Date:
20120730
Docket:
IMM-8599-11
Citation:
2012 FC 938
Ottawa, Ontario, July 30, 2012
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Near
BETWEEN:
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SUSAN MERLENE COUDOUGAN
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Applicant
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and
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MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
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Respondent
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REASONS FOR
JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
[1]
The
Applicant, Susan Merlene Coudougan, seeks judicial review of a negative
Pre-Removal Risk Assessment (PRRA), dated November 18, 2011. This hearing was
held at the same time as that of her judicial review application related to a
denial on humanitarian and compassionate (H&C) grounds (Court File #
IMM-8600-11).
I. Background
[2]
The
Applicant is a citizen of St. Vincent and the Grenadines (St. Vincent). She
initially brought a claim for refugee protection in Canada in 2006 based on
violence committed by her former partner and the father of her three eldest
children, Gus Robertson. Her claim was denied, as was a subsequent PRRA. She
was removed to St. Vincent in December 2009.
[3]
The
Applicant claims that on her return she was attacked by family members of Mr. Robertson.
She arrived in Canada again on October 5, 2011. She applied for a PRRA to be
considered along with her pending H&C application that was initially filed
prior to her removal from Canada in 2008. Both applications were denied by the
same Senior Immigration Officer (the Officer). The Applicant now asks
this Court to review the decision made regarding her PRRA application.
II. PRRA Determination
[4]
The
Officer assessed the risk posed by Mr. Robertson, noting that there was little
information on which to base a finding that he poses a serious possibility of
forward looking risk to the Applicant. Given her past history and country
documentation on violence against women in St. Vincent, however, the
Officer gave the Applicant the benefit of the doubt and acknowledged that she
faced some degree of risk from Mr. Robertson. In addition, the Officer
accepted evidence of Mr. Robertson’s family attacking the Applicant and that
they posed a degree risk, despite suggesting that these family members were not
purposely searching for the Applicant to attack her.
[5]
More
significantly, the Officer found that state protection would be available and
reasonably forthcoming to the Applicant in St. Vincent. The police and state
were willing to take action in response to the incidents experienced by her. She
reported the incidents to police and they speculated the family member had fled
to Trinidad. The fact that police failed to secure a conviction was not
evidence of their failure to investigate.
[6]
Turning
to relevant documentary evidence, the Officer placed greater weight on more
current and independent information in a US State Department Human Rights report
(or USDOS report) discussing police training to deal with domestic violence
victims. While domestic violence is not a crime in St. Vincent, the law
provides protection through other charges as do government and non-government
services.
[7]
The
Officer explicitly recognized that state protection was imperfect, referring to
a lack of shelters, an “imbalance of power between men and women; the
prevalence and severity of domestic violence incidents; and that the small size
of the country imposes a challenge.”
III. Issues
[8]
The
general issue before this Court is the reasonableness of the Officer’s
determination.
IV. Standard
of Review
[9]
The
standard of review applicable to the assessment of a PRRA Officer is generally
reasonableness (see for example Hnatusko v Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration), 2010 FC 18, [2010] FCJ no 21 at paras 25-26). This
standard is relevant to any finding of state protection.
V. Analysis
[10]
The
Applicant submits the Officer erred in finding that state protection would be
reasonably forthcoming to her by not focusing on whether protection existed at
the practical or operational level. However, I remain unconvinced that the
Officer failed to undertake the appropriate analysis and consider the adequacy
of state protection in the present case. The Officer addressed the procedures
in place for responding to domestic violence complaints in the country,
referred to police training, legal protection and services provided by the
government’s Gender Affairs Division. At the same time, the Officer expressly
acknowledged the imperfections. Her analysis considered some limited knowledge
and skills on domestic violence as referred to in evidence, the lack of
shelters as well as a power imbalance between men and women and prevalence of
domestic violence in St. Vincent.
[11]
I
am of the view that the Officer was alive to contradictory evidence of
practical challenges associated with addressing domestic violence and, given
information of efforts being made to address the problem while considering all
of the relevant negative evidence, was sufficiently justified in the conclusion
that state protection would be reasonably forthcoming. While the Applicant
would have preferred a more favourable weighing of this evidence, it does not
follow that the Officer’s analysis was unreasonable in the circumstances. The
Applicant is expected to provide clear and convincing evidence that state
protection would be inadequate or not reasonably forthcoming (Carillo v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FCA 94, [2008] FCJ no 399
at para 38).
[12]
Similarly,
the Applicant faults the Officer for referencing particular portions of reports
but not others that highlight the extent of domestic violence in the country. I
emphasize that the Officer is presumed to have considered all of the evidence
before him or her and is not required to refer to each and every piece of that
evidence (Florea v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration),
[1993] FCJ no 598); Hassan v Canada (Minister of Employment and
Immigration) (1992), 147 NR 317, [1992] FCJ no 946 (FCA)). In
general, the Officer’s reasons demonstrate concern for the prevalence and
severity of domestic violence in St. Vincent.
[13]
The
Officer is also entitled to assign weight to evidence based on factors such as
its currency, as done with the USDOS report in relation to other information
available. Contrary to the Applicant’s submissions, and as the Respondent has
noted, the Officer expressly considered the legal opinion presented as to the
issue of domestic violence in St. Vincent. The Officer referred to the
conclusion in the opinion that adequate state protection did not exist for
victims and various limitations associated with it. This contradictory
information was specifically addressed by the Officer in a relatively detailed
manner before reaching the conclusion that state protection would nonetheless
be forthcoming for the Applicant.
[14]
The
Applicant further takes issue with the Officer’s finding that the police and
state were willing to take action in response to the incidents experienced by
her. She charges that there was no adequate emergency response to her attack
occurring not far from the police station where police were asleep and no
efforts were made to locate the perpetrators. Despite this information, the
Officer also referenced her ability to file a report and follow up with police.
The Respondent points to evidence that in response to another attack police
attended at the hospital to gather evidence. The Officer recognized the
shortcomings the Applicant perceived in the police reaction but, in light of
all of the evidence presented, found them sufficiently responsive to the
Applicant’s situation and noted that the lack of an arrest did not demonstrate
that they were not investigating or taking action on the case. Even though the
Applicant believes the Officer should have focused solely on negative
information related to the police response, the analysis and conclusion are
reasonable as they reflect the totality of evidence presented for the PRRA
application.
VI. Conclusion
[15]
Since
I consider the Officer’s finding on the availability of state protection
reasonable in this case, the application for judicial review is dismissed.
JUDGMENT
THIS
COURT’S JUDGMENT is that this
application for judicial review is dismissed.
“
D. G. Near ”