Date:
20120921
Docket:
T-862-11
Citation:
2012 FC 1111
Ottawa, Ontario,
September 21, 2012
PRESENT: The
Honourable Madam Justice Mactavish
BETWEEN:
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CHARBEL EL-HELOU
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Applicant
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and
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COURTS
ADMINISTRATION SERVICE, LAURENT FRANCOEUR, FRANCINE CÔTÉ, ÉRIC CLOUTIER,
DAVID POWER, AND ÉRIC DELAGE
|
|
|
Respondents
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|
REASONS FOR
JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
[1]
Charbel
El-Helou seeks judicial review of a decision of the Interim Public Sector
Integrity Commissioner. Mr. El-Helou had complained to the Office of the Public
Sector Integrity Commissioner (OPIC), alleging that he had been subject to
reprisals after he reported what he believed to be acts of wrongdoing on the
part of certain employees of Courts Administration Service (CAS).
[2]
The
Commissioner dismissed two of the allegations of reprisal made by Mr. El-Helou
against CAS and certain CAS employees. The Commissioner referred a third
allegation of reprisal to the Public Servants Disclosure Protection Tribunal
(the Tribunal) for hearing. Mr. El-Helou seeks judicial review of the decision
dismissing two of his allegations of reprisal.
[3]
For
the reasons that follow, I have concluded that Mr. El-Helou was treated
unfairly in the complaints process. Consequently, his application for judicial
review will be granted.
The
Parties
[4]
CAS
provides administrative services to the Federal Court, the Federal Court of
Appeal, the Court Martial Appeal Court of Canada and the Tax Court of Canada.
It is part of the “public sector”, as defined by subsection 2(1) Public
Servants Disclosure Protection Act, S.C. 2005, c. 46 [the PSDPA or
the Act], and its employees are “public servants” within the meaning of that
Act. The full text of the relevant provisions of the Act is attached as an
appendix to these reasons.
[5]
Mr.
El-Helou worked in the Information Technology Services (ITS) section of CAS. He
was employed by CAS between August of 2006 and February of 2010, when he left
to take up a position elsewhere in the Public Service. In 2009, when the
wrongdoings and reprisals at issue in this proceeding are alleged to have
occurred, Mr. El-Helou occupied the position of Director, Client Services and
Infrastructure.
[6]
Mr.
El-Helou reported to Laurent Francoeur, who was Director General of Information
Technology Services. For a brief period between May 25 and June 15, 2009, Mr.
El-Helou reported to Eric Cloutier, who was acting in Mr. Francoeur’s position
while Mr. Francoeur was away from the office.
[7]
Mr.
Francoeur and Mr. Cloutier both reported to David Power, who was the Acting
Deputy Chief Administrator for Corporate Services. Mr. Power was also the
“Senior Officer” for CAS for the purposes of subsection 10(2) of the Act. That
is, he had been designated by CAS’ Chief Administrator to be responsible for
receiving and dealing with disclosures of wrongdoing made by CAS employees.
[8]
On
June 1, 2009, Francine Côté replaced Mr. Power as Deputy Chief Administrator.
[9]
Mr.
El-Helou also worked closely with Eric Delage, Director General of the
Administrative, Facilities and Security Services Division of CAS.
[10]
These
CAS employees were identified as respondents during the investigation carried
out by the OPIC. They are also respondents in this application for judicial
review. They will be referred to collectively as the “individual respondents”.
Background
[11]
Mr.
El-Helou alleges that while he was working for CAS, he observed what he
considered to be wrongdoing on the part of certain CAS employees. The
particulars of the alleged wrongdoing are not relevant to the issues currently
before the Court.
[12]
Mr.
El-Helou reported the alleged misconduct to Mr. Power in his capacity as the
CAS “Senior Officer”. These reports were made in the spring of 2009.
[13]
In
his complaint filed with the OPIC, Mr. El-Helou alleged that between May and
December of 2009, the individual respondents took reprisal actions against him
as a result of his having made a “protected disclosure”, as contemplated by
subsection 2(1) of the Act.
[14]
In
particular, Mr. El-Helou alleged that:
a) Laurent Francoeur asked Eric
Cloutier to obtain information about Mr. El-Helou’s management style and to
solicit negative comments from his subordinates. Mr. Cloutier carried out this
request while Mr. Francoeur was on vacation and Mr. Cloutier was acting in his
position (the first allegation);
b) On June 5, 2009, Francine Côté
temporarily reassigned Mr. El-Helou to other duties and his supervisory
responsibilities were taken away from him (the second allegation); and
c) Mr. El-Helou’s security
clearance at the Top Secret level was withheld from May of 2009 until his
departure from CAS in February of 2010 (the third allegation).
[15]
Mr.
El-Helou’s complaint also alleged that he had been subjected to “ongoing
harassment” by CAS employees. With Mr. El-Helou’s consent, this allegation was
not pursued by the OPIC investigator.
[16]
Subsection
19.4(1) of the Act requires that the Commissioner decide whether or not to deal
with a complaint within 15 days of the complaint being filed. Upon the
completion of a preliminary investigation, the Commissioner decided to deal
with Mr. El-Helou’s complaint. Mr. Francoeur, Mr. Cloutier, Mr. Delage and Ms.
Côté were identified as respondents. In accordance with subsection 19.7(1) of
the Act, the Commissioner then appointed an investigator to investigate the
complaint.
[17]
The
Act does not provide much in the way of guidance with respect to the conduct of
investigations. It does contain a general admonition that investigations are to
be conducted as informally and expeditiously as possible: subsection 19.7(2).
Section 19.8 requires the Commissioner to notify the complainant, any
interested parties, and the chief executive of the organization in question of
“the substance of the complaint to which the investigation relates”. In El-Helou
v. Courts Administration Service (25 Nov 2011), 2011-PT-03 [El-Helou #3],
the Tribunal observed that the section 19.8 notice requirement “ensures that
the parties are afforded the protections of natural justice, such as the right
to be heard, at the earliest opportunity”: at para. 38.
[18]
Most
importantly for our purposes, one of the duties of the Commissioner is to “ensure
that the right to procedural fairness and natural justice of all persons
involved in investigations is respected, including persons making disclosures,
witnesses and persons alleged to be responsible for wrongdoings”: subsection
22(d) of the Act.
[19]
The
investigation into Mr. El-Helou’s complaint was carried out between
July of 2009 and April of 2011. A number of witnesses were
interviewed, and there were several changes of investigator over the course of
the investigation.
[20]
In
the course of the investigation, Mr. El-Helou raised several additional
allegations of reprisal with the investigator. One of these was the allegation
that Mr. Francoeur improperly interfered with his participation in a job
competition at another department in the public service.
[21]
Mr.
El-Helou further alleged that CAS employees threatened to initiate a security
investigation into his conduct unless he signed an acknowledgement that he had
breached his duty of loyalty to his employer, which document would then be
placed on his employee file. A security investigation could result in the loss
of Mr. El-Helou’s Secret-level security clearance, which would make him
ineligible for many positions within the public service.
[22]
Mr.
El-Helou also claimed that Mr. Power had informed Mr. El-Helou that he would
not provide Mr. El-Helou with an employment reference unless Mr. El-Helou
admitted to having committed a security breach. Mr. El-Helou contended that
this would adversely affect his job search.
[23]
As
a result of these latter allegations, the OPIC investigator determined that Mr.
Power should also be added as a respondent. As the Tribunal has confirmed, the Commissioner
has the power to add a party to a complaint, even if that person was not named
in the original complaint: El-Helou #3, at para. 31.
[24]
There
were significant delays in the investigation caused, in part, by the
replacement of the investigator mid-way through the investigation and a further
change of investigator near the end of the investigation. The investigation
report was ultimately finalized on April 14, 2011, some 21 months after Mr.
El-Helou filed his complaint with OPIC. This is obviously a matter of some
concern, given the admonition in subsection 19.7(2) of the Act that
investigations are to be conducted as informally and expeditiously as
possible.
[25]
The
investigator recommended that Mr. El-Helou’s allegation of reprisal relating to
the withholding of his Top Secret security clearance from May
of 2009 until his departure from CAS in February of 2010 be referred to the
Tribunal for hearing. In this regard, the report states that the evidence
supported Mr. El-Helou’s claim that he had been subjected to possible reprisals
by Mr. Power and Mr. Delage.
[26]
The
investigator further recommended that the other two allegations of reprisal
identified in Mr. El-Helou’s July, 2009 complaint be dismissed. The
investigation report states that the evidence did not establish reasonable
grounds to believe the allegations of reprisal against Mr. Cloutier, Mr.
Francoeur or Ms. Côté.
[27]
The
Interim
Commissioner accepted the investigator’s recommendation on April 15,
2011. In
a Notice of Decision dated April 18, 2011, the Interim Commissioner
confirmed that he had made an application to the Tribunal pursuant to
subsection 20.4(1) of the Act. The application was limited, however, to Mr.
El-Helou’s reprisal complaint against CAS, Mr. Power and Mr. Delage in relation
to the withholding of Mr. El-Helou’s Top Secret security clearance.
[28]
The
Interim Commissioner declined to make an application to the Tribunal in
relation to Mr. El-Helou’s first two reprisal complaints involving the conduct
of Mr.
Cloutier, Mr. Francoeur and Ms. Côté. Based on the Investigator’s Report,
the Commissioner determined that there was “insufficient evidence to believe on
reasonable grounds” that either Mr. El-Helou’s reassignment or the information
sought by Mr. Cloutier with respect to Mr. El-Helou’s management style
constituted reprisals. The Commissioner accordingly dismissed these two
allegations pursuant to section 20.5 of the Act.
[29]
The
Tribunal has made a number of preliminary rulings with respect to Mr.
El-Helou’s third allegation of reprisal. However, the
hearing into the merits of this allegation has been put on hold by the Tribunal
pending the outcome of this application for judicial review: El-Helou v.
Courts Administration Service et al., 2011-PT-01, at paras. 100-102 [El-Helou #1], and
El-Helou
#3,
above at para. 5.
The Issues
[30]
Mr.
El-Helou has raised a number of issues in his application. These include the
proper interpretation of the “reasonable grounds to believe” standard set out
in subsection 20.4(3) of the Act, the question of who bears the burden of proof
in cases such as this, and whether it is only necessary that there be “some
basis” in the evidence to support the referral of a reprisal complaint to the
Tribunal by the Commissioner.
[31]
Mr.
El-Helou also alleges that the investigator, and, by extension, the Interim Commissioner,
erred by weighing the evidence and engaging in fact-finding with respect to the
merits of his complaint, rather than merely assessing whether the evidence met
the “reasonable grounds to believe” standard as Mr. El-Helou submits they were
obliged to do.
[32]
Mr.
El-Helou asserts that the Interim Commissioner also erred by failing to have
due regard to the public interest in deciding whether to send his first and
second allegations of reprisal on for a hearing, as required by subsection
20.4(3) of the Act. The Interim Commissioner further erred, Mr. El-Helou says,
by failing to consider whether the respondents’ explanations for their actions
were in fact pretextual.
[33]
Mr.
El-Helou has also alleged that he was denied fairness in the investigation
process. He has identified what he says are a number of different breaches of
procedural fairness that occurred in the process leading up to the dismissal of
his first and second allegations of reprisal.
[34]
As
will be explained below, I agree with Mr. El-Helou that the process followed by
OPIC was not fair. Given my conclusion in relation to the fairness issues, it
is not necessary for me to address the remainder of Mr. El-Helou’s arguments.
Standard of Review
[35]
Where
an issue of procedural fairness arises, the task for the Court is to determine
whether the process followed by the decision-maker satisfied the level of
fairness required in all of the circumstances: see Canada (Citizenship and
Immigration) v. Khosa, 2009 SCC 12, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 339, at para. 43.
The
Process Followed by the OPIC
[36]
In
order to put Mr. El-Helou’s fairness arguments into context, it is necessary to
have some understanding of what transpired during the investigation of his
reprisal complaint by the OPIC.
[37]
In
February of 2010, after his complaint had been under investigation for approximately
six months, Mr. El-Helou was advised by the investigator that she anticipated
that she would be providing her investigation report to the Commissioner within
a week. Mr. El-Helou was also advised that a decision would be made with
respect to his complaint within a month.
[38]
While
Mr. El-Helou had not been represented by counsel to this point in the process,
he then decided to retain legal counsel. His counsel wrote the investigator requesting
a one-month delay in issuing the report, in order to allow counsel to provide
advice to Mr. El-Helou prior to making submissions on Mr. El-Helou’s behalf.
[39]
The
request for a delay was granted and the investigator advised counsel that she
would extend the time for the completion of the report to April 2, 2010 in
order to allow Mr. El-Helou to provide his written submissions.
[40]
Detailed
submissions were subsequently provided to the investigator by counsel for Mr.
El-Helou. These submissions addressed the interpretation of the Act and the
fairness of the OPIC’s investigation. Counsel also requested that the
investigator provide Mr. El-Helou with a list of the witnesses who had been
interviewed, the substance of their evidence, and any documentary evidence that
had been collected during the investigation prior to the finalization of the
investigation report.
[41]
When
no response was received to this request, Mr. El-Helou’s counsel once again
contacted the investigator. The investigator then advised counsel that the
reprisal file was “under investigation” and that the disclosure of the
investigation file was “under review”.
[42]
In
a letter to Mr. El-Helou’s counsel dated September 28, 2010, the investigator
reviewed the process that had been followed to date in the investigation. She
provided counsel with a list of the individuals who had been interviewed to
that point, and noted that her office was concluding the investigation process.
[43]
The
investigator then stated that:
A summary of findings will be prepared and sent to the parties for
comment. Your client and the persons alleged to
have committed reprisal will have an opportunity to respond. Once the
responses have been received, analyzed and the report amended as required, the
matter will be presented to the Commissioner for her decision. [my emphasis]
[44]
Mr.
El-Helou’s counsel responded by letter dated October 29, 2010, noting that Mr.
El-Helou had never been provided with the details of the investigation. Counsel
also identified two individuals who he said would provide “crucial” evidence.
One of these witnesses was the then-Chief Administrator of CAS, who
had the final say with respect to Mr. El-Helou’s security clearance. As a
result,
counsel said, the Chief Administrator would have had “significant” involvement
in the Top Secret security clearance process, and would, as well, have
potentially had a role in the reprisals taken against Mr. El-Helou.
[45]
Counsel
went on in his letter to confirm his understanding that he would be provided
with a copy of the investigation report for comment, in due course. He stated: “[w]e
stress that we expect to receive, in addition to a report with any analysis you
have conducted, a complete and detailed description of all the evidence you
have received from the witnesses”. Counsel
observed that “[t]his is essential to enable us to comment on the report”.
[46]
Counsel
also expressed Mr. El-Helou’s concern as to whether the alleged threat to deny
him an employment reference unless he signed a document admitting improper
behaviour was being investigated.
[47]
In
a letter
to Mr. El-Helou’s counsel dated January 20, 2011, the investigator referred to
Mr. El-Helou’s claim that he was threatened with the prospect of a further
security investigation if he failed to comply with his employer (CAS)’s
“wishes”. In this regard, the investigator stated that:
This implied threat of a security
investigation could constitute a potential reprisal measure and it was
therefore examined during the investigation. This matter will be addressed in
my report. [my emphasis]
[48]
The
investigator also stated:
I have not interviewed [the Chief Administrator
of CAS]
nor is there a record of the previous investigator doing so. As you indicate
that he has evidence linked to the alleged reprisal action, I will add him to
the witness list. […]
We will interview [the second
employee suggested by counsel] as you indicate that she has evidence in this
case. […]
[49]
The
investigator then stated that based upon the information provided by counsel
and the investigation file, it was her understanding that there were three
persons remaining to be interviewed. The investigator stated that Mr. Power
would be re-interviewed, and that the Chief Administrator and the second individual
identified by counsel for Mr. El-Helou in his October 29, 2010
letter would also be interviewed.
[50]
The
investigator further advised counsel that “[o]nce the investigation is
complete, the investigation report [will be] finalized and presented to the Interim
Commissioner for his consideration”. The investigator also noted that she could
not advise counsel as to who would actually be completing the investigation, as
the investigator herself had recently changed positions.
[51]
Counsel
for Mr. El-Helou responded, reiterating his position that his client was
entitled to “a complete and detailed description of all the evidence you have
received from the various witnesses as well as other particulars regarding the
conduct of the investigation”. Counsel also referred to his earlier submissions
with respect to the fairness of the process being followed by the investigator,
and expressed his ongoing dismay with respect to the delays in the
investigation process.
[52]
After
further correspondence between the investigator and counsel for Mr. El-Helou,
the investigation report was finalized on April 14, 2011. As noted earlier, the
investigator recommended that Mr. El-Helou’s allegation of reprisal relating to
the withholding of his Top Secret security clearance from May
of 2009 until his departure from CAS in February of 2010 be referred to the
Tribunal for hearing. The report found that the evidence supported an
application to the Tribunal with respect to possible reprisals by Mr. Power and
Mr. Delage in this regard.
[53]
The
investigator further recommended that the other two allegations of reprisal
identified in Mr. El-Helou’s July, 2009 complaint be dismissed as the evidence
did not support a finding that there were reasonable grounds to believe the
allegations of reprisal made against Mr. Cloutier, Mr. Francoeur or Ms. Côté.
[54]
It
will be recalled that the investigator had acknowledged in her January 20, 2011
letter that Mr. El-Helou’s claim that he was threatened with the prospect of a
further security investigation if he failed to comply with CAS’s wishes could
constitute a potential reprisal measure. The investigator had further advised
Mr. El-Helou that the allegation had been examined during the investigation and
would be addressed in the investigation report. However, the investigation
report is entirely silent on this issue.
[55]
Moreover,
despite the statement in the investigator’s January 20, 2011 correspondence
that she would interview the Chief Administrator and the second witness
identified by Mr. El-Helou’s counsel in his October 29, 2010
letter, it does not appear that either of these individuals was ever
interviewed.
[56]
It
will also be recalled that the investigator’s September 28,
2010 letter to Mr.
El-Helou’s counsel clearly stated that a summary of the
investigator’s findings would be given to the parties for comment, and an
opportunity provided for them to respond prior to the matter being presented to
the Interim Commissioner for decision. However, neither Mr.
El-Helou nor any of the respondents were ever provided with an
opportunity to review or comment on either the investigator’s report or the
evidence that it relied upon prior to the report being provided to the Interim
Commissioner for decision.
Analysis
[57]
As
was noted earlier, the
Public
Servants Disclosure Protection Act stipulates that everyone involved
in OPIC investigations is entitled to procedural fairness.
[58]
The
content of the duty of procedural fairness is variable, and depends, amongst
other things, on the nature of the rights affected: Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, 174 D.L.R. (4th)
193 [Baker].
[59]
As
the Supreme Court noted in Baker, several factors are relevant in
determining the content of the duty of fairness in a particular case. These
include the nature of the decision being made and the process followed in
making it, the nature of the statutory scheme and the terms of the statute
pursuant to which the body operates, the importance of the decision to the
individual or individuals affected, the legitimate expectations of the person
challenging the decision and the choices of procedure made by the agency
itself. This list is not exhaustive. Regard must also be had to the relevant
jurisprudence governing the duty of fairness in particular types of cases.
[60]
There
is little case law as yet dealing with the Public Servants
Disclosure Protection Act. There is, however, a comprehensive body
of jurisprudence that has been developed in the human rights context and there
are a number of similarities between the PSDPA and the complaints
process under the Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. H-6.
[61]
Baker
teaches that in determining the content of the duty of fairness in a given
case, regard should be had to the nature of the decision being made and to process
followed in making it. Regard must also be had to the nature of the statutory
scheme and the terms of the statute pursuant to which the body operates.
[62]
From
a procedural perspective, the Tribunal has remarked upon the “structural
similarities” between the human rights and “whistleblower” regimes: see El-Helou
#1, above at para. 83 and El-Helou #3, above at para. 71. Both
processes involve two separate agencies – a Commission that performs a
“gatekeeper” function, receiving and investigating complaints, and a Tribunal
that hears and decides the complaints referred to it by the relevant
Commission.
[63]
The
Commission or Commissioner is a party to Tribunal proceedings carried out under
both the CHRA and PSDPA, along with the complainant and the
respondent.
[64]
While
there are complainants and respondents in both human rights and “whistleblower”
cases, neither type of case is entirely private litigation as the public
interest plays a role in each process: see section 51 of the CHRA and
sections 20.4(3)(d), 25.1(7)(a), 33(1) and 49(3)(b) to the PSDPA, as
well as the Preamble to the latter Act.
[65]
There
are also many similarities in the policy considerations underlying the two
pieces of legislation. The PSDPA and the CHRA are
remedial legislation. Human rights and “whistleblower” cases may each
involve conditions of employment and the protection of individuals from unfair
or oppressive conduct by their employers where certain identified
considerations are a factor in that conduct.
[66]
Baker
also
requires us to have regard to the importance of the decision to the
individual or individuals affected. Decisions made by the Commissions in both
human rights and “whistleblower” cases are potentially determinative of
rights, and may have the effect of denying relief under the legislation in
issue.
[67]
Moreover,
complaints under the PSDPA will always involve an
individual’s employment, whereas complaints under the CHRA frequently
arise in the employment context. Canadian jurisprudence is replete with
references to the crucial role that employment plays in the dignity and
self-worth of the individual.
[68]
By
way of example, in Reference re Public Sector Employee Relations Act (Alberta), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313, the Supreme Court of Canada stated:
Work is one of the most
fundamental aspects in a person's life, providing the individual with a means
of financial support and, as importantly, a contributory role in society. A
person's employment is an essential component of his or her sense of identity,
self-worth and emotional well-being. [at para.91]
[69]
Although
this quotation comes from Chief Justice Dickson’s dissenting judgment, similar
sentiments regarding the central role that employment plays in the dignity and
self-worth of the individual have been expressed in many other judgments of the
Supreme Court: see, for example, Evans v. Teamsters Local Union No. 31, 2008 SCC 20, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 661; Newfoundland
(Treasury Board) v. N.A.P.E., 2004 SCC 66, [2004]
2 S.C.R. 381; Nova Scotia (Workers' Compensation Board) v. Martin,
2003 SCC 54, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504, at para. 104.
[70]
Furthermore,
both
types of cases require
a balancing of Charter-protected rights (section 15 equality rights in the case
of the CHRA versus the section 2 right to free expression in the case of
the PSDPA) with other
important principles such as bona fide occupational requirements (CHRA)
or the duty of loyalty owed by public servants to their employers (PSDPA).
[71]
Because
of the similarities between the complaints regimes established under the PSDPA and
the CHRA, all of the
parties have relied, to a greater or lesser extent, on jurisprudence that has
evolved in the human rights context in support of their respective positions. I
agree that this jurisprudence is very helpful in determining whether Mr.
El-Helou’s right to be treated fairly in this matter has been respected.
[72]
Before
addressing this question, I would note that the last two Baker factors
are the legitimate expectations of the person challenging the decision and the
choices of procedure made by the agency itself. Insofar as the latter factor is
concerned, deference will ordinarily be extended to an agency’s procedural
choices. The legitimate expectations of the person challenging the decision are
an important factor in this case, and will be addressed in some detail in my
analysis.
[73]
The Federal Court
of Appeal has made it clear that parties to a human rights complaint have a
right to be informed of the substance of the evidence which will be
relied upon in making the decision to dismiss a complaint or to refer it to the
Canadian Human Rights Tribunal for hearing. The parties must also be offered
the opportunity to respond to that evidence and to present all relevant
arguments relating to it: see Mercier v. Canada (Human Rights Commission), [1994] 3 F.C. 3, [1994] F.C.J. No. 361 (QL)
(F.C.A.) at para. 14; Slattery v. Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission),
[1994] 2 F.C. 574, 73 F.T.R. 161 [Slattery]; affirmed (1996), 205 N.R.
383 (F.C.A.). See also the Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions in Radulesco
v. Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission), [1984] 2 S.C.R. 407, 14
D.L.R. (4th) 78 [Radulesco] and Syndicat des
employés de production du Québec et de l'Acadie v. Canada (Canadian Human
Rights Commission),
[1989] 2 S.C.R. 879, (1989), 62 D.L.R. (4th) 385 [SEPQA].
[74]
I
am of the view that the common-law
duty of procedural fairness also requires that the parties to a complaint under
the PSDPA be afforded a similar opportunity.
[75]
I
agree with the respondents that Mr. El-Helou was not necessarily
entitled to see all of the transcripts of all of the witness interviews or each and every
document produced to the investigator. Rather, the case law
merely requires that he be made aware of the “substance of the case” (Radulesco)
or the “substance of the evidence obtained by the investigator” (SEPQA, Mercier).
[76]
This
requirement will generally be satisfied by the disclosure of the investigator’s
report and the provision of an opportunity for comment. Alternatively, the
provision of a summary of the witness interviews and other documentary evidence
would have been sufficient to allow Mr. El-Helou to know the case he had to
meet, and to respond to it: see Mercier, above at para. 18; Canadian
Broadcasting Corp. v. Paul, 2001 FCA 93, 198 D.L.R. (4th) 633 at paras.
39-44.
[77]
Neither
of these things happened here. Mr. El-Helou and the respondents were never made
aware of the substance of the evidence that had been obtained by the investigator,
nor did any of them have any opportunity to respond to the investigator’s
findings. Moreover, the fact that both sides were treated equally unfairly does
not somehow render the process fair.
[78]
Mr.
El-Helou submits that if he had been provided with an opportunity to respond to
the investigator’s findings, he would have provided the investigator with many
of the lengthy and detailed submissions that were made to this Court. However,
he was never given that opportunity. This was a clear breach of the common law
duty of procedural fairness.
[79]
This
error was, moreover, compounded by the breach of the explicit representation
made by the investigator that Mr. El-Helou would be afforded an opportunity to
comment on the investigator’s findings prior to a decision being made by the Interim
Commissioner in relation to his complaint.
[80]
It
will be recalled that in response to repeated requests by counsel for Mr.
El-Helou, the investigator
stated in a letter dated September 28, 2010 that:
A summary of findings will be prepared and sent to the parties for
comment. Your client and the persons alleged to
have committed reprisal will have an opportunity to respond. Once the
responses have been received, analyzed and the report amended as required, the
matter will be presented to the Commissioner for her decision. [my emphasis]
[81]
Mr. El-Helou
thus had a legitimate expectation that this is the process that would be
followed in the investigative process. A legitimate expectation will arise in
the administrative law context where a party has been given assurances as to
the steps that will be followed in the decision-making process. This can
include procedures which an administrative authority has voluntarily undertaken
to follow. However, for a legitimate expectation to be created, the undertaking
has to be “clear, unambiguous and unqualified”: See D.J.M. Brown and J.M.
Evans, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in Canada, loose-leaf (Toronto: Canvasback Publishing, 2011), at p. 7:1710.
[82]
A
legitimate expectation cannot confer a right to a specific substantive result.
That is, the doctrine of legitimate expectation is limited to procedural
relief: Mount Sinai Hospital v. Quebec (Minister of Health and Social
Services), [2001] 2 S.C.R. 281, 200 D.L.R. (4th) 193, at paras. 32, 79 and
86. That said, where a legitimate expectation properly arises, a party’s
procedural rights and the degree of fairness to which they are entitled can be
extended beyond basic common law principles.
[83]
The
representation made by the investigator in this case was clear, unambiguous and
unqualified: Mr. El-Helou and the respondents would be provided with a summary
of the investigator’s findings and all of the parties would be provided with an
opportunity to respond to those findings. Nothing in that representation
conflicted in any way with the investigator’s statutory duties under the Public
Servants Disclosure Protection Act. Indeed, it accorded with the duty of
fairness contemplated by subsection 22(d) of the Act. It was simply unfair for
the investigator to promise to do one thing and to then do the opposite.
[84]
There
was a further breach of procedural fairness in this case. The investigator was
aware of Mr.
El-Helou’s claim that he was threatened with the prospect of a further security
investigation if he failed to comply with his employer’s “wishes”. The
investigator further recognized that such a threat could potentially constitute
a reprisal measure. As a result, the investigator stated in her January 20,
2011 letter to Mr. El-Helou’s counsel that this allegation “was therefore
examined during the investigation” and that “[t]his matter will be addressed in
my report”. Mr. El-Helou thus had a legitimate expectation that
this would happen.
[85]
However,
despite this clear,
unambiguous and unqualified undertaking by the investigator, the investigation
report makes no mention of this issue, with the result that this allegation was
never considered by the Interim Commissioner.
[86]
The
respondents deny knowledge of any representations that may have been made to
Mr. El-Helou, and they have made no substantive submissions in relation to this
issue. I am satisfied that the failure of the investigator to investigate this
allegation constitutes a further breach of procedural fairness.
[87]
The
investigator also failed to follow through on her undertaking to interview the
former Chief Administrator of CAS. It will be recalled that in her January
20, 2011 letter to Mr. El-Helou’s counsel, the investigator stated that she had
“not interviewed [the Chief Administrator of CAS] nor
is there a record of the previous investigator doing so”. The investigator went
on to state that “[a]s you indicate that he has evidence linked to the alleged
reprisal action, I will add him to the witness list”. Further on in the
letter, she reiterated that this individual would be
interviewed. However, it appears that this never happened.
[88]
The
respondents once again deny any knowledge of any representations that may have
been made to Mr. El-Helou in this regard, and they have made no substantive
submissions in relation to this issue.
[89]
Here
again we have the investigator making a clear, unambiguous and unqualified
representation as to the process that would be followed in the investigation
and then failing to follow through with that undertaking.
[90]
I
note that the
evidence of the former Chief Administrator of CAS was relevant to the issue
of the alleged withholding of Mr. El-Helou’s Top Secret security clearance.
Given that this issue has been referred to the Tribunal for a hearing, the
prejudice to Mr. El-Helou in this regard was limited, but was not entirely
eliminated in that Mr. El-Helou does not have the benefit of notes or a
transcript of an interview with the former Chief
Administrator as he heads into the Tribunal hearing.
[91]
Procedural
fairness also requires that in fulfilling its statutory
responsibility to investigate complaints, investigations carried out by the
Commissioner’s office must be both neutral and thorough: Slattery, at
para. 49.
[92]
Cases
decided after Slattery have established that a decision to dismiss a
complaint made by the Canadian Human Rights Commission in reliance upon a
deficient investigation will itself be deficient because “[i]f the reports were
defective, it follows that the Commission was not in possession of sufficient
relevant information upon which it could properly exercise its discretion”: see
Grover v. Canada (National Research Council), 2001 FCT 678, [2001]
F.C.J. No. 1012, at para. 70. See also Garvey v. Meyers Transport Ltd.,
2005 FCA 327, [2005] F.C.J. No. 1684 (C.A.), Singh v. Canada
(Attorney General), 2002 FCA 247, [2002] F.C.J. No. 885, at para. 7 and Kollar
v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 2002 FCT 848, [2002] F.C.J. No.
1125, at para. 40.
[93]
Despite
the very lengthy amount of time during which this matter was under investigation,
the investigation was not sufficiently thorough.
[94]
Insofar
as the requirement of thoroughness is concerned, the Federal Court observed in Slattery
that “deference must be given to administrative decision-makers to assess
the probative value of evidence and to decide to further investigate or not to
further investigate accordingly”. As a consequence, “[i]t should only be where
unreasonable omissions are made, for example where an investigator failed to
investigate obviously crucial evidence, that judicial review is warranted”: at
para 56.
[95]
I
am satisfied that in this case, the investigator failed to investigate
obviously crucial evidence.
[96]
It
will be recalled that Mr. El-Helou’s first allegation was that “Laurent
Francoeur asked Eric Cloutier to obtain information about [his] management
style and to solicit negative comments from his subordinates.” Mr. El-Helou
further alleged that “Mr. Cloutier carried out this request while Mr. Francoeur
was on vacation and Mr. Cloutier was acting in his position.”
[97]
Thus
Mr. El-Helou alleges that at the behest of Mr. Francoeur, Mr.
Cloutier actively sought out Mr. El-Helou’s subordinates in order to obtain
negative comments from them with respect to Mr. El-Helou’s management style.
Mr. El-Helou further alleges that this was done as a result of his having made
a protected disclosure.
[98]
However,
a
status report prepared by the investigator reveals that Mr. Cloutier denied
ever having conducted a review of Mr. El-Helou’s management style. Rather, he
told the investigator that the employees all came to him during the
three weeks that he acted for Mr. Francoeur: Application Record, Vol. 7 at p.
2180.
[99]
Thus
the question of who initiated these discussions was central to this allegation
of reprisal.
[100] In her report,
the investigator stated that “[a]lthough the complainant believes that Mr.
Cloutier deliberately solicited negative information about him from his
employees, there is little evidence presented that Mr. Cloutier
initiated the questioning until employees identified problems to him”:
Investigation Report at para. 106. [my emphasis]
[101] However, Mr.
El-Helou had specifically identified at least two CAS employees who he said
would tell the investigator that Mr. Cloutier had indeed approached them
in an attempt to obtain negative information about his management style. The
investigator appears to have been aware that there was evidence to support Mr.
El-Helou’s position on this point: see the investigation report at footnote 38
and Application Record, Vol. 7 at p. 2180. Nevertheless, the investigator never
interviewed either of the individuals identified by Mr. El-Helou in relation to
this issue.
[102] The failure to
obtain what was obviously crucial evidence is all the more puzzling as the
investigator had a copy of an investigation report prepared by a private
company that had investigated allegations of harassment that had been made
against Mr. El-Helou and another CAS employee. The individuals identified by
Mr. El-Helou were interviewed in the course of that investigation, and it
appears that although their evidence would not have been entirely supportive of
Mr. El-Helou’s management style, it may well have been of some assistance to
him in establishing who initiated the discussions, and whether Mr. Cloutier was
in fact actively seeking negative information with respect to Mr. El-Helou.
[103] The
jurisprudence has established that some defects in an investigation may be
overcome by providing the parties with the opportunity to make submissions with
respect to the investigation report. As the Federal Court of Appeal observed in
Sketchley v. Canada (Attorney General), 2005 FCA 404, [2006] 3 F.C.R.
392, the only errors that will justify the intervention of a court on review
are “investigative flaws that are so fundamental that they cannot be remedied
by the parties’ further responding submissions”: at para. 38. The difficulty
with this is of course that in this case, Mr. El-Helou was never given an
opportunity to provide further responding submissions, nor was he ever advised
of the substance of the investigator’s findings.
Conclusion
[104] For these
reasons, the application for judicial review is allowed. The April 18, 2011
decision of the Interim Public Service Integrity Commissioner is set aside and
the matter is remitted to the Office of the Public Service Integrity
Commissioner for further investigation in accordance with these reasons.
[105] In accordance
with the agreement of the parties, Mr. El-Helou is entitled to his costs of
this application at the mid-point Column III of the table to Tariff B of the Federal
Courts Rules.
JUDGMENT
THIS
COURT ORDERS AND ADJUDGES that:
1. This application
for judicial review is allowed. The April 18, 2011 decision of the Interim Public
Service Integrity Commissioner is set aside, and the matter is remitted to the
Office of the Public Service Integrity Commissioner for further investigation
in accordance with these reasons.
2. Mr. El-Helou is
entitled to his costs of this application at the mid-point Column III of the
table to Tariff B of the Federal Courts Rules.
“Anne Mactavish”
APPENDIX
Public Servants Disclosure
Protection Act,
S.C. 2005, c. 46
2.(1) … “protected
disclosure” means a disclosure that is made in good faith and that is made by
a public servant
(a) in accordance with this
Act;
(b) in the course of a
parliamentary proceeding;
(c) in the course of a
procedure established under any other Act of Parliament; or
(d) when lawfully required to
do so.
…
“public
sector” means
(a)
the departments named in Schedule I to the Financial Administration Act and
the other portions of the federal public administration named in Schedules
I.1 to V to that Act; and
(b)
the Crown corporations and the other public bodies set out in Schedule 1.
However,
subject to sections 52 and 53, “public sector” does not include the Canadian
Forces, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service or the Communications
Security Establishment.
“public
servant” means every person employed in the public sector, every member of
the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and every chief executive.
“reprisal” means any of the
following measures taken against a public servant because the public servant
has made a protected disclosure or has, in good faith, cooperated in an
investigation into a disclosure or an investigation commenced under section
33:
(a) a disciplinary measure;
(b) the demotion of the public
servant;
(c) the termination of
employment of the public servant, including, in the case of a member of the
Royal Canadian Mounted Police, a discharge or dismissal;
(d) any measure that adversely
affects the employment or working conditions of the public servant; and
(e) a threat to take any of the
measures referred to in any of paragraphs (a) to (d).
8. This Act applies in respect of
the following wrongdoings in or relating to the public sector:
(a) a contravention of any Act
of Parliament or of the legislature of a province, or of any regulations made
under any such Act, other than a contravention of section 19 of this Act;
(b) a misuse of public funds or
a public asset;
(c) a gross mismanagement in
the public sector;
(d) an act or omission that
creates a substantial and specific danger to the life, health or safety of
persons, or to the environment, other than a danger that is inherent in the
performance of the duties or functions of a public servant;
(e) a serious breach of a code
of conduct established under section 5 or 6; and
(f) knowingly directing or
counselling a person to commit a wrongdoing set out in any of paragraphs (a)
to (e).
…
10. (2) Each chief executive
must designate a senior officer to be responsible for receiving and dealing
with, in accordance with the duties and powers of senior officers set out in
the code of conduct established by the Treasury Board, disclosures of
wrongdoings made by public servants employed in the portion of the public
sector for which the chief executive is responsible.
19. No person shall
take any reprisal against a public servant or direct that one be taken
against a public servant.
19.1 (1) A public
servant or a former public servant who has reasonable grounds for believing
that a reprisal has been taken against him or her may file with the
Commissioner a complaint in a form acceptable to the Commissioner. The
complaint may also be filed by a person designated by the public servant or
former public servant for the purpose.
…
19.3 (1) The
Commissioner may refuse to deal with a complaint if he or she is of the
opinion that
(a) the
subject-matter of the complaint has been adequately dealt with, or could more
appropriately be dealt with, according to a procedure provided for under an
Act of Parliament, other than this Act, or a collective agreement;
(b) if the
complainant is a member or former member of the Royal Canadian Mounted
Police, the subject-matter of the complaint has been adequately dealt with by
the procedures referred to in subsection 19.1(5);
(c) the complaint is
beyond the jurisdiction of the Commissioner; or
(d) the complaint
was not made in good faith.
(2) The
Commissioner may not deal with a complaint if a person or body acting under
another Act of Parliament or a collective agreement is dealing with the
subject-matter of the complaint other than as a law enforcement authority.
…
19.4 (1) The
Commissioner must decide whether or not to deal with a complaint within 15
days after it is filed.
(2) If the
Commissioner decides to deal with a complaint, he or she must send a written
notice of his or her decision to the complainant and to the person or entity
that has the authority to take disciplinary action against each person who
participated in the taking of a measure alleged by the complainant to
constitute a reprisal.
19.7 (1) The
Commissioner may designate a person as an investigator to investigate a
complaint.
(2) Investigations
into complaints are to be conducted as informally and expeditiously as
possible.
19.8 (1) When commencing
an investigation, the investigator must notify the chief executive concerned
and inform that chief executive of the substance of the complaint to which
the investigation relates.
(2) The
investigator may also notify any other person he or she considers
appropriate, including every person whose conduct is called into question by
the complaint, and inform the person of the substance of the complaint.
19.9 (1) If the investigator
so requests, chief executives and public servants must provide the
investigator with any facilities, assistance, information and access to their
respective offices that the investigator may require for the purposes of the
investigation.
…
20.3 As soon as possible
after the conclusion of the investigation, the investigator must submit a
report of his or her findings to the Commissioner.
20.4 (1) If, after
receipt of the report, the Commissioner is of the opinion that an application
to the Tribunal in relation to the complaint is warranted, the Commissioner
may apply to the Tribunal for a determination of whether or not a reprisal
was taken against the complainant and, if the Tribunal determines that a
reprisal was taken, for
(a) an order
respecting a remedy in favour of the complainant; or
(b) an order
respecting a remedy in favour of the complainant and an order respecting
disciplinary action against any person or persons identified by the
Commissioner in the application as being the person or persons who took the
reprisal.
(2) The order
respecting disciplinary action referred in paragraph (1)(b) may not be
applied for in relation to a complaint the filing of which is permitted by
section 19.2.
(3) In considering
whether making an application to the Tribunal is warranted, the Commissioner
must take into account whether
(a) there are
reasonable grounds for believing that a reprisal was taken against the
complainant;
(b) the
investigation into the complaint could not be completed because of lack of
cooperation on the part of one or more chief executives or public servants;
(c) the complaint
should be dismissed on any ground mentioned in paragraphs 19.3(1)(a) to (d);
and
(d) having regard to
all the circumstances relating to the complaint, it is in the public interest
to make an application to the Tribunal.
20.5 If, after receipt
of the report, the Commissioner is of the opinion that an application to the
Tribunal is not warranted in the circumstances, he or she must dismiss the
complaint.
22. The duties of the
Commissioner under this Act are to
…
(d)
ensure that the right to procedural fairness and natural justice of all persons
involved in investigations is respected, including persons making disclosures,
witnesses and persons alleged to be responsible for wrongdoings;
…
(i)
receive, review, investigate and otherwise deal with complaints made in
respect of reprisals.
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2.(1) …« divulgation protégée »
Divulgation qui est faite de bonne foi par un fonctionnaire, selon le cas :
a) en vertu de la présente loi;
b) dans le cadre d’une
procédure parlementaire;
c) sous le régime d’une autre
loi fédérale;
d) lorsque la loi l’y oblige.
…
« secteur public »
a) Les ministères figurant à
l’annexe I de la Loi sur la gestion des finances publiques et les autres
secteurs de l’administration publique fédérale figurant aux annexes I.1 à V
de cette loi;
b) les sociétés d’État et
autres organismes publics figurant à l’annexe 1.
Sous réserve des articles 52 et
53, la présente définition ne s’applique toutefois pas au Service canadien du
renseignement de sécurité, au Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications et
aux Forces canadiennes.
« fonctionnaire » Toute
personne employée dans le secteur public, tout membre de la Gendarmerie
royale du Canada et tout administrateur général.
« représailles » L’une ou
l’autre des mesures ci-après prises à l’encontre d’un fonctionnaire pour le
motif qu’il a fait une divulgation protégée ou pour le motif qu’il a
collaboré de bonne foi à une enquête menée sur une divulgation ou commencée
au titre de l’article 33 :
a) toute sanction
disciplinaire;
b) la rétrogradation du
fonctionnaire;
c) son licenciement et,
s’agissant d’un membre de la Gendarmerie royale du Canada, son renvoi ou
congédiement;
d) toute mesure portant atteinte
à son emploi ou à ses conditions de travail;
e) toute menace à cet égard.
8. La présente loi s’applique
aux actes répréhensibles ci-après commis au sein du secteur public ou le
concernant :
a) la contravention d’une loi
fédérale ou provinciale ou d’un règlement pris sous leur régime, à
l’exception de la contravention de l’article 19 de la présente loi;
b) l’usage abusif des fonds ou
des biens publics;
c) les cas graves de mauvaise
gestion dans le secteur public;
d) le fait de causer — par action
ou omission — un risque grave et précis pour la vie, la santé ou la sécurité
humaines ou pour l’environnement, à l’exception du risque inhérent à
l’exercice des attributions d’un fonctionnaire;
e) la contravention grave d’un
code de conduite établi en vertu des articles 5 ou 6;
f) le fait de sciemment
ordonner ou conseiller à une personne de commettre l’un des actes
répréhensibles visés aux alinéas a) à e).
…
10. (2) Il désigne un agent
supérieur chargé de prendre connaissance des divulgations et d’y donner suite
d’une façon qui soit compatible avec les attributions qui lui sont conférées
par le code de conduite établi par le Conseil du Trésor.
19. Il est interdit d’exercer des
représailles contre un fonctionnaire, ou d’en ordonner l’exercice.
19.1 (1) Le fonctionnaire ou
l’ancien fonctionnaire qui a des motifs raisonnables de croire qu’il a été
victime de représailles peut déposer une plainte auprès du commissaire en une
forme acceptable pour ce dernier; la plainte peut également être déposée par
la personne qu’il désigne à cette fin.
…
19.3 (1) Le commissaire peut
refuser de statuer sur une plainte s’il l’estime irrecevable pour un des
motifs suivants :
a) l’objet de la plainte a été
instruit comme il se doit dans le cadre d’une procédure prévue par toute
autre loi fédérale ou toute convention collective ou aurait avantage à
l’être;
b) en ce qui concerne tout
membre ou ancien membre de la Gendarmerie royale du Canada, l’objet de la
plainte a été instruit comme il se doit dans le cadre des recours visés au
paragraphe 19.1(5);
c) la plainte déborde sa
compétence;
d) elle n’est pas faite de
bonne foi.
(2) Il ne peut statuer sur la
plainte si une personne ou un organisme — exception faite d’un organisme
chargé de l’application de la loi — est saisi de l’objet de celle-ci au titre
de toute autre loi fédérale ou de toute convention collective.
…
19.4 (1) Le commissaire statue sur
la recevabilité de la plainte dans les quinze jours suivant son dépôt.
(2) Dans le cas où il décide
que la plainte est recevable et où il y donne suite, le commissaire envoie
par écrit sa décision au plaignant et à la personne ou à l’entité qui a le
pouvoir d’infliger les sanctions disciplinaires à chaque personne qui a
participé à l’exercice des prétendues représailles faisant l’objet de la
plainte.
19.7 (1) Le commissaire peut
charger une personne d’enquêter sur une plainte.
(2) L’enquête est menée, dans
la mesure du possible, sans formalisme et avec célérité.
19.8 (1) Au moment de commencer
l’enquête, l’enquêteur informe l’administrateur général compétent de la tenue
de celle-ci et lui fait connaître l’objet de la plainte.
(2) Il peut aussi informer
toute personne, notamment toute personne dont la conduite est mise en
question par la plainte, de la tenue de l’enquête et lui faire connaître
l’objet de la plainte.
19.9 (1) Si l’enquêteur en fait la
demande, les administrateurs généraux et les fonctionnaires doivent lui
donner accès à leur bureau et lui fournir les services, l’aide et les
renseignements qu’il peut exiger dans le cadre de l’enquête.
…
20.3 L’enquêteur présente son
rapport au commissaire le plus tôt possible après la fin de l’enquête.
20.4 (1) Si, après réception du
rapport d’enquête, le commissaire est d’avis que l’instruction de la plainte
par le Tribunal est justifiée, il peut lui demander de décider si des
représailles ont été exercées à l’égard du plaignant et, le cas échéant :
a) soit d’ordonner la prise des
mesures de réparation à l’égard du plaignant;
b) soit d’ordonner la prise des
mesures de réparation à l’égard du plaignant et la prise de sanctions
disciplinaires à l’encontre de la personne ou des personnes identifiées dans
la demande comme étant celles qui ont exercé les représailles.
(2) Le commissaire ne peut
demander au Tribunal d’ordonner la prise de sanctions disciplinaires visée à
l’alinéa (1)b) à l’égard de la plainte dont le dépôt est autorisé par
l’article 19.2.
(3) Dans l’exercice du pouvoir
visé au paragraphe (1), le commissaire tient compte des facteurs suivants :
a) il y a des motifs
raisonnables de croire que des représailles ont été exercées à l’égard du
plaignant;
b) l’enquête relative à la
plainte ne peut être terminée faute de collaboration d’un administrateur
général ou de fonctionnaires;
c) la plainte doit être rejetée
pour l’un des motifs énoncés aux alinéas 19.3(1)a) à d);
d) il est dans l’intérêt public
de présenter une demande au Tribunal compte tenu des circonstances relatives
à la plainte.
20.5 Si, après réception du
rapport d’enquête, le commissaire est d’avis, compte tenu des circonstances
relatives à la plainte, que l’instruction de celle-ci par le Tribunal n’est
pas justifiée, il rejette la plainte.
22. Le commissaire exerce
aux termes de la présente loi les attributions suivantes :
…
d) veiller à ce que les
droits, en matière d'équité procédurale et de justice naturelle, des
personnes mises en cause par une enquête soient protégés, notamment ceux du
divulgateur, des témoins et de l'auteur présumé de l'acte répréhensible;
…
i) recevoir et examiner
les plaintes à l’égard des représailles, enquêter sur celles-ci et y donner
suite.
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