Given
that the RIC is one of the few identity documents in China that contain
security features, the RPD assigned a significant negative inference to the
Applicant’s failure to provide an original RIC and to his poor explanation for
not doing so.
The Hukou
[9]
The
RPD found that the Applicant’s credibility was undermined by his testimony
regarding his hukou (household registration card). Initially, the Applicant was
unable to recall when his hukou was issued. He then testified that it was
issued in 2007 when, in fact, it was issued in 2000. The RPD did not accept the
Applicant’s explanation that he could not recall the proper date because his
wife usually looked after these affairs.
[10]
Also,
the Applicant testified that the PSB made a handwritten change to the hukou at
the request of the Applicant’s wife. In the RPD’s view, this change should have
been noticed and corrected sooner on a hukou that was issued in the year 2000.
The RPD also found it “implausible” that the PSB would have updated the
Applicant’s hukou, given that the Applicant was a wanted person at the material
time. The RPD concluded that either the Applicant was not a wanted person or
the hukou was not genuine, both of which undermine the Applicant’s credibility
with respect to his identity and his allegations of persecution.
The Qualification
Certificate and the Marriage Certificate
[11]
Handwritten
changes were also made to the Applicant’s Qualification, or “school”, Certificate.
The Applicant explained that his wife arranged to have those changes made. The
RPD concluded that the “handwritten changes … undermined its authenticity.”
[12]
The
Applicant’s Marriage Certificate indicates that the marriage ceremony took
place before the certificate was issued, but the Applicant testified that the
ceremony took place after the certificate was issued. When asked to explain
this inconsistency, the Applicant indicated that it was illegal to do the
ceremony before obtaining the marriage certificate. The RPD found that this
explanation did not address the inconsistency.
[13]
Due
to its concerns regarding the Applicant’s hukou and his marriage certificate,
the RPD found that there was insufficient credible evidence to support the
Applicant’s alleged family status. Therefore, the RPD found that it could not
place significant weight on the Applicant’s claims that his wife sent him the
documents and that his RIC was seized when his wife attempted to mail it.
The Applicant Failed to
Establish That He Was a Restaurant Owner
[14]
The
Decision states that the Applicant failed to establish that he was a restaurant
owner in China. He “did not provide
any documents in support of the existence of the restaurant” or of his claim
that the restaurant was destroyed by fire. He testified that he did not know that
he should acquire such documentation for the hearing. The RPD rejected
this explanation, given that the Applicant was represented by counsel, had been
assisted by an immigration consultant and had been instructed in his
application for refugee protection to establish his residence and occupation. This
lack of evidence undermined his allegation that he owned a restaurant and that
he was motivated to become a Christian after his restaurant experienced an
economic downturn.
The Applicant’s
Explanation Regarding Delivery of His Identity Documents Was Implausible
[15]
The
Applicant explained that his wife collected his identity documents and gave
them to his landlord, who was in China on a visit. The landlord then delivered them to
a colleague, in China, to bring to Canada in September 2010. The RPD rejected this
explanation as implausible for the following reason.
[16]
The
seizure of his RIC meant that the Applicant was a person of interest to the
authorities. In consequence, it would be too risky to have the documents
transported to Canada in person because they
would more likely be noticed and seized by Chinese exit authorities or by
Canadian immigration officials. The Applicant could have arranged to have the
documents sent or couriered in a way that would not alert the authorities that
the documents had been sent by his wife or were destined for delivery to him.
In consequence, the RPD concluded that it could not place significant weight on
the Applicant’s testimony regarding how he had received his identity documents
from China.
[17]
Based
on the above analysis of the evidence, the RPD concluded that the Applicant had
not established his identity, thereby rendering it unnecessary for the RPD to
move on to the merits of the claim. The RPD found that the Applicant was
neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection and, on this
basis, rejected his claim.
ISSUES
[18]
The
Applicant raises the following issue:
Whether, in finding that
the Applicant had not established his identity, the RPD made irreconcilable and
contradictory findings of fact, referred to evidence that was not properly
before it, ignored evidence that was properly before it and relied almost
exclusively on plausibility determinations.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
[19]
The
following provisions of the Act are applicable in these proceedings:
Convention refugee
96. A Convention refugee is a person who, by reason of a well-founded fear
of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group or political opinion,
(a) is outside each of their countries of nationality and is
unable or, by reason of that fear, unwilling to avail themself of the
protection of each of those countries; or
(b) not having a country of nationality, is outside the country
of their former habitual residence and is unable or, by reason of that fear,
unwilling to return to that country.
Person in need of protection
97. (1) A person in need of
protection is a person in Canada whose removal to their country or countries of
nationality or, if they do not have a country of nationality, their country
of former habitual residence, would subject them personally
(a) to a danger, believed on substantial grounds to exist, of
torture within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture; or
(b) to a risk to their life or to a risk of cruel and unusual
treatment or punishment if
(i) the person is unable or, because of that risk, unwilling to avail
themself of the protection of that country,
(ii) the risk would be faced by the person in every part of that country
and is not faced generally by other individuals in or from that country,
(iii) the risk is not inherent or incidental to lawful sanctions, unless
imposed in disregard of accepted international standards, and
(iv) the risk is not caused by the inability of that country to provide
adequate health or medical care.
Person in need of protection
(2) A person in Canada who is a member of a class of persons prescribed by the
regulations as being in need of protection is also a person in need of
protection.
[…]
Credibility
106. The Refugee Protection Division must take into account, with respect
to the credibility of a claimant, whether the claimant possesses acceptable
documentation establishing identity, and if not, whether they have provided a
reasonable explanation for the lack of documentation or have taken reasonable
steps to obtain the documentation.
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Définition de « réfugié »
96. A qualité de réfugié au sens de la Convention — le
réfugié — la personne qui, craignant avec raison d’être persécutée du fait de
sa race, de sa religion, de sa nationalité, de son appartenance à un groupe
social ou de ses opinions politiques :
a) soit se trouve hors de tout pays dont elle a la
nationalité et ne peut ou, du fait de cette crainte, ne veut se réclamer de
la protection de chacun de ces pays;
b) soit, si elle n’a pas de nationalité et se trouve hors
du pays dans lequel elle avait sa résidence habituelle, ne peut ni, du fait
de cette crainte, ne veut y retourner.
Personne à protéger
97. (1) A qualité de personne à protéger la personne qui se
trouve au Canada et serait personnellement, par son renvoi vers tout pays
dont elle a la nationalité ou, si elle n’a pas de nationalité, dans lequel
elle avait sa résidence habituelle, exposée :
a) soit au risque, s’il y a des motifs sérieux de le
croire, d’être soumise à la torture au sens de l’article premier de la
Convention contre la torture;
b) soit à une menace à sa vie ou au risque de traitements
ou peines cruels et inusités dans le cas suivant :
(i) elle ne peut ou, de ce fait, ne veut se réclamer de
la protection de ce pays,
(ii) elle y est exposée en tout lieu de ce pays alors que
d’autres personnes originaires de ce pays ou qui s’y trouvent ne le sont
généralement pas,
(iii) la menace ou le risque ne résulte pas de sanctions
légitimes — sauf celles infligées au mépris des normes internationales — et
inhérents à celles-ci ou occasionnés par elles,
(iv) la menace ou le risque ne résulte pas de
l’incapacité du pays de fournir des soins médicaux ou de santé adéquats.
Personne à protéger
(2) A également qualité de personne à protéger la
personne qui se trouve au Canada et fait partie d’une catégorie de personnes
auxquelles est reconnu par règlement le besoin de protection.
[…]
Crédibilité
106. La Section de la
protection des réfugiés prend en compte, s’agissant de crédibilité, le fait
que, n’étant pas muni de papiers d’identité acceptables, le demandeur ne peut
raisonnablement en justifier la raison et n’a pas pris les mesures voulues
pour s’en procurer.
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[20]
The
following provisions of the Refugee Protection Division Rules,
SOR/2002-228 (Rules), are applicable in these proceedings:
Documents
establishing identity and other elements of the claim
7. The claimant must provide acceptable
documents establishing identity and other elements of the claim. A claimant
who does not provide acceptable documents must explain why they were not
provided and what steps were taken to obtain them.
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Documents
d’identité et autres éléments de la demande
7. Le demandeur d’asile
transmet à la Section des documents acceptables pour établir son identité et
les autres éléments de sa demande. S’il ne peut le faire, il en donne la
raison et indique quelles mesures il a prises pour s’en procurer.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
[21]
The Supreme Court of Canada in Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, held
that a standard of review analysis need not be conducted in every instance.
Instead, where the standard of review applicable to the particular question
before the court is well-settled by past jurisprudence, the reviewing court may
adopt that standard of review. Only where this search proves fruitless must the
reviewing court undertake a consideration of the four factors comprising the
standard of review analysis.
[22]
At
issue in this application are the RPD’s findings of fact and credibility and
its assessment of the evidence. These considerations attract a standard of
reasonableness. See Elmi v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 773 at
paragraphs 19-21.
[23]
When reviewing a decision on the standard of reasonableness, the
analysis will be concerned with “the existence of justification, transparency
and intelligibility within the decision-making process [and also with] whether
the decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are
defensible in respect of the facts and law.” See Dunsmuir, above, at paragraph
47; and Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Khosa, 2009 SCC 12 at
paragraph 59. Put another way, the Court should
intervene only if the Decision was unreasonable in the sense that it falls
outside the “range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in
respect of the facts and law.”
ARGUMENTS
The Applicant
The RPD Made
Irreconcilable and Contradictory Findings of Fact
[24]
At
paragraph 6 of the Decision, the RPD states that the Applicant “failed to
establish his personal identity and nationality.” At paragraph 10, it states
that the Applicant “has established his nationality through his passport.” At
paragraph 20, it states that the Applicant failed to establish his “personal
identity,” without reference to whether it was satisfied that he had
established his nationality.
[25]
The
RPD has not reconciled or otherwise explained these directly contradictory
findings, which leaves the Applicant in the impossible position of being unable
to ascertain whether the RPD accepted that he was a national of China. It is acknowledged in
the jurisprudence that the RPD is required to express its credibility findings
“in clear and unmistakable terms.” The Applicant contends that the RPD is
equally required to express findings of facts that are central to a claim for
refugee protection in the same manner.
[26]
Given
that the Applicant’s identity was a dispositive issue, the contradictory findings
as to whether the Applicant had established that he was a national of China are fatal to the
Decision. If the RPD had concluded that the Applicant was in fact a national of
China (which it appears to have done at paragraph 10 of the Decision), the RPD had
a clear duty to determine whether the Applicant was a Christian, and if so,
whether as a Christian he would be subject to a risk of religious persecution
or would otherwise be able to practise his religion openly and freely in China.
See Fosu v Canada (Minister of Employment
and Immigration)
(1994), 90 FTR 182, [1994] FCJ No 1813 (QL) at paragraph 5. However, the RPD
made no findings regarding the Applicant’s religious identity. Indeed, it
expressly refused to “move on to the merits of the claim” based on its
contradictory findings regarding the Applicant’s identity. As a result, the
Applicant’s claim for refugee protection was not fully adjudicated. Under these
circumstances, the Applicant submits that the intervention of this Court is
warranted.
The RPD Referred to
Evidence That Was Not Before It
[27]
At
paragraph 10 of the Decision, the RPD referred to the Applicant’s passport as
having established his identity. However, the Applicant’s passport was never
adduced into evidence. Indeed, the Applicant’s Personal Information Form (PIF)
indicates that he travelled to Canada using a fraudulent South Korean passport.
[28]
The
RPD’s reliance on evidence that was not actually before it, coupled with its
contradictory findings regarding the Applicant’s nationality, suggests that the
RPD did not have regard to the facts of the matter before it and that it relied
upon boilerplate reasons to reject the Applicant’s claim. See Mohacsi v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2003 FCT 429. The
Applicant submits that, given the importance of the Decision, any doubt
regarding the RPD’s failure to turn its mind to the facts of the claim ought to
be resolved in the Applicant’s favour. As Justice Howard Wetston of this Court
stated in Mohamed-Zein v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1994), 49 ACWS (3d)
1135, [1994] FCJ No 1157 (QL) at paragraph 3, a tribunal commits a reviewable
error where it misapprehends evidence that is central to its determinations
concerning the applicant’s claim for refugee protection. Moreover, given that
the factual error regarding the passport was apparently taken into account in
the Decision, it may have contaminated the ultimate conclusion. See Yang v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 468 at paragraphs 2-3.
The RPD Failed to
Consider Relevant Evidence That Was Before It
[29]
The
Applicant argues that the RPD failed to consider highly relevant documentary
evidence that was before it and that would have assisted in establishing the
Applicant’s identity, namely the Applicant’s business license and the summons
issued by the PSB in the Applicant’s name and delivered to his wife. The RPD
made no reference to these documents.
[30]
In Cepeda-Gutierrez
v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration) (1998), 157 FTR 35, [1998] FCJ No 1425 (QL) at
paragraph 17, this Court held that, although a tribunal is not required to
refer specifically to every piece of evidence before it:
the
more important the evidence that is not mentioned specifically and analyzed in
the agency’s reasons, the more willing a court may be to infer from the silence
that the agency made an erroneous finding of fact “without regard to the
evidence”: Bains v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration)
(1993), 63 F.T.R. 312 (F.C.T.D.).
[31]
These
documents constitute important evidence relevant to the central issue of the
Applicant’s identity. The RPD found that the Applicant had failed to establish
that he was a restaurant owner. The Applicant’s business license—which
contained the Applicant’s name, date of issue, type of business (namely,
restaurant), name of business and location of business—provided information
directly relevant to establishing the Applicant’s identity as a restaurant
owner. Similarly, the summons—which contained the Applicant’s name and
address—provided further information directly relevant to establishing the
Applicant’s identity as a resident of ShenYang City in Liaoning Province. The
Applicant submits that the RPD’s failure specifically to mention and analyze
this document amounts to further reviewable error. These documents are presumed
to be acceptable evidence of their content, and the RPD has not rebutted that
presumption. See Sertkaya v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 734.
The RPD Made Improper
Plausibility Findings
[32]
The
RPD made a number of implausibility findings, including findings related to the
method by which the Applicant’s identity documents were delivered from China to
Canada as well as to the
seizure of the RIC by post office officials and the subsequent visit of the
Applicant’s wife to the police station.
[33]
This
Court in Leung v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1994), 81 FTR 303, [1994] FCJ No 774 (QL) at paragraphs
14-15, stated that “the Board is under a very clear duty to justify its
credibility findings with specific and clear reference to the evidence”:
This
duty becomes particularly important in cases such as this one where the Board
has based its non-credibility finding on perceived “implausibilities” in the
claimants’ stories rather than on internal inconsistencies and contradictions
in their narratives or their demeanour while testifying. Findings of
implausibility are inherently subjective assessments which are largely
dependant (sic) on the individual Board member’s perceptions of what
constitutes rational behaviour. The appropriateness of a particular finding can
therefore only be assessed if the Board’s decision clearly identifies all of
the facts which form the basis for their conclusions.
[34]
The
Applicant submits that the RPD’s implausibility determinations were based
neither on the evidence nor on internal inconsistencies in the Applicant’s
testimony. Rather, they were based on pure speculation as to likelihoods or
probabilities. In relying upon them and subsequently in rejecting the
authenticity of the Applicant’s identity documentation, the RPD acted
improperly. See Adaramasha v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 1529 at
paragraph 11.
The Respondent
The RPD’s
Identity Findings Were Reasonable
[35]
The
Respondent recognizes the statutory requirement upon every refugee claimant to
prove his identity on a balance of probabilities. See Qiu v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 259 at paragraph 6. An absence of
acceptable documentation without a reasonable explanation, or the failure to
take reasonable steps to obtain such documents, is a significant factor in
assessing the credibility of a refugee claimant.
[36]
The
RPD stated a number of reasonable concerns with respect to errors and
discrepancies on the face of the Applicant’s documents, and it did not accept
the Applicant’s explanations for them. For example, the RIC is one of the few
identity documents in China that contains security
features. It is therefore is an important personal identity document for an
individual in China. The Applicant’s
failure to provide a RIC and his failure to provide a satisfactory reason for
not doing so warranted a significant negative inference.
[37]
Similarly,
the RPD questioned the Applicant regarding the handwritten modification to his
hukou, which revealed a significant inconsistency. The Applicant first
indicated he did not remember the date on which this document was issued. He
then said that it was issued in 2007, when in fact it was issued was in 2000,
which represents a difference of seven years. Only after he was asked to
explain the notable inaccuracy of his estimation did the Applicant explain that
his wife looked after these affairs. The RPD reasonably found that the
Applicant’s hukou would not be updated by the authorities, given that he was a
wanted person at the material time and that all of the authorities would have
received notice of this.
[38]
Finally,
the RPD considered the Applicant’s testimony regarding when his marriage
certificate was issued: before or after the ceremony. The Applicant gave
contradictory answers and failed to provide an explanation that addressed the
RPD’s concerns. The RPD was entitled to find that the Applicant was not
credible based on vague or insufficiently detailed explanations. See He v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2001 FCT 1256.
[39]
Given
the availability of fraudulent documents in China and given the Applicant’s inability to provide
credible testimony in relation to the hukou, the RPD acted reasonably in
finding that the Applicant had not established his identity on a balance of
probabilities.
[40]
The
Respondent argues that negative decisions regarding an applicant’s credibility
are properly made as long as the tribunal gives reasons in “clear and
unmistakable terms.” In the instant case, the RPD made precise findings that
were supported by specific reference to the evidence. As such, it met all of
the legal requirements in arriving at its Decision. See Hilo v Canada (Minister of Employment
and Immigration)
(1991), 130 NR 236, [1991] FCJ No 228 (QL) (FCA).
The Applicant’s
Nationality Was of No Consequence
[41]
The
RPD’s comment that that the Applicant established his nationality through his
passport appears to be an error. However, it is of no consequence. Contrary to
the Applicant’s arguments, the Applicant’s nationality was not of critical
importance because the RPD found that the Applicant had not established his
personal identity. In particular, the RPD noted that the Applicant had not
provided sufficient credible or trustworthy evidence in support of his
allegation that he owned a restaurant that was destroyed in a fire, which he
claimed is what motivated him to become a Christian. Having failed to establish
his personal identity, the Applicant has similarly failed to establish that he
is a Christian, which forms the basis of his claim for refugee protection.
[42]
The
Respondent submits that the Decision should be read as a whole. The RPD
considered the evidence in its totality and furnished many reasons supporting
its determination that the Applicant’s evidence regarding his identity was
neither credible nor trustworthy. This error was not of consequence and does
not require the intervention of this Court.
The RPD Need Not Have Assessed the
Remainder of the Claim
[43]
The
Respondent contends that, once a tribunal has concluded that identity has not
been established, it need not analyze the remainder of the claim. The
Applicant’s failure to prove his identity on a balance of probabilities
effectively undermines any claim of a well-founded fear of persecution. See Liu
v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 831 at paragraph 18.
ANALYSIS
[44]
The
Decision is based upon “personal identity and nationality”:
The
panel found that the claimant has failed to establish his personal identity and
nationality because of concerns with the claimant’s documents and testimony
related to documents.
[45]
The
RPD provides a list of its concerns. Many of them are reasonable in my view.
However, the Decision also presents a series of problems and concerns in its
own right:
a.
At
paragraph 6 of the Decision, the RPD states that the Applicant “failed to
establish his personal identity and nationality.” At paragraph 10, it states
that the Applicant “has established his nationality through his passport.” At
paragraph 20, it states that the Applicant failed to establish his “personal
identity,” without reference to whether it was satisfied that he had
established his nationality;
b.
At
paragraph 10 of the Decision, the RPD states that the Applicant has established
his nationality through his passport, whereas the Applicant’s PIF indicates
that he never used his own passport but rather used a fraudulent South Korean
passport to enter Canada. There does not appear
to be a genuine Chinese passport in evidence for the Applicant;
c.
At
paragraph 20 of the Decision, the RPD indicates that the Applicant provided a
copy of his RIC. However, at paragraph 12 of the Decision, the RPD states that
the Applicant failed to provide an original copy of his RIC and failed to
provide a satisfactory explanation for not doing so. On this basis, the RPD
draws a “significant negative inference”;
d.
At
paragraph 18 of the Decision, the RPD states that the Applicant could provide
no documentary evidence that he owned a restaurant or that it was destroyed by
fire. This lack of evidence, the RPD finds, undermines the Applicant’s claim
that he owned a restaurant and that he was motivated to become a Christian
after his restaurant experienced an economic downturn. However, the Applicant’s
business license—which was before the RPD and which contained the Applicant’s
name, date of issue, type of business (namely, restaurant), name of business
and location of business—provided information directly relevant to establishing
the Applicant’s identity as a restaurant owner. The RPD never mentions why this
evidence, which is relevant to an important aspect of the claim, was not
considered persuasive of the Applicant’s status as a restaurant owner. Indeed,
the RPD never mentions the license at all.
[46]
The
Respondent invites the Court to read the Decision by removing the offending
words in paragraph 10 concerning the passport and nationality and to treat this
mistake as isolated and immaterial. See Varatharajah v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 746 at paragraph 35. I think the
difficulty with this approach is that the national/personal distinction is
present throughout the Decision, and this suggests that the distinction was
important to the RPD’s conclusions. In paragraph 20 of the Decision, the RPD
concludes that “the claimant has failed to provide acceptable documents and
testimony to establish his personal identity ….”
[47]
When
the Decision is read as a whole, I do not think that it can be reasonably determined
what the RPD meant in paragraph 10. Hence, I think the Decision is unsafe. It
is for the RPD to explain its reasoning in clear and unmistakable terms. See Armson
v Canada (Minister of Employment
and Immigration)
(1989), 9 Imm LR (2d) 150, [1989] FCJ No 800 (QL) (FCA). The Court cannot, as
it were, attempt to edit the Decision so as to render it comprehensible unless,
of course, the mistake is of a typographical nature and is isolated and
immaterial. I cannot say in this instance that the mistake in paragraph 10
about the passport and the issue of national identity was isolated and
immaterial.
[48]
The
Respondent states that the RPD’s implausibility findings are reasonable without
explaining how they are reasonable. I am particularly concerned about the findings
regarding the Applicant’s driver’s license and the post office seizure notice.
The RPD says that the driver’s license appears to be genuine but nonetheless
dismisses it because it has found that the other documents are fraudulent and
because fraudulent documents are readily available in China. The same is true of
the post office seizure notice, which the Applicant submitted as proof that his
wife tried to mail his RIC to him but post office officials seized it and sent
it to the PSB. The RPD does not find that it is fraudulent but refuses to place
“significant weight on the seizure notice as an explanation for the
[Applicant’s] failure to provide the [RPD] with acceptable identity documents,”
given its concerns relating to the authenticity of the other identity documents
and the availability of fraudulent documents in China.
[49]
As
Justice Carolyn Layden-Stevenson pointed out in Lin v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 84, at paragraph 12, a finding that
one document is (or some documents are) fraudulent does not necessarily mean
that all documents are fraudulent even in a situation where fraudulent
documents are readily available. The RPD must make some effort to ascertain the
authenticity of documents that appear to be genuine.
[50]
The
RPD’s findings regarding the handwritten changes to the Applicant’s hukou and
his qualification certificate, as well as the findings regarding the date of
issue of the marriage certificate, are reasonable in my view. Given the standard of review, it is not for this Court to
substitute its own views of the evidence even where it might have drawn a
different inference from that drawn by the RPD. See Ariff v Canada (Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration) (1996), 61 ACWS (3d) 772, [1996]
FCJ No 256 (QL) (FC). However, the RPD’s failure to address the restaurant
licence is a material error that renders the Decision unreasonable. This was
documentary evidence that went directly to the Applicant’s identity as a
restaurant owner and which supported the reasons he gave for becoming a
Christian. It is evidence that directly contradicts the RPD’s conclusions on
point. See Cepeda-Gutierrez, above, at paragraph 15.
[51]
The transcript of the hearing shows that the Applicant was
questioned extensively on his Christian beliefs (there are 18 pages of dialogue
between the Applicant and either the member or counsel), but the RPD makes no
finding as to whether it believes that the Applicant is a Christian, having
found that the Applicant did not establish his identity.
[52]
As
both parties state, negative decisions regarding an applicant’s credibility are
properly made as long as the tribunal gives reasons in “clear and unmistakable
terms.” I am not satisfied, given the significant errors noted above, that the
RPD turned its mind sufficiently to the facts of this case. See Erdos v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigraiton), 2003 FC 955 at paragraph 28. This matter needs
to be returned for reconsideration.
JUDGMENT
THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT is
that
1.
The
application is allowed. The Decision is quashed and the matter is referred back
to a differently constituted RPD for reconsideration.
2.
There
is no question for certification.
“James Russell”