Date: 20100525
Docket: IMM-3301-09
Citation: 2010 FC 563
Ottawa, Ontario, May 25, 2010
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice O'Reilly
BETWEEN:
PRESNICK LORMILSAINT,
ELMITA CLEOPHARD,
KATIANA LORMILSAINT
Applicants
and
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
I.
Overview
[1]
Mr. Presnick Lormilsaint, his wife Elmita
Cleophard, and their daughter Katiana, claimed refugee protection in Canada on the basis of political
persecution in Haiti. Mr.
Lormilsaint and Ms. Cleophard alleged that they were mistreated there because
of their opposition to the Lavalas movement. Mr. Lormilsaint left Haiti in 2000; Ms. Cleophard left in 2003.
The couple lived in the United States for a number of years, which is where Katiana was born. The family
came to Canada in 2007.
[2]
A panel of the Immigration and Refugee Board
dismissed the applicants’ claim for protection. In respect of Mr. Lormilsaint’s
application, the Board found his evidence to be inconsistent and unreliable. The
applicants do not challenge this part of the Board’s decision. Rather, they
question the treatment of Ms. Cleophard’s claim. The Board found that she
feared the general climate of criminality in Haiti, particularly the high rate of crime against women, which did not
entitle her to refugee protection.
[3]
Ms. Cleophard argues that the Board’s decision
was unreasonable because the Board failed to appreciate that her risk is
heightened by her past political activities and, therefore, that her fear went
beyond concern about the overall treatment of women in Haiti. She asks for a
new hearing before a different panel of the Board.
[4]
As I read the Board’s decision, it did not seem
to doubt Ms. Cleophard’s description of the mistreatment she endured for making
what were perceived to be political statements. Yet, the Board concluded that
her fear was confined to the overall level of crime in Haiti. In my view, the Board erred by not taking account of the evidence
supporting Ms. Cleophard’s claim of political persecution. Accordingly, I must
grant this application for judicial review.
[5]
The sole issue is whether the Board’s decision
was unreasonable.
II.
Analysis
(1)
The Board’s decision
[6]
Ms. Cleophard testified that she was a
schoolteacher in Haiti. She explained
that she had been beaten by Lavalas supporters after telling her students that
the government of Haiti was
wasting money and neglecting the education system. After that, she feared for
her life. She also feared rape, given that women are sometimes sexually
assaulted as punishment for their political beliefs in Haiti. The state apparatus there is unable to protect women at risk, Ms.
Cleophard argued.
[7]
The Board found that there was no nexus between
the basis for Ms. Cleophard’s fear and the grounds for protection under the
Refugee Convention, i.e., political persecution. The Board agreed that
women in Haiti are poorly
treated. However, it concluded that the risk facing Ms. Cleophard is no
different from that facing other women in Haiti.
(2)
Was the Board’s decision unreasonable?
[8]
The Board appears to have accepted Ms.
Cleophard’s account of the treatment she received for criticizing the
government. It did not point to any inconsistencies or discrepancies in her
evidence. In addition, documentary evidence before the Board suggested that
citizens returning to Haiti are
more likely to be targeted for mistreatment if they had previously been
involved in political activities.
[9]
The Board appears not to have considered the
possibility that Ms. Cleophard’s risk transcended the treatment that other
returning citizens to Haiti
might face. In doing so, it failed to address evidence supporting Ms.
Cleophard’s claim to be at greater risk of mistreatment than the general
population.
[10]
In my view, the Board’s conclusion that Ms.
Cleophard’s circumstances were indistinguishable from those of other women in Haiti was unreasonable because it failed to
take account of the evidence before it to the contrary. As such, the decision
does not fall within the range of acceptable outcomes based on the facts and
the applicable law.
III.
Conclusion and Disposition
[11]
Having failed to address an important element in
Ms. Cleophard’s claim for protection, the Board’s conclusion was unreasonable. I
must, therefore, allow this application for judicial review and order a new
hearing. Neither party proposed a question of general importance for me to
certify, and none is stated.
JUDGMENT
THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT is
that
1.
The
application for judicial review is allowed. A new hearing is ordered before a
different panel of the Board.
2.
No
question of general importance is stated.
“James
W. O’Reilly”
FEDERAL COURT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET: IMM-3301-09
STYLE OF CAUSE: LORMILSAINT,
ET AL v. MCI
PLACE OF HEARING: Toronto, ON.
DATE OF HEARING: February 4, 2010
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
AND JUDGMENT: O’REILLY J.
DATED: May 25, 2010
APPEARANCES:
|
Dov Maierovitz
Philip Varickanickal
|
FOR THE APPLICANTS
|
|
Laoura Christodoulides
|
FOR THE RESPONDENT
|
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
|
GERTLER, ETIENNE, LLP
Toronto, ON.
|
FOR THE APPLICANTS
|
|
JOHN H. SIMS, Q.C.
Deputy Attorney General of Canada
Toronto, ON.
|
FOR THE RESPONDENT
|