Parmar v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), docket IMM-3177-96

Date: 19971112

Docket: IMM-3177-96

BETWEEN:

     AMIN RAMZAN ALI PARMAR

     Applicant

     - and -

     THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION

     Respondent

     REASONS FOR ORDER

MacKAY J.

[1]      The applicant, seeks an order quashing the decision of a visa officer of the Canadian High Commission in Colombo, Sri Lanka, dated August 6, 1996, which refused the applicant's application for permanent residence in Canada. He also seeks an order directing reconsideration of his application in accordance with the Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2, as amended, (the "Act") and Immigration Regulations, SOR/78-172, as amended, (the "Regulations") by a different visa office or officer and in a fashion that allows the applicant to address concerns that may arise concerning his work experience.

Background     

[2]      On January 31, 1996, the applicant applied for permanent residence in Canada at the Canadian High Commission in Colombo, Sri Lanka. Earlier, he had applied at the New Delhi, India visa office for permanent residence, but he had been rejected on January 20, 1995. In the Colombo application, he applied as an "assisted relative" as he had received a family business job offer from his brother-in-law in Bobcaygeon, Ontario. The job offer, to assist in the management of "Pic 'N' Save" convenience store ("the store"), was approved by the Canada Immigration Centre in Orillia, Ontario on November 28, 1995. The job in question was designated as "assistant manager, retail" on the applicant's application.

[3]      In a letter dated January 25, 1996 accompanying the applicant's residency application, an immigration consultant, who was assisting the applicant, proposed to the visa officer that the applicant's immigration point count should include 11 points for "Special Vocational Preparation" ("SVP"), found under Schedule I of the Regulations. He also indicated that the point total for "occupational demand" under Schedule I should be set at 10. With the points proposed, the consultant urged that this would result in a total point allocation of 79, well above the 65 required by the applicant as an assisted relative.

[4]      At the paper screening of the residency application performed by the Visa Office in Colombo, the applicant was awarded 7 points for SVP and 0 points for occupational demand. These figures were generated by a computerized information processing system, or "CAIPS", which assigns points for occupational demand and SVP for every seven digit job classification listed in the Canadian Classification and Dictionary of Occupations (CCDO), a classification system used in considering applicants for residence in Canada.

[5]      The visa officer interviewed the applicant on July 31, 1996. According to the applicant's affidavit, the visa officer asked the applicant what discussions he had had with his brother-in-law regarding the job offer. The applicant indicates that he initially misunderstood this question and said that there had been no discussion. He later corrected himself when the officer pointed out that a job offer letter, dated October 25, 1995, referred to previous discussions between the applicant and his brother-in-law. These discussions, the applicant avers, focused on salary and accommodation and the location of his assistant management position. The applicant also says his nervousness prompted him to wrongly indicate that the store sold furniture when asked what sort of business the store did.

[6]      In her affidavit, the visa officer states that when asked about his bookkeeping duties in his current job, the applicant responded that his bookkeeping involved writing down stock in- and outflows and keeping track of customer cheques, but formal bookkeeping was done by a chartered accountant. In the visa officer's report of the interview, the applicant did not know the store sold food, though the job offer indicated that the store was a mini-supermarket/convenience store. The visa officer states that the applicant had told her that he and his brother-in-law had not really discussed the job. In her case notes, the officer wrote that "based on what the [applicant] has said I am not satisfied that the [applicant] really had the intention of working in the stated store as he seems to know very little about it. He does not otherwise have an occupation for which there is a demand in Canada."

[7]      The appellant states in his affidavit that the officer told him he had not qualified because he did not meet "the criteria" and did not have the number of points the applicant's consultant said he did. She would not, however, reveal the applicant's point score. The officer, in her affidavit, states that she did not inform the applicant of his point score at the interview because she wanted to make sure she was awarding points correctly. On August 6, 1996, the visa officer wrote to the applicant to report that his residency application had been rejected. The letter indicated that he had been assigned a total of 62 points, 3 less than the 65 required for an assisted relative, including 7 points for specific vocational preparation ("SVP"), 0 points for occupational demand, and 4 points for personal suitability.

[8]      In her reply, dated August 19, 1996, to the consultant's inquiry on behalf of the applicant, the visa officer indicated that she had reviewed the consultant's submissions and she reported that since the CAIPS system had assigned a SVP of 7, the consultant's arguments concerning points that should be assigned would have no impact on her decision.

Issues

[9]      The applicant challenges the visa officer's decision on a variety of grounds which I classify in three general categories: first, failure to consider matters that ought to have been considered, thus erring in law; second, taking into consideration irrelevant factors, and; third, denying procedural fairness to the applicant.

Alleged failure to consider relevant matters

[10]      As for the first ground, several errors are alleged. Thus, it is said the visa officer failed to consider: a relevant section, IS 1:18, of the Immigration Manual; paragraph 11(1)(b) of the Regulations; the applicant's experience as a bookkeeper; and certain documents relevant for assessing personal suitability.

[11]      The applicant submits that under IS 1:18 of the Immigration Manual, the family job program is to be viewed as a means of reunifying families as much as supplying workers to employers unable to find suitable employees in Canada, and the family reunification aspects of the program are to be accorded equal, if not more, significance than are job market considerations. The applicant submits that the visa officer failed to consider properly this policy and, as a consequence, her decision should be set aside.

    

[12]      It is well settled that the Immigration Manual guidelines do not fetter the discretion of visa officers. The Federal Court of Appeal in Mohammad v. Minister of Employment and Immigration¹, held that "Insofar as the Department's policy directives are concerned, the Martineau (No.1) case has established that policy directives, whether made pursuant to regulatory authority or general administrative capacity, are no more than directions and are unenforceable by members of the public." Similarly, in Vidal v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, Mr. Justice Strayer (as he was then) wrote that he was

...satisfied that these guidelines adequately convey to immigration officers that, particularly in respect of humanitarian and compassionate considerations, the guidelines are not to be regarded as exhaustive and definitive. It is emphasized and reemphasized that officers are expected to use their best judgment.2

The role of the guidelines, non-binding and not exhaustive, as guidance for the exercise of discretion is reaffirmed in recent cases.³ In Vidal, Strayer J., discussing the specific case of humanitarian and compassionate guidelines, wrote that

...it must follow as a corollary of the reasoning of Jerome A.C.J. in Yhap that an applicant cannot complain if an immigration officer fails or refuses to follow the Minister's guidelines. Nor can he complain if an immigration officer applies any factor in lieu of those in the guidelines as long as this is done in good faith and the factor is not wholly irrelevant to any conceivable view of humanitarian and compassionate considerations.4

[13]      In this case, the visa officer had no legal obligation to follow IS 1.18 of the Immigration Manual in rendering her decision and, as there is no evidence either that she considered it or ignored it, and none that she acted in bad faith, the officer made no reviewable error.

[14]      As for s-s. 11(1) of the Regulations, the applicant submits that this provision requires the officer to consider whether the applicant is able to carry out the proposed job, notwithstanding alleged lack of experience. It is said the visa officer, in basing her decision in part on the applicant's lack of bookkeeping experience failed to apply this provision and, therefore, erred. The relevant parts of the sub-section read as follows:

11. (1) Subject to subsections (3) and (5), a visa officer shall not issue an immigrant visa pursuant to subsection 9(1) or 10(1) or (1.1) to an immigrant who is assessed on the basis of factors listed in column I of Schedule I and is not awarded any units of assessment for the factor set out in item 3 thereof [i.e., experience] unless the immigrant

...

(b) is qualified for and is prepared to engage in employment in a designated occupation.

[15]      In my opinion, the section as drafted applies only where the applicant for resident status has not been awarded any points for experience. On the facts, the applicant received 4 points for experience and as a consequence, I am of the view that the visa officer made no reviewable error in not relying on sub-section 11(1) in arriving at her decision. In any event, sub-paragraph 11(1)(b) does not require the issuance of an immigrant visa; rather it precludes the issue of a visa unless the applicant is one who is without any points for experience and who is prepared to engage in a designated occupation, two conditions that are not applicable in this case.

[16]      As for the submission that the visa officer failed to consider the applicant's bookkeeping experience as a basis for sufficient points to allow the applicant to be assessed successfully as a bookkeeper under the independent category, the applicant submits that the certified job offer was one that had bookkeeping duties. Because the applicant intended to operate as a bookkeeper in Canada, it is urged that the officer was under an obligation to assess him in that occupational role.

[17]      The respondent counters that the applicant has not demonstrated that he had any bookkeeping experience. Further, aside from the applicant's assertions in this proceeding, his application requested an assessment under the occupational heading of "assistant manager, retail." At the hearing of this matter there was some confusion about the job requested for assessment of the applicant's experience, apparently arising from closely similar classification numbers for different jobs. Nevertheless, I conclude that the applicant, at the time of his application, failed to adduce evidence demonstrating that he met occupational requirements of the occupation "bookkeeper" as defined by the CCDO, the department's job classification system. At no time did the applicant make representations to the visa officer that he met the requirements of any other occupation defined in the CCDO than the identified "assistant manager, retail", the occupation for which his application was assessed.

[18]      In Li v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration),⁵ Jerome A.C.J. followed his earlier ruling in Hajariwala v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration)⁶ in holding that

...there exists a clear responsibility on the part of the visa officer to assess alternate occupations inherent in the applicant's work experience where the applicant seeks such an assessment by designating it in his application. Where his work experience suggests that the occupation may be appropriate, the visa officer must assess the applicant in the designated occupation, regardless of which alternate occupations the officer has seen fit to consider.

More recently, in Cai v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),⁷ Pinard J. held that

In making his or her assessment, the visa officer is not only called upon to compare the applicant's experience and qualifications with those set out in Schedule I of the Regulations, but is also obliged to consider the applicant under every occupation he or she designates in his or her application, and is also vested with the "clear responsibility...to assess alternate occupations inherent in the applicant's work experience".

Finally, in Asghar v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),⁸ Muldoon J. had occasion to discuss visa officer duties to assess alternate occupations. Having examined the principles set out above, he stated that

...where the applicant has not indicated a listed occupation, the question is, rather, whether a particular occupation is "inherent" in his work experience; therefore there must be evidence on the record that indicates that the applicant is qualified to pursue those occupations, otherwise the visa officer cannot be faulted for his failure to consider those occupations.

[19]      In my view, the visa officer must consider the applicant's whole work experience, and the occupations inherent in it, and must provide the applicant with an opportunity to submit evidence of his or her qualifications. Where there is no evidence presented of alternate or inherent occupations, the officer does not err in failing to consider other occupations than those which the applicant has requested.

[20]      In this case, the record shows that the applicant did request an assessment under the occupational heading of "assistant manager, retail." Further, the applicant's immigration consultant, in his letters to the High Commission, dated January 25, 1996 and August 9, 1996, also proposed an assessment of the applicant's qualifications as an "assistant manager, retail." That was the occupational classification for which he was assessed. I do not find that the visa officer failed in her duty to assess alternate occupations inherent in the applicant's work experience, for there is no evidence that the officer failed to consider the applicant's whole work experience or to give him an opportunity to submit evidence of his qualifications. On the contrary, the officer's description of the interview in both her affidavit and from her notes suggests that she spent some time questioning the applicant on his bookkeeping skills, a point the applicant himself makes in his submissions regarding the visa officer's assessment of his personal suitability. It is also notable that in her notes, the visa officer does indicate, in rejecting the applicant, that "He does not otherwise have an occupation for which there is a demand in Canada." Similarly, in her letter of August 6, 1996 to the applicant, she wrote that "There is no other occupation apparent on your application in which you are qualified and experienced, and under which your application would be successful." I take "apparent on your application" in this context to include the information from the interview as well as the written material submitted by the applicant.

[21]      In my opinion, the officer's conclusion that the applicant was not qualified for any other occupation inherent from his work experience that would enable the applicant to succeed was not made capriciously, perversely or without regard to the material before her. The officer quite clearly found the applicant's experience in bookkeeping limited, a finding of fact the applicant has not challenged with any evidence to the contrary.

[22]      The applicant submits that the officer failed to take into account evidence relevant to the consideration of personal suitability in making her decision, in particular the applicant's employer's assessment and his volunteer activities. The visa officer has discretion in weighing evidence related to personal suitability. I agree with the position taken by my colleague Madame Justice Simpson in Khan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration):⁹

...unless I can find that the Officer exercised her discretion inappropriately by overlooking relevant factors or by placing undue emphasis on particular factors or in some way acting unfairly, I am not in a position to second-guess her exercise of discretion.

In that case, the applicant argued that the officer had overlooked supportive character references in arriving at her determination of personal suitability. Simpson J. responded to this submission as follows:

I have concluded that there is no reason to suppose that the Officer overlooked the references. I think that the Officer concluded that the fact that the Applicant was a hard worker was not overcome by the fact that he did not advance in his chosen field, either by study or by employment. It was open to the Officer to find that these were the most significant factors in her assessment of the Applicant's personal suitability.

[23]      Here the applicant was given an opportunity to present relevant material, and there is no reason to conclude that the officer failed, in rendering her decision, to consider the evidence the applicant views as favourable. I am not persuaded that failure to refer to all of the evidence before her can be the basis of a conclusion that some aspects of it were overlooked by the visa officer who, in my view, committed no reviewable error in this regard.

Alleged considerations of irrelevant matters

[24]      The applicant's second general ground for questioning the visa officer's decision is said to be that irrelevant considerations were taken into account in assessing the application for an immigrant visa. In particular, the officer's reliance on an assumption, with no evidence, that the store in which the applicant was offered employment sold food, and her alleged reliance upon criteria for personal suitability that are not apparent in the job offer or in Schedule 1 of the Regulations, are both said to be errors warranting the setting aside of the decision here impugned.

[25]      The applicant submits that the officer's assumption, with no evidentiary basis, that the store sold food affected her opinion of the applicant's ability to take up the job offer. The stores in question here, operated by the applicant's brother-in-law, were "variety/general stores in cottage country in Ontario", in the words of the applicant's immigration consultant in a letter to the Canadian High Commission in Colombo dated August 9, 1996, and a store in Bobcaygeon, Ontario described as a "mini-supermarket/convenience store", according to the memorandum from the CIC office in Orillia, Ontario to the High Commission, dated November 28, 1995. Apparently, based on these descriptions, the visa officer inferred that the stores sold food. I do not find this inference to be unreasonable. I note that the applicant has not since adduced any evidence to show that the stores did not in fact sell food. In any event, this assumption was not a principal factor on which the assessment of the applicant was based, rather it was a factor, not here contradicted, in regard to the applicant's perceived lack of awareness of the business he would be expected to assist with under the job offer made to him.

[26]      The applicant argues that the regulations do not permit visa officers to consider "flexibility" or education in determining personal suitability. Flexibility is not specified among the enumerated qualities to be assessed under Schedule I, Factor 9, in determining personal suitability. The job offer did not include "flexibility" as a job requirement, except in relation to hours of work. In addition, by considering the applicant's educational performance in assessing personal suitability, it is urged that the officer double-counted education, considering it under both the factors of personal suitability and of education.

    

[27]      The relevant portions of the Schedule I of the Regulations read as follows:

9. Personal Suitability      Units of assessment shall be awarded on the basis of an interview with the person to reflect the personal suitability of the person and his dependants to become successfully established in Canada based on the person's adaptability, motivation, initiative, resourcefulness and other similar qualities.

[28]      In Umeda v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)¹⁰, the visa officer considered the applicant's "flexibility" as well as motivation, resourcefulness and adaptability, in assessing personal suitability. Rothstein J. held that "There is nothing perverse or capricious about awarding the applicant 5 of a possible 10 units having regard to these considerations." In Ping v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)¹¹, Jerome A.C.J. cited with approval Strayer J.'s judgement in Mangat v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration)¹², that

The criteria listed under that factor [9] are essentially those relevant to "getting on" from an economic standpoint, and I think the reference at the end to "other similar qualities" must be taken to refer to criteria of a similar nature.

[29]      In my opinion, in light of these authorities, considering "flexibility" under the heading of Factor 9, personal suitability, is not a reviewable error. Moreover, here the visa officer did not consider matters of "flexibility" that were not also indicative of "initiative", a specified criterion under Factor 9. In this regard, in her affidavit, the visa officer indicates that the applicant

...failed to show any evidence of initiative or flexibility at the interview. He knew very little about the job he had been offered in Canada and certainly nothing of the nature of the store where he hoped to work and had made no efforts to find out. He had never operated a cash register and the bookkeeping at his present place of employment was done by an accountant. He had also demonstrated his lack of initiative by failing to complete a commerce course he had done for a year or take further studies.

In my view, all these examples of the applicant's behaviour may be considered as examples of a lack of initiative or of a lack of flexibility, as I understand the common meaning of these words and the last sentence quoted of the visa officer's assessment refers to the applicant's educational shortcomings as "also demonstrating a lack of initiative".

[30]      As for considering education as a criterion of personal suitability, Stefan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)¹³ stands for the proposition that "What must be seen in an analysis under personal suitability is an assessment focused on the four Factors and not on the skill level already recorded in other parts of the assessment". Yet, as Madame Justice Simpson ruled in that case education can be relevant under Factor 9 so long as it is looked at from a different perspective than when it is assessed as an independent factor. I agree with this view.

[31]      Here, in rendering her decision, the visa officer focused on the applicant's failure to complete or pursue his studies as an element relating to the applicant's initiative. It is my opinion that she did not thereby commit a reviewable error.

Denial of procedural fairness

[32]      The applicant submits that he should have been appraised of the units of assessment assigned for the SVP of his intended occupation, before being refused. The applicant would then have had an opportunity to change his intended occupation if it appeared that he would not be successful in regard to his original choice. It is also submitted that the officer violated procedural fairness by failing to inform the applicant of her concerns with respect to personal suitability and by failing to allow the applicant to respond to these. Finally, the officer's reliance on CAIPS to determine the SVP points is said to constitute improper delegation of authority. In these respects it is urged that the applicant was denied procedural fairness.

[33]      The submission that failure to disclose to the applicant, in advance of the officer's decision, the criteria employed under the SVP assessment constitutes a reviewable error is essentially the matter dealt with in Yu v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration).¹⁴ In finding that there was no breach of procedural fairness in that case, I held that

...there is no ground for arguing unfairness in the process merely because the visa officer at an interview of the applicant does not stress all of the concerns he may have that arise directly from the Act and Regulations that he is bound to follow in his assessment of an application. The Act and Regulations pertinent to admission are available to applicants whose task is to establish to the satisfaction of the visa officer that they meet the criteria set out and that their admission to Canada would not be contrary to the Act.

[34]      In my view, the same reasoning applies in this case. In his January 25, 1996, and August 9, 1996, letters to the High Commission, the applicant's immigration consultant clearly proposed certain SVP points for "assistant manager, retail," CCDO designation 5130-198. Obviously, he had access to the information the applicant needed for his application. The consultant's estimate of points to be assigned did not match the figure determined by the visa officer, but that is not a basis for arguing a violation of procedural fairness.

[35]      In any event, in this case the applicant was notified by the officer that he had failed to receive an adequate number of points in the overall assessment, before the final decision was rendered. Both the applicant and the officer indicate in their affidavits that the applicant was told at the end of the interview that he had failed to meet the "criteria".

[36]      In my opinion, this notice of a pending unfavourable decision gave the applicant and his immigration consultant an opportunity to change the applicant's intended occupation, even in the absence of the SVP units of assessment. In fact, as noted above, the immigration consultant did write to the High Commission on August 9, 1996, to reiterate his own assessment of the applicant's point total and to present his own arguments concerning the points total that should be awarded to the applicant under the occupation "assistant manager, retail". I cannot agree with the applicant, therefore, that the officer erred in not making explicit the SVP units of assessment prior to her formal decision. There was in my view no procedural unfairness in this respect in the process followed by the officer dealing with the application. Procedural fairness does not oblige a visa officer, in weighing evidence provided by the applicant, "...to accord an applicant a 'running score' or a penultimate comment on his 'score'".¹⁵ I would add to this position the view set out in Yu that there is no requirement for notice of an officer's concerns where these arise directly from the Act and Regulations that the officer is bound to follow in his or her assessment of the applicant.

[37]      I believe this reasoning applies equally to the applicant's submissions regarding failure to pinpoint shortcomings related to personal suitability. In the present case, the visa officer did advise the applicant at the conclusion of the interview that he had failed to meet the criteria for residence but did not inform him then of her specific concerns. In that respect, therefore, this case can be distinguished from Tam v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration,¹⁶ the case cited by the applicant in support of his submission, for in that case there was no forewarning by the visa officer of his negative decision before it was rendered. The visa officer's particular reservations about personal suitability of the applicant do not have to be communicated in advance of the final determination. That is a matter for decision based on the applicant's submissions and interview, subject to being set aside on judicial review only where the officer's discretion is found to have been exercised unreasonably. That is not the case here.

[38]      With regard to the CAIPS, the departmental computer based system, and the alleged, improper delegation, or fettering, of discretion, I note that it has been held that the CCDO is "...a binding system of classification and assessment."¹⁷ As a result, visa officers are bound by the CCDO definitions and may not substitute their own criteria for a given occupation. In the recent case of Lakhani v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),¹⁸ Heald D.J., in refusing to certify a question on whether visa officers can delegate their authority to CAIPS, held that CAIPS "...is simply an administrative procedure whereby the visa officer employs a processing system to assist her in making her assessment of the applicant." In my view, there is no reviewable error where a visa officer uses CAIPS to arrive at an assessment figure for specific vocational preparation (SVP).

Fettering of discretion and the Delhi notes

[39]      The appellant submits that the officer's comment on the applicant's failure to take further studies was drawn from notes of another visa officer located in Delhi, made in regard to an earlier application for a visa by the applicant. The applicant argues that in seeking to render her processing of the applicant's application consistent with that of the earlier assessment in Delhi, the officer fettered her discretion. Because she made this decision before the interview with the applicant, it is said she violated the principle that "she who hears must decide". Finally, the officer's reliance on the New Delhi officer's notes precluded the assessment of personal suitability with reference only to the interview, as required by Schedule I, Factor 9 which provides that "Units of assessment shall be awarded on the basis of an interview with the person...". It is urged that there was an improper delegation of authority.

[40]      In my opinion, the visa officer did not fetter her discretion merely by obtaining the case notes of the Delhi visa officer. Nor was there any fettering of discretion by the Colombo officer simply considering the earlier Delhi assessment, and particularly the applicant's failure to pursue further studies, as a matter relevant in assessing personal suitability. I note the Colombo officer scored the applicant at 4 points, higher than the earlier assessment by the officer in Delhi. I note also that the applicant's lack of educational initiative was only one among several reasons, and the last one listed, that the visa officer in Colombo identified in discussing how she arrived at the personal suitability score was assigned.

[41]      Processing the applicant's application in a manner not inconsistent with that of the earlier Delhi assessment is not evidence that the later assessment in Colombo simply followed the earlier one. The applicant was applying under different occupational classifications in each instance, and a different score was assigned for personal suitability in the later assessment. It cannot be assumed that administrative decision makers act inappropriately where they seek harmony in the exercise of discretion when discharging common administrative responsibilities.

Conclusion

[42]      I conclude that the visa officer did not err in her assessment of the applicant's residency application in any manner that would warrant intervention by this Court. For the reasons set out, this application is dismissed. An order goes to that effect.

[43]      Counsel for the parties agreed at the hearing that this case does not raise a serious question of general importance for certification for consideration by the Court of Appeal, pursuant to section 83 of the Immigration Act, and no question is certified.

    

    

                                 JUDGE

OTTAWA, Ontario

November 12, 1997.

__________________

^1.      (1988), [1989] 2 F.C. 363 at 372, 91 N.R. 121 at 127, 55 D.L.R. (4th) 321 at 329 (F.C.A.).

^2.      (1991), 41 F.T.R. 118 at 125, 49 Admin. L.R. 118 at 130 (F.C.T.D.).

^3.      See Jebnoun v. Minister of Employment and Immigration (1993), 68 F.T.R. 14 (F.C.T.D.) per Noël J. at 16; William v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, (1996), [1997] 1 F.C. 431 (F.C.T.D.) per Reed J. at 444 of F.C., 121 F.T.R. 226, 35 Imm. L.R. (2d) 286, upheld on this issue (1997), [1997] 2 F.C. 646, 147 D.L.R. (4th) 93, 212 N.R. 63 (F.C.A.).

^4.      Supra note 2, at 123 of F.T.R., at 126-27 of Admin. L.R.

^5.      (1990), 31 F.T.R. 290 at 297, 9 Imm. L.R. (2d) 263 at 273 (F.C.T.D.).

^6.      (1988), 23 F.T.R. 241, [1989] 2 F.C. 79, 34 Admin. L.R. 206 (F.C.T.D.).

^7.      (January 17, 1997) Court File No. IMM-883-96 at 3, [1997] F.C.J. No. 55 (F.C.T.D.). See also, Chen v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1995), 96 F.T.R. 254 (F.C.T.D.).

^8.      (August 21, 1997) Court File No. IMM-2114-96 at 3, [1997] F.C.J. No. 1091 (F.C.T.D.).

^9.      (1996), 35 Imm. L.R. (2d) 298 at 301, 302 (F.C.T.D.).

^10.      (December 6, 1996) Court File No. IMM-2905-95 at 3, [1996] F.C.J. No. 1603 (F.C.T.D).

^11.      (1997), 37 Imm. L.R. (2d) 135 (F.C.T.D.).

^12.      (1991), 45 F.T.R. 128 at 133, 13 Imm. L.R. (2d) 184 at 192 (F.C.T.D.).

^13.      (1995), 35 Imm. L.R. (2d) 21 at 24 (F.C.T.D.).

^14.      (1990), 36 F.T.R. 296 at 304, 11 Imm. L.R. (2d) 176 at 188-89 (F.C.T.D.).

^15.      Covrig v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1995), 104 F.T.R. 41 at 48 (F.C.T.D.). See also Asghar v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), supra note 8.

^16.      (1996), 35 Imm. L.R. (2d) 207 (F.C.T.D.).

^17.      Haughton v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1996), 111 F.T.R. 226 at 230, 34 Imm. L.R. (2d) 284 at 288 (F.C.T.D).

^18.      (1996), 119 F.T.R. 234 at 239, 36 Imm. L.R. (2d) 47 at 54 (F.C.T.D.).