Date: 20110614
Docket: IMM-4722-10
Citation: 2011 FC 693
Ottawa, Ontario,
June 14, 2011
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Russell
BETWEEN:
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ROBERT ROCKY FACI
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Applicant
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and
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THE MINISTER OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
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Respondent
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REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND
JUDGMENT
[1]
This
is an application for judicial review of the Decision of the Minister’s
Delegate dated 12 July 2010 (Decision) referring the Applicant to an
admissibility hearing before the Immigration Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board,
pursuant to subsection 44(2) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act,
S.C. 2001, c. 27 (Act). The 14 April 2010 admissibility report (Report), prepared
pursuant to subsection 44(1) of the Act and adopted as reasons by the
Minister’s Delegate, identified the Applicant as a permanent resident of Canada
who is inadmissible for serious criminality under paragraph 36(1)(a) of
the Act due to
his convictions in July 2008 for robbery, uttering threats and failing to
attend Court.
BACKGROUND
[2]
The
Applicant is a 25-year-old citizen of the former Yugoslavia. His father is
an ethnic Albanian and his mother an ethnic Serb. He came to Canada with his family
in 1990 and was granted permanent residence status under the Convention refugee
category. He is single and has no children and no known relatives outside Canada. He has a good
relationship with his parents, who provide him with emotional and financial
support. He is currently serving a sentence of four years and seven months at
the Drumheller Institution for three counts of robbery, two counts of failing
to attend Court and one count of uttering threats; he was convicted on 23 July
2008.
[3]
The
Applicant has been convicted of criminal offences both as a youth and as an
adult and, in addition to the above-noted, his offences include: mischief;
obstructing a peace officer; arson; break and enter; theft; possession of
property obtained by crime under $5000 and over $5000; assault; taking a motor
vehicle without consent; failing to attend Court; and failing to comply with a
probation order.
[4]
The
Applicant is addicted to narcotics. He began experimenting with marijuana in
his early teens and later developed a serious problem with cocaine. He abstained
from narcotics consumption for two years, beginning in late 2005, during which
time he had no criminal convictions. The end of his sobriety marked a
recurrence of his criminal behaviour. Early in his sentence at Drumheller, the Applicant
tested positive for marijuana consumption. However, he subsequently completed
the National Substance Abuse Program Moderate Intensity (NSAP) and the High
Intensity Violence Prevention Program (HIVPP). He has been placed in a
“drug-free” unit, is subject to random and frequent drug testing (which he
routinely passes) and regularly attends Narcotics Anonymous meetings. In
addition, while at Drumheller, the Applicant has completed his high-school
equivalency.
[5]
On
20 July 2009, the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) sent the Applicant a
fairness letter, informing him about the admissibility process generally and
inviting him to provide written submissions within 15 days of receiving the
letter.
[6]
On
1 March 2010, more than seven months later, the Applicant replied to the CBSA
through counsel. He submitted 20 pages of written submissions and 118 pages of
supporting documents and requested that his case not be referred to an
admissibility hearing. The supporting documents included a psychological
assessment from Dr. Patrick Baillie, dated 11 December 2009 and a Program
Performance Report from the Drumheller Institution, dated 4 February 2010. On 4
March 2010, Applicant’s counsel sent an updated assessment from Dr. Baillie
dated 2 March 2010, which was written as a result of the Applicant having
completed the HIVPP.
[7]
On
14 April 2010, the CBSA issued an admissibility report (Report), identifying
the Applicant as criminally inadmissible under subsection 44(1) of the Act. On
12 July 2010, the Minister’s Delegate reviewed the Report and decided to refer
the Applicant to the Immigration Division for a hearing to determine if the Applicant
is inadmissible to Canada as a person described in subsection 36(1) of
the Act. This is the Decision under review.
DECISION UNDER REVIEW
[8]
The
Report constitutes the reasons for the Decision. It reviews the Applicant’s
immigration background and his criminal record and enumerates the following
factors, which were considered relevant to the admissibility process.
[9]
The Applicant
has no dependants and no known relatives outside Canada. He enjoys a good relationship with his
parents, who describe him as a “changed person.” The Applicant submits that he
will face significant hardship in Serbia because of his Albanian ethnicity and his lack
of familiarity with the language and the country.
[10]
The
judge who pronounced sentence upon the Applicant following his 2008 convictions
made the following pertinent comments, which were noted in the Report. Judge
Meagher observed that the Applicant has an extensive prior record and that his
most recent crimes occurred while he was on judicial interim release with
respect to other charges. These were identified as aggravating factors.
However, Judge Meagher noted that the Applicant’s youth, his early guilty pleas
and his heretofore lack of federal incarceration were mitigating factors. The Report
also notes that the Applicant’s February 2009 Criminal Profile Report concludes
that he is at a moderate risk of re-offending.
[11]
The Report
notes a number of points on which there is conflicting evidence. The February
2009 Criminal Profile Report states that the Applicant has responded to
community supervision and support programs with non-compliance and recidivism.
However, the February 2009 Correctional Plan states that the Applicant’s
problems with substance abuse have played a considerable role in his criminal
history and that the Applicant appears motivated to address his addictions. There
is also conflicting evidence of the Applicant’s demeanour; some reports
describe him as “pleasant and respectful,” others as “rude” and “angry.” Dr.
Baillie concludes that the Applicant “will be at a relatively lower risk for
re-offence on release if he is able to maintain abstinence from any use of
street drugs or alcohol. He is motivated to do so …. [H]is risk for re-offence
is very likely to be manageable in the community.”
[12]
The Report
concludes:
Despite the progress that Mr. Faci displays in detention, I
note that he did reoffend in the past after being convicted of multiple
criminal offences. He has indeed accumulated an extensive criminal record
throughout the years. Mr. Faci has stopped using drugs in the past but relapsed
after two years, committing more offences …. Mr. Faci’s criminality shows an
escalation in seriousness …. [H]is record shows many breaches of court ordered
conditions. Based on Mr. Faci’s past behaviour, I am not convinced that he
would not recourse to drugs and crimes again once released from prison.
Even though it would be emotionally difficult for his family
if Mr. Faci is deported, I note that no one is dependent on him in Canada. … [I]t would certainly be difficult for
Mr. Faci to adapt to a country he left while he was at a very young age and
where he does not know anybody. On the other hand, Mr. Faci did poorly integrate
into Canadian society as his disrespect of Canadian laws has shown. Overall, I
am of the opinion that Mr. Faci’s inadmissibility and lengthy criminal record
outweighs (sic) the humanitarian and compassionate factors of his case.
Mr. Faci alleged risks of persecution as a member of the
Albanian minority in Serbia. Mr. Faci is a Convention
Refugee in Canada and cannot be deported to Serbia unless he is found to be a danger to the
public in which case, a risk assessment will be completed before any deportation
order issued against him can be enforced.
[13]
For
these reasons, the Report recommended that the Applicant be referred to an
admissibility hearing for serious criminality.
ISSUE
[14]
The Applicant
raises the following issues in his argument:
a.
Whether
the Minister’s Delegate failed adequately to consider all relevant factors in
deciding to refer the Applicant to an admissibility hearing;
b.
Whether
the Minister’s Delegate’s reasons, as set out in the Report, are adequate;
c.
Whether
the Decision was made in a procedurally fair manner.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
[15]
The
following statutory provisions are applicable in these proceedings:
Serious
criminality
36. (1) A permanent resident or a foreign national
is inadmissible on grounds of serious criminality for
(a) having been convicted in Canada of an
offence under an Act of Parliament punishable by a maximum term of
imprisonment of at least 10 years, or of an offence under an Act of
Parliament for which a term of imprisonment of more than six months has been
imposed;
(b) having been convicted of an offence outside
Canada that, if committed in Canada, would constitute an offence under an Act
of Parliament punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at least 10
years; or
(c) committing an act outside Canada that is an offence
in the place where it was committed and that, if committed in Canada,
would constitute an offence under an Act of Parliament punishable by a
maximum term of imprisonment of at least 10 years.
[…]
Preparation
of report
44. (1) An officer who is of the opinion that a
permanent resident or a foreign national who is in Canada is
inadmissible may prepare a report setting out the relevant facts, which
report shall be transmitted to the Minister.
Referral or removal order
(2) If the Minister is of the opinion that the report is well-founded,
the Minister may refer the report to the Immigration Division for an
admissibility hearing, except in the case of a permanent resident who is
inadmissible solely on the grounds that they have failed to comply with the
residency obligation under section 28 and except, in the circumstances
prescribed by the regulations, in the case of a foreign national. In those
cases, the Minister may make a removal order.
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Grande
criminalité
36. (1) Emportent interdiction de territoire pour
grande criminalité les faits suivants :
a)
être déclaré coupable au Canada d’une infraction à une loi fédérale
punissable d’un emprisonnement maximal d’au moins dix ans ou d’une infraction
à une loi fédérale pour laquelle un emprisonnement de plus de six mois est
infligé;
b)
être déclaré coupable, à l’extérieur du Canada, d’une infraction qui, commise
au Canada, constituerait une infraction à une loi fédérale punissable d’un
emprisonnement maximal d’au moins dix ans;
c)
commettre, à l’extérieur du Canada, une infraction qui, commise au Canada,
constituerait une infraction à une loi fédérale punissable d’un
emprisonnement maximal d’au moins dix ans.
[…]
Rapport
d’interdiction de territoire
44. (1) S’il estime que le résident permanent ou
l’étranger qui se trouve au Canada est interdit de territoire, l’agent peut
établir un rapport circonstancié, qu’il transmet au ministre.
Suivi
(2) S’il estime le rapport bien fondé,
le ministre peut déférer l’affaire à la Section de l’immigration pour
enquête, sauf s’il s’agit d’un résident permanent interdit de territoire pour
le seul motif qu’il n’a pas respecté l’obligation de résidence ou, dans les
circonstances visées par les règlements, d’un étranger; il peut alors prendre
une mesure de renvoi.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
[16]
The Supreme Court of Canada in Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, held
that a standard of review analysis need not be conducted in every instance.
Instead, where the standard of review applicable to the particular question
before the Court is well-settled by past jurisprudence, the reviewing Court may
adopt that standard of review. Only where this search proves fruitless must the
reviewing Court undertake a consideration of the four factors comprising the
standard of review analysis.
[17]
This Court held in Lasin v Canada (Minister of Immigration and
Citizenship), 2005 FC 1356 at paragraphs 18-19, and Lee v Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 158 at paragraph 20,
that a Decision to refer an Applicant to an admissibility hearing under
subsection 44(2) is reviewable on the patent unreasonableness standard. In Dunsmuir, above,
the Supreme Court of Canada held that the reasonableness simpliciter and
patent unreasonableness standards should be collapsed into a single “reasonableness”
standard. Therefore, the appropriate standard of review for the issue in
question is reasonableness. See also Richter v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 806; and Ranu v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 87. However, both this Court and the
Federal Court of Appeal have provided significant guidance as to how the
discretion to refer under subsection 44(2) should be exercised.
[18]
At
issue in this judicial review is whether the Minister’s Delegate failed to
consider adequately all relevant factors in deciding to refer Mr. Faci to an
admissibility hearing pursuant to subsection 44(2),whether her reasons (as set
out in the Report) are adequate, and whether she acted in a procedurally fair
way.
[19]
Two
facts are particularly relevant to determining the Minister’s Delegate’s
discretion in the circumstances: that Mr. Faci is a permanent resident and not
a foreign national; and that he has been found to be inadmissible for serious
criminality (as opposed to, for example, remaining in Canada beyond the period
authorized by a visitor’s visa). As the Federal Court of Appeal says in Cha v Canada (Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FCA 126 at paragraph 23:
Immigration
is a privilege, not a right. Non-citizens do not have an unqualified right to
enter or remain in the country. Parliament has the right to enact legislation
prescribing the conditions under which non-citizens will be permitted to enter
and remain in Canada. As a result, the Act and the Regulations
treat citizens differently than permanent residents, who in turn are treated
differently than Convention refugees, who are in turn treated differently than
other foreign nationals.
[20]
The minister’s
delegate may refer a report for an admissibility hearing where he or she is, in the words of subsection 44(2) of the
Act, “of the opinion” that the report is well-founded. The jurisprudence
is clear that this language suggests a standard of
deference, a finding that has been bolstered in some cases by an analysis of
the limited right of appeal, the expertise of the minister’s delegate, the
balancing of society’s interests and those of the applicant, and the highly
fact-based and contextual nature of the question.
[21]
A
determination regarding the scope, if any, of the minister’s delegate’s
discretion in subsection 44(2) of the Act is a question of law which attracts
the standard of correctness. See Cha, above, at paragraph 16.
[22]
The
jurisprudence further suggests that the scope of the discretion afforded the
minister’s delegate under subsection 44(2) varies according to the facts of the
case.
[23]
Awed
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 469, relies on
Cha for the proposition that the scope of the minister’s delegate’s
discretion under subsection 44(2) may vary depending
on the grounds alleged or on whether the person concerned is a permanent
resident or a foreign national. However, Awed finds
in general that the scope of the discretion for both decisions is “very
limited, reflecting Parliament’s intention that non-citizens who commit certain
types of crimes are not to remain in Canada.”
[24]
Justice Décary for the Federal Court of Appeal in Cha says:
“There may be a [sic] room for discretion in some cases, and none
in others. This is why it was wise to use the term ‘may’ [in subsection
44(2)].” However, he goes on to find, at paragraph 37, that the discretion is
constrained by the Act:
It
cannot be, in my view, that Parliament would have in sections 36 and 44 of the
Act spent so much effort defining objective circumstances in which persons who
commit certain well defined offences in Canada are to be removed, to then grant
the immigration officer or the Minister's delegate the option to keep these
persons in Canada for reasons other than those contemplated by the Act and the
Regulations. It is not the function of … the Minister's delegate when he acts
on a report, to deal with matters described in sections 25 (H&C
considerations) and 112 (Pre-Removal Assessment Risk) of the Act ….
[25]
Lee
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 158, and Richter
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 806 (affirmed
by the Federal Court of Appeal), both indicate that the minister’s delegate may have some discretion to consider humanitarian and
compassionate factors but that the decision under subsection 44(2) is not a
full-blown humanitarian and compassionate review. The general consensus seems
to be that the Act provides opportunities elsewhere for the applicant to
raise H&C issues.
[26]
In Tran
v Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2009 FC 1078, Justice
Mosley relied on his decision in Richter to find that the duty of
fairness for proceedings under section 44 is relaxed and consists of the right
to make submissions and the right to obtain a copy of the report.
[27]
In Richter
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 806, Ms.
Richter, like Mr. Faci, was a permanent resident of Canada who was convicted, inter
alia, of a serious offence (in her case, trafficking in firearms). While in
prison, she was interviewed by an immigration officer with respect to her
immigration status. The officer then wrote a report, which recommended that Ms.
Richter be referred to an admissibility hearing. The minister’s delegate
considered the report and decided, pursuant to section 44(2), that the report
was well-founded and that it should be referred for an admissibility hearing.
[28]
At
issue in the judicial review was the decision of the officer to prepare a
report and the decision of the delegate to refer the report for an
admissibility hearing. Justice Mosley observes that subsections 44(1) and (2)
of the Act state that the decision maker is empowered to act where he or she is
“of the opinion” which, in Justice Mosley’s view, indicates the legislature’s
intention to afford deference to the decisions. Therefore, he found that the
appropriate standard of review for the decision of the officer and the
minister’s delegate is reasonableness.
[29]
At
paragraphs 11-13, Justice Mosley relies on Correia v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 782, to find that the officer’s
discretion under subsection 44(1) not to prepare a report is extremely limited.
He relies on his own decision in Awed v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2006 FC 469, as authority for the proposition that the
objective of an officer in conducting an interview under subsection 44(1) is
simply to confirm whether or not there are facts to support an opinion that a
permanent resident or foreign national present in Canada is inadmissible.
[30]
Justice
Mosley finds that, where the facts support a finding of inadmissibility, the
officer must prepare a report; she is not empowered by the statute to exercise
discretion. Further, the officer is not authorized by the Act to assess
personal factors. Where such an assessment is carried out but does not affect
the outcome, however, the decision to issue a report need not be set aside.
Justice Mosley added, at paragraph 22, that the applicant’s expressions of
remorse or lack thereof are irrelevant to the officer’s duty under subsection
44(1):
There
is nothing in the plain language of the enactment to suggest that Parliament
intended that officers be given the discretion to consider whether convicted
offenders regretted their crimes and should thereby be exempted from the
inadmissibility provisions of the Act in determining whether to issue a report.
[31]
Justice
Mosley then turns his attention to the decision of the minister’s delegate to
refer the report to an admissibility hearing. He relies on the Federal Court of
Appeal decision in Cha v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FCA 126, to find
that the scope of the minister’s delegate’s discretion depends on whether the
person in question is a foreign national or a permanent resident. If the person
in question is a foreign national, then the minister’s delegate has no
discretion to refer the report for an admissibility hearing. If the person in
question is a permanent resident, then “the question was left open whether some
minimal amount of discretion was available.” See Richter FC at paragraph 14. In
Ms. Richter’s case, Justice Mosley finds that the minister’s delegate did
consider H&C factors and that the decision to refer to an admissibility hearing
was reasonable. I conclude from this that Justice Mosley accepts that
minister’s delegate can exercise “minimal discretion” and consider H&C
factors without rendering unreasonable the decision to refer the report for an
admissibility hearing.
[32]
With
respect to procedural fairness, Justice Mosley finds, at paragraphs 18-19 and
24 that procedural fairness with respect to proceedings under section 44 is
“relaxed,” in accordance with Hernandez v Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration), 2005 FC 429, and consists of the right to make
submissions and the right to obtain a copy of the report. Immigration officials
have no heightened duty of fairness when dealing with a person in custody, even
though that person’s liberty is restricted. He further states that adequate
reasons are those that permit the person about whom the decision was made to
understand the basis for that decision.
[33]
In Richter
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FCA 73, in an
11-paragraph decision, the Federal Court of Appeal found that Justice Mosley
made no reviewable error and substantially adopted his reasons.
[34]
In Tran,
above, Mr. Tran, like Mr. Faci, was a permanent resident of Canada. A deportation order
was made after a hearing was conducted in which he was found to be
inadmissible. The reasons, written by Justice Mosley, address the procedural
fairness of three proceedings: 1) the decision under subsection 44(1) to
prepare an admissibility report; 2) the decision under subsection 44(2) to
refer the report for an admissibility hearing; and 3) the deportation order.
[35]
The
applicant in Tran received a letter informing him about the
admissibility hearing and inviting him to make submissions, which he did. The
officer then interviewed the applicant and made notes. The officer confirmed
the applicant’s criminal convictions and drafted a report stating that he was
inadmissible. This report was sent to the minister’s delegate, who adopted the
report as her reasons and referred the report for an admissibility hearing. The
admissibility hearing took place and a deportation order was issued.
[36]
The
applicant in Tran argued that the report and the notes which the officer
took during the interview should have been disclosed to him before the
minister’s delegate made the decision to refer the report for an admissibility
hearing. If the applicant had received these documents, he argued, he could
have made submissions on that information and perhaps persuaded the delegate
not to refer the report. Justice Mosley noted that the applicant did not
request the report nor did he request the notes which the officer took during
the interview.
[37]
Justice
Mosley found that there was no breach of procedural fairness. The information
contained in the report and the notes was information that the applicant
already had or knew about. Justice Mosley relied on his decision in Richter
FC that the duty of fairness for proceedings under section 44 is relaxed
and consists of the right to make submissions and the right to obtain a copy of
the report. This duty was fulfilled in the applicant’s case. Justice Moseley
stated at paragraph 21:
There
was no clear and specific request for delivery of such material made by the
applicant before either the referral decision or the admissibility hearing. No
request was made by the applicant for an explanation of the 44(1) and 44(2)
decisions. In my view, the applicant can not be heard now to complain about the
failure to disclose the officer's notes or to provide such an explanation when
he did not request that they be produced.
[38]
When reviewing a Decision on the standard of reasonableness, the
analysis will be concerned with “the existence of justification, transparency
and intelligibility within the Decision-making process [and also with] whether
the Decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are
defensible in respect of the facts and law.” See Dunsmuir, above, at paragraph
47; and Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Khosa, 2009 SCC 12 at paragraph 59. Put another way, the Court should intervene only if the Decision
was unreasonable in the sense that it falls outside the “range of possible,
acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law.”
ARGUMENTS
The Applicant
The Minister’s Delegate Failed
to Consider Relevant Factors
[39]
The Applicant
argues that the Minister’s Delegate erred in failing to consider two relevant
factors: the conditions in the Applicant’s home country; and the Applicant’s
rehabilitation. This Court has made clear that, in a matter such as this, a
reasonable decision is one in which the Minister’s Delegate has considered all
relevant factors. See Poonawalla v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 371 at paragraph 15; and Lee,
above, at paragraph 53. Moreover, Chapter 6 of the Inland Enforcement Manual
(ENF 6) clearly states that, prior to referring a
permanent resident to an admissibility hearing, the Minister’s Delegate should
consider several relevant factors, including conditions in the permanent
resident’s home country.
[40]
In the instant case, the Applicant provided detailed documentary
evidence that recognized the significant difficulties faced by ethnic Albanians
and the inadequacy of the protection provided by Serbian authorities. The failure
of the Report to address and of the Minister’s Delegate to consider this highly
relevant factor is evident in the comment in the Report that, as the Applicant
is a Convention refugee, he cannot be deported to Serbia before a
risk assessment has been undertaken. This does not constitute proper consideration;
the Minister’s Delegate has allowed her duty to weigh this factor to be shifted
to a Pre-Removal Risk Assessment officer at some later date.
[41]
The Minister’s Delegate also failed properly to consider the relevant
factor of rehabilitation. The Report states: “Based on Mr. Faci’s past
behaviour, I am not convinced that he would not recourse to drugs and crimes
again once released from prison.” ENF 6 requires the
Minister’s Delegate specifically to consider whether an applicant has completed
any rehabilitation programs. In the instant case, the Applicant has completed
at least two rehabilitation programs directly related to his rehabilitation:
the NSAP and the HIVPP. The Report fails to even mention the latter. It also
fails to acknowledge that, while the Applicant had previously relapsed, he had
not at that time received any formal treatment or assistance in dealing with
his addictions.
[42]
Further, the list of documents considered by the Minister’s Delegate
does not include Dr. Baillie’s updated psychological assessment from March
2010, which was written in light of the Applicant’s completion of the HIVPP.
The Applicant submits that the only conclusion to be drawn is that these
materials were not considered by the Minister’s Delegate. These are glaring
omissions. The HIVPP was a “centrepiece” of the Applicant’s rehabilitation
efforts; Dr. Baillie’s updated assessment demonstrated that the Applicant’s
participation in the HIVPP would further reduce his chance of re-offending. The
Minister’s Delegate should have considered it and, because she did not, the Decision
is unreasonable.
The Respondent
The Minister’s
Delegate Considered All Relevant Factors
Country
Conditions
[43]
The Respondent challenges, on three grounds, the Applicant’s
statement that the Minister’s Delegate committed a reviewable error in failing
to consider conditions in the Applicant’s country of origin.
[44]
First, the reasons of the Minister’s Delegate, as stated in the
Report, do consider the Applicant’s “alleged risks of persecution as a member
of the Albanian minority in Serbia.” The Report concludes that the Applicant
cannot be deported to Serbia unless found to be a danger to the public, in which case a risk
assessment will first be undertaken.
[45]
Second, the Applicant’s reliance on ENF 6 is unfounded. Contrary
to the Applicant’s assertions, this manual is a guide, not a dictate or a law.
Further, the public policy considerations in the manual are not binding upon
the Minister and his agents. See Ziaei v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2007 FC 1169 at paragraph 20; Lee, above, at
paragraphs 44-50; and Maple Lodge Farms Ltd v Canada, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 2, 137 DLR (3d) 558.
[46]
Third, the Applicant’s home country conditions are neither an
appropriate nor a relevant factor in this Decision. As the Report correctly
states, there are separate and parallel schemes for removal orders and removal
risk assessments for persons such as the Applicant. The subsection 44(1) report
and subsection 44(2) referral are precursors to a removal. Removal risk factors
are considered in a separate, judicially reviewable decision under subsection
115(2) of the Act. See Lasin, above, at paragraphs 17-19; Lee,
above, at paragraphs 26-29; and Richter v Canada (Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 806 at paragraphs 12-15,
aff’d 2009 FCA 73.
Rehabilitation
[47]
The Applicant argues that the Minister’s Delegate committed a
second reviewable error in failing to consider the Applicant’s rehabilitation.
The Respondent again submits that the Report addresses this point specifically
and clearly. The Applicant’s argument is an invitation to the Court to re-weigh
the rehabilitation factor. This is not the purpose of judicial review. The
question is not whether the Minister’s Delegate gave enough weight to the
relevant factors or properly applied the guidelines. The question is whether
there is any evidence that the Minister’s Delegate actually failed to consider
the appropriate factors. The Respondent contends that there is no such evidence
in the instant case. See Poonawalla, above, at paragraphs 14-15; and Lee,
above, at paragraph 46.
[48]
Contrary to the Applicant’s submission, the “Documents Attached”
section of the Report specifically lists the Program Performance Report (the
HIVPP). Even if it did not, however, failure to mention a particular document
is not fatal to the Decision. The Minister’s Delegate is assumed to have
considered all of the evidence unless the contrary is shown. See Akram v Canada (Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 629 at paragraph 15.
[49]
The Respondent acknowledges that Dr. Baillie’s updated
psychological assessment, dated 2 March 2010, is not listed in the “Documents
Attached” section of the Report. However, even assuming that the Minister’s
Delegate did not consider it, the omission is not “glaring”; it is immaterial
for the following three reasons.
[50]
First, the updated assessment reaches almost exactly the same
conclusion as the 11 December 2009 assessment, which was considered and which
concludes that “[the Applicant’s] risk for re-offence is very likely to be
manageable in the community.” The updated assessment concludes that “the
program participation is likely to have a positive impact with respect to
reducing [the Applicant’s] potential for re-offence.” In short, the updated
opinion says nothing new and would not have materially affected the Decision.
[51]
Second, the updated assessment merely summarizes the HIVPP, which
was before the Minister’s Delegate.
[52]
Third, the procedural fairness implication of this argument is
that the Applicant is not only entitled to make submissions before the subsection
44(1) report is prepared, he is also entitled to make additional (and late)
submissions. However, as has been repeatedly held by this Court, “the duty of
fairness owed for the proceedings under section 44 of IRPA are (sic)
relaxed and consist of the right to make submissions and to obtain a copy of
the report.” See Richter, above, at paragraph 18, aff’d 2009 FCA 73; and
Tran v Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency
Preparedness), 2009 FC 1078 at paragraph 16.
Conclusion
[53]
The Respondent submits that the Supreme Court of Canada held in Canada
(Minister of Employment and Immigration) v Chiarelli, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 711, [1992] SCJ No 27 (QL) at page 715, that Parliament has the right to enact
legislation prescribing the conditions under which non-citizens may remain in Canada. One
condition is that they not be convicted of an offence for which a term of
imprisonment of ten years or more may be imposed. The Court held unanimously
that this condition represents a legitimate, non-arbitrary choice by
Parliament. If an individual deliberately violates this condition, there is no
breach of fundamental justice in giving practical effect to the termination of
their right to remain in Canada. Deportation is how this is accomplished. It is not necessary, in
order to comply with fundamental justice, to look beyond the serious conviction
to other aggravating or mitigating circumstances.
The Applicant’s Reply
[54]
The Applicant submits that, although the Report states that a risk
assessment will have to be conducted before the Applicant could be deported, a
statement about future events does not fulfill the duty of the Minister’s
Delegate to consider all relevant factors, including the conditions in the Applicant’s
home country.
The
Respondent’s Further Memorandum
[55]
The Respondent challenges the Applicant’s submission that the
Minister’s Delegate was duty-bound to consider home country conditions and
removal risks. The Applicant’s argument misconstrues the legislative scheme and
confuses the Delegate’s comparatively narrow discretion under subsection 44(2)
with the wider discretion under paragraph 115(2)(a), which is described
at length in Hasan v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2008 FC 1069 at paragraphs 10 and 21-22. In short, the Applicant’s argument is
premature. It calls for the consideration of factors that are properly assessed
only after there has been an inadmissibility determination and paragraph
115(2)(a) has been engaged.
[56]
The
Respondent also challenges the Applicant’s statement that Dr. Baillie’s updated
assessment dated 2 March 2010 was “highly relevant” and that the failure of the
Minister’s Delegate to consider it before rendering her Decision was a “glaring
omission” and a reviewable error. The Respondent points out that, in an
affidavit dated 11 January 2011, the Minister’s Delegate confirms that the updated
assessment
and its accompanying letter were not before her when she rendered her Decision
but that neither document would have changed her Decision as they add no “significant
new facts.” The updated assessment and accompanying letter are therefore
immaterial.
[57]
Finally,
the Respondent observes that the Supreme Court of Canada, in Medovarski v
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 SCC 51 at paragraph
10, recognized that the Act has made security a priority and, in so doing,
requires permanent residents, such as the Applicant, to respect Canadian laws:
The
objectives as expressed in the IRPA indicate an intent to prioritize
security. This objective is given effect by preventing the entry of applicants
with criminal records, by removing applicants with such records from Canada, and by emphasizing the obligation of permanent residents
to behave lawfully while in Canada. This marks a change from the focus in
the predecessor statute, which emphasized the successful integration of applicants
more than security …. Viewed collectively, the objectives of the IRPA
and its provisions concerning permanent residents, communicate a strong desire
to treat criminals and security threats less leniently than under the former
Act.
The Respondent submits that, in light of the
Supreme Court’s finding, the Applicant’s criminal conduct warrants an
admissibility hearing.
ANALYSIS
[58]
The Applicant
says that the Decision is unreasonable because the Minister’s Delegate failed
to consider relevant factors.
[59]
First
of all, relying upon ENF 6, the Applicant says that the Minister’s Delegate
failed to consider conditions in the Applicant’s home country.
[60]
As
the Report makes clear, the Delegate did turn her mind to this issue but
decided that risk assessment could be left to a later decision because
Mr.
Faci is a Convention Refugee in Canada and cannot be deported to Serbia unless he is found to be a danger to the public in which
case, a risk assessment will be completed before any deportation order issued against
him can be enforced.
[61]
The Applicant
says that the Minister’s Delegate should not have dealt with this issue in this
way and should have considered and taken into account the country conditions
documents that were submitted.
[62]
Even
if I were to agree with the Applicant that, when considering whether to refer a
permanent resident to an admissibility hearing, the Minister’s Delegate may
consider all “relevant” factors in making a Decision, in my view, country
conditions in Serbia were not relevant to
this Decision because the Applicant cannot be deported to Serbia. The Minister’s Delegate
is not obliged to speculate about how and when a future deportation might take
place. The country conditions documentation submitted by the Applicant may well
not be applicable if and when deportation is considered. And it is clear that
the risks feared by the Applicant will have to be given full consideration at
the appropriate time before he can be deported.
[63]
The
jurisprudence of this Court makes clear that, when deciding whether to
recommend an admissibility hearing, the Minister’s Delegate has the discretion,
not the obligation, to consider the factors set out in ENF 6. See Lee, above,
at paragraph 44; and Hernandez v Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration),
2005 FC 429 at paragraphs 22-23. The Minister’s Delegate in this case
reasonably concluded that country conditions need not be considered at this
stage of the process because a risk assessment would have to be done before the
Applicant could be removed.
[64]
The Applicant
says that the Minister’s Delegate also failed to consider the Applicant’s
rehabilitation.
[65]
It
is clear from the Report that the Minister’s Delegate considered the Applicant’s
rehabilitation in considerable detail. In fact, the “Documents Attached”
section of the Report refers to the 4 February 2010 HIVPP that the Applicant
says was left out of account. There is nothing in the Report to suggest that
the Minister’s Delegate failed to take into account the HIVPP, or the fact that
the Applicant had never had any treatment until completing the NSAP and HIVPP
at Drumheller, as part of her detailed consideration of rehabilitation. In
fact, the Report says that the Applicant has “successfully completed
rehabilitative programs”; it even quotes from the HIVPP report.
[66]
The Applicant
also says that the Minister’s Delegate failed to take into account Dr. Baillie's
updated psychological assessment of March 2010, which was written in light of
the Applicant’s completion of the HIVPP program.
[67]
In
her affidavit of 11 January 2011, the Minister’s Delegate confirms that Dr. Baillie’s
updated assessment and counsel’s accompanying letter were not before her when
she rendered her Decision. The Report is dated 14 April 2010, the Decision is
dated July 2010 and the letter from counsel with the updated assessment is
dated 4 March 2010. There is no explanation from either side as to why the
updated report was not before the Minister’s Delegate. She was not
cross-examined on her affidavit. At the hearing it became clear that the
materials were submitted after the stated 15 days had been extended to 1 March
2010 and that counsel did not follow up to discover whether the late filing was
acceptable or to request a further extension. In these circumstances I cannot
say that procedural unfairness occurred, particularly having regard to the
“relaxed” nature of procedural fairness in this context. See Tran, above
[68]
The Respondent
says that the updated psychological report and counsel’s submissions are
immaterial because neither of them could have affected the outcome of the Decision.
The Minister’s Delegate also says that this in her affidavit. I will not
consider this aspect of the affidavit.
[69]
The Minister’s
Delegate was obviously aware of the 4 February 2010 HIVPP, so materiality in
this context depends upon what Dr. Baillie said in his updated assessment of 2 March
2010.
[70]
In
his 11 December 2009 assessment, Dr. Baillie had concluded that the Applicant “will
be at relatively lower risk for re-offence on release if he is able to maintain
abstinence from any use of street drugs or alcohol,” and that the Applicant’s “risk
for re-offence is very likely to be manageable in the community.” The 2 March
2010 update concludes that “the program participation is likely to have a
positive impact with respect to reducing [the Applicant’s] potential for re-offence.”
[71]
It
is difficult to be precise about what Dr. Baillie’s update adds to his previous
opinion. He quotes and summarizes the report, which the Minister’s Delegate has
read, and adds a brief paragraph on what the report suggests to him. It seems
to me that he is saying that the Applicant’s completion of the HIVPP is a
further positive factor that supports his assessment of the Applicant’s sincere
motivation and that risk of his re-offending is low and “manageable in the
community.” In other words, Dr. Baillie’s assessment of risk does not change.
It is simply further supported by the HIVPP.
[72]
Dr. Baillie’s
assessment of risk is canvassed fully in the Report and is taken into account
in the overall assessment. It appears to me, then, that the updated report from
Dr. Baillie did not change the picture with regard to Dr. Baillie’s assessment
of rehabilitation and the likelihood of the Applicant’s re-offending. Hence, I
do not believe that anything material to the Decision was left out of account
or that a breach of procedural fairness occurred through the failure of the Minister’s
Delegate to consider Dr. Baillie’s update. She had the completion of the HIVPP
before her and she had Dr. Baillie’s assessment on rehabilitation. Both were
taken into account in the conclusions.
[73]
The Applicant
has raised inadequate reasons as a ground of review but has made no submissions
on point. There is, in any event, nothing inadequate about these reasons.
JUDGMENT
THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT is
that
1.
The application is
dismissed.
2.
There is no question
for certification.
“James Russell”
Judge