Date: 20070110
Docket: IMM-7242-05
Citation: 2007 FC 21
Ottawa, Ontario, January
10, 2007
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice O'Keefe
BETWEEN:
SHENG
SHUI LIN
Applicant
and
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
O’KEEFE J.
[1]
This
is an application pursuant to subsection 72(1) of the Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (IRPA) for judicial review of a
decision of the Refugee Protection Division of the Immigration and Refugee
Board (the Board), dated November 21, 2005, which determined that the applicant
was neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection.
[2]
The
applicant seeks an order of certiorari quashing the decision of the
panel and an order of mandamus compelling the panel to grant a new
hearing.
Background
[3]
The
applicant, Sheng Shui Lin, is a citizen of China who alleged
a fear of persecution on the basis of his membership in a particular social
group, namely, as a practitioner of Falun Gong. The applicant also feared being
tortured at the hands of the authorities if returned to China.
[4]
The
applicant explained in his Personal Information Form (PIF) narrative that he
began practicing Falun Gong in April 2003. The applicant decided to engage in
the practice in order to alleviate his back pain, even though it was declared
illegal in China in 1999. The
applicant practiced Falun Gong privately in order to avoid being discovered by
Chinese authorities. However, on April 17, 2004, the applicant and his fellow
practitioners were told that the authorities were approaching the house in
which they were practicing Falun Gong. The applicant hid in his cousin’s home
while the authorities searched his house due to his suspected involvement with
Falun Gong. The applicant stated that two fellow practitioners were arrested
following this incident. The applicant fled China as he feared
being jailed for practicing Falun Gong.
[5]
The
applicant obtained a fraudulent passport issued by Japan in order to
leave China and enter Japan. This passport was also used to enter Canada from Japan. The
applicant was smuggled into Canada and arrived in Toronto on June 17,
2004. He made his refugee claim on June 24, 2004.
[6]
The
applicant stated that he returned his passport to a “snakehead” in Toronto’s Chinatown.
The applicant’s claim was heard on September 13, 2005.
[7]
At
the commencement of the hearing, the Board indicated that the applicant’s
identity was still in issue. Counsel submitted a motion requesting that his
client’s Resident Identification Card (RIC) be tested forensically before the
hearing proceeded, pursuant to the Board’s usual policy. Counsel’s motion was
refused, and the hearing proceeded without a forensic test of the RIC. By
decision dated November 21, 2005, the Board found that the applicant was
neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection on the basis
that he had not established his identity. This is the judicial review of the
Board’s decision.
Board’s Reasons for the
Decision
[8]
The
Board’s decision turned on the applicant’s inability to establish his identity.
The documentary evidence indicated that adult Chinese citizens require two
identity documents: the Hukou and the RIC, therefore the Board placed
significant weight upon them. The Refugee Protection Officer (RPO) examined the
applicant’s RIC and did not question its authenticity. However, identity was
still in issue as there were inconsistencies between the content of the RIC and
other documents provided by the applicant. The Board wanted to give the applicant
an opportunity to explain the inconsistencies and indicated that the RIC could
be submitted for testing after the hearing. The Board proceeded with the
hearing despite counsel’s motion and noted that the applicant bore the onus of
establishing his identity.
[9]
The
documentary evidence indicated that both counterfeit and fraudulently obtained
but legitimately produced RICs could be procured, and that their possession did
not guarantee that they were legitimately obtained. The Board referred to Ibnmogdad
v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 321, in
which the Court held that the Board was not under a duty to order an expert
report if there was sufficient evidence to cast doubt upon the authenticity of
a document. The RPO’s review of the RIC was not professional, as it only
confirmed the existence of the card’s most well-known security features. In
addition, the RPO who reviewed the RIC was not the RPO who was assigned to the
case, therefore it was reviewed in isolation, without access to other
information. The Board rejected counsel’s submission that the applicant’s
identity should be accepted on the basis of the RIC despite the existence of
inconsistent information.
[10]
The
applicant provided the Board with a photocopy of his Hukou, an original RIC, an
original marriage certificate, and a photocopy of a Fine Receipt. The Board
found that there were serious inconsistencies and omissions between the
applicant’s oral testimony and the information contained in the documents. The
applicant failed to provide reasonable explanations for these inconsistencies,
which cast serious doubt upon the veracity of the documents. The following
inconsistencies were noted with respect to the documents:
-
the
RIC was issued on July 28, 2000, and contained an 18 digit serial number (350127197508065014).
This number of digits was inconsistent with the number of digits on the serial
number located on his marriage certificate, which had 15 digits
(350127750806501). The applicant explained that the serial number on the RIC
had three more digits than that found on the marriage certificate (see above in
bold) because he had used his Hukou (which had his old 15 digit serial number
at the time) when he got his marriage certificate replaced;
-
the
marriage certificate was issued on June 27, 2002, and the Hukou was issued on
June 6, 2000. The Principal Holder page of the applicant’s Hukou was
registered on August 30, 2002, and contains the 18 digit number. The page does
not show an old RIC number or any changes to the number.
[11]
The
Board found it implausible to have an 18 digit number noted on the Hukou on
August 30, 2002, in the same section of the document where a 15 digit number
allegedly existed, absent any amendments, given that the Address Page of the
Hukou indicates that it was issued on June 6, 2000. The Board found it
reasonable to expect that the Hukou which was submitted to obtain the marriage
certificate would have listed a 15 digit RIC number. It was also reasonable to
expect the RIC number to be amended with the additional three digits in the
section of the Hukou where the old RIC number was entered when issued on June
6, 2000.
[12]
The
Board cited documentary evidence which indicated that altered or deleted items
on the Hukou must be stamped by the issuing authority, and noted that the
applicant’s RIC number did not appear altered, although it had three more
digits than his previous RIC number. The applicant also testified that after he
registered his marriage, he had his Hukou amended in order to transfer his wife
and children to his Hukou. The applicant’s wife and children were registered on
the applicant’s Hukou on August 30, 2002.
[13]
The
documentary evidence indicated that household registration is mandatory in
mainland China and should a
person fail to notify the local registration office of their relocation, they
would not be able to register once they have moved. It was therefore
unreasonable to expect that the applicant had a Hukou issued on June 6, 2000,
without the Principal Holder page being completed until August 30, 2002. The
Board found that the applicant’s evidence with respect to when he amended his
Hukou to reflect the change in his RIC number from 15 digits to 18 digits was
not credible and that the Hukou submitted to obtain his marriage certificate did
not contain the 15 digit number. The applicant’s explanation for the
inconsistency between his RIC and marriage certificate numbers was unpersuasive
and the Board did not find the evidence regarding his RIC number credible. The
Board did not find the applicant’s evidence with respect to the document
submitted to get his marriage certificate credible, therefore the marriage
certificate was assigned no probative value.
[14]
With
respect to the Hukou, the claimant testified that he moved to the address found
on the Address Page (104-5-30 Jiang Bin Road) on January 8, 2001, and prior to
that had lived at 56 Xia Kou. The applicant was asked to explain why the Jiang Bin
Road
address was listed on his RIC (which was issued in 2000), when he had not moved
there until 2001. The applicant explained that he bought a house at the Jiang Bin
Road
address in 2000 and began using its address.
[15]
The
Board noted that the “When and from where moved to this address” section of the
Hukou was blank. The applicant explained that this section was blank because
the first page already contained his address. The Board did not accept this
explanation as it was not reasonable to expect the address “where he moved from”
to be the same as that indicated on the Address Page. The documentary evidence
stated that the Hukou includes the holder’s permanent address and any changes
requiring a new registration, such as relocation, must be reported to the
authorities. The Board found it reasonable to expect that since the applicant had
allegedly reported his relocation to the authorities, that the former address
section would have been completed. A negative inference was drawn from the fact
that the section was blank.
[16]
The
applicant’s Hukou listed the type of household as “family”; however the documentary
evidence indicated that households are categorized as either agricultural
(rural) or non-agricultural (urban). The applicant explained that he thought
his Hukou was rural and did not know why it said “family”. This explanation was
not persuasive, as it was reasonable to expect that having used the document
since 2000, the applicant would have known that it categorized his household as
“family”. The Board did not find the applicant’s evidence in this regard to be
credible.
[17]
The
documentary evidence indicated that the number of household section is located
on the second page of the Hukou, which is a key Chinese identity document. The
Board found it reasonable to expect the applicant’s Hukou to contain a number
of household entry for the purposes of identification and drew a negative
inference from the fact that it was blank. As a result of these findings, the
Hukou was not considered genuine and was assigned no probative value.
[18]
The
photocopy of the Fine Receipt was assigned little value, absent its original,
as it did not contain any security features, nor did it list the applicant’s
name, his RIC, or his wife’s address. In addition, no weight was attributed to
the RIC, given the applicant’s contradictory testimony regarding the address
listed on the card. As a result of the above findings, the documentary
evidence, and the fact that the applicant was smuggled into Canada, the Board
held that the documents were not genuine. The applicant had therefore failed to
produce sufficient documents to establish his identity as a Chinese national. The
Board acknowledged that the applicant spoke Mandarin but could not make a
finding of nationality based upon that fact. The Board noted that a refugee
claim must be rejected as soon as the claimant’s identity fails to be
established.
[19]
The
Board noted its expertise in evaluating Chinese identity documents. The Board
acknowledged that a presumption arises when a claimant swears to the truth of
certain allegations, but noted that it could be rebutted where there are inconsistencies,
implausibilities in testimony, or a lack of corroborating documentary evidence.
As a result of the applicant’s lack of credibility, the Board found that there
was no evidence to support any elements of his claim.
Issues
[20]
The
issues are:
- Did the
Board violate the rules of natural justice in proceeding with the hearing
without seeking forensic analysis of the RIC?
- Did the
Board err in finding that the applicant had failed to establish his
identity?
Applicant’s Submissions
[21]
The
applicant noted that the Board usually sends documents for testing when there
are concerns about their authenticity. However, in the case at hand, the Board
did not send the RIC for testing since the RPO had concluded that it was
authentic. The applicant submitted that if there were further concerns about
the applicant’s identity, the Board should have sent the card for forensic
tests prior to the hearing. Concerns regarding the Board’s methodology were
raised by counsel at the outset of the hearing but were ignored.
[22]
The
Board relied upon case law in declaring that it was not required to test a
document where there was sufficient evidence to cast doubt on its authenticity.
The applicant submitted that once the RPO determined that the card was genuine,
the Board was under a duty to have it tested if it doubted its authenticity. The
applicant submitted that the Board’s failure to have the card tested prior to
the hearing was unfair and contrary to the rules of natural justice. The
applicant cited Xu v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration), 2005 FC 1528, wherein Justice von Finckenstein stated that
having never raised the genuineness of the RIC and not having tested it
forensically, the Board could not assert that it was fraudulent or fraudulently
obtained.
[23]
The
applicant submitted that it was unfair for the Board to doubt the authenticity
of the RIC due to the fact that it was assessed by a different RPO or because
RPOs are not experts in assessing the authenticity of such documents. The
applicant submitted that the Board drew a negative inference from his failure
to provide sufficient documentation when it was the Board that chose not to
have the RIC tested. The applicant submitted that the Board misapplied Merja
v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 73, in justifying its unfair
practices.
[24]
The
applicant submitted that the Board erred in drawing negative inferences about
the applicant’s evidence on the basis of pure speculation about the issuance of
identity documents in China (see Canada (Minister of
Employment and Immigration) v. Satiacum (1989), 99 N.R. 171
(F.C.A.)). It was submitted that the Board was overzealous in searching for
inconsistencies in the applicant’s documents (see Attakora v. Canada (Minister of
Employment and Immigration) (1989), 99 N.R. 168 (F.C.A.)). It was submitted
that demonstrating that the applicant was not aware of the content of certain
documents did not place his identity as a Chinese citizen in question. The
applicant submitted that the Board’s logic in determining that the lack of
credibility attributed to the Hukou should extend to the RIC was faulty.
[25]
The
applicant noted that the Board perceived counsel as threatening. It was
submitted that the Board’s inability to distinguish between legal objections
and personal attacks was evidence of the Board’s inability to reason in a
fair-minded manner and raised a reasonable apprehension of bias.
Respondent’s Submissions
[26]
The
respondent submitted that the Board did not breach natural justice in refusing
to send the applicant’s RIC for testing prior to the hearing. It was submitted
that there is no duty on the Board to send documents for forensic testing where
there is sufficient evidence to cast doubt upon their authenticity ( see Culinescu
v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1997), 136 F.T.R.
241 (F.C.T.D.)). The respondent submitted that it was open to the Board to rely
upon its expertise in concluding that the applicant had not presented authentic
identity documents. In the case at hand, there were inconsistencies, incorrect
information and omissions, in addition to documentary evidence, which justified
the decision to forego forensic testing (see Merja, above). It was
submitted that the applicant was aware that he bore the onus of providing
evidence to prove his claim, but failed to provide sufficient documents to
establish his identity (Kante v. Canada (Minister of Employment and
Immigration) (1994), 47 A.C.W.S. (3d) 798 (F.C.T.D.)).
[27]
The
respondent submitted that the Court should not intervene in the Board’s
decision unless it was based upon an erroneous finding of fact made in a
perverse or capricious manner, or made without regard to the material before it
(see Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
[1998] 1 S.C.R. 982). The respondent submitted that the Court should not
substitute its view regarding matters of fact, since the Board is a specialized
tribunal which has considered the evidence before it (see Medarovik v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration) (2002), 111 A.C.W.S. (3d) 569 (F.C.T.D.)).
The Board is therefore entitled to determine the weight attributed to each
piece of evidence and draw conclusions based upon this evidence. The respondent
submitted that upon reading the Board’s decision as a whole, it is clear that
the Board understood the facts and found the evidence insufficient to support a
positive determination (see Ndombele v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration) (2001), 110 A.C.W.S. (3d) 154 (F.C.T.D.)).
[28]
The
respondent submitted that the Board considered all of the documentary evidence
before it before concluding that it was inadequate. It was open to the Board to
attribute no weight to the documents as they included inconsistencies and
omissions, which the applicant was not able to explain credibly (see Nechifor
v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2003 FC 1004). It was submitted that the
Board was entitled to draw negative inferences with respect to the authenticity
of the documents based on the different identification numbers on the RIC and
marriage certificate. The respondent submitted that the Board was also entitled
to draw a negative inference regarding the applicant’s evidence as to when he
amended his Hukou to reflect his changed identification number (see Shahamati
v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1994] F.C.J. No.
415 (QL)).
[29]
The
respondent submitted that the Board may reject even uncontradicted evidence if
it is not consistent with the probabilities affecting the case as a whole (see Faryna
v. Chorny, [1952] 2 D.L.R. 354). It was submitted that the Board may
make an adverse finding of credibility based upon the implausibility of the
applicant’s story alone. The Board found it implausible that the applicant
amended the identification number on his Hukou on August 30, 2002, in order to
insert a new 18 digit number, without there being evidence that there had been
a previous 15 digit number, or a stamp from the issuing authority.
[30]
The
respondent submitted that it was open to the Board to draw a negative inference
regarding the authenticity of the applicant’s documents from the following
inconsistencies and omissions:
-
the
applicant testified that he moved to the Jiang Bin Road address in
2001, but his RIC (issued in 2000) already listed this address;
-
the
“When and from where moved to this address” section of the Hukou was blank, but
the applicant testified that he had relocated;
-
the
applicant was unable to explain why his household type had been characterised
as “family” in his Hukou, when the documentary evidence indicated that status
is characterised as rural or urban;
-
the
number of household section of the Hukou was blank, however the documentary
evidence indicated that the second page of the Hukou is the address page which
includes the number of household;
-
the
sections of the Hukou referring to “occupation” and “place of employment” were
blank. The applicant stated that he paid the government to operate a bicycle
tire repair shop but left the section blank because the business was not
registered.
[31]
The
respondent submitted that a claim for asylum must be rejected once the Board
determines that the applicant’s identity has not been proven. It was submitted
that the standard of review applicable to the Board’s identity documents is
patent unreasonableness (see Ipala v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 472).
Analysis and Decision
Standard of Review
[32]
The
standard of review applicable to breaches of natural justice and procedural
fairness is that of correctness. It is well established that the standard of
review applicable to the Board’s findings regarding identity documents is
patent unreasonableness (see Ipala v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 472).
[33]
Issue
1
Did
the Board violate the rules of natural justice in proceeding with the hearing
without seeking forensic analysis of the RIC?
The Board
stated in part, at page 685 of the tribunal record:
COUNSEL: I’m not clear on whether
that responds to my query which is if the panel has concerns about the
authenticity of the ID card, then the standard procedure is to send it off for
forensics. Is it your intention to do so?
PRESIDING MEMBER: I have not
made an opinion at this point in time. If you wish me to do that at the end of
the hearing, I would be glad to, because some of the concerns might be
addressed by the claimant and the issue might be resolved. So for me to state
that up here without having any evidence of the claimant I think is unfair. So
I need to hear some responses from the claimant in order to clarify the issues
that remain of concern. I believe the identity card is an old ID card as well.
It doesn’t have as many - - it’s a 1985 issue, is it?
And in its decision:
Counsel was further advised that the
panel at that point of the hearing was not considering sending the RIC for a
Forensic test noting that the claimant should first be provided the opportunity
to offer an explanation for the apparent inconsistencies. His explanation for
the apparent inconsistencies may address and alleviate the panel’s concerns.
Thus, a Forensic test would be unnecessary. . . .
[34]
The
RPO noted that the RIC appeared to be legitimate and contained several security
features. Prior to the hearing, the Board had requested the card so that it
could be forensically tested. Applicant’s counsel, as noted, wished to have the
RIC tested before the hearing continued but the Board did not agree and stated that
the applicant’s responses at the hearing might resolve any concerns it had
about the card.
[35]
At
the hearing, the applicant was questioned about his Hukou. The Board did not
accept the applicant’s explanation for the differences and found that the Hukou
was not genuine.
[36]
In
addition, the Board found that the marriage certificate submitted by the
applicant was not genuine. The Board attached no probative value to the
Executive Affairs fee payment receipt (fine receipt) as the original was not
present and hence, the copy did not have any security features.
[37]
The
Board then used the defects it found with respect to the Hukou and other
documents to conclude that the RIC was not genuine. The Board stated, in part,
at page 15 of its decision:
. . . Having found that the Hukou, on a
balance of probabilities, is not genuine, this lack of credibility extends to
the RIC. . . .
[38]
I
have reviewed the transcript of the hearing and cannot find any reasons for questioning
the legitimacy of the RIC. The only evidence available is that the RPO believed
the RIC to be legitimate.
[39]
In
this particular case, the Board cannot simply say, in light of the RPO’s
evidence that the RIC is not genuine because the Board found the Hukou and
other documents not to be genuine. There is no logical basis for this finding.
It may be that with other evidence, such as forensic testing, the Board might
be able to conclude that the RIC was not genuine, but this type of evidence was
not before the Board.
[40]
I
am of the view that for these reasons, the Board’s decision is patently
unreasonable and must be set aside and the matter submitted to a new panel of
the Board for redetermination.
[41]
Neither
party wished to submit a proposed serious question of general importance for my
consideration for certification.
JUDGMENT
[42]
IT
IS ORDERED that the application for judicial review is allowed and the
matter is referred to a different panel of the Board for redetermination.
“John
A. O’Keefe”
ANNEX
Relevant Statutory Provisions
The relevant statutory
provisions of The Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001,
c.27 are:
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96. A
Convention refugee is a person who, by reason of a well-founded fear of
persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group or political opinion,
(a) is outside
each of their countries of nationality and is unable or, by reason of that
fear, unwilling to avail themself of the protection of each of those
countries; or
(b) not having
a country of nationality, is outside the country of their former habitual
residence and is unable or, by reason of that fear, unwilling to return to
that country.
97. (1) A
person in need of protection is a person in Canada
whose removal to their country or countries of nationality or, if they do not
have a country of nationality, their country of former habitual residence,
would subject them personally
(a) to a
danger, believed on substantial grounds to exist, of torture within the
meaning of Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture; or
(b) to a risk
to their life or to a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment if
(i) the person
is unable or, because of that risk, unwilling to avail themself of the
protection of that country,
(ii) the risk
would be faced by the person in every part of that country and is not faced
generally by other individuals in or from that country,
(iii) the risk
is not inherent or incidental to lawful sanctions, unless imposed in
disregard of accepted international standards, and
(iv) the risk
is not caused by the inability of that country to provide adequate health or
medical care.
(2) A person
in Canada who is a member of a class of persons
prescribed by the regulations as being in need of protection is also a person
in need of protection.
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96.
A qualité de réfugié au sens de la Convention — le réfugié — la personne qui,
craignant avec raison d’être persécutée du fait de sa race, de sa religion,
de sa nationalité, de son appartenance à un groupe social ou de ses opinions
politiques:
a)
soit se trouve hors de tout pays dont elle a la nationalité et ne peut ou, du
fait de cette crainte, ne veut se réclamer de la protection de chacun de ces
pays;
b)
soit, si elle n’a pas de nationalité et se trouve hors du pays dans lequel
elle avait sa résidence habituelle, ne peut ni, du fait de cette crainte, ne
veut y retourner.
97.
(1) A qualité de personne à protéger la personne qui se trouve au Canada et
serait personnellement, par son renvoi vers tout pays dont elle a la
nationalité ou, si elle n’a pas de nationalité, dans lequel elle avait sa
résidence habituelle, exposée:
a)
soit au risque, s’il y a des motifs sérieux de le croire, d’être soumise à la
torture au sens de l’article premier de la Convention contre la torture;
b)
soit à une menace à sa vie ou au risque de traitements ou peines cruels et
inusités dans le cas suivant:
(i)
elle ne peut ou, de ce fait, ne veut se réclamer de la protection de ce pays,
(ii)
elle y est exposée en tout lieu de ce pays alors que d’autres personnes
originaires de ce pays ou qui s’y trouvent ne le sont généralement pas,
(iii)
la menace ou le risque ne résulte pas de sanctions légitimes — sauf celles
infligées au mépris des normes internationales — et inhérents à celles-ci ou
occasionnés par elles,
(iv)
la menace ou le risque ne résulte pas de l’incapacité du pays de fournir des
soins médicaux ou de santé adéquats.
(2)
A également qualité de personne à protéger la personne qui se trouve au
Canada et fait partie d’une catégorie de personnes auxquelles est reconnu par
règlement le besoin de protection.
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Chairperson’s Guideline
7
(Concerning Preparation and Conduct of Hearing in the Refugee Protection
Division) sets out the framework for reverse order questioning:
|
19. In a
claim for refugee protection, the standard practice will be for the RPO to
start questioning the claimant. If there is no RPO participating in the
hearing, the member will begin, followed by counsel for the claimant.
Beginning the hearing in this way allows the claimant to quickly understand
what evidence the member needs from the claimant in order for the claimant to
prove his or her case.
23. The
member may vary the order of questioning in exceptional circumstances. For
example, a severely disturbed claimant or a very young child might feel too
intimidated by an unfamiliar examiner to be able to understand and properly
answer questions. In such circumstances, the member could decide that it
would be better for counsel for the claimant to start the questioning. A
party who believes that exceptional circumstances exist must make an
application to change the order of questioning before the hearing. The
application has to be made according to the RPD Rules.
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19.
Dans toute demande d'asile, c'est généralement l'APR qui commence à
interroger le demandeur d'asile. En l'absence d'un APR à l'audience, le
commissaire commence l'interrogatoire et est suivi par le conseil du
demandeur d'asile. Cette façon de procéder permet ainsi au demandeur d'asile
de connaître rapidement les éléments de preuve qu'il doit présenter au commissaire
pour établir le bien-fondé de son cas.
23.
Le commissaire peut changer l'ordre des interrogatoires dans des
circonstances exceptionnelles. Par exemple, la présence d'un examinateur
inconnu peut intimider un demandeur d'asile très perturbé ou un très jeune
enfant au point qu'il n'est pas en mesure de comprendre les questions ni d'y
répondre convenablement. Dans de telles circonstances, le commissaire peut
décider de permettre au conseil du demandeur de commencer l'interrogatoire.
La partie qui estime que de telles circonstances exceptionnelles existent
doit soumettre une demande en vue de changer l'ordre des interrogatoires
avant l'audience. La demande est faite conformément aux Règles de la SPR.
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