Rodriquez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), docket IMM-4573-96

     IMM-4573-96

B E T W E E N:

     ANA MARIA RODRIGUEZ

     ALVIN GUSTAVO MEDINA RODRIGUEZ

     Applicants

- and -

THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION

     Respondent

     REASONS FOR ORDER

HEALD, D.J.:

     This is an application for judicial review of a decision of the Convention Refugee Determination Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board (the "Board") dated December 6, 1996. By that decision, the Board determined the applicants not to be Convention refugees.

Facts

     The principal applicant Ana Maria Rodriguez was (at the time of the hearing) a 23 year old citizen of Venezuela. The minor applicant her son, Alvin, also a citizen of Venezuela, was three years old. The applicants came to Canada on November 29th, 1993. They claimed refugee status in August of 1994 on the basis of their relationship with the minor applicant's father. The principal applicant deposed that her "spouse was involved in the mafia's drug related business."¹ Her evidence was that three armed men came to her house and advised her that they had been "busted" for a lot of money. In her house they threatened her verbally and produced guns. The next morning, the principal applicant reported this incident to the police. The police advised her to return home and wait for a police officer. No police officer came to her home. The next day, the three men returned, broke into and searched her house, pointed guns at her and again questioned her as to her spouse's whereabouts. At that time she did not know of his whereabouts. They continued to threaten her. Later these men destroyed the house and set it afire. She, her mother and her son sought refuge at the home of a neighbour. After the fire, the principal applicant again consulted the police who again advised her they would come to her house. However, they did not appear. The principal applicant, her mother and her son then went to stay with friends. After a stay of two months, they came to Canada.

The Decision of the Board

     It was the Board's conclusion that the record herein does not establish a link between the problems of the applicant's spouse and any of the grounds set out in the Refugee Convention. The Board then considered whether a factual scenario such as this, where a family has been threatened for any reason whatsoever is sufficient to establish a nexus to the Convention ground of membership in a particular social group.

     The Board stated²:

While one might desire to offer protection to all those at risk of persecution for whatever reason, the framers of the Convention and Parliament, made it clear by enumerating grounds that it was not their intention to provide Convention refugee protection to all victims of persecution, no matter what the reason for the persecution.

Also at page 16 of the Applicant's Record:

To put it another way, the difficulties of family members of those persecuted for non-Convention grounds - if those difficulties are solely by reason of their connection with the principal target -- are too remote from the kinds of situations and dangers against which the Canadian Parliament, and the framers of the Convention intended to provide Convention refugee protection."

     The Board went on to determine that the applicants herein did not belong to a "particular social group" within the meaning of the Convention definition as set out in Canada ("Attorney General") v. Ward³. The Board recognized that members of a family possess some of the characteristics of a particular social group as defined in Ward supra. However, it was of the view that the ratio in Ward did not extend to the facts at bar. In Ward, La Forest, J. rejected any application of the definition that could be considered a mechanical application.

     On its appreciation of the facts at bar and the ratio of Ward as applied to those facts, the Board concluded:⁴

Thus, where,

(i)a person is the principal target of oppressors;

(ii)      the reason for the oppressor's animosity toward the principal target is not encompassed by a Convention ground;

(iii)      a member of the principal target's family might be mistreated by the oppressors;

(iv)      there would be no reason for the mistreatment of the family member other than the reason referred to in (ii) and the family connection with the principal target, and

(v)the oppressor's intention, in mistreating the family member would be either to injure the principal target or to pressure the principal target, or to vent the oppressor's anger with the principal target, then

the family member will not be considered as belonging to a particular group within the meaning of the definition.

     Put another way, the Board concluded that the applicant herein, was required to establish some sort of nexus between her persecution and a Convention ground. The intent of the refugee Convention is to protect individuals who have been persecuted, but because of a lack of state protection in their own country, must rely on the international community for such protection. In my view, the Board was correct in finding that when determining membership in a particular social group, the context of the claim should be examined and the purpose of the Convention considered.

     Accordingly, for a claimant to be included under the heading of "particular social group," that claimant must demonstrate that she or he is a member of a group in respect of which Parliament, intended to afford protection. The Convention does not protect everybody who has been persecuted. Availability of state protection is also a necessary ingredient.

     On the facts, the proper characterization of the group to which the applicant belongs would appear to be a family member of a group targeted because of its illicit drug activities. This is a private group and there is no evidence on this record to show that family members of drug dealers are targeted.

    

     Accordingly, I conclude that the Board's finding herein was reasonable on this record. The application for judicial review is therefore dismissed.

Certification

     Neither counsel suggested certification of a serious issue of general importance pursuant to Section 83 of the Immigration Act. I agree that this is not a case for certification. Accordingly, no question is certified.

"Darrel V. Heald"

D.J.

Toronto, Ontario

September 26, 1997

     FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA

     Names of Counsel and Solicitors of Record

COURT NO:                  IMM-4573-96

STYLE OF CAUSE:          ANA MARIA RODRIGUEZ ET AL

                     - and -

                     THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP

                     AND IMMIGRATION

DATE OF HEARING:          SEPTEMBER 25, 1997

PLACE OF HEARING:          TORONTO, ONTARIO

REASONS FOR ORDER BY:      HEALD, D.J.

DATED:                  SEPTEMBER 26, 1997

APPEARANCES:

                     Mr. Roop N. Sharma

                         For the Applicants

                     Ms. Lori Hendriks

                         For the Respondent

SOLICITORS OF RECORD:

                    

                     Roop N. Sharma

                     1-942 Gerrard Street East

                     Toronto, Ontario

                     M4M 1Z2

                         For the Applicants

                      George Thomson

                     Deputy Attorney General

                     of Canada

                         For the Respondent

                     FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA

                     Court No.:      IMM-4573-96

                     Between:

                     ANA MARIA RODRIGUEZ ET AL.

     Applicants

                         - and -

                     THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP

                     AND IMMIGRATION

     Respondent

                     REASONS FOR ORDER

                    

__________________

¹      Applicant's Record, p. 8

²      Applicant's Record, p. 16

³      (1993) 2 S.C.R. 689

⁴      Applicant's Record, p. 18