Docket: IMM-6481-10
Citation: 2011 FC 804
Toronto, Ontario, June 30,
2011
PRESENT: The Honourable Madam Justice Mactavish
BETWEEN:
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EDELMIRA NIETO VELASQUEZ
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Applicant
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and
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
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Respondent
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REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND
JUDGMENT
[1]
Edelmira
Nieto Velasquez seeks judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Protection
Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board. The Board accepted that Ms. Nieto
Velasquez had been threatened by members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (or “FARC”) in the past, but found that there were locations within Colombia where she could now live
safely.
[2]
For the
reasons that follow, I am not persuaded that the Board’s decision was
unreasonable. As a consequence, the application for judicial review will be
dismissed.
Analysis
[3]
The Board
accepted that Ms. Nieto Velasquez and her then-husband had owned hotels in the
town of Pereira. During the mid-1990’s, she had
been approached by FARC members who wanted her to provide them with information
regarding hotel guests. She refused to do so. The Board further accepted that
in 1998, Ms. Nieto Velasquez was attacked and threatened by FARC, leading her
to flee Colombia the next day.
[4]
Ms. Nieto
Velasquez spent the next 11 years in the United States before coming to Canada in 2009 and applying for
refugee protection. In rejecting Ms. Nieto Velasquez’s claim, the Board found
that she had a viable internal flight alternative (or “IFA”) in either in
Bogota or Barranquilla.
[5]
The burden is on the individual seeking
refugee protection to establish on a balance of probabilities that there is a
serious possibility of persecution throughout the country, including the area
which is alleged to afford an IFA: see Rasaratnam v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] 1 F.C. 706, 140 N.R. 138 (F.C.A.).
[6]
There are two parts
to the test for determining whether a viable IFA exists: firstly, the Board
must be satisfied that there is no serious possibility that the claimant will
be persecuted in the proposed IFA; secondly, the conditions in the proposed IFA
must be such that it is not unreasonable for the claimants to seek refuge
there: see Thirunavukkaransu v. Canada (Minister of Employment and
Immigration), [1994] 1 F.C. 589, [1993] F.C.J. No. 1172.
[7]
Ms. Nieto
Velasquez argues that the Board erred in its evaluation of the extent of FARC’s
activities in urban areas of Colombia. In particular, she says that
the Board erred in finding that there was no evidence that FARC had carried out
any terrorist activities in large urban centres in recent years apart from one
car bombing in Cali. Ms. Nieto Velasquez says
that by overlooking evidence regarding ongoing terrorist activities perpetrated
by FARC in Colombia’s cities, its finding that
Ms. Nieto Velasquez could live safely in either Bogota or Barranquilla was unreasonable.
[8]
There are
two difficulties with this argument.
[9]
The first
is that the Board was not persuaded that Ms. Nieto Velasquez would be of any
on-going interest to FARC in any event, given that she had been away from
Colombia for 13 years, she was no longer involved in the hotel business, and members
of her family still involved in the hotel business in Colombia had not been
harmed. This was a reasonable finding, one that by itself was sufficient to
dispose of Ms. Nieto Velasquez’s refugee claim.
[10]
The second
difficulty with Ms. Nieto Velasquez’s argument is that when the reasons of the
Board are read as a whole, it is clear that the Board was aware that there was
more than a single recent incident of terrorist activity perpetrated by FARC in
Colombian cities. Paragraph 11 of the Board’s reasons refer to a 2009 report
which states that “several attacks with explosives” had been launched by FARC
in cities such as Bogota, Cali, Buenaventura and Neiva. Paragraph 12 refers to
recent attempts by FARC to penetrate cities, and paragraph 15 refers to random
terrorist attacks in Colombia’s cities.
[11]
It is also
noteworthy that Ms. Nieto Velasquez did not even suggest in her testimony that
she would face a risk from FARC in either Bogota or Barranquilla. Her concerns about living in either
city related to her ability to earn a living and the fact that she would be
away from her family in Pereira.
[12]
Ms. Nieto
Velasquez also argues that even if she was no longer at risk because of her
past problems with FARC, the Board should have had regard to the risk that she
would face as a middle-class woman living in Colombia. Not only was this argument not advanced
before the Board, Ms. Nieto Velasquez’s own evidence does not support a finding
that she would now be perceived as middle class. Moreover, the evidence
regarding the risks faced by women in Colombia relied upon by Ms. Nieto
Velasquez refers specifically to problems faced by women teachers who refused
to follow FARC’s directions as to what should be taught, or women who had
deserted from FARC. Neither profile fits Ms. Nieto Velasquez’s situation.
[13]
Finally,
Ms. Nieto Velasquez argues that she faces a risk in Colombia because “it is
possible” that she would be flagged at a road-side checkpoint if she tried to
reach Bogota. Not only is more than a mere
possibility of persecution required, it is not even clear why Ms. Nieto
Velasquez would have to pass through a road-side checkpoint if she returned to
Bogota by air.
Conclusion
[14]
For these reasons,
the application for judicial review is dismissed.
Certification
[15]
Neither party has
suggested a question for certification, and none arises here.
JUDGMENT
THIS COURT ORDERS AND ADJUDGES that:
1. This application
for judicial review is dismissed; and
2. No serious
question of general importance is certified.
“Anne Mactavish”