Date: 20100610
Docket: T-1354-06
Citation: 2010 FC 627
BETWEEN:
JAG FLOCOMPONENTS N.A. and
JAG
FLOCOMPONENTS (NORTH AMERICA) INC.
Plaintiffs
and
ARCHMETAL INDUSTRIES
CORPORATION,
HENRY CHEN, JEROME CHEN and
FORTUNE MANUFACTURING
CO., LTD.
Defendants
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
PHELAN
J.
I. OVERVIEW
[1]
This
is an action by the Plaintiffs for expungement of the Canadian trade-mark FUSION,
a declaration of breaches of s. 7(a) of the Trade-marks Act (Act)
and for injurious falsehoods and slander of ownership of the trade-mark. The
Plaintiffs also claimed various interlocutory relief in the nature of
injunction, damages for past losses and future losses as well as punitive and
exemplary damages. The issue of damages has been bifurcated from that of
liability.
[2]
The
trade-mark in issue is Registration Number TMA 662,598, registered April 12,
2006. The Registrant is Archmetal Industries Corp. The trade-mark is FUSION,
and the wares are “ball valves for industrial use”. The registration claims use
in Canada “since at
least as early as September 2002”.
[3]
JAG
Flocomponents N.A. Inc. is an Alberta general partnership and
JAG Flocomponents (North America) Inc. is its majority partner. JAG
Flocomponents (North America) Inc. is the successor to the original
company JAG Flocomponents Inc. (JAG), which initiated the business arrangements
and other material matters in this lawsuit.
[4]
Archmetal
Industries Corporation (Archmetal) is a British Columbia corporation registered
extra-provincially in Alberta. Archmetal is wholly
owned by Fortune Manufacturing Co., Ltd. (Fortune Manufacturing), a Chinese
company. Both companies are either directly or indirectly owned and controlled
by the Defendant, Jerome Chen. Archmetal was a 30% shareholder in the original
company, JAG. Archmetal was also Fortune Manufacturing’s importer of valves
into the North American market. Archmetal was the holder of this particular
trade-mark, FUSION.
[5]
The
Defendant Jerome Chen is a business man with manufacturing interests in China and
distribution operations in Canada.
[6]
The
Defendant Henry Chen is the son of Jerome Chen and at various times relevant to
this action was the Assistant to the President of both Archmetal and Fortune
Manufacturing, being Jerome Chen.
[7]
The
principal issues in this case, as agreed by the parties, are:
1. Whether
the Court should grant an Order expunging from the Register of Trade-marks the
registration for TMA 662,598 which lists the Defendant Archmetal Industries
Corporation as registrant.
2. Whether
the Defendants or any one or more of them are liable for the infringement of
trade-marks and a breach of section 7 of the Trade-marks Act.
3. Whether
JAG Flocomponents N.A. ought to be registered as the owner of the trade-mark
FUSION.
[8]
This
action arises out of the termination of a relationship between JAG and
Archmetal where for a period of time the parties cooperated in the marketing
and sale of valves manufactured in China, some by Fortune
Manufacturing and some by an unrelated third party company.
II. WITNESSES
A. Plaintiffs’
Witness – John McCrae
[9]
McCrae
was a former President and CEO of the Plaintiffs and was one of the founding
shareholders of JAG. His evidence covered the background of the Plaintiffs and
its business relationships, particularly with respect to Archmetal, Fortune
Manufacturing and Jerome Chen. He outlined the development of the company,
their business model and their manner of ordering valves manufactured in China and imported
through Archmetal. He also outlined the manner in which the trade-mark FUSION
was created and used and the products with which it was associated. His
evidence was critical as to the Plaintiffs’ claim for expungement and its own
claim for registration based on first use. His evidence also covered the events
up to and including termination of the business relationship with Archmetal and
Jerome Chen as well as some of the aspects of the post-termination phase of
dealings.
[10]
In
general, McCrae’s evidence is supported by documents and in that regard, can be
relied upon. His memory of general events and the accuracy of that recounting
is generally credible but his recollection of specific dates and the timing of
some of the critical events was contradictory and vague. McCrae was somewhat
careless in respect of the specifics of his evidence and although generally
credible, the Court has approached his evidence with a degree of caution.
B. Plaintiffs’
Witness – Gary Williams
[11]
Williams
was the other co-founder of JAG and although his evidence paralleled that of
McCrae’s in certain regards, his experience and expertise were more focused on
the technical aspects of the valve business and the manufacture and quality
issues respecting valves ordered by JAG. While there was considerable debate
with respect to the times at which Williams was in China early in the
relationship with Fortune Manufacturing and Archmetal (that evidence designed
to undermine his credibility), I am prepared to accept Williams’ evidence as
truthful in respect of his time in China and the events which
occurred there. Williams, like many of the other witnesses testifying without
contemporaneous notes, had some difficulty with respect to specifics; however, I
found his evidence and the manner in which it was presented to be credible and
deserving of considerable weight.
C. Plaintiffs’
Witness – Warren Williams
[12]
Warren
Williams, one of the sons of Gary Williams, became an employee of JAG well
after the relationship with Archmetal and Jerome Chen was up and running. His
evidence generally related to those events following the dissolution of the
business relationship and some aspects of the use of trade-marks and nature of
the products associated therewith. Warren Williams was a generally credible
witness subject to the vagaries of specific recollections and I am prepared to
give weight to his evidence.
D. Plaintiffs’
Witness – Darren Williams
[13]
Darren
Williams is the other son of Gary Williams and his evidence was very similar to
that of Warren Williams and is deserving of the same weight for the same
reasons.
E. Plaintiffs’
Witness - Grace Cheng
[14]
Ms.
Cheng was a former employee of Archmetal. She played a support role in the
establishment of the relationship between JAG and Archmetal. She was the
translator in many circumstances for Jerome Chen and she acted as a general administrative
assistant and key point of contact with Jerome Chen and the operations of
Archmetal. There were disturbing aspects of her evidence which, while not
critical to the Court’s final determination, deserve some comment.
[15]
It
was obvious during her testimony in Court, both in direct and in cross-examination,
that she was extremely nervous and somewhat frightened. Her recollection, or claimed
lack thereof, of events and activities for which she was responsible provided
little assistance to the issues in this litigation. The claimed lack of
knowledge or recollection seemed inconsistent with her role in the company and
some of her other evidence.
[16]
During
a break in her cross-examination, Ms. Cheng was approached by the wife of
Jerome Chen, the specific details of the conversation conducted in Mandarin are
unknown to the Court but the end result was that the Defendants’ counsel had to
intervene between the two individuals. Ms. Cheng’s state of agitation was
clearly heightened. As a result of the inappropriate but necessary contact with
the witness, counsel for the Defendants quite properly terminated his
cross-examination. The Court issued specific orders with respect to non-contact
between parties adverse. Ms. Cheng had to be escorted out of the building under
the protection of Court security.
[17]
The
explanation tendered, that Mrs. Chen was merely expressing regrets for past
events, is inconsistent with Ms. Cheng’s reaction. The Court is concerned that
she may have been intimidated before her Court appearance and at the
adjournment.
[18]
Ms.
Cheng was in a position to confirm or deny a number of circumstances raised by
the parties but she was unable to do so for either side and the Court can put
little or no weight on her evidence with respect to these critical matters.
F. Defendants’
Witness – Jerome Chen
[19]
Jerome
Chen was the controlling shareholder of all the Fortune Manufacturing related
companies including Archmetal. He was the sole witness for the Defendants
notwithstanding that his son Henry Chen attended most of the days of evidence
in this case, was fluent in English and was involved in many of the critical
matters in this litigation.
[20]
Mr.
Chen testified through an interpreter. Although he understood English, he felt
less comfortable testifying in his second language particularly as to specific
details and at times where nuance and technical terms were in issue. His
evidence essentially covered all of the areas that were raised by the witnesses
for the Plaintiffs including the background of the relationship between
Archmetal and JAG, the creation and use of the trade-mark and associated
products, the business of Fortune Manufacturing in China and the
goals of Archmetal’s business and its role. He also testified as to the
circumstances leading to the break-up of the relationship with JAG and the
post-termination events including Archmetal’s actions with respect to the
registration of the trade-mark FUSION.
[21]
The
Court has taken into consideration the fact that Mr. Chen was testifying in a
foreign court proceeding, through an interpreter, and in a culturally different
environment to that to which he is generally used to. The Court is also aware
that partial understanding of a second language sometimes makes matters even
more difficult in terms of responses than when one is completely dependent on
translation. Given all of these factors, Mr. Chen’s evidence was unpersuasive,
evasive and often unresponsive. Where in direct conflict with that of the
evidence of the Plaintiffs, the Court generally accepts the evidence of the
Plaintiffs. Whereas Mr. McCrae may have been careless with the facts, Mr. Chen
exhibited an economy with the truth.
III. EVIDENTIARY
BACKGROUND
[22]
The
wares in question in this litigation are valves used primarily in the oil field
business. These valves are of two types; the first is the multi-turn valve
which is commonly seen as the valves with a large wheel used to open and close
the valve. The second is the ball valve, often referred to as a quarter-turn
valve, which are considered more efficient and constitute 60-70% of the valves
in the oil field business. These latter valves are of a more sophisticated
nature and valves used in the oil field business tend to be of higher quality
because of the pressures which the valves are required to take.
[23]
McCrae
had been in the business of marketing valves to the oil field industry for a
number of years. Williams had been in the same business but primarily the
technical side of the manufacture and production of valves. They met in the
latter half of 2001 and decided to combine McCrae’s business experience with
Williams’ technical expertise to create a company which would ultimately not
only sell current valve models but design and produce new valves.
[24]
JAG
was created on October 1, 2001 (the name stands for John and Gary) and the plan
was to operate essentially in a partnership model, to mortgage their homes for
capital and to focus their business on ball valves. Because ball valves are
large and expensive, JAG required some other form of valves to create volume sales
and cash flow in this initial stage of the business. Lesser quality valves are
often called “throw away valves” and are not used in the high pressure
situations contemplated by the ball valves. These throw away valves are
mass-produced but would provide JAG with the income flow that it needed to sustain
the business in its start-up phase.
[25]
McCrae
knew of Jerome Chen and his company Fortune Manufacturing and was aware that
Fortune Manufacturing produced a form of throw away valve; the type that JAG
needed to begin its business. Sometime in late October/early November 2001,
Grace Cheng contacted McCrae and indicated that Jerome Chen was interested in
meeting with him. The precise details of that meeting are lost in the fog of
time. McCrae insisted that they contemplated JAG as being responsible for the
design and operation of valves whereas Chen contended that he viewed the business
plan as a method of selling his company’s valves under circumstances where he
had complete control of the valve design and manufacture and where the valves
would be sold under the name FUSION.
[26]
Whatever
the particular personal perspectives may be, on November 28, 2001, the parties
entered into a Letter of Intent which set out the basics of their relationship.
There was no subsequent shareholder or similar type of agreement that purported
to set forth the respective rights and obligations of the parties other than a
Consignment Agreement, details of which are later discussed.
[27]
The
salient parts of the Letter of Intent were that:
·
Archmetal
was to acquire a 30% ownership interest in JAG.
·
The
consideration for the 30% interest included $300,000 worth of “Fortune” brand
industrial valve inventory.
·
JAG
was to provide technical and marketing support to Fortune Manufacturing in
order to improve the existing valve product line as well as to create new
product lines targeted at the oil field industry.
·
Where
Fortune Manufacturing did not have the capacity or capability to manufacture
industrial valves required by JAG, Fortune Manufacturing was to work with JAG
“to source these products from other manufacturers and create a “Fortune
branded” product line that JAG can market until such time as Fortune has
decided to bring that manufacturing in-house”.
·
Fortune
Manufacturing was to grant JAG an exclusive marketing relationship for all of
Fortune’s current and future industrial valves in Canada and
Archmetal was to refer its valve customers to JAG after which Archmetal was to
focus its business on non-oil field related products.
·
The
valves supplied by Fortune Manufacturing to JAG were to be marketed under the
“Fortune” name.
·
Fortune
Manufacturing was to consign its valve products to JAG on certain terms; those
terms were subsequently set out in the Consignment Agreement.
·
Transfer
pricing was to be agreed on a product basis.
The Letter of Intent was signed by the
parties’ respective representatives.
[28]
Transfer
pricing and profit margins were a problem almost from the initial stage and
never were definitively resolved.
[29]
Almost
immediately after the signing of the Letter of Intent, McCrae advised Chen that
there were problems with the market’s acceptance of products with the name “Fortune”
because of the perception of quality problems with Chinese manufactured
products. It was McCrae’s proposal that the name JAG should be used for the new
high pressure valves, and that the Fortune logo should be used beside the word
JAG. This was the beginning of the discussion about the need for a distinctive
name to be associated with the products being sold. Even before all the details
had been finalized, McCrae, with the knowledge of Chen, informed various
customers of their plans and the relationship between JAG and Fortune
Manufacturing. That notice advised customers as well of the plans to move into
the higher end ball valve business. In late April 2002, Fortune Manufacturing’s
counsel was in the process of preparing a Consignment Agreement for the
distribution of Fortune valves.
[30]
The
Consignment Agreement, although dated January 1, 2002, was finalized sometime
later. The Consignment Agreement is a critical component of this litigation and
for reasons to be discussed later, constitutes the full answer to who was
entitled to register the trade-mark FUSION.
[31]
The
Consignment Agreement contains a number of clauses critical to this litigation.
Clause 2(b)
provided that all of the products shipped from Archmetal to JAG remain the
property of Archmetal until JAG sells the product to a third party. The clause
specifically reads:
Unless otherwise provided, all products
of the Company received by the Agent shall at all times remain the sole
property of the Company pending sale by the Agent. The Agent shall receive and
keep safe the products as a prudent trustee and shall take reasonable measures
to identify and insure the Company’s products and not comingle same with the
Agent’s own goods.
Clause 2(c) provided
that the products are to be sold at a market price to be agreed to and
Archmetal was to bill monthly for the products sold in that month.
Clause 12 is
a clause which was referred to in correspondence as late as February 28, 2002:
Any new products, designs, patents,
inventions, calculations, and other intellectual property which arise directly
or indirectly pursuant to or in consequence of this agreement shall be deemed
to [sic] equally owned by the parties hereto.
[32]
At
the same time that JAG, Archmetal and Fortune Manufacturing were finalizing
their arrangements, Gary Williams was in China attempting
to find a manufacturer who could produce ball valves of the type which Fortune
Manufacturing could not manufacture and which were to be sold by JAG in Canada.
[33]
Gary
Williams’ evidence was that he took a valve made by a competitor, Nutron, to a
number of places and settled on a company called Suzhou Neway Machinery Co.,
Ltd. (Neway) as a manufacturer who was capable of producing the type of valves
necessary to move into the higher end of the valve market.
[34]
In
addition to Gary Williams being in China, Charlie Martin,
currently an employee of Fortune Manufacturing, was brought in by JAG to aid
with the communication, development and quality of Fortune valves. He was
located at Fortune Manufacturing’s plant in China and the cost
of his salary was shared equally between Fortune Manufacturing and JAG until
the product development stage was completed, after which he became a Fortune
Manufacturing employee.
IV. DEVELOPMENT
OF “FUSION”
[35]
McCrae
claims that on or about January 29, 2002, he came up with the name FUSION
because the name Fortune would not be readily acceptable in the Canadian market.
The evidence confirms that Archmetal and Fortune Manufacturing, and
particularly Jerome Chen, were well aware of the origin and development of the
name Fusion which was to be used with respect to certain valves covered by the
Fortune/Archmetal/JAG arrangement.
[36]
Not
only did McCrae come up with the name Fusion but he developed the style in
which it was to appear on products and in particular the requirement that the
type form be “Bauhaus 93” font.
[37]
By
February 27, 2002, JAG had entered into a market representation agreement with
Neway for their ball valve products in Canada. The
correspondence refers to a visit by Gary Williams and confirms the agreement
that the ball valves from Neway would show the Neway logo for CRN purposes (CRN
is a numbering system used for regulatory purposes to confirm certain qualities
of the valves to withstand certain pressures) but “will also show your name
“Fusion””. The JAG-Neway relationship subsequently changed to an exclusive
representation agreement.
[38]
There
is no evidence that either Archmetal or Fortune Manufacturing exercised any
control or gave directions with respect to the nature and quality of the Neway
products which ultimately were sold in Canada under the
name Fusion. Chen and other officials in Archmetal/Fortune Manufacturing were
aware of the Neway arrangement, the shipment of Neway valves bearing the Fusion
mark, and took no steps to protest or to prevent this arrangement.
V. FORMATION
TO TERMINATION
[39]
There
were problems in the relationship between JAG and Fortune Manufacturing from
the very beginning. It is not this Court’s function to review all the problems
in the relationship and to determine which party may be responsible and to what
extent. Those issues were settled under an Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench action
in which only the intellectual property issues were left unresolved. However,
between the initiation of the arrangement between the parties and its
termination, a number of main events occurred relevant to the trade-mark issues
before this Court.
[40]
In
about November 2002, as part of JAG’s efforts to market Fusion valves, some of
which were produced by Fortune Manufacturing and some by Neway, JAG created a
catalogue of Fusion ball valves. That catalogue exhibited the Fusion name, the
JAG name and logo, and the Fortune name and logo prominently displayed on the
spine and inside on various pages of the catalogue.
[41]
The
catalogue was divided into the products being sold in 2002 which were Fusion
Ball valves, Fusion 2000 WOG, Fusion Class 1500, Fusion Class 2500, Fusion
Flanged Floaters, Fusion Trunnions and JAG’s Spring Returns. There was no
question that the last two Fusion valve types were produced by Neway, nor can
there be any question that the Defendants knew and at least acquiesced in the
use of the Fusion name on these products which it neither made nor over which
it exercised any product quality control.
[42]
In
preparation for an important trade show at Calgary in June
2002, JAG ordered some large valves from Neway for purposes of exhibiting them
as samples. JAG contends that these valves were subsequently sold to Medfield,
a JAG client, and constituted JAG’s first use of the Fusion name in Canada in August
2002.
[43]
JAG’s
relationship with Neway obviously blossomed and in late June 2002, JAG became
Neway’s exclusive representative for Neway ball valves in Canada. It is the
Defendants’ contention that they were unaware of the nature of this
representational relationship.
[44]
The
evidence about the Calgary trade show established that JAG and Fortune
Manufacturing had a booth at which they exhibited wares associated with the
Fusion name. Chen was present for part of the show and had his picture taken
against the backdrop showing the valves being promoted under the Fusion name;
two of which were made by Neway at that time and not by Fortune Manufacturing.
Problems between the parties appeared to accelerate in the latter half of 2002.
Whatever the merits of the complaints, the relationship was evidently
unravelling.
[45]
In
addition to the problems perceived as to quality, timeliness and absence of
funding, Warren and Darren Williams joined JAG in September 2002. Chen was not
prepared to dilute Archmetal’s 30% shareholding to bring the Williams sons in
as shareholders of Archmetal.
[46]
At
a meeting in January 2003 between the principals of the parties, including
Henry Chen who acted as a translator for his father, the parties discussed some
of the problems that had arisen. The precise details of this meeting are lost
in the respective memories but the one salient feature is that the question of
ownership of the name Fusion was raised. Neither party instantly asserted that
it was the owner and McCrae undertook to Chen to outline their position on
ownership at some later date. It is accurate to describe the parties’ behaviour
as “dipsey-doodling around the issue”.
[47]
In
February 2003 McCrae and Williams created a new entity JAG Flocomponents (North
America) Inc. and without advising Archmetal, they transferred the business of
JAG to JAG North America.
[48]
Equally
consistent with each party seeking to protect what they saw as their interests
and rights, Grace Chen was instructed by Fortune Manufacturing on March 14,
2003 to register in Archmetal’s name “right away” both in Canada and the United
States the trade-mark FUSION. Instructions to that effect were given to
Archmetal’s intellectual property lawyers on March 17, 2003. None of the
principals of JAG or its successor were aware of Archmetal’s attempt to seek
trade-mark registration.
[49]
Not
to be outdone in the race to claim the Fusion name, JAG NA filed with the
Alberta Government for the registration of the trade-name FUSION in June 2002.
Apparently, McCrae was unaware of the significant legal distinction between a
trade-name and a trade-mark.
[50]
Finally,
on July 2, 2003, after a series of e-mails concerning the problems between the
parties, under letterhead of the original JAG, McCrae gave notice to Archmetal
that on the basis of Archmetal’s failure to comply with the agreement of
January 1, 2002, JAG was treating the agreement as concluded. The letter
further indicated that any valves carrying the Fusion name would have the name
ground off and Archmetal was directed to cease use of the name Fusion anywhere
in North
America.
JAG claimed that the name was registered intellectual property and that any
agreement expressly implied [sic] for the use of that name on any
product was withdrawn.
VI. POST-TERMINATION
A. Defendants’
Trade-mark and Subsequent Action
[51]
Even
before the termination of the arrangement between JAG and Archmetal/Fortune
Manufacturing, Archmetal filed a trade-mark application on March 27, 2003 for
the mark FUSION. Archmetal claimed that it used the mark in Canada since as
early as September 2002.
[52]
There
is no evidence to suggest that the Trade-marks Office was advised of the potential
co-ownership of the trade-mark or any interest that JAG may have in the name
and mark FUSION.
[53]
The
first use relied upon in this case to substantiate the claim before the
Trade-marks Office was an order for various parts, some of which bear the name
Fusion. The date of the order of those parts is September 12, 2002. The
evidence is that it is more likely than not that the parts were received by JAG
some time before the end of September 2002. Subsequent to the Defendants’
trade-mark filing, JAG also filed its trade-mark application for FUSION on
April 24, 2003.
[54]
The
Defendants opposed JAG’s trade-mark application and filed evidence and
submissions with the Trade-marks Office.
[55]
In
a critical affidavit by Henry Chen in opposition to JAG’s trade-mark application,
the Defendants filed as exhibits the Consignment Agreement but without the
important provision of Clause 12. The Defendants also filed as an exhibit
the bulk of the catalogue used by JAG to market the various valves. The
catalogue exhibit filed is missing those portions of the catalogue which
clearly show JAG and its logo also associated with the sale of Fusion valves.
The Defendants also included as an exhibit the photograph of Jerome Chen at the
Calgary trade show
and while it showed amongst the valves listed two of the valves made by Neway,
there was no indication of Neway’s involvement. Further, the photograph is
selective in that a wider angle shot would have disclosed JAG’s presence and
its connection to Fusion.
[56]
At
no time was there any acknowledgement of JAG’s involvement with the mark FUSION
or the wares nor was there disclosure of the rights of joint ownership of this
or any other intellectual property.
[57]
The
evidence relied upon for first use in this Court was disclosed in Exhibit 5 and
referred to earlier. In the affidavit filed in opposition to JAG’s trade-mark
was an invoice of September 30, 2002. This covered some but not all of the
items referred to in the shipping order of September 12, 2002.
[58]
The
invoice relied upon by Archmetal in respect of first use contained as part of
the terms and conditions the following words “unpaid goods remain property of
Fortune”. The phrase is consistent with paragraph 2(b) of the Consignment
Agreement.
B. Plaintiffs’
First Use
[59]
JAG
Flocomponents N.A. Inc., in its April 24, 2003 trade-mark application for the
mark FUSION, claimed its date of first use in Canada as February
22, 2002. The evidence before this Court as to first use, to the extent that it
was discernible, was that first use was in August 2002 when JAG allegedly sold one
of the samples received from Neway to Medfield. For reasons to follow, the
evidence of first use is not persuasive.
[60]
It
is also noted that the Plaintiffs’ trade-mark application or any other filings
with the Trade-marks Office made no reference to the joint ownership provisions
under the Consignment Agreement. The Plaintiffs’ trade-mark application was
denied and in the Trade-marks Office’s decision reference was made to the then
pending Archmetal application.
C. Section
7 Evidence
[61]
The
Plaintiffs rely on four instances to ground this claim:
(1) a
communication from Henry Chen to JAG’s key customer, C.E. Franklin Ltd.,
referring to the seizure of JAG’s inventory in China. The e-mail
makes reference to Fortune Manufacturing holding the registration for the mark
FUSION in China which gave
it the ability to have the inventory seized.
(2) a
telephone call from Henry Chen to Dale Rawson of C.E. Franklin Ltd. advising
that JAG’s China facility had
been closed down. The suggestion is that it was closed because of trade-mark
issues.
(3) a
letter to customers from Henry Chen advising that the arrangement with JAG had
been discontinued due to JAG’s improper conduct and seeking the customers’
business for valves including the “Fusion line”.
(4) the
misleading statements and materials filed with the Trade-marks Office as to
ownership and first use, which JAG says constitutes some form of publication or
dissemination of this information.
[62]
As
part of the post-termination conduct, Fortune Manufacturing obviously obtained
in China a trade-mark
for the use FUSION.
[63]
The
source of the information about events in China was Jerome
Chen.
[64]
The
Plaintiffs, in relying on the affidavit of Henry Chen filed in opposition to
JAG’s trade-mark application and the misstatements as to ownership and use with
respect to the wares, claim that Henry Chen’s affidavit is false and
misleading.
VII. LEGAL
ANALYSIS
[65]
There
are several grounds on which this trade-mark could be expunged including
absence of entitlement to the trade-mark, inaccurate first use claim, material
omissions to the Trade-marks Office, loss of distinctiveness and false or
misleading representations to a competitor.
A. Ownership
[66]
Section
57(1) of the Act gives this Court broad and explicit jurisdiction to expunge a
trade-mark on the grounds that it does not accurately represent (express or
define) the rights of a person who is a registrant.
57.
(1) The Federal Court has exclusive original
jurisdiction, on the application of the Registrar or of any person interested,
to order that any entry in the register be struck out or amended on the
ground that at the date of the application the entry as it appears on the
register does not accurately express or define the existing rights of the
person appearing to be the registered owner of the mark.
(2)
No person is entitled to institute under this section any proceeding calling
into question any decision given by the Registrar of which that person had
express notice and from which he had a right to appeal.
|
57.
(1) La Cour fédérale a une compétence initiale exclusive,
sur demande du registraire ou de toute personne intéressée, pour ordonner
qu’une inscription dans le registre soit biffée ou modifiée, parce que, à la
date de cette demande, l’inscription figurant au registre n’exprime ou ne
définit pas exactement les droits existants de la personne paraissant être le
propriétaire inscrit de la marque.
(2)
Personne n’a le droit d’intenter, en vertu du présent article, des procédures
mettant en question une décision rendue par le registraire, de laquelle cette
personne avait reçu un avis formel et dont elle avait le droit d’interjeter
appel.
|
[67]
The
protections in the Act are, as recognized in both Citrus Growers Assn. Ltd.
v. William D. Branson Ltd. (1990), 36 C.P.R. (3d) 434 (Fed. T.D.) and in Unitel
Communications Inc. c. Bell Canada (1995), 61 C.P.R. (3d) 12, the protection of
the public through the effective use of the trade-mark regime.
[68]
Pursuant
to s. 18 of the Act, a trade-mark registration is invalid if the applicant is
not the (Court’s emphasis) person entitled to the registration.
18.
(1) The registration of a trade-mark is invalid if
(a) the trade-mark
was not registrable at the date of registration,
(b) the trade-mark
is not distinctive at the time proceedings bringing the validity of the
registration into question are commenced, or
(c) the trade-mark
has been abandoned,
and subject to section 17,
it is invalid if the applicant for registration was not the person entitled
to secure the registration.
(2) No registration
of a trade-mark that had been so used in Canada
by the registrant or his predecessor in title as to have become distinctive
at the date of registration shall be held invalid merely on the ground that
evidence of the distinctiveness was not submitted to the competent authority
or tribunal before the grant of the registration.
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18.
(1) L’enregistrement d’une marque de commerce est
invalide dans les cas suivants :
a)
la marque de commerce n’était pas enregistrable à la date de
l’enregistrement;
b)
la marque de commerce n’est pas distinctive à l’époque où sont entamées les
procédures contestant la validité de l’enregistrement;
c)
la marque de commerce a été abandonnée.
Sous réserve de l’article
17, l’enregistrement est invalide si l’auteur de la demande n’était pas la
personne ayant droit de l’obtenir.
(2) Nul
enregistrement d’une marque de commerce qui était employée au Canada par
l’inscrivant ou son prédécesseur en titre, au point d’être devenue
distinctive à la date d’enregistrement, ne peut être considéré comme invalide
pour la seule raison que la preuve de ce caractère distinctif n’a pas été
soumise à l’autorité ou au tribunal compétent avant l’octroi de cet
enregistrement.
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[69]
In
this case, s.17 does not preclude the Plaintiffs’ action because (a) the
pertinent issue is ownership and (b) the person seeking expungement is the
“other person” claiming previous use and confusion as contemplated by s.17(1).
[70]
The
Court is satisfied that the idea of using the mark FUSION was entirely that of
McCrae on behalf of JAG. At the time the issue of branding was in flux.
Moreover, Jerome Chen consented to the use of FUSION in respect of products
made and sold under the arrangement entered into between JAG and Archmetal.
[71]
While
the Letter of Intent between the parties contemplated using “Fortune” branded
products, that concept was altered because of market perception problems
associated with Fortune and other Chinese products. Archmetal’s/Jerome Chen’s
conduct, while perhaps not conceding quality issues, accepted the need for a
new brand name.
[72]
As
the parties worked to finalize agreements to more formally establish their
legal framework, they entered into a Consignment Agreement as one of the
agreements governing their relationship. Clause 12 of that Consignment
Agreement is critical in that it specifically addresses new intellectual
property.
12. Any
new products, designs, patents, inventions, calculations, and other
intellectual property which arise directly or indirectly pursuant to or in
consequence of this agreement shall be deemed to [sic] equally owned
by the parties hereto.
[Emphasis added]
[73]
The
new trade-mark and its use fall squarely within the terms of Clause 12. The
concept of branding, as set out in the Letter of Intent, changed and Clause 12
became the operative clause for ownership of intellectual property.
[74]
Jerome
Chen, Fortune Manufacturing and Archmetal cannot now complain that they somehow
own the rights to Fusion. Jerome Chen, on behalf of these entities, consented
to JAG’s proposal to use Fusion without reservation as to alleged ownership
rights.
[75]
JAG
is in the same position. It cannot now assert that it holds the exclusive
rights to the FUSION trade-mark. Neither the Plaintiffs nor the Defendants
acted as if they owned the rights in this mark until after they had their
falling out. Their pre-dispute conduct more accurately reflects their
understanding of their respective rights than does this post-dispute
positioning.
[76]
The
importance of Clause 12 and its impact on ownership rights is confirmed by the
Defendants’ efforts to hide that clause from the Trade-marks Office’s examiners
when they filed the Consignment Agreement but omitted to disclose the clause’s
existence.
[77]
Given
the joint ventureship manner of operating which marked some aspects of the
parties’ early dealings, Clause 12 accurately reflects that the parties
intended that any new trade-mark to be used would be jointly owned.
[78]
Given
the animosity between the parties, it is not surprising that, until the actual
trial and only at the last minute, did Clause 12 become a focal point. Clause
12 is a double-edged sword slaying the claims of both sides. Each side wished
to avoid the real consequences of their agreement – that neither could claim
sole ownership of FUSION.
[79]
The
fact that Clause 12 was not pleaded is not fatal to this case. The Defendants
were not caught by surprise and there was no prejudice to either side that the
clause assumed importance in the litigation. Moreover, the Court has a duty to
the trade-mark system to ensure that only properly registrable marks are on the
Register.
[80]
The
Court concludes that ownership of the mark FUSION was owned jointly by JAG and
Archmetal. As such, neither had the exclusive right to registration of the mark
in their name. On that ground alone the mark should be expunged because neither
side acknowledges the joint ownership nor is there any suggestion that they are
prepared to share ownership. From that perspective, FUSION has been “poisoned”
as a viable mark.
B. First Use
(1) Re:
Archmetal/Fortune Manufacturing
[81]
The
trade-mark registration is based on first use in Canada of September 2002. The claim is based on a
shipment from Fortune Manufacturing to JAG.
[82]
The
case law is relatively settled that a person may sell his goods through a
distributor, retailer or wholesaler and still have the benefit of “use” in Canada. The following quote is
much used in support of this proposition.
I think that those words must surely mean that s. 4 contemplates
the normal course of trade as beginning with the manufacturer, ending with the
consumer and with a wholesaler and retailer or one of them as intermediary.
When the applicant sold to the retailer and the retailer sold to the public,
the public came to associate applicant's mark with the HARNESS HOUSE belt; s. 4
contemplates that the use between the retailer and the public enures to the
benefit of the manufacturer and its use in Canada. In other words -- if any part of the chain takes place in Canada, this is "use" in Canada within the meaning of s. 4.
If this interpretation is correct, then the sale by the retailers in Toronto
and Montreal to the public of HARNESS
HOUSE wares marked with applicant's trade mark is a "use" in Canada
and it matters not whether property or possession passed to the retailer in the
United States.
Manhattan
Industries Inc. v. Princeton Manufacturing Ltd. (1972), 4 C.P.R. (2d) 6 at para. 40
[83]
JAG,
in its capacity as an importer or agent, did not acquire the right to register
the mark in its own name (see Citrus Growers Assn., above).
[84]
Nor is
the fact that Archmetal was not involved in this shipment necessarily fatal to
the registrability of the mark. Archmetal was clearly the agent for Fortune
Manufacturing in this instance.
[85]
However,
what is fatal to the registration is that the sale in September 2002 did not
meet the requirements of s. 4 of the Act being a transfer in the “ordinary
course of trade”.
4.
(1) A trade-mark is deemed to be used in association with
wares if, at the time of the transfer of the property in or possession of the
wares, in the normal course of trade, it is marked on the wares themselves or
on the packages in which they are distributed or it is in any other manner so
associated with the wares that notice of the association is then given to the
person to whom the property or possession is transferred.
(2)
A trade-mark is deemed to be used in association with services if it is used
or displayed in the performance or advertising of those services.
(3)
A trade-mark that is marked in Canada on wares or on the packages in which
they are contained is, when the wares are exported from Canada, deemed to be
used in Canada in association with those wares.
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4.
(1) Une marque de commerce est réputée employée en
liaison avec des marchandises si, lors du transfert de la propriété ou de la
possession de ces marchandises, dans la pratique normale du commerce, elle
est apposée sur les marchandises mêmes ou sur les colis dans lesquels ces
marchandises sont distribuées, ou si elle est, de toute autre manière, liée
aux marchandises à tel point qu’avis de liaison est alors donné à la personne
à qui la propriété ou possession est transférée.
(2) Une
marque de commerce est réputée employée en liaison avec des services si elle
est employée ou montrée dans l’exécution ou l’annonce de ces services.
(3) Une
marque de commerce mise au Canada sur des marchandises ou sur les colis qui
les contiennent est réputée, quand ces marchandises sont exportées du Canada,
être employée dans ce pays en liaison avec ces marchandises.
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[86]
The
Defendants rely on Lin Trading Co. v. CBM Kabushiki Kaisha (F.C.A.)
(1989), 21 C.P.R. (3d) 417 as support of its contention that a sale to a
distributor constitutes “use in Canada”. In general terms, they are correct. However,
in Lin Trading, above, the Court examined the relationship and
expectation of the parties and the intent that the sale to the Canadian
distributor was intended to promote the mark in Canada.
[87]
The
essential feature of cases such as Lin Trading and others upholding use
through a distributor is that there was a sale, a transfer, at the core of the
transaction. In that critical respect, those cases are distinguishable from the
present circumstances.
[88]
In
the Consignment Agreement, Archmetal was to supply product to JAG “for sale on
a consignment basis”. Aside from JAG being required to pay for product only
when it was sold, there never was any intention to treat the delivery of
product as a sale or transfer to JAG. Clause 2(b) is clear on that issue.
[89]
Clause
2(b) of the Consignment Agreement evidences Archmetal/Chen’s intent to retain
property and legal possession of valves shipped to JAG.
Unless otherwise provided, all products
of the Company received by the Agent shall at all times remain the sole
property of the Company pending sale by the Agent. The Agent shall receive
and keep safe the products as a prudent trustee and shall take
reasonable measures to identify and insure the Company’s products and not
comingle same with the Agent’s own goods.
[Emphasis added]
[90]
Given
the degree of hesitancy in the relationship even in early 2002, it was evident
that Jerome Chen through his companies did not intend to transfer products to
JAG until JAG had sold them to a third party.
[91]
Any
possession JAG had of the products was layered with the same type of
limitations as any suggestion of a transfer. JAG held the products as a trustee
and not in its own right.
[92]
The
parties did not contemplate that delivery of product to JAG meant anything
close to “use in Canada” as that term is understood in the Act. The
“use in Canada” would occur
when JAG sold products to the next level of trade. The trade-mark benefits of
that sale would inure to the benefit of the registrant.
[93]
Therefore,
the use relied upon to support registrability was not “use in Canada” pursuant to
s. 4 of the Act. There is no reliable evidence of further sales in September
2002 and therefore the date of first use cannot be sustained.
[94]
Further,
as held in Unitel Communications, above, a material misrepresentation as
to use, whether or not fraudulent or intended to deceive, can render a
trade-mark registration void. Here the misrepresentation, even if innocent, was
material. There was no first use in September 2002 and thus the registration
ought to be expunged on this ground as well.
(2) Re:
JAG
[95]
JAG
has requested that the FUSION registration be in its name. There are at least two
problems with JAG’s request quite apart from the absence of jurisdiction in
this Court to order substitution of the registered owner.
[96]
The
first problem is like that of the Defendants – JAG is only an equal owner of
the trade-mark pursuant to Clause 12 of the Consignment Agreement.
[97]
The
second problem is that JAG cannot establish its earlier date of use of August
2002 based upon an alleged sale to Medfield.
[98]
The
documentary evidence does not allow for a tracing of the sale. The best
evidence that McCrae relies upon is an invoice but no purchase order or other
documents substantiating the sale were put in evidence.
[99]
There
is a discrepancy between McCrae’s discovery evidence and his trial evidence on
this issue. McCrae’s own recollection is not strong and there is no evidence
from Medfield to support the sale.
[100] The
circumstantial evidence is of no assistance. The Plaintiffs contend that the
valves shipped in August 2002 had the FUSION mark on it but that was three
months before the mark had been settled.
[101] It is more
likely that the invoice referred to a sample but even that explanation is
speculative.
[102] Therefore,
the Plaintiffs cannot make out their case for an earlier date of first use even
if it were relevant.
C. Distinctiveness
[103] The evidence
concerning whether the mark was and continued to be distinctive is confusing
and inconsistent.
[104] One
outstanding feature of the evidence is that there was a complete mixing of the
Fortune Manufacturing logo with that of the mark, and a mixing of the products
including those made by Neway. Lastly, neither Fortune Manufacturing nor
Archmetal had any control over the Neway products, their quality or their manufacture,
which sold under the mark FUSION.
[105] On balance,
the Court would have found that at the time of this expungement application the
mark FUSION had not acquired, or if acquired, had lost, the element of
distinctiveness.
D. Misrepresentation/Patent
Office
[106] It is trite
law that misrepresentation can occur by commission or omission. To justify
expungement, the commission or omission must be material.
17 They
rely on the case of Unitel Communications Inc. v. Bell Canada and Marchand
Rona Inc. v. Tefal S.A., but more specifically on the following statement
of Harold G. Fox referred to with approval in these cases:
There is... no provision in the Act under which mis-statements in
an application for registration... become grounds for invalidating the
registration unless the mis-statements had the effect of making the trade
mark not registrable under s. 12 of the Act or unless there was a
fraudulent misrepresentation.
[Emphasis added]
18 A
registration can be invalidated by two kinds of mis-statements: (i) fraudulent,
intentional mis-statements, and (ii) those that may be innocent but that are
material in the sense that, without them, the section 12 barriers to
registration would have been insurmountable.
General
Motors of Canada v. Décarie Motors Inc., [2001] 1 F.C. 665
[107] The somewhat
unique feature of this case is that both sides engaged in the same type of
misrepresentation as to the date of first use.
[108] Both parties
also failed to address the joint ownership provision of Clause 12 of the
Consignment Agreement. However, the Defendants’ conduct in this regard, in
terms of its dealings with the Trade-marks Office, was more egregious.
[109] In Henry
Chen’s affidavit filed with the Trade-marks Office, he attests to the provision
in the Consignment Agreement as to the retention of ownership of the
Defendants’ products. He also attached parts of the Consignment Agreement.
However, the critical part of that Agreement, Clause 12, was omitted from
the attachment to his affidavit.
[110] To find a
material omission, the Court need not find an intent to deceive. There is no
doubt that the provision is material to the trade-mark application. The clause
virtually invited the Office to inquire further as to ownership rights.
[111] The Court
cannot escape the conclusion that the Defendants knew that the disclosure of Clause
12 would raise issues as to ownership. There was nothing inadvertent about the
omission of this evidence.
[112] The
trade-mark should be expunged on the grounds of material omission.
E. Section
7 – Unfair Competition
[113] The
Plaintiffs claim that the Defendants caused them damage by making false and
misleading statements tending to discredit their business, wares or services.
They plead each of s. 7’s provisions but only paragraph (a) is
really applicable in the circumstances.
7.
No person shall
(a)
make a false or misleading statement tending to discredit the business, wares
or services of a competitor;
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7.
Nul ne peut :
a)
faire une déclaration fausse ou trompeuse tendant à discréditer l’entreprise,
les marchandises ou les services d’un concurrent;
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[114] There are
three essential elements under s. 7(a): 1) the existence of a false and
misleading statement, 2) the statement tending to discredit the business, wares
or services of a competitor, and 3) resulting damage.
[115] The
constitutionality of s. 7 has been previously litigated (ITT Hartford Life
Insurance Co. of Canada v. American International Assurance Life Co., [1997]
F.C.J. No. 948, para. 16). Its validity rests on its relationship to
intellectual property over which the federal government has authority such as
patents, trade-marks, copyright and similar intellectual property.
[116] The
Defendants’ sole response to the s. 7 issue is that since JAG did not own the
FUSION trade-mark or, more importantly, if neither party owns the mark, there
can be no slander, defamation or “anything coming out of the Trade-marks Act”.
[117] With due
respect, it is not necessary to own a mark to have the right to claim s. 7
relief. The question is whether the offending party is using alleged
intellectual property rights subject to federal jurisdiction to harm a competitor.
[118] While the
first communication makes reference to Fortune Manufacturing’s Chinese
trade-mark, it is purporting to use those rights, not valid in Canada, to harm its
competitor in Canada. In that
respect there is sufficient nexus to federal law to ground the s. 7 claim. It
is integral to the integrity of the Canadian system that non-recognized marks
not be used in this manner. In addition, there is a clear implicit relationship
to the Canadian trade-mark which is invalid and provides further nexus to s. 7.
[119] However, the
statements made are not false and misleading in that Fortune Manufacturing had
the Chinese trade-mark and it was the basis of that trade-mark upon which JAG’s
inventory was seized.
[120] The telephone
call to C.E. Franklin Ltd. was false and misleading in that JAG’s facility was
not closed down. Seen in the context of the dispute between the parties and the
intended impact it was to have on C.E. Franklin Ltd., it is probable that it
was made in reference to both Canadian and Chinese trade-mark rights or was intended
to be understood in that manner.
[121] No
representative of C.E. Franklin Ltd. was called to speak to the matter and the
evidence of its connection and impact may be dealt with in the damages phase of
this case. Bifurcation does not always allow for finalizing of the liability
phase of a case.
[122] The letter
sent to customers makes specific reference to FUSION and seen against the
background of the relationship and dispute, makes reference, if only by
implication, to the Canadian trade-mark which is invalid.
[123] The
Plaintiffs’ reliance on the Trade-marks Office’s proceedings does not fall
within s. 7. The remedy for misstatements has previously been discussed. The
statements/omissions complained of arise in the context of administrative litigation.
Therefore, the limited privilege accorded pleadings would apply in these
circumstances. The pleadings are not the type of “statement” contemplated by s.
7.
[124] As an
essential element of a s. 7 claim is damage and as there are issues yet to be
finalized in the damages phase, the Court will not make a final declaration
with respect to s. 7 liability.
VIII. CONCLUSION
[125] The Court
does not have the jurisdiction to substitute one registrant for another, as
requested by the Plaintiffs. Even if it did have the jurisdiction to do so, it
would not. The right to the trade-mark FUSION is joint and neither party has
sought an order for joint ownership. Moreover, the Court questions whether there
is a distinctiveness or value in the mark now.
[126] The Court
will order the expungement of TMA Registration 662,598.
[127] The
Plaintiffs shall have their costs. The scale of costs may be addressed in the
damages phase of the case.
“Michael
L. Phelan”
Ottawa, Ontario
June 10,
2010