Date: 20110111
Docket: IMM-1426-10
Citation: 2011 FC 22
Ottawa, Ontario, January 11, 2011
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Russell
BETWEEN:
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MAJID HASSAN CHAUHDRY
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Applicant
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and
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MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
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Respondent
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REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND
JUDGMENT
[1]
This is an application pursuant to subsection 72(1) of the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (Act), for judicial
review of the decision of the Designated Immigration Officer (Visa Officer) of
the Immigration Regional Program Center in Buffalo, New York, dated 31 December
2009 (Decision), which refused the Applicant’s application for a permanent
residence visa on the ground that the Applicant’s health condition “might
reasonably be expected to cause excessive demand on [the] health or social
services” of Canada.
BACKGROUND
[2]
The
Applicant is a full-time PhD student in the Electrical and Computer Engineering
program at the University of Connecticut. He is also employed by
a private company, with whom he has private health insurance. Although
currently resident in the United States, the Applicant applied for permanent
residence in Canada under the
Federal Skilled Worker Class in December 2007.
[3]
The
Applicant received a renal transplant in 2004. He requires daily
immunosuppressive medication. Nonetheless, he says that he is in excellent
health and expects to remain so for many years, a claim which is supported by
letters from two medical doctors in the U.S. He also says
that his health condition poses no impediment to his academic course work and
research or to his work with the private company; these claims are supported
with letters from his thesis supervisor as well as his employer. He describes
himself as financially stable. He has savings and property in Pakistan in addition
to the financial support of his father and brother, both of whom are
veterinarians. He intends to purchase a comprehensive health insurance package,
should he be granted a permanent residence visa to Canada.
[4]
The
Visa Officer sent the Applicant a “Fairness Letter” dated 20 February 2009,
acknowledging his medical condition and advising him that he must establish a
reasonable and workable plan to offset the excessive demand that he would
otherwise impose on Canadian health and social services, due to his condition.
The Applicant’s 20 March 2009 response stated the above-noted facts: that his
condition was stable and that he required neither social services nor
assistance. He also forwarded to the Visa Officer the above-mentioned academic,
employment and medical letters of support; details of his own financial
resources and those of his family; and a signed Declaration of Ability and
Intent, in which he promised not to hold the federal or provincial authorities
responsible for costs associated with his health. The final two items were
submitted as evidence of the Applicant’s plan to offset the excessive demands
on health or social services that could result from his medical condition.
[5]
The
Applicant’s visa application was rejected by letter (Refusal Letter) dated 31
December 2009 on the ground that his medical condition might require services,
the costs of which would likely exceed the average Canadian per capita costs
over five years. This is the Decision under review.
DECISION UNDER REVIEW
[6]
The
Decision consists of a Fairness Letter, the Visa Officer’s CAIPS notes and a
copy of the regulatory definitions pertinent to the Applicant’s case. The
letter advises the Applicant that he does not meet the requirements for
immigration to Canada because his medical condition, Chronic Renal
Failure–Post Renal Transplant, could reasonably be expected to require health
or social services, the costs of which would likely exceed the average Canadian
per capita costs over five years. In other words, the costs would be excessive.
An excessive demand is currently defined as an amount greater than $4806 per
year.
[7]
The
letter acknowledges the Applicant’s 20 March 2009 submission of additional
information, all of which was carefully considered but which did not alter the
original assessment presented in the “Fairness Letter” of 20 February 2009. The
Visa Officer notes that the Decision is final and reasonable in her view.
[8]
The
CAIPS notes reiterate the Visa Officer’s finding that the Applicant’s 20 March
2009 submissions did not convince her that he would be able to mitigate his
medical costs.
ISSUES
[9]
The
Applicant raises the following issues:
1.
Did
the Visa Officer fail to provide adequate reasons for her Decision and thereby
breach the principles of procedural fairness?
2.
Did
the Visa Officer err in failing to conduct an individualized assessment of
whether the Applicant’s health condition might reasonably be expected to cause
excessive demand on Canadian health or social services?
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
[10]
The
following provisions of the Act are applicable in these proceedings:
Application
before entering Canada
11. (1) A foreign national must, before entering
Canada, apply to an officer for a visa or for any other document required by
the regulations. The visa or document may be issued if, following an
examination, the officer is satisfied that the foreign national is not
inadmissible and meets the requirements of this Act.
…
Health
grounds
38. (1) A foreign national is inadmissible on health
grounds if their health condition
(a) is likely to be a danger to public health;
(b) is likely to be a danger to public safety; or
(c) might reasonably be expected to cause excessive
demand on health or social services.
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Visa et documents
11. (1) L’étranger doit, préalablement à son entrée
au Canada, demander à l’agent les visa et autres documents requis par
règlement. L’agent peut les délivrer sur preuve, à la suite d’un contrôle,
que l’étranger n’est pas interdit de territoire et se conforme à la présente
loi.
…
Motifs
sanitaires
38. (1) Emporte, sauf pour le
résident permanent, interdiction de territoire pour motifs sanitaires l’état
de santé de l’étranger constituant vraisemblablement un danger pour la santé
ou la sécurité publiques ou risquant d’entraîner un fardeau excessif pour les
services sociaux ou de santé.
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[11]
The
following provisions of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227, are
applicable in these proceedings:
Definitions
1. (1) The definitions in this
subsection apply in the Act and in these Regulations.
[…]
“excessive demand”
« fardeau excessif »
“excessive demand” means
(a) a demand on health services or social
services for which the anticipated costs would likely exceed average Canadian
per capita health services and social services costs over a period of five
consecutive years immediately following the most recent medical examination
required by these Regulations, unless there is evidence that significant
costs are likely to be incurred beyond that period, in which case the period
is no more than 10 consecutive years; or
(b) a demand on health services or social
services that would add to existing waiting lists and would increase the rate
of mortality and morbidity in Canada as a result of an inability to provide
timely services to Canadian citizens or permanent residents.
[…]
“health services”
« services de santé »
“health services” means any health services for
which the majority of the funds are contributed by governments, including the
services of family physicians, medical specialists, nurses, chiropractors and
physiotherapists, laboratory services and the supply of pharmaceutical or
hospital care.
“social services”
« services sociaux »
“social services” means any social services,
such as home care, specialized residence and residential services, special
education services, social and vocational rehabilitation services, personal
support services and the provision of devices related to those services,
(a) that are intended to assist a person in
functioning physically, emotionally, socially, psychologically or
vocationally; and
(b)
for which the majority of the funding, including funding that provides direct
or indirect financial support to an assisted person, is contributed by
governments, either directly or through publicly-funded agencies.
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Définitions
1. (1) Les
définitions qui suivent s’appliquent à la Loi et au présent règlement.
[…]
« fardeau excessif »
“ excessive demand ”
« fardeau excessif » Se dit :
a) de toute charge pour les services sociaux ou
les services de santé dont le coût prévisible dépasse la moyenne, par
habitant au Canada, des dépenses pour les services de santé et pour les
services sociaux sur une période de cinq années consécutives suivant la plus
récente visite médicale exigée par le présent règlement ou, s’il y a lieu de
croire que des dépenses importantes devront probablement être faites après
cette période, sur une période d’au plus dix années consécutives;
b) de toute charge pour les services sociaux ou
les services de santé qui viendrait allonger les listes d’attente actuelles
et qui augmenterait le taux de mortalité et de morbidité au Canada vu
l’impossibilité d’offrir en temps voulu ces services aux citoyens canadiens
ou aux résidents permanents.
[…]
« services de santé »
“ health services ”
« services de santé » Les services de santé
dont la majeure partie sont financés par l’État, notamment les services des
généralistes, des spécialistes, des infirmiers, des chiropraticiens et des
physiothérapeutes, les services de laboratoire, la fourniture de médicaments
et la prestation de soins hospitaliers.
« services sociaux »
“ social services ”
« services sociaux » Les services sociaux —
tels que les services à domicile, les services d’hébergement et services en
résidence spécialisés, les services d’éducation spécialisés, les services de
réadaptation sociale et professionnelle, les services de soutien personnel,
ainsi que la fourniture des appareils liés à ces services :
a) qui, d’une part, sont destinés à aider la
personne sur les plans physique, émotif, social, psychologique ou
professionnel;
b)
dont, d’autre part, la majeure partie sont financés par l’État directement ou
par l’intermédiaire d’organismes qu’il finance, notamment au moyen d’un
soutien financier direct ou indirect fourni aux particuliers.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
[12]
The Supreme Court of Canada in Dunsmuir v. New
Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, held that a standard of review analysis need not be conducted
in every instance. Instead, where the standard of review applicable to the
particular question before the court is well-settled by past jurisprudence, the
reviewing court may adopt that standard of review. Only where this search
proves fruitless must the reviewing court undertake a consideration of the four
factors comprising the standard of review analysis.
[13]
The
first issue raised by the Applicant concerns the adequacy of reasons. As
held in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration) v. Charles, 2007 FC 1146 at
paragraph 24, citing C.U.P.E. v. Ontario
(Minister of Labour), 2003 SCC 29, the adequacy of reasons is an issue of procedural fairness and is reviewable on a standard of correctness.
[14]
The
second issue concerns whether the Visa Officer conducted an individualized
assessment. Justice Rosalie Abella in Hilewitz v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 SCC 57 (Hilewitz) at
paragraph 57, observed that the “Act calls for individual assessments.” In Sapru
v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 240 at paragraph 16, Justice Richard
Mosley of this Court, relying on Hilewitz, stated: “the … Officer failed
to comply with her obligations as set down in Hilewitz. That is an issue
of law which should be reviewed on a standard of correctness.” The Visa
Officer’s findings of fact with respect to the assessment are reviewable on a
standard of reasonableness. See Mazhari v. Canada (minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 467 at paragraph 9; Barnash v.
Canada (Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 842 at paragraph 20; Canada (Minister of
Employment and Immigration) v. Jiwanpuri (1990), 109 N.R. 293
(F.C.A.).
[15]
When reviewing a decision on the standard of reasonableness, the
analysis will be concerned with “the existence of justification, transparency
and intelligibility within the decision-making process [and also with] whether
the decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are
defensible in respect of the facts and law.” See Dunsmuir,
above, at paragraph 47. Put another way, the Court should
intervene only if the Decision was unreasonable in the sense that it falls
outside the “range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in
respect of the facts and law.”
ARGUMENTS
The
Applicant
Decision
Breached Principle of Procedural Fairness
[16]
In
her Fairness Letter, the Visa Officer stated that she had consulted with the
Health Management Branch of Citizenship and Immigration and determined that,
with respect to social services, the Applicant would need “immunosuppressive
medications on a daily basis.” The Refusal Letter states that the Applicant’s
medical condition might reasonably be expected to cause excessive demands on
health or social services.
[17]
The
Applicant argues that both letters offer the conclusion that the application
must be rejected but offer no meaningful explanation as to how that conclusion
was reached. There is no analysis regarding how the Applicant’s prescription
medication might cause a demand on services, no explanation for the conclusion
that the demand would be excessive, and no explanation as to why the U.S. doctors’
letters and Applicant’s plan to offset the costs of the medication failed to
satisfy the Visa Officer’s concerns. The mere statement that the Applicant
requires medication in and of itself is not sufficient to explain how the cost
of that medication would exceed the average per capita expenditures.
[18]
The
Federal Court of Appeal in Via Rail Canada Inc. v. Canada (National
Transportation Agency), [2001] 2 F.C. 25 (F.C.A.) at paragraph 22, states
that “the decision maker must set out its findings of fact and the principal
evidence upon which those finds were based.” The reasons should provide a
meaningful explanation that makes clear to the applicant why his or her claim
has failed. See Ladouceur v. Canada (Attorney
General),
2006 FC 1438 at paragraphs 22-27; Ogunfowora v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 471 at paragraph 58.
[19]
Adequate
reasons are an important component of full participation in the decision-making
process. They advise the applicant of the case to be met. The Citizenship and
Immigration Canada Operational Bulletin 063B (July 29, 2009, section B) states
that officers must “ensure the procedural fairness letter explicitly informs
the applicant of the required care and social services that are critical to the
individual being assessed as medically admissible.”
[20]
In
the instant case, the Fairness and Refusal Letters do not state which social
services the Applicants will supposedly require, and they do not assess how the
prescription medication might impose an excessive demand on the health care
system. In failing to provide adequate reasons, the Visa Officer breached the
duty of fairness.
Visa Officer
Failed to Provide Individualized Assessment of Excessive Demand
[21]
Section
38(1)(c) of the Act requires an officer to determine whether an applicant has a
health condition that might reasonably be expected to cause excessive demand on
health or social services. It is not enough for the officer simply to find that
the applicant has a health condition. The officer must conduct an
individualized assessment to determine the “repercussions” that each particular
applicant’s condition will have on those services. See Brahim v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2003 FC 1313 at paragraph 13.
[22]
Not
every demand is excessive, and a “medical officer is not entitled to presume
that a particular medical condition or disability must necessarily result in
excessive demand.” See Rabang v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] F.C.J. No. 1934 at paragraphs
17-18. The Supreme Court of Canada held in Hilewitz, above, at paragraph
56, that an assessment must be carried out for each individual:
If
the medical officer considers the need for potential services based only on the
classification of the impairment rather than on its particular
manifestation, the assessment becomes generic rather than individual. It is an
approach which attaches a cost assessment to the disability rather than to the
individual. This in turn results in an automatic exclusion for all individuals
with a particular disability, even those whose admission would not cause, or
would not reasonably be expected to cause, excessive demands on public funds.
[23]
An
individualized assessment determines the expected costs of the medication based
on the applicant’s “unique circumstances and dosage requirements.” See Fallahi
v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2003 FC 906 at paragraph 7. It takes into
account the applicant’s “likely demands on services, not mere
eligibility for them.” See Hilewitz, above, at paragraph 54. See also Tong
v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), Immigration and
Refugee Appeal Board (Appeal Division), 29 September 2009, TA7-12458 at
paragraphs 24 and 33; and Ashraf v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), Immigration and Refugee Appeal Board
(Appeal Division), 19 May 2009, TA7-05863 at paragraph 32.
[24]
Equally
importantly, an individualized assessment considers the “willingness and
ability of the applicant or his or her family to pay for the services.” See Hilewitz,
above, at paragraphs 55 and 61. Visa officers must consider this factor. See Hossain
v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 475 at paragraph 23. An officer
who fails to assess whether an applicant has a viable plan to cover the costs
of medication commits an error. See Companioni v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 1315 (Companioni) at
paragraph 10.
[25]
In
the instant case, the Visa Officer provided no assessment of whether the costs
of the Applicant’s medication would exceed the per capita cost over five years
and no assessment of whether the costs would draw on government-funded
services. There is no universal government-funded out-patient drug program in Canada, so the
officer should not have assumed that the Applicant’s medication would be
covered through a publicly-funded drug plan for which the Applicant would be
eligible. Further, the Visa Officer did not assess the Applicant’s financial
plan to enrol in a private health insurance plan to attenuate any excessive
demand on Canadian health services.
[26]
The
Applicant submits that, in failing to carry out the appropriate assessment, the
Visa Officer made an error of law, which is reviewable on the correctness
standard.
The
Respondent
Visa
Officer’s Reasons Were Adequate
[27]
The
Respondent argues that the Visa Officer’s reasons were adequate in the
circumstances. If the Applicant believed them to be inadequate, however, he was
obligated to request additional information and clarification. In Hayama v.
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2003 FC 1305 (Hayama)
at paragraph 15, Justice Edmond Blanchard relied on the Federal Court of
Appeal’s decision in Marine Atlantic Inc. v. Canadian Merchant Service Guild, 2000 CanLII 15517 (Marine
Atlantic), in concluding as follows:
If
the applicant was unsatisfied with the decision letter and felt it did not
adequately explain the decision, a request should have been made for further
elucidation. There is no evidence that such a request would have been refused.
I therefore conclude that, in the circumstances of this case, there is no
breach of duty of fairness due to an absence of reasons, or inadequacy of
reasons.
[28]
In
the alternative, if the Applicant was not obligated to request clarification of
reasons, the Respondent submits that the Visa Officer’s reasons were sufficient
in that they identified both the source of the concern (namely, “Renal
failure—chronic—post renal transplant”) and the nature of the concern (namely,
“excessive demand on health services”). See Hersi v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2000 CanLII 16671 (F.C.) at paragraph 21.
[29]
Although
the Applicant argues that he was deprived of “meaningful explanations” for how
the Visa Officer arrived at her negative conclusions and evaluations regarding
the letters of support and the plan for payment of medication costs, the
Respondent argues that it would be “inappropriate” to demand such detailed
reasons from this administrative officer as she is not an adjudicative
administrative tribunal. See Cupid v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 176 at paragraph 12. Further, an
applicant may successfully challenge the adequacy of reasons only where such
inadequacy has prejudiced his or her right of judicial review. That has not
been shown here. See Za’rour v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 1281.
[30]
The
Respondent contends that the Applicant was advised of which social services he
would require in the Visa Officer’s view; a copy of the statutory definitions
of “excessive demand,” “health services,” and “social services” was attached to
the Visa Officer’s reasons. See Yogeswaran v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 1997 CanLII 5080 (F.C.T.D.) at paragraph
7.
[31]
The
Respondent submits that the Fairness Letter and the Refusal Letter respond to
live issues in the case. An appeal based on inadequacy of reasons is available
only where the reasons are so deficient as to foreclose meaningful appellate
review. That is not the case here.
Visa Officer
Conducted Individualized Assessment
[32]
The
Respondent argues that, contrary to the Applicant’s assertions, the Visa
Officer did conduct an individualized assessment of his medical status. In her
affidavit, dated 26 May 2010, the Visa Officer refers to the Medical
Notification produced by Dr. Jason Creaghan, the Medical Officer who determined
the Applicant’s inadmissibility. The notification identifies the Applicant’s
health condition, the medication he was taking and the dosage, as well as the
cost per year and the complete coverage that would be available through the
provincial drug plan of Prince Edward Island (PEI), where the Applicant was
planning to reside. The details of this assessment are confirmed and explained
in Dr. Creaghan’s own affidavit, dated 25 May 2010.
[33]
The
Visa Officer also considered the Applicant’s plan to cover the costs of
medication, which she found was based on the Applicant’s promise to pay. This
Court has recognized such promises as unenforceable. The Applicant, in his
argument on this point, has mischaracterized Justice Sean Harrington’s decision
in Companioni, above. In that case, the facts of which are similar to
those of the instant case, the Court observed that “[p]romises not to access [Ontario’s provincial
drug program] are simply not enforceable.” See Companioni, above, at
paragraph 10; and Rashid v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 157 at paragraph 23.
Applicant’s
Reply
[34]
The
affidavits of the Visa Officer and the Medical Officer introduce, for the first
time, the above-noted information on specific medications, dosages and drug
costs, and explain, for the first time, how the officers came to the conclusion
that the Applicant’s medication costs might impose an excessive burden on the
public purse.
[35]
The
Applicant requests that, in the circumstances of this case, these affidavits be
given little or no weight. In Sklyar v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 1226 at paragraph 11, Justice
Michael Phelan advised a cautionary approach to after-the-fact affidavit
evidence, which may be offered to buttress inadequate reasons:
While
there may be instances where the reasons for the decision are properly
contained in not only the decision letter and the CAIPS notes but also in an
affidavit (see Hayama v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2003 FC 1305), the Court is concerned when the evidence submitted post-filing
of an application for judicial review attempts to fill in gaps in the record of
decision on the very points in issue and does so by adding major elements to
the Record. The attempt to supplement the Record must be approached with
caution when attempted by either an applicant or a respondent. If admissible,
the Court must assess its weight.
[36]
The
Respondent, relying on Hayama, above, and Marine Atlantic, above, argues
that the Applicant should have requested clarification if he found the Visa
Officer’s reasons to be inadequate. However, the Applicant contends that these
cases are distinguishable from the instant case: the requirement for an
applicant to request further clarification is not absolute but dependent on the
circumstances of the case. See Kidd v. Greater Toronto Airports Authority,
2004 FC 703 at paragraphs 29-32, aff’d 2005 FCA 81; Marine Atlantic,
above, at paragraph 7. In cases of medical admissibility on grounds of
excessive demand, such as the instant case, visa officers are expected to
provide adequate reasons to allow applicants to respond effectively.
[37]
The
Medical Officer’s affidavit is deficient. With respect to provincial drug
coverage in PEI, it fails to
identify when the information was obtained, the program for which the Applicant
is supposedly eligible and the eligibility criteria. Eligibility for
publicly-funded drug plans is not automatic. Moreover, both affidavits fail to
deal with the Applicant’s intention to enrol in a private health insurance plan
in Canada as he done in the United States.
Respondent’s
Further Memorandum
[38]
The
Respondent disputes the Applicant’s submissions regarding the admissibility of
the affidavits of the Visa Officer and the Medical Officer. Unlike the impugned
affidavits highlighted in the cases cited by the Applicant, these two
affidavits are not being used to buttress the Visa Officer’s Decision or to
introduce an “entire line of reasoning not reflected anywhere in her notes.”
[39]
The
Visa Officer simply attached to her affidavit the Medical Notification issued
by the Medical Officer, which is contained in the Tribunal Record and which
informed the Visa Officer’s Decision.
[40]
The
Medical Officer’s affidavit echoes the contents of the Medical Notification,
which addresses the Applicant’s condition, the requisite treatment and its
projected costs and the coverage of these costs by the provincial health plan
in Prince
Edward Island.
The affidavit confirms that the Medical Officer considered the opinions of the
Applicant’s physicians in the United States and was still not
dissuaded from his initial determination of inadmissibility.
[41]
The
Applicant’s Reply demonstrates no error in the Medical Officer’s affidavit. The
Applicant suggests that the Medical Officer may not have confirmed that the
provincial drug plan would cover the costs of the medication prior to the
issuance of the Refusal Letter. This suggestion is without merit. Further, if
the Applicant doubted the Medical Officer’s findings with regard to the
coverage of the medication, he could have cross-examined him on his affidavit.
ANALYSIS
[42]
I
have reviewed all of the issues raised by the Applicant. I think it is clear
that an individualized assessment did take place. The only issue of substance
relates to procedural fairness.
[43]
The
Officer provided the Applicant with reasons for the Decision. However, the
Applicant now says that more should have been provided. He says that although
“the Officer’s Refusal Letter concludes very generally that the Applicant might
cause excessive demand on health or social services, there is no explanation of
what actual services the Officer believes the Applicant would require.” The
Applicant also complains that the “Refusal Letter also does not assess how any
services required by the Applicant can be expected to exceed average Canadian
per capita costs over 5 years.”
[44]
The
Applicant complains that the Fairness Letter is no better: “[l]ike the Refusal
Letter, the Fairness Letter presents statements of conclusion, some of which
appear to be template phrases copied and repeated more than once.”
[45]
As
for the CAIPS notes, the Applicant says that “there is no meaningful
explanation of how the Applicant’s doctors’ letters, proposed plan and
financial ability were taken into account, nor any explanation as to why they
were not sufficient to alter the finding of medical inadmissibility.”
[46]
It
is clear then, that the Applicant thinks he should have received further
details that lay behind the reasons and conclusions provided. He says that it
is procedurally unfair that this did not occur.
[47]
I
have reviewed the Fairness Letter and the Applicant’s response. These documents
make it clear that the Applicant knew perfectly well what the decisive issue
was: drug costs and excessive demands upon the public health system in Canada. He understood this
because, in his response, he says that the problem can be overcome and he can
make arrangements for a private or group plan that will mean he does not make
excessive demands upon the public purse.
[48]
As
Applicant’s counsel conceded at the oral hearing, the real issue in this case
was whether procedural unfairness occurred because the Applicant was not
provided with the information concerning PEI which had been part of Dr. Creaghan’s
assessment. He says that if he had been provided with this information he could
have provided a viable plan involving medical insurance and/or he could have
directed his application at Ontario, for example, rather than PEI.
[49]
In
my view, this is not a procedural fairness issue. The Fairness Letter and the
Applicant’s response make it clear that the reason for the refusal was
explained to the Applicant in sufficient detail to allow him to understand why
his application was refused. It was then up to the Applicant to take whatever
advice he needed and suggest a solution that would avoid an excessive demand upon
the public system. The Applicant’s response indicates that he knew this would
involve alternative insurance coverage, but he does not say how and where this
will be provided. The resolution he comes up with is a suggestion or
declaration of intent. It is not a plan. It is inchoate. See Companioni,
above, at paragraphs 25 and 30-31.
[50]
The
Officer was not obliged to advise the Applicant that he might wish to consider
residing elsewhere than PEI. The Applicant should
have sought advice and provided a clear plan that would address the problem of
excessive demand. The Officer could not guess that the Applicant might be
willing to go to Ontario or to some other location that would not give rise to
the problems that will occur if he goes to PEI. It was the responsibility of the Applicant to
review his options and provide a plan that was more than an intention to seek
group and/or private insurance.
[51]
The
Applicant did indicate his willingness to enroll in a private health insurance
plan in Canada, just as he has done in
the United
States,
but his plans were inchoate.
[52]
As
the Court held in Companioni, above, personal undertakings not to access
government programs are not enforceable.
[53]
In Rashid,
above, Justice Mosley quoted Justice John Evans in the Federal Court of Appeal
decision in Deol v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 FCA 271 at
paragraph 46, that:
[a]s
has been held in several previous cases, it is not possible to enforce a
personal undertaking to pay for health services that may be required after a
person has been admitted to Canada as a permanent resident, if the services
are available without payment.
[54]
I
see little difference between a personal promise to pay or to refrain from
accessing a government scheme, and a promise to enrol in a private health
insurance plan. The Applicant may have no alternative in the United States but
to purchase or enroll in such a plan but in Canada, where an alternative government scheme is
available, his promise not to use it and to seek private coverage is not
enforceable. The Applicant’s reply to the Fairness Letter makes it clear that
the Applicant does not understand the public health system in Canada. His attitude with
respect to paying for private or group insurance may well change after he
arrives here and realizes that he is paying for health coverage that other
Canadians receive through the public system.
[55]
The
Applicant is at liberty to re-apply for permanent residence. He now has a full
knowledge of what is required. He could have acquired this knowledge earlier if
he had sought and taken appropriate advice. I can find no reviewable error in
the Decision.
JUDGMENT
THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT is
that
1.
The
application is dismissed;
2.
There
is no question for certification.
“James
Russell”