MacKay
J.:
—
These
two
applications
came
on
for
hearing
in
Fredericton,
New
Brunswick,
on
April
11,
1996
at
which
time
I
reserved
my
decision.
Additional
written
submissions
were
thereafter
invited
from
counsel
for
the
parties
and
were
received
later
in
April
and
May.
These
are
the
reasons
for
the
disposition
of
the
applications,
one
by
the
plaintiffs
and
another
by
the
defendant.
The
plaintiffs’
application
is
for
an
order
requiring
that
all
copies
of
books,
records,
documents
or
things
seized
by
the
defendants
on
March
2,
1994
from
the
personal
and
business
premises
of
the
plaintiffs
and
from
the
offices
of
their
accountants,
together
with
all
copies,
summaries,
notes,
outlines
or
extracts
thereof
in
the
possession
or
control
of
the
defendants
be
impounded
and
kept
in
sealed
boxes
in
the
custody
of
the
Chief
of
Special
Investigations
of
the
District
Taxation
Office
of
Revenue
Canada
in
Saint
John,
New
Brunswick,
until
final
disposition
of
the
action,
and
that
no
use
shall
be
made
of
those
records
and
other
documents
until
that
time
by
the
defendant.
The
defendant’s
application
seeks
an
order
directing
that
Claudette
Miller,
Marc
Boudreau,
M.
Burchill,
Terry
LeBlanc,
Barbara
Dawe
and
Suzanne
Ouellette,
originally
named
as
defendants,
be
removed
from
the
statement
of
claim,
and
an
order
allowing
the
defendants
to
amend
the
statement
of
defence
by
adding,
after
the
number
“5”,
the
words
“only
insofar
as
it
refers
to
Her
Majesty
the
Queen”
in
paragraph
1,
line
5,
and
the
words
“5,
insofar
as
it
refers
to
the
Attorney
General
and
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue”
in
paragraph
2,
line
2,
after
the
number
“4”.
The
defendants
also
seek
an
order
that
the
Attorney
General
and
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
be
removed
from
the
statement
of
claim
as
defendants
or
alternatively,
an
order
permitting
the
defendant
to
amend
the
statement
of
defence
in
paragraph
16
by
deleting
“and
18”
and
replacing
that
phrase
with
“18
and
18.1”.
The
defendants
also
seek
an
order
striking
paragraphs
22(f),
(g)
and
(h)
from
the
statement
of
claim.
The
plaintiffs,
Mandate
Erectors
and
Welding
Ltd.
and
Bathurst
Machine
Shop,
are
companies
incorporated
in
the
Province
of
New
Brunswick.
The
remaining
plaintiffs
are
all
business
persons,
and/or
their
spouses,
associated
with
those
corporations.
The
corporate
plaintiffs
were
audited
under
the
Income
Tax
Act
by
agents
and
employees
of
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
for
time
periods
during
the
19903.
The
plaintiffs
claim
that
no
notices
of
assessment
were
issued
as
a
result
of
those
audits,
and
that
they
cooperated
fully
with
the
defendants
at
all
material
times.
Following
the
audits
of
the
plaintiff
corporations,
Claudette
Miller
and
Terry
LeBlanc,
employees
of
the
Department
of
National
Revenue,
gathered
information,
and
Ms.
Miller
later
swore
to
an
Information
to
Obtain
Search
Warrants
alleging
that
she
had
reasonable
and
probable
grounds
to
believe
that
certain
books,
accounting
records,
financial
statements,
banking
records,
correspondence,
contracts,
memoranda,
and
other
documents
belonging
to
the
plaintiffs
would
provide
evidence
of
the
commission
of
violations
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
On
February
23,
1994,
His
Honour
Judge
Casey
of
the
Provincial
Court
of
New
Brunswick
issued
search
warrants
pursuant
to
section
487
of
the
Criminal
Code
for
the
purposes
of
searching
the
business
and
personal
premises
of
the
plaintiffs.
On
approximately
March
2,
1994,
Marc
Boudreau,
M.
Burchill,
Terry
LeBlanc,
Barbara
Dawe
and
Suzanne
Ouellette,
who
were
also
employees
of
the
Department
of
National
Revenue,
executed
the
search
warrants
and
seized
books,
documents,
cheques,
registers,
papers
and
various
other
things
from
the
defendants’
premises.
Those
documents
and
records
were
eventually
returned
to
the
plaintiffs
pursuant
to
an
order
of
Judge
Casey
dated
August
23,
1994,
though
the
department
retained
copies
of
all
documents.
By
statement
of
claim
filed
September
21,
1995
the
plaintiffs
allege
that
the
search
warrants
should
be
declared
of
no
force
or
effect
because
Claudette
Miller,
in
the
Information
Sworn
to
Obtain
the
Warrants,
had
mischaracterized
various
transactions
of
the
defendants,
including
a
transaction
involving
the
purchase
and
sale
of
tractors
in
which
an
unclaimed
exchange
of
cash
was
said
to
have
occurred.
It
is
said,
inter
alia,
that
she
failed
to
contact
various
persons
who
would
have
been
available
to
properly
explain
any
transactions
of
the
plaintiffs,
and
to
confirm
the
nature
of
the
transactions,
and
further,
that
she
failed
to
disclose
the
sources
of
some
of
her
information.
The
plaintiffs
allege
that
there
was
no
basis
for
the
Minister
to
utilize
extreme
measures
and
that
use
of
the
warrants
was
an
abuse
of
power
and
a
breach
of
the
Minister’s
duty
to
act
fairly.
In
the
plaintiffs’
view,
the
search
warrants
did
not
meet
the
minimal
standards
of
specificity
and
should,
therefore,
be
set
aside.
The
plaintiffs
by
their
statement
of
claim
seek
declaratory
relief
as
well
as
damages
for
unlawful
search
and
seizure
and
for
trespass.
The
plaintiffs
rely
on
rule
470
of
the
Federal
Court
Rules,
C.R.C.
1978,
c.
663
in
support
of
their
application
for
the
impounding
and
sealing
of
all
documents,
records
and
other
things
seized
from
the
defendants
pursuant
to
the
search
warrants.
That
rule
provides:
470(1)
Before
or
after
the
commencement
of
an
action,
the
Court
may,
on
the
application
of
any
party,
make
an
order
for
detention,
custody
or
preservation
of
any
property
that
is,
or
is
to
be,
the
subject-matter
of
the
action,
or
as
to
which
any
question
may
arise
therein;
and
any
such
application
shall
be
supported
by
an
affidavit
establishing
the
facts
that
render
necessary
the
detention,
custody
or
preservation
of
such
property
and
shall
be
made
by
motion
upon
notice
to
all
other
parties.
...
(4)
An
order
under
paragraph
(1)
shall
identify
the
property
to
be
detained,
kept
or
preserved,
shall
state
where,
by
whom,
for
how
long
and
at
whose
cost,
the
property
is
to
be
detained,
kept
or
preserved,
and
shall
contain
such
other
terms,
if
any,
as
seem
just
in
the
circumstances.
(5)
An
order
under
paragraph
(1)
shall
have
as
its
sole
purpose
the
protection
of
the
property
pending
suit.
The
plaintiffs
also
rely
on
section
8
of
the
Charter
of
Rights
and
Freedoms
in
support
of
their
application.
That
provision
is:
8.
Everyone
has
the
right
to
be
secure
against
unreasonable
search
or
seizure.
The
plaintiffs
urge
that
the
search
of
their
premises
constitutes
an
unreasonable
search
because
of
the
alleged
deficiencies
in
the
Information
to
Obtain
Search
Warrants
sworn
by
Claudette
Miller,
and
an
alleged
failure
to
disclose
all
relevant
information
to
Judge
Casey
at
the
time
the
warrants
were
obtained.
The
plaintiffs
also
allege
that
the
form
of
the
Information
did
not
comply
with
the
rules
under
the
Criminal
Code.
Thus,
in
the
plaintiffs’
view,
a
serious
question
has
been
raised
for
determination
by
the
court.
The
plaintiffs
submit
that
they
will
suffer
irreparable
harm
if
the
application
is
not
granted.
They
urge
that
permitting
the
defendants
to
keep
and
review
the
documents,
seized
under
an
unreasonable
search,
amounts
to
a
continuing
invasion
of
privacy,
an
invasion
that
constitutes
irreparable
harm.
On
that
basis,
the
plaintiffs
submit,
the
balance
of
convenience
also
lies
in
their
favour.
In
my
view,
rule
470
of
the
Federal
Court
Rules
was
not
intended
to
apply
to
protect
documents
for
the
purpose
here
sought
by
the
plaintiffs.
Rather,
the
purpose
of
that
rule
is
to
preserve
goods
or
property
which
are
themselves
the
subject
matter
of
the
suit.
Here,
there
is
no
need
to
ensure
the
preservation
of
the
property
because
it
has
already
been
returned
to
the
plaintiffs
pursuant
to
a
court
order.
The
defendants
have
retained
copies
of
the
documents
and
records
seized,
which
the
Crown
says
is
authorized
pursuant
to
section
490
of
the
Criminal
Code,
as
it
applied
at
the
relevant
time,
where
an
investigation
is
underway,
as
in
these
circumstances,
regarding
a
possible
criminal
offence.
That
provision
then
stated,
in
part:
490(13)
Where
any
document
is
returned
or
ordered
to
be
returned,
forfeited
or
otherwise
dealt
with
under
subsection
(1),
(9)
or
(11),
the
Attorney
General
may,
before
returning
the
document
or
complying
with
the
order,
make
or
cause
to
be
made,
and
may
retain,
a
copy
of
the
document.
(14)
Every
copy
made
under
subsection
(13)
shall,
if
certified
as
a
true
copy
by
the
Attorney
General,
be
admissible
in
evidence
and,
in
the
absence
of
evidence
to
the
contrary,
shall
have
the
same
probative
force
as
the
original
document
would
have
if
it
had
been
proved
in
the
ordinary
way.
The
order
sought
here
by
the
plaintiffs
is
in
the
nature
of
a
stay
pursuant
to
section
51
of
the
Federal
Court
Act,
R.S.C.
1985,
c.
F-7,
as
amended.
Accepting
that
there
may
be
a
serious
issue
here
raised
to
be
determined
by
the
court
at
trial
of
the
action,
I
am
not
persuaded
that
the
plaintiffs
have
established
that
they
will
suffer
irreparable
harm
if
the
application
is
denied.
Serious
as
the
apprehended
invasion
of
privacy
may
be
if
the
Crown’s
right
to
retain
and
use
copies
of
documents
seized
in
a
criminal
investigation
is
ultimately
determined
to
be
wrong,
any
harm
the
plaintiffs
may
suffer
in
the
circumstances
of
this
case
is
compensable
in
damages
or
by
other
relief,
and
in
my
opinion,
does
not
constitute
irreparable
harm.
For
these
reasons,
the
plaintiffs’
application
is
dismissed.
For
the
defendants
originally
named
it
is
urged
that
the
individuals
named
as
defendants,
Claudette
Miller,
Marc
Boudreau,
M.
Burchill,
Terry
LeBlanc,
Barbara
Dawe
and
Suzanne
Ouellette,
should
be
struck
from
the
statement
of
claim
as
defendants,
pursuant
to
paragraph
419(l)(a)
and
subsection
1716(2)
of
the
Federal
Court
Rules.
It
is
urged
that
in
this
Court
no
reasonable
cause
of
action
lies
against
them
and
thus
they
have
been
improperly
or
unnecessarily
made
parties
to
the
action.
The
defendant
submits
that
the
causes
of
action
against,
and
alleged
liability
of,
the
individual
defendants
are
based
on
alleged
wrongful
search
and
seizure
and
trespass,
that
is,
based
upon
tort
law
and
not
upon
federal
law.
The
court,
in
the
defendant’s
view,
has
no
jurisdiction
over
the
claims
against
the
individuals
based
on
tort
law
in
light
of
the
requirements
set
out
in
Miida
Electronics
Inc.
v.
Mitsui
O.S.K.
Lines
Ltd.
(sub
nom.
I.T.O.
-
International
Terminal
Operators
Ltd.
v.
Miida
Electronics
Inc.),
[1986]
1
S.C.R.
752,
68
N.R.
241,
28
D.L.R.
(4th)
641.
There
Mr.
Justice
McIntyre
set
out
a
three
part
test
for
determining
whether
the
Federal
Court
has
jurisdiction
over
a
particular
matter,
the
second
part
of
which
requires
that
there
be
an
“existing
body
of
federal
law
which
is
essential
to
the
disposition
of
the
case
and
which
nourishes
the
statutory
grant
of
jurisdiction”.
Here,
it
is
said,
the
action
against
the
individual
defendants
is
not
dependant
on
either
the
Criminal
Code
or
the
Income
Tax
Act,
but,
rather,
is
founded
upon
the
law
of
tort.
The
defendant
also
submits
that
it
is
unnecessary
for
the
plaintiffs
to
name
the
Attorney
General
of
Canada
and
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue,
and
that
those
parties
ought
to
be
struck
pursuant
to
subsection
1716(2)
and
paragraph
419(l)(a),
because
Her
Majesty
the
Queen
has
already
been
named
in
the
suit
and
is
the
only
necessary
party.
The
plaintiffs
submit
that
the
claims
against
the
individual
plaintiffs
ought
not
to
be
struck
because
both
the
Criminal
Code
and
the
Income
Tax
Act
are
existing
bodies
of
federal
law
which
are
essential
to
the
disposition
of
the
case.
The
plaintiffs
cite
Marshall
v.
R.
(sub
nom.
Marshall
v.
The
Queen),
[1986]
1
F.C.
437
(T.D.)
at
pages
447-50,
where
the
court
suggested
that
a
claim
against
a
private
individual
that
is
intimately
intertwined
with
a
claim
against
the
Crown
may
be
within
subsection
17(1)
of
the
Federal
Court
Act,
which
may
support
jurisdiction
over
the
entire
cause
of
action.
In
my
view
that
suggestion
has
been
rejected
by
the
Court
of
Appeal
in
Varnam
v.
Canada
(Minister
of
National
Health
&
Welfare),
50
D.L.R.
(4th)
44,
84
N.R.
163
(C.A.),
and
in
Wilder
v.
Minister
of
National
Revenue,
(sub
nom.
Norberg
v.
Wilder)
[1988]
2
C.T.C.
77,
(sub
nom.
Wilder
v.
Canada)
88
D.T.C.
6393
(C.A.).
Further,
the
plaintiffs
submit
that
the
Attorney
General
and
the
Minister
ought
not
to
be
struck
from
the
statement
of
claim
without
each
having
personally
made
an
application
to
that
effect.
Moreover,
the
plaintiffs
urge
that
it
is
necessary
to
name
these
persons
for
the
purposes
of
cross-examination
on
discovery
in
the
action.
I
am
persuaded
that
the
individual
defendants
should
be
removed
as
parties
defendants
to
this
action
and
an
order
now
issues
directing
their
names
be
so
removed
and
removed
from
the
style
of
cause.
In
my
view,
this
court
does
not
have
jurisdiction
to
determine
the
personal
claims
against
them
as
individuals,
because
those
claims
are
grounded
in
the
law
of
tort,
not
in
federal
law.
(See
Tomossy
v.
Hammond,
[1979]
2
F.C.
232,
13
C.P.C.
150
(T.D.);
Stephens
Estate
v.
R.
(sub
nom.
Stephens
Estate
v.
The
Queen),
[1982]
C.T.C.
138,
82
D.T.C.
6132
(F.C.A.)).
I
am
not
persuaded
that
either
the
Criminal
Code
or
the
Income
Tax
Act
are
essential
to
the
disposition
of
the
claims
made
against
the
individual
defendants,
at
least
in
terms
of
the
test
set
out
by
the
Supreme
Court
in
I.T.O.,
supra.
However,
in
my
opinion,
the
names
of
these
individuals
should
not
be
struck
from
paragraphs
in
the
statement
of
claim
where
the
plaintiff
sets
out
facts
on
which
it
intends
to
rely
in
support
of
its
claim
to
relief
in
its
action
against
the
Crown,
even
though
the
individuals
are
no
longer
defendants
in
the
action.
Thus,
the
order
here
issued
removes
the
individual
defendants
from
the
style
of
cause,
and
as
named
defendants
in
the
text
of
the
statement
of
claim.
Further,
in
my
opinion,
the
Attorney
General
and
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
should
be
struck
as
defendants
in
this
action.
It
appears
from
the
statement
of
claim
that
relief
is
not
sought
against
them
in
their
personal
capacities.
If
it
were,
the
claims
would
be
based
in
tort
and,
as
in
the
case
of
the
other
individuals,
would
not
be
within
the
jurisdiction
of
this
Court.
Pursuant
to
subsection
1716(2)
of
the
Federal
Court
Rules
I
strike
the
ministers
as
defendants
because
they
are
unnecessary
parties
to
the
action.
Section
48
of
the
Federal
Court
Act
effectively
provides
that
proceedings
against
the
Crown
are
to
be
initiated
against
Her
Majesty
the
Queen:
48(1)
A
proceeding
against
the
Crown
shall
be
instituted
by
filing
in
the
Registry
of
the
Court
the
original
and
two
copies
of
a
document
that
may
be
in
the
form
set
out
in
the
schedule....
In
the
form
referred
to
in
that
section
the
defendant
named
is
Her
Majesty
the
Queen.
In
Kealey
v.
R.
(1991),
1
Admin
L.R.
(2d)
138,
(sub
nom.
Kealey
v.
Canada)
46
F.T.R.
107,
my
colleague
Mr.
Justice
Teitelbaum
stated
at
page
158
(F.T.R.
120)
that:
I
am
satisfied
that
if
it
is
not
the
intention
to
sue
the
Attorney
General
personally,
then
it
is
redundant
to
include
the
Attorney
General
of
Canada
as
a
party;
it
is
sufficient
to
name
Her
Majesty
the
Queen
as
Defendant.
On
that
basis,
Mr.
Justice
Teitelbaum
struck
the
Attorney
General
from
the
proceedings.
In
my
view,
the
Federal
Court
Act
here
requires
that
Her
Majesty
be
named
as
a
defendant.
On
that
basis,
in
my
opinion,
it
is
redundant
to
name
the
Attorney
General
and
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
in
the
circumstances
of
this
case.
Where
there
can
be
no
claim
against
the
defendants
in
their
personal
capacity,
as
is
the
case
here,
there
is
no
basis
for
including
them
as
defendants.
The
plaintiff’s
right
to
cross-examine
in
discovery
is
limited
to
one
who
is
a
party
defendant
in
the
sense
of
one
defending
against
an
order
or
judgment
sought
against
that
named
party.
Insofar
as
the
Crown,
Her
Majesty
the
Queen,
is
the
defendant
as
a
result
of
the
activities
of
officers
or
servants
purporting
to
act
within
the
scope
of
their
lawful
duties,
the
plaintiff
may
cross-examine
in
discovery
only
an
officer
or
officers
named
by
the
Crown
as
its
representative
or
representatives.
Moreover,
in
my
view,
it
is
not
necessary,
as
the
plaintiffs
urge,
for
the
Attorney
General
and
the
Minister
to
individually
bring
applications
to
be
removed
as
parties
where
there
is
no
jurisdiction
over
the
claims
against
the
Minister
in
his
or
her
personal
capacity.
It
is
sufficient
in
these
circumstances
that
Her
Majesty
the
Queen,
as
a
defendant,
initiates
an
application
for
removal
of
parties
who
are
improperly
impleaded
in
the
action.
Finally,
the
defendants
also
made
application
for
an
order
that
subparagraphs
22(f),
(g)
and
(h)
to
be
struck
from
the
statement
of
claim
on
the
basis
that
they
constitute
an
abuse
of
process
of
the
Court
for,
it
is
said,
in
essence
orders
in
the
nature
of
mandamus
or
certiorari
are
here
sought,
though
they
are
cast
in
terms
of
declaratory
relief.
In
addition,
the
defendants
urge
that
a
claim
for
declaratory
relief
against
a
federal
board,
commission
or
other
tribunal
is
available
only
in
judicial
review
proceedings.
Moreover,
the
defendant
submits
that
the
relief
sought
by
the
plaintiffs
in
those
paragraphs
is
not
available
against
the
Crown
under
the
Crown
Liability
and
Proceedings
Act
but,
rather
that
relief
is
only
available
on
judicial
review
in
relation
to
decisions
of
a
federal
board,
commission
or
tribunal.
The
plaintiffs
seek
a
variety
of
declaratory
orders,
as
part
of
the
relief
sought
in
the
action,
as
outlined
in
paragraph
22
of
the
statement
of
claim.
A
number
of
the
declarations
they
seek
concern
findings
of
fact
or
law.
Subparagraphs
22(f),
(g)
and
(h)
are
somewhat
different;
they
provide:
(f)
that
a
Declaration
issue
from
this
Honourable
Court
declaring
that
the
Defendants
and
all
of
them
must
return
forthwith
to
the
Plaintiffs
all
documents,
books,
records,
papers
or
other
things
seized
by
the
Defendants,
as
well
as
all
extracts
or
copies
thereof;
(g)
that
a
Declaration
issue
from
this
Honourable
Court
declaring
that
the
Defendants
must
return
forthwith
all
summaries,
notes
or
diagrams
taken
from
the
documents,
books,
records,
papers
or
other
items
seized
by
the
Defendants;
(h)
that
a
Declaration
issue
from
this
Honourable
Court
declaring
that
the
Defendants
cannot
use
the
said
document,
books,
records,
papers
or
other
items,
or
all
summaries,
notes,
diagrams
or
information
taken
from
said
items;
The
plaintiffs
urge
that
in
view
of
the
action
here
set
out
in
the
statement
of
claim
the
relief
sought
as
described
in
these
paragraphs
should
be
available,
in
the
interests
of
justice,
if
they
ultimately
succeed
in
their
action
in
other
respects.
The
declaratory
relief
here
questioned
is
intended
to
reinforce
other
relief
sought,
and
to
ensure
that
the
plaintiffs’
rights
against
unreasonable
search
and
seizure
are
meaningful.
In
my
opinion,
subparagraphs
22(f),
(g)
and
(h)
of
the
statement
of
claim
ought
not
to
be
struck
in
the
circumstances
of
this
case.
In
Williams
v.
Lake
Labine
Band,
(February
5,
1996),
Doc.
A-649-95
(F.C.A.),
the
Court
of
Appeal
found
that
this
court
does
not
have
jurisdiction
to
grant
declaratory
or
injunctive
relief
in
an
action
against
a
federal
board,
commission
or
other
tribunal;
pursuant
to
section
18
of
the
Federal
Court
Act,
such
relief
is
available
against
such
a
body
only
upon
originating
motion
to
the
Court
pursuant
to
section
18.1.
However,
in
the
circumstances
here,
the
action
is
not
against
a
“federal
board,
commission
or
other
tribunal”
as
set
out
in
section
18
of
the
Federal
Court
Act,
rather
the
action
is
against
Her
Majesty
the
Queen,
particularly
as
the
other
defendants
are
now
to
be
struck,
as
I
have
found
in
response
to
the
first
parts
of
the
Crown’s
motion.
In
my
opinion,
declaratory
or
injunctive
relief
is
available
against
a
defendant
to
an
action
where
the
defendant
is
not
a
federal
board,
commission
or
other
tribunal,
including
declaratory,
but
not
injunctive
relief
in
an
action
against
Her
Majesty.
Whether
the
relief
sought
is
in
reality
a
declaration,
or
an
order
of
mandamus
or
an
injunction
which
would
not
be
available
against
the
Crown,
as
the
defendant
submits,
may
depend
upon
the
argument
and
the
form
of
declaratory
relief
actually
sought
at
trial.
Rule
1723
of
the
Court’s
Rules
provides
“No
action
shall
be
open
to
objection
on
the
ground
that
a
merely
declaratory
judgment
or
order
is
sought
thereby,
and
the
Court
may
make
binding
declarations
of
right
whether
or
not
any
consequential
relief
is
or
could
be
claimed”.
At
this
stage,
I
am
not
prepared
to
strike
paragraphs
22(f),
(g)
and
(h)
of
the
statement
of
claim.
For
these
reasons,
orders
issue,
dismissing
the
plaintiff’s
application,
and
dismissing
the
defendant’s
application
to
strike
paragraphs
22(f),
(g)
and
(h)
of
the
statement
of
claim,
but
allowing
the
defendant’s
motion
in
relation
to
striking
some
of
the
original
defendants
named
in
the
action.
Thus,
it
is
directed
that
the
individual
respondents,
and
the
Attorney
General
and
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
are
struck
as
parties
defendant
and
from
the
style
of
cause,
which
style
of
cause
shall
hereafter
be
as
set
out
at
the
commencement
of
these
reasons.
The
defendant
is
directed
to
file
an
Amended
Statement
of
Defence,
which
reflects
changes
appropriate
in
the
text
as
well
as
the
style
of
cause,
in
accord
with
the
terms
of
the
Order.
In
view
of
the
directions
for
striking
individuals
originally
named
as
defendants
and
also
the
ministers
named
as
defendants
from
this
action
as
parties
defendant,
counsel
for
the
plaintiffs
is
directed
to
file
an
Amended
Statement
of
Claim
consistent
with
those
directions.
Taxpayer's
application
dismissed;
Crown’s
application
allowed
in
part.
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