BETWEEN:
JEAN-YVES
HAMEL
-and-
DOUBLE
J. RANCH INC.,
Plaintiffs,
AND:
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF
CANADA,
REPRESENTED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
CANADA,
CUSTOMS AND THE ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED
POLICE,
-and-
ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED
POLICE,
-and-
CANADA
CUSTOMS,
-and-
CINDY
VILLENEUVE,
-and-
TED
SISK,
Defendants.
REASONS
FOR JUDGMENT
ROULEAU J.
This is an action in tort
against Her Majesty the Queen in right of Canada (hereinafter referred to as
"Her Majesty") arising out of a fault allegedly committed by her
servants against Jean-Yves Hamel and the firm Double J. Ranch Inc. (hereinafter
referred to as "the plaintiffs").
Facts
The plaintiffs have had a
business buying and selling horses in the province of Quebec, Canada, for about
twenty years. In 1990, the plaintiffs were involved in buying horses in the
United States, more specifically in New Jersey, and therefore frequently had to
go through the customs office at the Canadian border.
Mr. Hamel arrived at the
Lacolle customs office (Blackpool) in Quebec on June 18, 1990, and after
completing the usual forms, the customs officer on duty asked him to park the
truck he was driving, to which a trailer containing some ten horses was
hitched, in the vehicle inspection area. The customs officers did this
pursuant to a look-out notice that had been issued by the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police (hereinafter referred to as the "R.C.M.P.") concerning
horses belonging to the Double J. Ranch Inc. because it was suspected that the
horses were being used for drug trafficking. While the customs officers were
doing a cursory inspection of Mr. Hamel's truck, he was informed that he was
suspected of trafficking in narcotics and was subjected to a pat-down search
before making a statement to the peace officers and members of the R.C.M.P.
After consenting to his
horses being examined, Mr. Hamel, accompanied by Cindy Villeneuve, an R.C.M.P.
constable on duty, and escorted by other R.C.M.P. vehicles, drove his truck and
the contents of his trailer, some ten horses, to the St-Hyacinthe veterinary
hospital. While the horses were there, they were subjected to a series of
examinations to determine whether they contained cocaine. Among other things,
they were fed laxatives over a period of at least three days. Certain areas of
their bodies were also shaved.
The horses were returned
to the plaintiffs on June 29, 1990, about ten days after they arrived at the St‑Hyacinthe
veterinary hospital, since no prohibited substances had been detected or passed
by natural means, and since it had been decided not to carry out any surgery on
the horses.
Moreover, this case was given a certain amount of
coverage in the information media, both in the print media and on television.
Issues
First, the Court must
determine whether Her Majesty's servants, the members of the R.C.M.P., were
entitled to detain the plaintiffs' horses at the Lacolle (Blackpool) customs
office to have them examined and, if not, assess the damage caused by the
interception.
Second, the Court must
determine whether Her Majesty's servants are liable for leaking the information
to the various media and, if so, assess the damage caused by the leak.
Position of the plaintiffs
The plaintiffs contend
that Her Majesty's agents, and more specifically the members of the R.C.M.P. on
duty at the Lacolle (Blackpool) customs office, committed a fault by detaining
their horses and having them examined without first conducting a serious
investigation to check the soundness of the information they had received
concerning the possibility that the plaintiffs were trafficking in cocaine by
hiding it in the stomachs or intestines of horses.
As well, they contend
that the media were informed of this case by the R.C.M.P., since the
information that was published and broadcast was so clear and precise that it
could only have come from the R.C.M.P.
Mr. Hamel contends that
his reputation has been tarnished for all time, since the horse community is a
relatively small one and people are still talking about this incident, nearly
six years after it occurred. As well, he still feels humiliation when he has
to appear at public auctions and has fingers pointed at him or has numerous
offensive remarks made about him. He also contends that although Double J.
Ranch Inc. is a separate entity, its reputation is closely associated with his
own. Accordingly, the business is also still suffering the repercussions of
the events of June 1990. Moreover, although he concedes that it is difficult
to quantify the lost business, he claims that the number of customers has
dropped as a result of that event. Lastly, he submitted a calculation
explaining the amount of the claim for the loss of the horses.
In the instant case, the plaintiffs
are seeking the following amounts from the defendant:
(A) Amount claimed by Jean-Yves Hamel
(a) interference with his
reputation $50,000.00
(b) miscellaneous damage,
humiliation
and distress $20,000.00
TOTAL $70,000.00
(B) Amount claimed by Double J. Ranch Inc.
(a) lost horses $17,118.00
(b) lost business
in the discretion
of
the Court
(c) interference with its
reputation, miscellaneous
damage, humiliation and
distress $50,000.00
TOTAL $67,118.00
(not
including
lost
business)
The claim includes interest at the legal rate
from the date of service plus the additional indemnity provided in paragraph
1056(c) of the Civil Code.
Position of the defendant
The defendant submits
that Her Majesty's servants, the members of the R.C.M.P., committed no fault by
detaining the plaintiffs' horses at the Lacolle (Blackpool) customs office and
having them examined to determine whether they contained cocaine, since they
had the power to do so under paragraph 99(1)(a) of the Customs Act.
As well, they submit that
the plaintiffs have not succeeded in establishing, on a balance of probabilities,
that the information leaked to the media originated with one of Her Majesty's
servants. Moreover, in order for Her Majesty to be liable in respect of a
fault committed by one of her servants, the servant must have committed the
wrongful act in the performance of his or her authorized duties,
and this was not the case here since the members of the R.C.M.P. were not at
any time authorized to disclose information concerning this case.
Analysis
Paragraph 3(a) and
section 10 of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act provides as
follows:
3. The Crown is liable in tort for the damages for which,
if it were a private person of full age and capacity, it would be liable
(a) in respect of a tort committed by a servant of
the Crown;
10. No proceedings lie against the Crown by virtue of
paragraph 3(a) in respect of any act or omission of a servant of the
Crown unless the act or omission would apart from the provisions of this Act
have given rise to a cause of action in tort against that servant or the servant's
personal representative.
Her
Majesty will therefore not be held liable for the wrongful act of one of her
servants unless he or she committed the tort in the course of his or her
employment and an action in tort for damages could be brought against him or
her personally.
In
the instant case, there is no doubt that the members of the R.C.M.P. are
servants of Her Majesty. As well, when the members of the R.C.M.P. detained
the plaintiffs' horses and had them examined, they were acting in the course of
their employment. The only question that remains is therefore whether the
plaintiffs could bring an action in tort against the members of the R.C.M.P. as
a result of the events of June 18, 1990.
The
case law has established that the applicable law in tort cases is the law of
the province where the cause of action arose. In the instant case, this matter arose in
the province of Quebec in 1990. The Civil Code of Lower Canada, and
more specifically article 1053, therefore applies herein; that article reads as
follows:
Every person capable of discerning right from wrong is
responsible for the damage caused by his fault to another, whether by positive
act, imprudence, neglect or want of skill.
The
plaintiffs must therefore establish the three following points, on a balance of
probabilities, if this action is to succeed: that the defendant's servants
committed a fault, that there is damage and that there is a causal connection
between that damage and the fault of the defendant's servants.
Seizure and
examination of the plaintiffs' horses
First,
this Court must decide whether Her Majesty's servants committed a fault by
detaining the plaintiffs' horses and having them examined when they arrived at
the Lacolle (Blackpool) customs office. In order to do this, there is an
initial question that must be resolved: what is the statutory authority on
which the R.C.M.P. relied in doing this?
The
defendant contends that the horses were detained and examined under paragraph
99(1)(a) of the Customs Act. On June 18, 1990, that paragraph
read as follows:
99.(1) An officer may
(a) at any time up to the time of release, examine
any goods that have been imported and open or cause to be opened any package or
container of imported goods and take samples of imported goods in reasonable
amounts;
It
is clear that in order for a customs officer to be able to act under that
paragraph, the goods in question must not have been released. The definition
of release is found in subsection 2(1) of the Customs Act, and reads as
follows:
"release" means, in respect of goods, to
authorize the removal of the goods from a customs office, sufferance warehouse,
bonded warehouse or duty free shop for use in Canada.
In
the instant case, the horses were released, according to Exhibit P-4 and the
testimony of Angelo Deriggi, a Canada Customs information officer. Exhibit P-4
is a copy of the customs cargo control document that was given to Mr. Hamel on
June 18, 1990, on which there is a stamp which reads "MAINLEVÉE-RELEASED"
and [translation] "EXAMINED
AND RELEASED BY AGRICULTURE CANADA". In addition, Mr. Deriggi admitted
the following on the question of the release of the plaintiffs' horses:
[translation]
QDo you know when Mr. Hamel's horses were released?
AThey were released on the same evening they were
imported at Lacolle; the exact date and time ... I didn't have the time they
were released because I was not the officer there at the time they were
released.
QSo what is release?
ARelease is a procedure whereby the customs officer does
his examination, examines the goods or ... the goods, in other words, in this
case, and then he completes his examination. At the end of his examination, or
... he is satisfied. So he gives permission for the goods to be released, which
means to enter Canada.
QAnd when was that done?
AThat whole procedure was done on the evening of the
importation.
QExcept that the horses were still taken to the
veterinary hospital and they were there for thirteen days.
...
THE
COURT:
I am going to intervene here.
QYour own responsibility at Customs, it is not to obtain
narcotics, but it is to stop people who are the subject of a look-out notice
given to you by the R.C.M.P.?
AThat's right, yes.
QThat's right, okay. And if you find narcotics, you
immediately take the person in question and turn him over ...
ATo the R.C.M.P.
QTo the R.C.M.P.?
AThat's right, your honour.
QAnd at that point you have finished your work?
AYes, that's right.
QSo I am showing you Exhibit P-4. There is a
stamp on the left that says "Released".
AYes, that's right.
QAnd so that means that you have finished your job. You
have stopped the person, you have examined the animals, everything complied
with what you required, at that point, with your requirements?
ABut I was not there that evening.
QNo, no, but I am showing you the exhibit, and it in fact
shows the date?
AYes. That means that it was released.
QIt was released. If there were any duties to be
collected on the horses, then you would not have given the release?
ANo, no, no.
QNo. But as far as you were concerned, those animals were
entering duty-free?
ADuty-free, that's right.
QDuty-free. So then they were transported to the
Saint-Hyacinthe hospital?
AYes.
QFine. The reason your customs officers remained in
Saint-Hyacinthe was to assist the R.C.M.P.?
AYes, that's right.
QBecause in fact your investigation was finished at that
point?
AFinished.
QFine. So who had ultimate responsibility for allowing
the horses to be released from Saint-Hyacinthe to Mr. Hamel?
AIt was the R.C.M.P.
QYou no longer had any control?
ANo.
Once
the horses were released, the customs officer then turned them over to the
members of the R.C.M.P., so that the R.C.M.P. had control of them. Moreover,
while the members of the R.C.M.P. are also customs officers under the Customs
Act, nonetheless when the horses were driven to St-Hyacinthe, they had
already been released, and accordingly, Mr. Hamel could have continued on his
way with the horses were it not for the R.C.M.P.'s suspicions about him. Mr.
Deriggi also testified that the animals were under the control of the R.C.M.P.
after they were released, and that the only reason why the customs officers
accompanied the members of the R.C.M.P. to St-Hyacinthe was because the
R.C.M.P. was short-staffed.
Paragraph
99(1)(a) of the Customs Act therefore cannot apply in this case.
However, paragraphs 99(1)(e) and (f) might perhaps apply. Those
paragraphs read as follows:
99.(1) An officer may
(e) where the officer suspects on reasonable
grounds that this Act or the regulations or any other Act of Parliament
administered or enforced by him or any regulations thereunder have been or
might be contravened in respect of any goods, examine the goods and open or
cause to be opened any package or container thereof; or
(f) where the officer suspects on reasonable
grounds that this Act or the regulations or any other Act of Parliament
administered or enforced by him or any regulations thereunder have been or
might be contravened in respect of any conveyance or any goods thereon, stop,
board and search the conveyance, examine any goods thereon and open or cause to
be opened any package or container thereof and direct that the conveyance be
moved to a customs office or other suitable place for any such search,
examination or opening.
It
is clear from these paragraphs that the customs officer must have reasonable
grounds for suspecting that an offence has been committed before
"examining" the goods. In the instant case, this was not the
situation. The testimony of Daniel Paradis, a member of the R.C.M.P., is in
fact very clear. This case arises out of information that Mr. Paradis received
from an individual concerning Mr. Hamel. Armed with that information, Mr.
Paradis initiated a semblance of an investigation. I say semblance, since
there is no doubt that no real investigation was done in this case. After
doing what I would characterize as cursory checking, Mr. Paradis turned the
matter over to the R.C.M.P., which then issued a look-out notice concerning the
plaintiffs' horses.
I
am of the opinion that the members of the R.C.M.P. who detained the plaintiffs'
horses and had them examined had no reasonable grounds for suspecting that the
horses contained cocaine, and accordingly that the defendant cannot rely on
paragraphs 99(1)(e) and (f) of the Customs Act in the
instant case. In his testimony, Daniel Paradis admitted that the R.C.M.P.
acted on information that it had received from an informer, whom he did not
really know. The information he received from the informer was that Mr. Hamel
was using horses to transport drugs from the United States to Canada. The
informer also told him that the drug was cocaine and that once the horses
arrived at the Double J. Ranch Inc. they were then destroyed in order to remove
the drugs from them. The horses were then buried on Mr. Hamel's land, or
nearby. According to the informer, about nineteen horses were buried on Mr.
Hamel's land. In support of that assertion, he explained that in the past, he
had tried to purchase a horse that had just arrived from the United States, but
that Mr. Hamel had told him to come back later because he didn't have time to
sell it to him. When he went back to buy the horse, it had disappeared. Mr.
Hamel allegedly then informed him that he had had to destroy it because it was
sick.
The
informer also told him about other people whom he suspected of engaging in the
same kind of trafficking, and told him that one of them was in Texas at the
time with some people from Italy. The informer also stated that he found it
strange that Mr. Hamel had money and was living the good life, while in 1985 he
didn't have a dime and could not even pay for the horse he had just bought.
Upon
receiving this information, Mr. Paradis did the following research before
passing the information on to the R.C.M.P. section that is responsible for
"investigations":
[translation]
When I received the information, the next day or the day
after, the next day in my office I checked on the trip to Texas, concerning the
other rancher, and I discovered that in fact the person he had identified to me
was, had gone on a trip to Texas, that same day or the day before I did my
checking, and was accompanied by two people from Italy, two individuals, two
men from Italy.
And I contacted the Drug Enforcement Agency in Texas,
which is the equivalent of the R.C.M.P. for narcotics in the United States.
They told me that there was in fact a fairly big horse auction going on there,
I don't recall the exact place in Texas, but that they didn't have time to do
any checking, they were busy elsewhere. This was verified through an airline
company, where the plane tickets had been purchased.
I contacted our R.C.M.P. liaison officer in Rome, Italy,
to ask him to check the names. The only thing he could confirm was that those
people had money, but the Italian authorities were involved in a huge
investigation into organized crime, he had no idea who was who, and so they
were in a big muddle. He couldn't tell me any more about it.
Except that a little later, they confirmed that these two
people had returned to Italy and had brought nothing back, no horses, no drugs,
nothing at all.
QDid you talk to your informer once, or more than once?
QThat person, do you know him well or ...
ANo, I do not know him very well myself. He knew me more
than I knew him. He knew what I did for a living, what kind of work I did, and
so he contacted me and told me that he wanted to give me some information. So
I knew who he was, but we were not on familiar terms ...
I reported the information, I checked a few facts myself,
such as the trip to Texas and some other ranchers, and I checked with customs
to see whether Mr. Hamel did in fact work, excuse me, travel frequently to the
United States, or occasionally to the United States, to bring back horses, and
everything checked out.
All my research checked out and I was able to determine
that there were in fact people in Texas who corroborated the information I had
received and I also determined that Mr. Hamel had in fact gone to the United
States fairly often to buy horses, and even that he was in the United States at
that time, that he was due to return shortly with some horses.
So all, not all but some of the information that I had on
the case was corroborated in this way.
In
addition, no evidence was presented to me at the hearing to show that any more
thorough investigation had been done by the R.C.M.P. On the contrary, what the
testimony given at the hearing showed was rather that all the events that took
place on June 18, 1990 were orchestrated on the basis of the information
obtained by Daniel Paradis and of his pitiful efforts at checking it out.
There is nothing in the evidence to suggest to me that, inter alia, any
bank accounts held by the plaintiffs were checked or even that Mr. Hamel's
neighbours were questioned about his activities or the activities or the Double
J. Ranch Inc.
Based
on the foregoing, I am of the opinion that the R.C.M.P. did not have enough
information concerning Mr. Hamel and the Double J. Ranch Inc. to do what it
did. A prudent and diligent person would have investigated at greater length
and would have checked the truth of the allegations received through his
"source" before taking any action.
In
view of these facts, I am satisfied that Her Majesty's servants acted
wrongfully in detaining the plaintiffs' horses and having them examined, since
paragraphs 99(1)(a), (e) and (f) of the Customs Act
cannot apply in this instance.
Leaked information
The
plaintiffs also contend that the defendant's servants committed a fault by
disclosing information to the media concerning this case.
In
the instant case, counsel for the defendant submitted, first, that Her
Majesty's servants were not responsible for leaking the information to the
media. Second, he submitted that even if this Court were to find that an agent
of Her Majesty was responsible for the leak, that person was acting outside the
course of his or her employment in disclosing the information to the media.
I
am not of this opinion, however. After considering all of the evidence in the
record, I am satisfied, on a balance of probabilities, that a member of the
R.C.M.P. is responsible for leaking the information to the media.
The
case law has clearly established that the plaintiff need not identify the
person or persons responsible for the fault committed against him or her. The
plaintiff need only establish that the fault committed against him or her
resulted from the action of a servant of Her Majesty who was acting in the
course of his or her employment at the time he or she committed the fault.
While
none of the journalists who testified in this Court identified any member of
the R.C.M.P. as being his or her source of information concerning this case,
and all of Her Majesty's servants who testified stated that the leak did not
come from them, the leaked information could only have been come from the
R.C.M.P. Too many details were disclosed in the various articles published in
the print media. For example, in one of the articles dated June 20, 1990, we
find the following passages:
[translation]
Using a subterfuge that the police consider to be a first
in the annals of Canadian law, some crafty drug traffickers allegedly used real
horses as "couriers" in an attempt to import 200 kilos of cocaine
into Quebec, with an estimated value of over $130 million on the black market.
...
Although the police investigation is only at the
preliminary stage, La Presse learned yesterday that the animals that were used
as guinea pigs for transporting the precious white powder are currently under
medical supervision at the faculty of veterinary medicine of the Université de
Montréal at Sherbrooke.
If the police suspicions are borne out, then perhaps
today or tomorrow, either naturally or surgically, all of these horses might
pass a substantial quantity of the drug that is believed to have been hidden in
their anatomies.
...
In fact, it appears that some time ago federal police
officers learned that there were some individuals who planned to use large
animals to facilitate the transportation of significant quantities of drugs
between the United States and Canada.
In
another article dated June 22, 1990, the following was written concerning this
case:
[translation]
The surveillance and "detention" of the horses
was apparently ordered as a result of certain information received by the
police.
On
July 5, 1990, the following passage was published in a daily newspaper in the
Montreal region:
[translation]
The R.C.M.P. officers were firmly convinced that the
horses were stuffed with cocaine, and they even mentioned the figure of 200
kg., with a value of $60 million on the black market.
Only
a member of the R.C.M.P. could have said exactly how many kilos of cocaine the
plaintiffs' horses were suspected of transporting when they arrived at the
Lacolle (Blackpool) customs office. As well, only a member of the R.C.M.P.
could have known that this case arose out of information obtained from an
informer. Certainly, Mr. Hamel did give a number of television interviews, and
issued his comments to the print media. However, he did not do this until
after the information had been leaked to the media. He was merely trying to
set the facts straight and to give his opinion on the situation. He was
certainly not aware of how many kilos of cocaine the R.C.M.P. suspected him of
transporting, nor did he know about the existence of the informer.
Moreover,
I cannot accept the submission of counsel for the defendant that the member of
the R.C.M.P. who was the source of the leaked information was not acting in the
performance of his or her authorized duties since no member of the R.C.M.P. was
authorized to disclose information about this case. In Goh Choon Seng v. Lee
Kim Soo,
Lord Phillimore wrote the following concerning the extent of an employer's
liability for the actions of its employee:
The principle is well laid down in some of the cases
cited by the Chief Justice, which decide that "when a servant does an act
which he is authorized by his employment to do under certain circumstances and
under certain conditions, and he does them under circumstances or in a manner
which are unauthorized and improper, in such cases the employer is liable for
the wrongful act."
In
the instant case, the information that was disclosed to the media arose
directly out of the "investigation" conducted by the R.C.M.P. Only a
member of the R.C.M.P. who was involved in that investigation to some degree or
another could have supplied the information that was given to the media.
Whether that member acted alone or with the consent of the R.C.M.P. does
nothing to change the fact that when the member disclosed the information to
the media, he or she did so as a member of the R.C.M.P. who was involved in the
investigation.
Accordingly,
the member of the R.C.M.P. who disclosed the information to the media did so
wrongfully and in the course of his or her employment.
Damage and quantum
of damages
There
is no doubt that the plaintiffs have suffered direct and immediate harm as a
result of the actions of Her Majesty's servants. The plaintiffs are therefore
entitled to receive compensation from the defendant for the damage caused to
them by the faults committed by her servants.
The
Double J. Ranch Inc. suffered harm as a result of the treatment inflicted on
the horses while they were in St-Hyacinthe. According to the evidence
presented to me, the horses were in good health when they were inspected in the
United States. The same was true when they were examined at the Lacolle
(Blackpool) customs office. It cannot be denied that the series of
examinations to which the horses were subjected after they were transported to
St‑Hyacinthe had some effects on them. Among other things, they were fed
laxatives over a period of at least three days, to determine whether they
contained drugs. This purge weakened them and caused them to lose weight. As
well, some horses had various areas of their bodies shaved, again in order to
ensure that they did not contain any drugs. Moreover, the horses were supposed
to be sold at an auction the following Friday. However, they could not be sold
on that date, since they were not returned to the plaintiffs until after the
Friday. When the horses were returned to Mr. Hamel, he decided, in view of
their health, to sell them for a lower price.
Accordingly,
I fix the amount of the claim by the Double J. Ranch Inc. for the loss
associated with the horses at $5,000, having regard to the various points in
the evidence presented to me at the hearing, and more particularly since the
Double J. Ranch Inc. was still able to sell the horses.
Moreover,
interference with reputation may found a claim for compensation where it
amounts to a fault and has caused damage.
[translation]
In order for defamation to found an action for damages,
the person who perpetrated the defamation must have committed a fault. The
fault may result from two types of conduct. The first is where the defendant
knowingly, in bad faith, with intent to cause harm, attacks the reputation of
the victim and seeks to ridicule, humiliate and expose him or her to hatred or
contempt in the eyes of the public or of a group. The second is the result of
conduct where there was no intent to cause harm, but where the defendant
nonetheless interfered with the victim's reputation through recklessness,
negligence, impertinence or carelessness. Both forms of conduct constitute a
civil fault for which compensation may be awarded, and there are no differences
between them in terms of the right to a remedy. In other words, we must refer
to the ordinary rules of civil liability and resolutely abandon the false idea
that defamation is the result only of an act of bad faith involving the intent
to cause harm. Moreover, in civil law defamation is not the result only of the
disclosure or publication of false or incorrect news.
Such
interference generally causes two types of damage: material damage and moral
damage:
Defamation, first, entitles the victim to compensation
for the economic harm it causes. This includes loss of customers and reduction
in sales following attacks on a product by a competitor. There must also be
compensation for the physical or psychological harm suffered by the victim,
particularly if there is an impact on his or her capacity to work and therefore
to earn.
Most of the time, however, the essence of the claim is
composed of the moral damage suffered by the victim. In that case, it is
necessary to compensate for the interference with his or her reputation and to
try to compensate for the humiliation, contempt, hatred or ridicule directed
against him or her.
The
following factors are normally taken into consideration by the courts in
assessing the damage caused by interference with a person's reputation:
First, the seriousness of the act is considered. Was it
a mere discourteous or impolite comment, or was it, on the contrary, a
full-fledged attack? While the intent of the person who committed the
defamation is of no importance in terms of determining whether there was fault,
it may be of some importance in terms of assessing the harm. Thus the courts
have been more severe where the person who committed the defamation used it to
try to ruin the plaintiff or to stymie his or her political aspirations.
Obviously, it is important to know how widely the defamation was spread.
Logically, wide publicity must be grounds for a more generous award than if it
was limited to a small circle. The status of the parties, the effect that the
act had on the victim and his or her family and friends, how long the
interference went on, and whether the effects were permanent or transitory must
also be considered.
The
reputations of both Mr. Hamel and the Double J. Ranch Inc. were tarnished by
the wrongful acts of Her Majesty's servants. In the instant case, I shall deal
with the loss of business suffered by the Double J. Ranch Inc. before
addressing the question of moral damage.
The
Double J. Ranch Inc. lost business as a result of the events of June 18, 1990.
Yves Nolin and Michel Herbert, who both work in the horse trade, testified that
people in the horse community are still talking about the events of June 18,
1990. Yves Nolin also stated that shortly after June 18, 1990, he cut back on
his buying from the plaintiffs for a period of time. He then started doing
business with the plaintiffs again, but he stated that some people refused to
continue doing business with the plaintiffs.
The
events of June 1990 also resulted in a number of newspaper articles and
television reports. Some newspaper articles carried pretty eye-catching
headlines, which could not help but harm the plaintiffs' reputation and drive
away potential customers: [translation]
"Horses stuffed with drugs — Instead of "Coke" ... dung!",
"100% pure manure" and "Horses seized by RCMP believed stuffed
with 200 kilos of cocaine".
Accordingly,
although it may be somewhat difficult to establish with any certainty how much
business the Double J. Ranch Inc. lost as a result of the events of June 18,
1990, this Court assesses the amount that the defendant must pay to it as a
result of the wrongful acts of her servants to be $20,000.
Moreover,
as a result of the publication of these articles, Mr. Hamel, his wife and their
daughter were ridiculed, humiliated and identified as drug traffickers by the
public in general, and in particular by the people who move in the horse
world's circles. Despite the fact that the newspapers and television reports
all stated that the R.C.M.P. had found no drugs in the horses, it was too
little, too late. While a reputation is built up little by little, not much is
needed to destroy it. In the relatively closed circle of the horse world, the
reputations of Mr. Hamel and the Double J. Ranch have been sullied forever.
According to the evidence presented to me, the events of June 1990 are still a
topic of discussion and speculation. As well, doubts still persist in horse
circles about Mr. Hamel's honesty and the respectability of the Double J. Ranch
Inc. Despite the fact that Mr. Hamel himself contributed to the events of June
1990 becoming a media event by granting interviews both to the print media and
to television, he did this only in reaction to the unflattering newspaper
articles about him. He was only trying to restore his reputation. He cannot
be reproached for doing so.
On
the question of the importance of an individual's reputation, the Supreme Court
has written:
Democracy has always recognized and cherished the
fundamental importance of an individual. That importance must, in turn, be
based upon the good repute of a person. It is that good repute which enhances
an individual's sense of worth and value. False allegations can so very
quickly and completely destroy a good reputation. A reputation tarnished by
libel can seldom regain its former lustre. A democratic society, therefore,
has an interest in ensuring that its members can enjoy and protect their good
reputation so long as it is merited.
I
am of the opinion that the same reasoning applies to a corporate person: a
business's reputation is essential if it is to prosper and grow.
Accordingly,
after reviewing the evidence in the record, I am of the opinion that Mr. Hamel
and Double J. Ranch Inc. are entitled to receive the sum of $25,000 each from
the defendant to compensate for interference with their reputation and for
miscellaneous damage, humiliation and distress resulting from the faults
committed by Her Majesty's servants.
Conclusion
For
these reasons, this action is allowed.
The
defendant shall pay the sum of $25,000 to Jean-Yves Hamel. She shall also pay
the sum of $50,000 to Double J. Ranch Inc. These sums shall bear interest at
the legal rate as from the date when the action at law was instituted.
I
award costs to the plaintiffs.
"P. ROULEAU"
JUDGE
OTTAWA, Ontario
August 20, 1996
Certified true
translation
C. Delon, LL.L.
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