Date: 20090105
Docket: IMM-2182-08
Citation:
2009 FC 6
Ottawa, Ontario, the 5th day of January
2009
Present:
The Honourable Mr. Justice Shore
BETWEEN:
EMMANUEL
LALANE
Applicant
and
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND
JUDGMENT
I. Introduction
[1]
The
allegation of risks made in an application for permanent residence on
humanitarian and compassionate grounds (H&C) must relate to a particular
risk that is personal to the applicant. The applicant has the burden of
establishing a link between that evidence and his personal situation.
Otherwise, every H&C application made by a national of a country with
problems would have to be assessed positively, regardless of the individual’s
personal situation, and this is not the aim and objective of an H&C
application. That conclusion would be an error in the exercise of the
discretion provided for in section 25 of the Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (IRPA) which is delegated to, inter
alia, the Pre-removal Risk Assessment (PRRA) officer by the Minister (Mathewa
v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 914, [2005]
F.C.J. No. 1153 (QL) at para. 10; see also chapter IP 5 of the
Citizenship and Immigration Canada manual on inland processing of applications,
entitled “Immigrant Applications in Canada made on Humanitarian or
Compassionate Grounds”, which expressly provides that the risk identified in an
H&C application must be a personalized risk (section 13, p. 34), Exhibit
“B”, Affidavit of Dominique Toillon; Hussain v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 719, 149 A.C.W.S. (3d) 303).
[2]
Moreover,
as noted in Enforcement Manual (ENF) 10, section 11.2, a temporary stay
will be imposed where return to a specific country or place presents a
generalized risk that the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness
considers dangerous and unsafe to the entire general civilian population of
that country or place. Individualized risk is different from generalized risk
and is assessed during Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB), H&C and PRRA
assessments (ENF Manual 10, p. 22: Exhibit “A”, Affidavit of Dominique
Toillon).
[3]
It
should be noted that under subsection 230(3) of the Immigration and
Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227 (Regulations), the stay of the
removal order does not apply to a person who is inadmissible on grounds of
serious criminality or criminality under subsection 36(1)(a) of the IRPA.
(ENF Manual 10, p. 23: Exhibit “A”, Affidavit of Dominique Toillon).
[4]
Luc
Martineau J. made the following comments in the recent decision in Nkitabungi
v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 331, 169
A.C.W.S. (3d) 862:
[12] ... Moreover, the fact that the
relevant authorities have decided not to return to DRC all Congolese citizens
in Canada without legal status does not create a presumption of undue or
disproportionate hardship as learned counsel for the applicant argues. In
fact, every H&C application case is a specific case. With regard to this, I
note that in Mathewa v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2005 FC 914, it was found that a
moratorium on removals to DRC does not in and of itself prevent an application
made on humanitarian and compassionate grounds from being denied. (Emphasis added.)
II. Judicial Proceeding
[5]
This
is an application for judicial review of a decision by an immigration officer
of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration Canada, dated April 21, 2008, denying
the application for permanent residence.
III. Facts
[6]
The
applicant, Emmanuel Lalane, is a citizen of Haiti.
[7]
In
1990, Mr. Lalane became a permanent resident of Canada.
[8]
Between
2003 and 2007, Mr. Lalane was convicted of assault, breach of probation,
conspiracy to import narcotics, importing narcotics, possession of narcotics
for the purposes of trafficking and possession of substances.
[9]
In
June 2007, a 44 Report was issued under subsection 36(1)(a) of the
IRPA, “Inadmissibility on grounds of serious criminality”.
[10]
In
2008, Mr. Lalane submitted his H&C application, arguing that he was
established in Canada and was at risk in Haiti. He alleged that he was at risk
because of, inter alia:
- the general
situation in the country;
- his status as a
deportee and former member of the army;
- the fact that he
wears a pacemaker and the health system in Haiti would put his life in
danger.
IV. Impugned
Decision
[11]
The
IRPA requires that a foreign national who wishes to settle permanently in
Canada apply for and obtain a permanent resident visa before entering Canada;
under subsection 25.(1) of the IRPA, the Minister may exempt a foreign
national from applying for a permanent resident visa outside Canada on
humanitarian and compassionate grounds. This is an entirely discretionary
process (Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
[1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 at para. 51).
[12]
It
is up to the applicant to satisfy the immigration officer that there are
humanitarian and compassionate considerations that warrant a favourable
recommendation for an exemption from the usual process as provided by the IRPA.
[13]
More
specifically, the applicant must prove that his personal circumstances are such
that the hardship of having to obtain a permanent resident visa outside Canada
would be (i) unusual and undeserved or (ii) disproportionate (Immigration
Manual: (IP) Inland Processing, chapter IP 05 at para. 5.1).
V. Issue
[14]
Was
the decision of the immigration officer unreasonable?
VI. Analysis
[15]
Mr. Lalane
advanced the following grounds in support of his application for review of the
H&C decision:
- The PRRA officer
assessed the evidence improperly;
- The PRRA officer
failed to have regard to or comment on the fact that Haiti is on the list
of moratorium countries;
- The PRRA officer
assigned no weight to the best interests of the children;
- The fact that
Mr. Lalane wears a pacemaker that must be replaced in 2010 will be a
death sentence because specialized care is not available.
New evidence subsequent
to decision
[16]
The
four documents filed as Exhibits “A”, “B”, “C” and “D” to the affidavit of
Gilberte Charles (the applicant’s spouse) are new evidence.
[17]
A
number of facts set out in that affidavit constitute new evidence in themselves
because the affidavit was not in evidence before the PRRA officer.
[18]
Exhibits
“A”, “B”, “C” and “D” to that affidavit constitute new evidence because they
were not brought to the attention of the PRRA officer. The affidavit of
Dominique Toillon is thus uncontradicted evidence that those four exhibits are
not included anywhere in the court record.
[19]
Even
more obvious is the fact that Exhibit “B” is dated May 22, 2008, and
Exhibit “C” is dated May 6, 2008, that is, subsequent to the PRRA decision
dated April 21, 2008.
[20]
There
can be no doubt that the documents attached to Ms. Charles’ affidavit
cannot be considered by this Court when they were not before the PRRA officer
at the time he made his decision.
[21]
Moreover,
it is clear that Mr. Lalane is attempting mainly to use that affidavit to
reply to the concerns stated by the PRRA officer in his decision, by adding
information or clarifying the information he had already provided in his
H&C application. Mr. Lalane is thus trying to submit new evidence to
the Court.
[22]
It
is settled law that in an application for judicial review, this Court may not
have regard to evidence that was not before the decision-maker (C.D. v.
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 501, [2008]
F.C.J. No. 631 (QL) at para. 40; Alabadleh v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 716, 149 A.C.W.S. (3d) 470 at
para. 5; Mijatovic v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2006 FC 685, 149 A.C.W.S. (3d) 290 at para. 22).
Evidence
[23]
Mr. Lalane
argues that the immigration officer assessed the evidence improperly. More
specifically, in this regard, he alleges that:
- the officer used
the wrong test in assessing whether Mr. Lalane would have difficulty
re‑entering the labour market in Haiti;
- the officer failed
to have regard to the fact that Mr. Lalane has held several other
jobs, including one as a volunteer with an organization that assists the
Inuit population, while he was incarcerated;
- the officer failed
to have regard to the tests set out in the regulations and case law under
the IRPA concerning his wife and the reason for the marriage;
- he had a reasonable
expectation that his application would be considered and justified in
light of the moratorium;
- the PRRA officer “wore
two hats” and thus failed to apply the rules of natural justice, in that
he relied on a decision he had made himself and failed to inform
Mr. Lalane of this, and allowed him no opportunity to make
representations to counter that decision.
(Applicant’s Record at pp. 166, 168,
paras. 8, 10, 13, 15-16, 22, 27 and 30).
[24]
First,
regarding his re-establishment in Haiti, the immigration officer concluded:
[TRANSLATION]... The applicant obtained
an engineering degree in Haiti. I therefore believe that his employment history
and training, both in Canada and in Haiti, may help him to re‑enter the
labour market in his country of nationality ...
(Decision at p. 3).
[25]
In
his written submissions in support of his H&C application, Mr. Lalane
alleged, inter alia:
[TRANSLATION] Given the context of
insecurity and virtually total anarchy, I would have no way of earning a living
…
(Applicant’s written submissions in support
of his H&C application, page 3; Exhibit “C”, Affidavit of Dominique
Toillon).
The immigration officer therefore cannot be
accused of failing to consider this relevant factor in his assessment.
[26]
Second,
contrary to the allegation, the immigration officer noted, inter alia,
that Mr. Lalane had started working for the Inuultisivik centre in 2005.
The immigration officer stated, inter alia, that Mr. Lalane had
submitted a pay slip and deposit notice to support that aspect. The immigration
officer concluded:
[TRANSLATION] ... I am of the opinion
that holding a job is a positive point in an application on humanitarian and
compassionate grounds but it is not a decisive factor …
(Decision at p. 3 at paras. 2 and
3).
[27]
The
fact that Mr. Lalane had made progress in adapting to Canadian society,
that he was working and that he had become financially self-sufficient could
not have been a basis for the immigration officer to conclude automatically
that there were humanitarian and compassionate grounds. As this Court held in Tartchinska
v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (2000), 185 F.T.R. 161,
96 A.C.W.S. (3d) 112, self-sufficiency does not, in itself, guarantee that a
humanitarian and compassionate application will be accepted in the absence of
other factors such that refusal of the H&C application would result in
unusual or disproportionate hardship.
[28]
Third,
with respect to his wife and the reason for marriage, the immigration officer
concluded:
[TRANSLATION] He alleges that his wife
has been psychologically and physically affected by his incarceration and that
she now has to support her two children. He says that she wants him to stay in
Canada. However, he produced no documents to establish his wife’s health,
and no details concerning the nature of their relationship. As well, he
submitted no letter of support from her.
...
... Little information is given
concerning his relationship with his wife and his former wife. Accordingly, the
marriage is not a sufficient humanitarian and compassionate ground to grant an
exemption.
(Emphasis added.)
(Decision at p. 3 at paras. 6 et
8).
[29]
In
the absence of any evidence that the separation of Mr. Lalane and his wife
would cause unusual and undeserved or disproportionate hardship, it was
reasonable for the immigration officer to conclude as he did.
[30]
In
addition, the courts have held that the separation of family members in itself
does not constitute a humanitarian and compassionate ground warranting an
exemption, in the absence of any evidence supporting the conclusion that the
separation would cause unusual and undeserved or disproportionate hardship (Aoutlev
v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 111, [2007]
F.C.J. No. 183 (QL) at para. 20).
[31]
As
well, in Aoutlev, supra, this Court referred to one of its
previous decisions to reiterate that the fact that a person leaves family
members and employment behind does not necessarily constitute harm warranting a
favourable decision on humanitarian and compassionate grounds.
[32]
On
this point, also, Mr. Lalane does not specify the tests in the regulations
and case law under the IRPA that the officer failed to consider.
[33]
To
conclude, this Court has held in previous decisions that a PRRA officer has no
duty to disclose his or her decision regarding a PRRA application to the
applicant where that officer also decides the humanitarian and compassionate
application. More specifically, in Zolotareva v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2003 FC 1274, 241 F.T.R. 289, at
paragraph 24, Martineau J. said that the PRRA officer had no duty to give
the applicant an opportunity to make comments before reaching a final decision
on her application (Rasiah v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2005 FC 583, 139 A.C.W.S. (3d) 112 at para. 21; Vasquez
v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 91, 268 F.T.R.
122; Aoutlev, supra at para. 39; Akpataku v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 698, 131 A.C.W.S. (3d)
496; Chowdhury v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002
FCT 389, 218 F.T.R. 264; Pannu v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2006 FC 1356, 153 A.C.W.S. (3d) 195 at para. 37; Liyanage
v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 1045, 141
A.C.W.S. (3d) 118 at para. 41).
[34]
Mr. Lalane’s
position on this point amounts to disagreeing with how the immigration officer
assessed the various evidence before him in reaching his decision and asking
the Court to reconsider the matter and substitute its own decision.
Moratorium
[35]
As
noted earlier, Mr. Lalane alleges that he had a reasonable expectation
that his application would be considered and justified in light of the
moratorium. More specifically, he alleges that the PRRA officer should have
referred to the moratorium and applied that additional criterion for assessment
in considering the facts submitted by him.
[36]
The
two decisions cited in Mr. Lalane’s memorandum, Isomi v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 1394, 157 A.C.W.S. (3d) 807 and
Alexis v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 273,
[2008] F.C.J. No. 493 (QL), arise out of PRRA assessments, and not humanitarian
and compassionate applications.
[37]
Because
of the humanitarian and compassionate considerations, the immigration officer
had no duty to refer to the moratorium in his decision.
[38]
The
allegation of risks made in an H&C application must relate to a particular
risk that is personal to the applicant. The applicant has the burden of
establishing a link between that evidence and his personal situation.
Otherwise, every H&C application made by a national of a country with
problems would have to be assessed positively, regardless of the individual’s
personal situation, and this is not the aim and objective of an H&C
application. That conclusion would be an error in the exercise of the
discretion provided for in section 25 of the IRPA which is delegated to, inter
alia, the PRRA officer by the Minister (Mathewa, supra; see
also chapter IP 5 of the Citizenship and Immigration Canada manual on
inland processing of applications, entitled “Immigrant Applications in Canada
made on Humanitarian or Compassionate Grounds”, which expressly provides that
the risk identified in an H&C application must be a personalized risk
(section 13, p. 34), Exhibit “B”, Affidavit of Dominique Toillon; Hussain,
supra).
[39]
Moreover,
as noted in Enforcement Manual (ENF) 10, section 11.2, a temporary stay
will be imposed where return to a specific country or place presents a
generalized risk that the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness
considers dangerous and unsafe to the entire general civilian population of
that country or place. Individualized risk is different from generalized risk
and is assessed during IRB, H&C and PRRA assessments (ENF Manual 10,
p. 22: Exhibit “A”, Affidavit of Dominique Toillon).
[40]
It
should be noted that under subsection 230(3) of the Regulations, the
stay of the removal order does not apply to a person who is inadmissible on
grounds of serious criminality or criminality under subsection 36(1)(a)
of the IRPA. (ENF Manual 10, p. 23: Exhibit “A”, Affidavit of Dominique
Toillon).
[41]
Luc
Martineau J. made the following comments in the recent decision in Nkitabungi,
supra:
[12] ... Moreover, the fact that the
relevant authorities have decided not to return to DRC all Congolese citizens
in Canada without legal status does not create a presumption of undue or
disproportionate hardship as learned counsel for the applicant argues. In
fact, every H&C application case is a specific case. With regard to this, I
note that in Mathewa v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2005 FC 914, it was found that a moratorium on removals to DRC does not in
and of itself prevent an application made on humanitarian and compassionate
grounds from being denied. (Emphasis added.)
[42]
The
question is not when or to where the applicant will be removed. The issue here
is whether applying for a visa from outside Canada would cause the applicant
unusual and undeserved or disproportionate hardship. The applicant has the
burden of proving the particular facts of his personal situation, which mean
that applying for a visa from outside Canada would cause him unusual and
undeserved or disproportionate hardship. There is no particular point that
needs to be proved. It is up to the applicant to decide what grounds, in his
opinion, are relevant H&C factors in his particular circumstances and to
submit comments regarding those factors.
[43]
As
stated in Hussain, supra:
[12] It is also
a well-recognized principle that it is insufficient simply to refer to country
conditions in general without linking such conditions to the personalized
situations of an applicant (see for example, Dreta v. Canada
(The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005
FC 1239 and Nazaire v. Canada(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)[2006] F.C. 416).
[44]
In
this case, it is clear in the immigration officer’s decision that he considered
the difficult conditions in the country in question; however, as Yvon Blais J.
said in Mathewa, supra, that is not sufficient in itself for all
applications for exemption on humanitarian and compassionate grounds to be
allowed. The applicant must be facing a personalized risk, and that risk, as
well as all of the other factors alleged as humanitarian and compassionate
grounds, must satisfy the officer that applying for a visa from outside Canada
would cause the applicant disproportionate or unusual and undeserved hardship (Hussain,
supra).
[45]
In
this case, the immigration officer concluded that there was no personalized
risk that would result in unusual and undeserved or disproportionate hardship
for Mr. Lalane. His conclusion on that point was as follows:
[TRANSLATION] Notwithstanding that
situation, I find that the applicant has not established that his situation is
different from that of other Haitian citizens. Accordingly, I find that the
sources and the evidence submitted do not establish the existence of a
possibility that he would be personally at risk in that country.
Conclusion
Having regard to the foregoing, I find
that the humanitarian and compassionate grounds in this application, in
relation to establishment in Canada, the best interests of the children and the
risks alleged, are not sufficient to warrant granting an exemption. I am of the
opinion that the applicant has not established that leaving Canada to apply for
a visa would cause him unusual and undeserved or disproportionate hardship.
(Decision at pp. 6 and 7).
[46]
The
immigration officer assessed the conditions in the country, acknowledged that
the situation was still fragile, and concluded that Mr. Lalane was not
personally at risk if he were to be returned to Haiti. The immigration officer
weighed establishment in Canada, in relation to Mr. Lalane’s occupational
situation, his ties in Canada and his criminal record, and took into account
the best interests of the children, as will be explained in more detail later.
The immigration officer reached a general conclusion encompassing establishment
in Canada and the risks alleged, using the appropriate test. Although the
immigration officer did not refer to the moratorium in his decision, that is
not a reviewable error; an H&C decision and the potential enforcement of a
removal order are two completely different things:
[17] ... In passing, I note that the
decision to impose a temporary stay on removals to a country is under the
Minister of Public Safety’s jurisdiction while the decision made by the Officer
regarding an application on humanitarian and compassionate grounds falls within
the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration’s powers. These two decisions are
the concern of two completely different Ministers. In addition, as I made clear
earlier, the caselaw shows that a temporary stay on removals does not in and of
itself prevent an application made on humanitarian and compassionate grounds
from being denied (Mathewa, supra, para. 9). (Emphasis
added.)
(Nkitabungi, supra).
Best Interests of the
Children
[47]
It
is settled law that it is up to the immigration officer to weigh the relevant
factors in deciding an H&C application. The best interests of the children are
a factor that the officer must examine very carefully, and when the officer has
clearly referred to and defined that factor, it is up to the immigration
officer to determine what weight to assign to it in the circumstances (Baker,
supra; Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada
(Attorney General), 2004 SCC 4, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 76; Legault v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 FCA 125, [2002] 4 F.C. 358
(C.A.); Bolanos v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2003 FC 1031, 239 F.T.R. 122 at para. 14; Hussain, supra; Pannu,
supra at para. 37).
[48]
As
the Supreme Court clearly explained in Baker, supra (at
para. 75), the fact that the decision-maker should give the children’s
best interests substantial weight does not mean that those interests must
always outweigh other considerations, or that there will not be other reasons
for denying an H&C application even when the children’s interests are taken
into account.
[49]
In
Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law, supra, the
Supreme Court of Canada reiterated the legal principle stated in Baker, supra,
as follows:
It follows that the legal principle of
the “best interests of the child” may be subordinated to other concerns in
appropriate contexts. For example, a person convicted of a crime may be
sentenced to prison even where it may not be in his or her child’s best
interests. Society does not always deem it essential that the “best interests
of the child” trump all other concerns in the administration of justice. The “best interests of
the child”, while an important legal principle and a factor for consideration
in many contexts, is not vital or fundamental to our societal notion of
justice, and hence is not a principle of fundamental justice. (Emphasis added.)
[50]
In
addition, it is settled law that the applicant has the burden of presenting all
of the relevant information in support of his application. In Owusu v.
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FCA 38, [2004]
F.C.R. 635 at paragraph 8, the Court observed: “since applicants have the onus of
establishing the facts on which their claim rests, they omit pertinent
information from their written submissions at their peril” (Raji v.
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 653, 158 A.C.W.S.
(3d) 464 at para. 10).
[51]
It
is apparent from the notes in the record that the immigration officer
considered the best interests of the children in the context of the evidence submitted
to him. The immigration officer noted:
- The applicant had
four children from two different relationships;
- He did not cite the
best interests of the children from his first relationship;
- Only his young son
has his spouse’s permission to visit him;
- The applicant
submitted no concrete evidence of his involvement with his children;
- The older children
have lived with their mother for a long time, and the applicant does not
have visitation rights;
- The younger
children have been separated from their father since he was incarcerated
in May 2007 and live with their respective mothers in Canada.
[52]
There
having been no evidence before him as to the nature of the relationship that
Mr. Lalane had developed with his children, it was reasonable for the
immigration officer to conclude as he did.
[53]
The
reasons for the immigration officer’s decision indicate that the decision was
made in a manner that was receptive to the interests of the two children and
that intervention by the Court is not warranted. The fact that the immigration
officer did not arrive at the result Mr. Lalane had hoped for does not
mean that he erred.
Issue of the
Pacemaker
[54]
Contrary
to what Mr. Lalane stated in his memorandum of argument, at
paragraphs 37 et seq., the PRRA officer noted in his decision that
he had consulted the documents relating to the pacemaker and the documents from
the Correctional Service of Canada. As stated in his reasons, those documents
indicate that Mr. Lalane was monitored about every six months by a
cardiologist and that the pacemaker’s life is about two and a half years
(Decision at p. 4, subtitle [TRANSLATION] “Risks”).
[55]
What
the PRRA officer said in his reasons is that Mr. Lalane submitted no
evidence to support his allegation that [TRANSLATION] “[I]n Haiti, there is no
care available from a competent cardiologist and there are no battery
replacement instruments, as is the norm in Canada” (Decision at p. 4,
subtitle “Risks”).
[56]
The
PRRA officer analyzed the documentary evidence in the record, which indicated, inter
alia, that health services are not non-existent, but that access to
services is difficult for the poorest individuals. As noted by the PRRA
officer, Mr. Lalane did not establish that he fell into that category. As
well, he is from Port-au-Prince, where the situation is less problematic
(Decision at p. 5 at para. 1).
[57]
It
is settled law that what an immigration officer must do is examine the
documents submitted in evidence and assess their probative value. That is what
the immigration officer did, and he then stated precise and complete reasons in
support of his conclusion (Lim v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2002 FCT 956, 116 A.C.W.S. (3d) 929; Uddin v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 FCT 937, 116 A.C.W.S. (3d)
930).
VII. Conclusion
[58]
The
immigration officer had regard to all of the evidence submitted to him and
assessed all of the relevant factors relating to humanitarian and compassionate
grounds.
[59]
Mr. Lalane
has failed to identify any evidence that might persuade this Court that the
decision made was unreasonable, and there is nothing that would warrant the
intervention of the Court in respect of the immigration officer’s decision.
[60]
For
all these reasons, Mr. Lalane has failed to establish that there are
grounds on which the H&C decision made by the immigration officer should be
set aside. Accordingly, the application for judicial review is dismissed.
JUDGMENT
THE COURT ORDERS that
1. The application for judicial review be dismissed;
2. No
serious question of general importance be certified.
“Michel
M.J. Shore”
Certified
true translation
Brian
McCordick, Translator
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